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BY THEODORE ROOSEVELT 

THEODORE ROOSEVELT AND HIS TIME. 2 Vols. 

THEODORE ROOSEVELT. An Autobiography 



LETTERS TO HIS CHILDREN 



A book-lover's HOLIDAYS IN THE OPEN 
THROUGH THE BRAZILL-VN WILDERNESS 
AFRICAN GAME TRAILS. 2 vob. 
OUTDOOR PASTIMES OF AN AMERICAN HUNTER 
THE ROUGH RIDERS 

Profusely Illustrated 

THROUGH THE BRAZILIAN WILDERNESS 
AFRICAN GAME TRAILS 

OUTDOOR PASTIMES OP AN AMERICAN HUNTER 
LIFE-HISTORIES OF AFRICAN GAME ANIMALS 

With Edmund Heller 



THE GREAT ADVENTURE 
AMERICA AND THE WORLD WAH 
HISTORY AS LITERATURE 
OLIVER CROMWELL 



THE ROOSEVELT BOOK. Selections from the 
Writiugs of Theodore Roosevelt 



CHARLES SCRIBNER'S SONS 



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3 






THEODORE ROOSEVELT 
AND HIS TIME 




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THEODORE ROOSEVELT 
AND HIS TIME 

SHOWN IN HIS OWN LETTERS 



BY 

JOSEPH BUCKLIN BISHOP 

EDITOR OF "THEODORE ROOSEVELt's LETTERS TO HIS CHILDREN" 
AUTHOR OF "the PANAMA GATEWAY," ETC. 



WITH ILLUSTRATIONS 



VOL. I. 



NEW YORK 
CHARLES SCRIBNER'S SON'S 

1920 



^ 7d 7 



Copyright, 1919, 1920, by 

CHARLES SCRIBNER'S SONS 
Published September 1920 



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THE SCRIBNtR PRESS 

©CI,A576627 
SEP 28 1920 



TO 

HIS FELLOW-COUNTRYMEN 



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INTRODUCTION 

Five years or more before his death Theodore Eoose- 
velt said he wished me to write the history of the period 
which covered his public career. His reason was that I 
had been in his close confidence during the greater part 
of that period and knew the inside of every movement 
nearly as well as he knew it himself. We talked often on 
the subject and in the early spring of 1918 the project 
took definite form. He turned over to me for exclusive 
use all his personal and official correspondence together 
with other material relating to his public career from the 
time he was elected to the New York Legislature in Novem- 
ber, 1881, till his life ended. 

I began w^ork at once, and at the time of his death I had 
completed the first draft of the story of his public life 
down to the year 1905, and had received his approval of it. 
At different stages of the work I went over with him what 
I had written and had the inestimable advantage of his 
suggestions, obtaining from him incidents and anecdotes 
which added immeasurably to the interest and historical 
value of the narrative, making it virtually his own. Be- 
tween us we evolved a general plan for the history, which 
was to let the story of his career be told, as far as possible, 
in his own letters, utterances and acts. 

This was an arduous but not a difficult task to perform. 
It was arduous because the material was virtually inex- 
haustible, but it was not difficult because of the quality 
of Roosevelt's letters. One of his private secretaries has 
estimated that during his public career he wrote 150,000 
letters. Copies of these have been preserved. With them 



viii INTRODUCTION 

are the original letters of the many correspondents that he 
had in all parts of the world — authors, poets, historians, 
artists, explorers, naturalists, statesmen, prime ministers, 
kings, emperors. He not only touched life at all points, 
but on its intellectual side touched the highest points in 
every land. Not only is the correspondence limitless in 
its range, but from beginning to end it is Roosevelt himself 
and hence unlike the correspondence of any other person. 
Emerson, in his observations upon great men, says that 
*'He is great who never reminds us of others." No man 
ever met this test more fully than Theodore Roosevelt. 
Nature has made many millions of men but she has made 
only one Theodore Roosevelt. From the beginning to 
the end of his life he was himself and was unlike any one 
else. It was this clearly defined personality, at once unique 
and commanding, w^hich concentrated upon him the atten- 
tion of the world and made his name familiar in all civilized 
lands. Fame of this phenomenal sort is given only to a 
dominating personality. Its bestowal is to be explained 
only by an examination of the man as revealed in his words 
and acts. Roosevelt's letters not merely reflect his per- 
sonality, they reveal it with all the fulness of a frank 
and truthful man talking to tried and trusted friends. His 
letters are not merely like his talk, they are his talk — frank 
and free, with rays of irrepressible and always joyous 
humor playing about it, and with deft and sure thrusts at 
the foibles, vanities, perv^ersities, and weaknesses of man- 
kind. Few men have had a keener insight into human mo- 
tives or could detect more quickly the real nature of them. 
When he sat down to write or to dictate a letter to a con- 
genial friend, he did not compose, he talked. Whatever 
was uppermost in his mind at the time came out without 
restraint or reservation. As he wrote most freely in mo- 
ments of greatest stress, at the height of crises created by 
himself in his struggle for the triumph of causes dear 
to his heart, his letters give us a veritable ''inside history" 
of his time. They push aside the screen that hides the 



INTRODUCTION 



IX 



wires which control great events and we see them operat- 
ing before our eyes. We see, in very tinith, history in the 
making, shown and explained to us by the man who himself 
is making it. 

We get also a complete self -revelation of the man, of the 
motives, desires, and principles which guided his life. It is 
this quality of self-revelation, more than any other per- 
haps, which makes his letters so admirable a vehicle for 
telling the story of his career. Many writers have sought 
to depict the man Roosevelt, and many others will repeat 
the effort, but none has, and none can, depict him as he 
really was with that vivid clearness in which he stands self- 
revealed in his letters. All sides of this many-sided man 
are disclosed there— the intellectual, which covered all fields 
of human knowledge, ancient and modern; the political, 
which shows him to have been a sagacious statesman of the 
first rank rather than a politician, for as a politician he 
repeatedly broke the fundamental rules of the game ; the 
executive and administrator first of a great State and then 
of a great nation, whose motto was action, action and still 
more action, and who accomplished great and supposedly 
impossible tasks by the driving force of his character ; the 
diplomatist and peacemaker, a role which he played with 
greater success than any other man of his time ; and finally, 
the inspiring and uplifting leader of his countrymen, the 
intense, vigilant, militant, uncompromising patriot, eager 
to serve the nation in peace or in war, who throughout his 
life was first and always an American. 

It is the purpose of the present study of the man and his 
time to let his words and acts tell the story of his career and 
also of the epoch which it constitutes in American history, 
an epoch in which he was the leading and molding fig-ure. 
As the narrative concerns itself chiefly with his public 
career, it passes briefly over his ancestry, childhood and 
youth, a full account of which he has given in his 'Auto- 
biography,' and begins in detail with his entry into politi- 
cal life. 



X INTRODUCTION 

While in a few instances, in order to maintain the con- 
tinuity of the narrative, the present record overlaps the 
'Autobiography,' it really supplements and completes it, 
and the two works together constitute authentically the Life 
and Letters of Theodore Roosevelt as designed by himself. 

J. B. B. 

September, 1920. 



CONTENTS 
VOL. I. 

PAGE 

[ntroduction 

CHAPTER 

I. Ancestry, Childhood and Youth .... 1 

II. Legislature — First Term 6 

III. Legislature — Second Term 17 

IV. Legislature — Third Term 24 

V. First Appearance in National Politics. Mr. 

Blaine's Candidacy 33 

VI. Literary Labors — Tilt with Jefferson Davis 

— Candidate for Mayor 39 

VII. Civil Service Commissioner 43 

VIII. Police Commissioner 58 

IX. Assistant Secretary of the Navy .... 70^ 

X. The War with Spain .92 

XI. Governor of New York — First Year . . . 109 

XII. Governor of New York — Second Year . . 128 

XIII. Nominated and Elected Vice President . . 134 

XIV. President — Early Declarations of Policy . 148 
XV. The Booker Washington Incident . . . 165 

XVI. Controversies with General Miles . . . 171 

XVII. The Northern Securities Suit 182 

XVIII. Incidents of a Busy Year 188 

XIX. Coal Strike Settlement 198 

_^ XX. The Kaiser and Venezuela 221 

XXI. Popular Approval — Views on Various Subjects 230 
XXII. For President in 1904 — Futile Opposition — 

His Own Attitude 243 

XXIII. Notable Sentiments in Speeches and Letters — 

Alaska Boundary — Wide Range of Reading 256 
xi 



CHAPTER 

V XXIV. 

XXV. 

XXVI. 

XXVII. 

XXVIII. 
XXIX. 

XXX. 
^ "^ XXXI. 

1^ v^''4:xxii. 

XXXIII. 



XXXIV. 



XXXV. 

XXXVI. 

XXXVII. 



CONTENTS 

PAr;B 

Securing the Panama Canal 270 

Securing the Panama Canal— Concluded . 291 

National Convention and Campaign of 1904 312 
Attitude toward Campaign Contributions — 

Judge Parker's Charges 328- 

Visit of John Morley at the White House 337' 
Illuminating Letters on Various Subjects, 

Including Questions of Policy .... 343 

Inaugurated President— Death of John Hay 362! 

Russo-Japanese Peace Conference .... 374 

Russo-JapanesePeaceConference— Concluded 401 

Messages to Congress— Paul Morton Case- 
Senate ON Santo Domingo and Arbitration 

Treaties '^^5 

Rebukes to Riotous Strikers and Lynchers— 
Dealings with Senators— Letters on Vari- 
ous Subjects 438 

Builder of the Panama Canal 449 1 

Secret History of the Algeciras Convention 467" 
Secret History of the Algeciras Convention 
— Concluded 488" 



ILLUSTRATIONS 

VOL. I. 

Theodore Roosevelt, 1908 Frontispiece 

FACING 
PAGE 

Theodore Roosevelt, New York Legislature, 1881 ... 10 

Theodore Roosevelt, Police Commissioner, 1895 .... 60 

Theodore Roosevelt, Assistant Secretary of the Navy, 1897 . 72 

Theodore Roosevelt, Governor, 1899 112 

[nauguration Medal, 1905, and Coinage designs, by Augustus 
Saint-Gaudens, 1906 360 

The completed Panama Canal, 1919 450 

t 
I 



THEODORE ROOSEVELT 
AND HIS TIME 



THEODORE ROOSEVELT 
AND HIS TIME 

CHAPTER I 
ANCESTRY, CHILDHOOD AND YOUTH 

Theodoee Roosevelt, the second of that name, was born 
in New York City on October 27, 1858. His ancestors on 
the paternal side were of Holland stock, and on the 
maternal side were Scotch, Irish, Huguenot and English 
descent. The first Roosevelt to come to America was Klaes 
Martensen van Roosevelt, who reached New Amsterdam 
about 1644, and from that time for seven generations, from 
father to son, every one of his descendants was born in 
New York City. They were mainly merchants who held 
prominent positions in the affairs of the city and in its 
commercial and social life, before, during and after the 
Revolutionary War. 

The ancestors of the grandmother of the second Theo- 
dore came to Pennsylvania with William Penn, those of his 
mother came to Georgia from Scotland, her grandfather 
being the first Revolutionary President of Georgia. Some 
of the Roosevelt ancestors on both sides served respect- 
ably, but without distinction, in the army during the Revo- 
lution, and others rendered similar service in the Conti- 
nental Congress and in local legislatures. Those in the 
South were for the most part planters. Two brothers of 
Roosevelt's mother served in the. Confederate navy during 
the Civil War, one as admiral, who was the builder of the 
famous Confederate war sloop Alabama, and the other as 
midshipman on the same vessel. 

These facts about Roosevelt's ancestry are taken from his 
< Autobiography' (Charles Scribner's Sons, 1920) which 

1 



2 THEODORE ROOSEVELT AND HIS TIME 

contains much interesting information about his forbears, 
with affectionate tributes to those immediately preceding 
him, and charming reminiscences of his childhood. His 
letters supply some additional material which is well worth 
quoting. He invariably discouraged efforts to make him 
appear as an ''infant prodigy" who had given early signs 
of future greatness. During his first term as President, 
Mr. Richard Watson Gilder, then editor of the Century 
magazine, expressed a desire to publish a sketch of his 
childhood days with photographs of him at various stages 
of growth. In avowing his objection to the project, Roose- 
velt wrote to Mr. Gilder, on August 20, 1903 : 

*'For reasons which I am wholly unable to explain even 
to myself I somehow rather shrink from having a sketch of 
my younger days prepared. Perhaps my reason for caring 
little for the sketch of my younger days is that as far as I 
can remember they were absolutely commonplace. I was a 
rather sickly, rather timid little boy, very fond of desultory 
reading and of natural history, and not excelling in any 
form of sport. Owing to my asthma I was not able to go 
to school, and I was nervous and self-conscious, so that as 
far as I can remember my belief is that I was rather below 
than above my average playmate in point of leadership; 
though as I had an imaginative temperament this some- 
times made up for my other short-comings. Altogether, 
while, thanks to my father and mother, I had a very happy 
childhood I am inclined to look back at it with some wonder 
that I should have come out of it as well as I have ! It was 
not until after I was sixteen that I began to show any 
prowess, or even ordinary capacity; up to that time, except 
making collections of natural history, reading a good deal 
in certain narrowly Umited fields and indulging in the usual 
scribbling of the small boy who does not excel in sport, 
I cannot remember that I did anything that even lifted me 
up to the average." 

His love for his father, whom he spoke of always as the 
best man he had ever known, amounted to adoration. Writ- 



ANCESTRY, CHILDHOOD AND YOUTH 3 

ing to Edward S. Martin, on November 26, 1900, he said: 
* ' I was fortunate enough in having a father whom I have 
always been able to regard as an ideal man. It sounds^ 
little like cant to say what I am going to say, but he really ' 
did combine the strength and courage and will and energy i 
of the strongest man with the tenderness, cleanness and^ 
purity of a woman. I was a sickly and timid boy. He not 
only took great and untiring care of me — some of my 
earliest remembrances are of nights when he would walk 
up and down mth me for an hour at a time in his arms 
when I was a wretched mite suffering acutely with asthma — 
but he also most wisely refused to coddle me, and made me 
feel that I must force myself to hold my own with other 
boys and prepare to do the rough work of the world. I can- 
not say that he ever put it into words, but he certainly gave 
me the feeling that I was always to Jie^both^ decent and 
..maiily, and that if I were manly nobodjLwpuld laugh at my^ 
beiijg_decfint. In all my childhood he never laid hand on 
me but once, but I always knew perfectly well that in case 
it became necessary he would not have the slightest hesi- 
tancy in doing so again, and alike from my love and respect, 
and in a certain sense, my fear of him, I would have hated 
and dreaded beyond measure to have him know that I had 
been guilty of a lie, or of cruelty, or of bullying, or of 
uncleanness or of cowardice. Gradually I grew to have 
the feeling on my own account, and not merely on his. 

''There were many things I tried to do because he did 
them, which I found afterwards were not in my line. For 
instance, I taught Sunday school all through college, but 
afterwards gave it up, just as on experiment I could not 
do the charitable work which he had done. In doing my 
Sunday school work I was very much struck by the fact 
that the other men who did it only possessed one side of 
his character. My ordinary companions in college would, 
I think, have had a tendency to look down upon me for 
doing Sunday school work if I had not also been a corking 
boxer, a good runner, and a genial member of the Porcel- 
lian Club. I went in for boxing and wrestling a good deal, 



4 THEODORE ROOSEVELT AND HIS TIME 

and I really think that while this was partly because I liked 
them as sports, it was even more because I intended to be 
a middling decent fellow, and I did not intend that any one 
should laugh at me with impunity because I was decent. 
It is exactly the same thing with history. In most coun- 
tries the Bourgeoisie — the moral, respectable, commercial, 
middle class — are looked upon with a certain contempt 
which is justified by their timidity and; unwarlikeness. 
But the minute a middle class produces men like Hawkins 
and Frobisher on the seas, or men such as the average 
Union soldier in the Civil War, it acquires the hearty 
respect of others which it merits." 

It is easy to trace in this tribute of supreme filial devo- 
tion the influences which molded the son's character and 
laid firm and sure the strong foundations upon which he 
built his subsequent career, winning world-wide fame and 
honor and the enduring faith and aifectiou of his country- 
men. 

He was, as he said in his letter, a sickly and timid boy. 
Cordially supported and encouraged by his father, he began 
quite early to improve his physical condition through regu- 
lar gymnastic exercises, including boxing lessons. When 
he was ten years old he was taken on a trip to Europe which 
he ''thoroughly hated" and from which he gained nothing, 
and a second one four years later which he "enjoyed thor- 
oughly" and profited by. On his return from this second 
trip he began serious study under a private tutor (Arthur 
Cutler, later founder of the Cutler School in Xew York) in 
preparation for college, and in the fall of 1876, having by 
his systematic exercise brought himself into excellent physi- 
cal condition, he entered Harvard University. 

"I thoroughly enjoyed Harvard," he says in his 'Auto- 
biography, ' ' ' and I am sure it did me good, but only in the 
general effect, for there was very little in my actual studies 
which helped me in after life." Before he left Harvard in 
1880 he had begun the writing of his "History of the Naval 
War of 1812," which he completed in the follomng year and 
published in 1882. Although he said later of the opening 



ANCESTRY, CHILDHOOD AND YOUTH 5 

chapters that they ''were so dry that they would have made 
a dictionary seem light reading by comparison," the book 
had such genuine historical merit that it has remained till 
this day as the standard work on the subject. 

On October 27, 1880, he married Alice Hathaway Lee, 
daughter of George Cabot Lee. She died on February 14, 
1884, leaving one child, Alice, who became the wife of 
Nicholas Longworth on Februar^^ 17, 1906. On December 
2, 1886, he married in London Edith Kermit Carow, 
daughter of Charles Carow of New York. By this mar- 
riage there were five children, Theodore, Kermit, Archi- 
bald, Quentin and Ethel. 



CHAPTER II 

LEGISLATURE— FIRST TERM 

Theodore Roosevelt's public career began in January, 
1882, when at the age of 23 he entered the New York Legis- 
lature as a member of its lower house. He had been grad- 
uated from Harvard in 1880 and had spent the following 
year in the study of law. His inclination toward the legal 
profession was not strengthened by his studies for it seemed 
to him that some of the teachings of the law books and of 
the class-room were against rather than in favor of the 
attainment of justice. Then, too, the standards set by many 
successful lawyers who were in the service of great cor- 
porations, were incompatible with the idealism which he, 
in common with other high-minded men, entertained. It 
was a period, not yet closed, in which many of the ablest 
and most eminent members of the bar devoted their talents, 
not so much to the strict observance of the law, as to find- 
ing ways by which their clients could \'iolate the spirit if 
not the letter of the law and escape its penalties. The 
effect of studies under these conditions made an impres- 
sion upon young Roosevelt's mind which was never wholly 
effaced, but which deepened and strengthened as time went 
on and found expression later in his action as President in 
the direction of regulating and controlling the conduct of 
great corporations. 

While studying law he began to take an active interest 
in politics and his comfortable financial condition enabled 
him to give time and attention to political matters which 
he would otherwise have been obliged to concentrate upon 
earning a livelihood. He had been left by his father suf- 
ficient means to permit him to make the earning of addi- 
tional money a secondary matter. He said in after life that 

6 



LEGISLATURE— FIRST TERM 7 

it was the possession of this inheritance which enabled him 
to accept offices at a salary inadequate for the support of 
himself and his family and through which he secured 
advancement in public life. Instead of making his inheri- 
tance the excuse for an idle and purposeless life, as many 
another man in like situation has done, he used it as an aid 
to a life of action and public usefulness. 

In 1880, the machinery of party organization in New 
York City was entirely in the hands of men who made 
politics a profession by means of which they earned a live- 
lihood. As the Republican party was in a hopeless minor- 
ity in the city, the men in control of its organization used 
it mainly as a basis for combinations or ''deals" with 
Tammany Hall, receiving in return minor offices from the 
Tammany authorities and various other favors. The 
Republican district organizations formed social and politi- 
cal clubs and these selected all the candidates for office, who 
were usually men who could be depended upon to ''obey 
orders," that is, to act as the party bosses commanded. It 
was somewhat difficult for a man of young Roosevelt's type 
to become a member of a district club, as candidates had to 
be regularly proposed and elected, as in any other club. 

When Roosevelt declared his intention of becoming a 
member of the club in his district, which was known as the 
"silk-stocking" district of the city because of the wealth 
and social eminence of a large proportion of its voting 
population, his friends ridiculed him, saying that the men 
in control of city politics were not gentlemen, but saloon- 
keepers, street-car conductors and the like, and that he 
would not only be unable to exert any influence but would 
be subjected to unpleasantness and even brutality. His 
reply was characteristic of the man. ' ' I answered, ' ' he says 
in his 'Autobiography,' "that if. this were so it merely 
meant that the people I knew did not belong to the govern- 
ing class, and that the other people did — and that I 
intended to be one of the governing class; that if they 
proved too hard-bit for me I supposed I would have to 
quit, but I certainly would not quit until I had made the 



8 THEODORE ROOSEVELT AND HIS TIME 

effort and found out whether I really was too weak to hold 

my own in the rough and tumble." 

He was admitted to membership and after a year's 
association had so held his own as to become on good terms 
with enough of his fellow members to win their nomination 
for member of the Assembly, or lower branch of the Legis- 
lature, in spite of the fact that he had been an open oppo- 
nent of their machine methods and had fought a losing 
fight with them on more than one occasion. There was no 
doubt in their minds about his anti-machine sentiments or 
about his inflexible determination to uphold them at any 
and all times. In fact, they obtained fresh light on the 
subject as soon as he was nominated. The Assembly dis- 
trict included sections of Fifth and Sixth Avenues, and the 
party leaders thought at first they would take him on a 
personal canvass through the liquor saloons along Sixth 
Avenue. The canvass ended with the first saloon. The 
candidate was introduced with proper solemnity to the 
proprietor, who was an important political personage, and 
who began to catechize him as a suppliant for favor. When 
he said that he expected Roosevelt as member to treat the 
liquor interests fairly, he got a rather sharp reply that all 
interests would be treated fairly, and when he added that 
he regarded existing licenses as too high he got in response 
an assurance that the candidate did not consider them high 
enough and would endeavor to have them made higher. 
The interview at this point assumed so stormy an aspect 
that the candidate was withdrawn by his backers on a plea 
of pressing engagements elsewhere, and no other saloons 
were visited, it being explained to him that he would better 
confine his energies to his friends in Fifth Avenue and 
leave to others the burdens of the canvass in Sixth Avenue. 

These details of the first steps of Roosevelt in political 
life are given as throwing important light upon his subse- 
quent career, for they disclose the same characteristics that 
he displayed in all its later stages. 

He was successful in the election, and in January, 1882, 
took his seat in the Legislature a new man in politics, 



LEGISLATURE— FIRST TERM 9 

totally unknown outside the limits of the district that he 
represented. He had at the time no intention or expecta- 
tion of abandoning the profession of law for a political 
career. He wrote immediately after his election, to a class- 
mate, Charles Gr. Washburn of Worcester, Mass., that find- 
ing it would not interfere with his law studies he had 
accepted the nomination, ''but don't," he added, "think 
I am going to go into politics after this year, for I am not. ' ' 
Almost from the moment of his entrance he took a com- 
manding position among his associates. The Assembly 
was nearly evenly divided between Republicans and Demo- 
crats, the latter having a bare majority of one vote. The 
Democrats themselves were divided between Tammany and 
anti-Tammany members. The half dozen Tammany mem- 
bers sought to dictate the nomination for Speaker by putting 
up a candidate of their own, thus depriving the regularly 
nominated Democratic candidate of a majority. There was 
thus provided an ideal situation for a "deal" between the 
machine Republican members and the handful of Tammany 
members in favor of the nomination of a Speaker who 
would divide the patronage of the Assembly between his 
supporters. "Deals" of this character had been a well- 
' established custom for many years, whenever the oppor- 
tunity arose, and one was confidently anticipated at this 
time. In fact, the first steps of it had been taken, when the 
new and unknown member from New York arose to explain 
his vote while the deadlock was in progress. He said that 
the Democrats were in the majority and should be per- 
mitted to organize the Assembly. No harm was being done 
by the delay, and he was convinced after talking with gentle- 
men among his constituents who had large commercial in- 
terests that they would be relieved rather than annoyed by 
the absence of legislation. The Democrats were responsible 
for the delay and they would receive whatever blame the 
people might administer for it. As for the Republicans, 
they were opposed to any combination with the Democrats. 
The effect of this unexpected speech was instantaneous 
and, so far as the proposed "deal" was concerned, deadly. 



10 THEODORE ROOSEVELT AND HIS TIME 

As it was the first utterance of Roosevelt as a holder of 
public office it is interesting to record the comments that 
were made on it by the newspapers at the time. One said : 
'* Assemblyman Roosevelt made a very favorable impres- 
*sion by his first speech." Another: "His sensible and 
well-delivered remarks brought him many hearty congratu- 
lations from the older members. ' ' An Albany correspond- 
ent of another: *'The next orator was Mr. Theodore 
Roosevelt of the twenty-first, a Republican. This young 
gentleman has been dubbed 'Oscar Wilde' by his admiring 
colleagues, who were much amused by his elastic move- 
ments, voluminous laughter and wealth of mouth. But his 
speech to-day was well-considered and put." Another 
correspondent, like the one just quoted, writing for a 
Democratic journal, felt moved to ridicule while bestowing 
praise: ''Young Mr. Roosevelt of New York, a blond 
young man with eyeglasses, English side whiskers, and 
Dundreaiy drawl in his speech, made his maiden effort as 
an orator. He objected to talk of Republican aid to the 
Democrats. . . . The older Republican members who 
have been trying to make party capital by representing the 
State as going to ruin because the Democrats did not or- 
ganize the Legislature, wriggled uneasily in their seats 
when young Mr. Roosevelt pictured the complacency of the 
people over the deadlock. There was no way to stop him, 
however, and he got through without interruption. An 
effort to undo what he said to-day will probably be made 
to-morrow. ' ' 

It was impossible to undo it for the simple reason that 
daylight had been let into the scheme by ''Young Mr. 
Roosevelt" — he was to be accused of the "atrocious crime 
of being a young man" for many years afterwards — and 
the "deal" was abandoned, for political trickery of that 
sort must be carried on in secret or it cannot succeed. The 
anti-Tammany candidate for Speaker was elected by aid 
of the Tammany votes and Roosevelt had scored his first 
victory over the united powers of evil in politics. 

The second victory followed quickly on the steps of the 




THEODORE ROOSEVELT, NEW YORK LEGISLATURE, 1881 



, LEGISLATURE— FIRST TERM 11 

' first. An effort was made to regain what had been lost in 
the Speakership contest by a scheme to deprive the Speaker 
of the power to appoint subordinate oflScers in the Assem- 

< bly, lodging it in the hands of the clerk, who was a Repub- 

^ lican. The defeated Tammany members had united with 
the Republican "dealers" in this project. A Republican 
caucus was held and a resolution was introduced by an 

, expert Republican ''dealer" to approve the plan. Mr. 
Roosevelt, who had been joined by a half-dozen other young 
members who shared his independent views, denounced the 
plan so vigorously that it was defeated by a nearly unani- 
mous vote. The press of the State had been fully aroused 
by the action which Roosevelt had taken in the Speakership 
contest and its hearty approval of his course had made 
Republican members very timid about opposing him. 

He had been made a member of the Committee on Cities, 
and as soon as the Speakership controversy was settled he 
turned his attention to needed legislation for the city oi. 
New York, bringing in a bill which pro^dded for the elec- 
tion of Aldermen by Assembly Districts and the election of 
the President of the Board by the city at large. This abol- 
ished the existing method which included a system of minor- 
ity representation that had worked chiefly in the interest 
of ' ' deals ' ' and the consequent success of the most undesir- 
able candidates, and assured the choice of a President of 
the Board who, because of the method of his election, would 
be a less objectionable person than was possible under the 
old system. The measure was fought viciously by the poli- 
ticians of both parties but was supported warmly by the 
reputable press of the city and was enacted. It was the 
first step toward an improvement in the quality of the mem- 
bership of the Board of Aldermen, and was the basis of 
further steps in the same direction in subsequent years. 

The action of his first legislative session which attracted 
most widespread attention and subjected Roosevelt to 
abuse and ridicule was his effort to secure the impeach- 
ment of a Justice of the Supreme Court of the State. The 
Justice had been charged in the press with allowing him- 



12 THEODORE ROOSEVELT AND HIS TIME 

self to be used as an instrument in their business by men 
connected with railway interests in New York City. Roose- 
velt introduced a resolution calling for an investigation by 
the Judiciary Committee of the Assembly. In support of 
it he made a carefully prepared speech, setting forth in 
detail the charges in the case. Strong opposition was at 
once made to the resolution, led by one of the oldest Eepub- 
lican leaders in the Assembly and warmly espoused by the 
leader or boss of Tammany Hall. It was the old combina- 
tion that Roosevelt had fought and overcome in the Speak- 
ership contest. 

The press of the city and State was divided on the ques- 
tion, the more reputable portion favoring investigation and 
the Tammany Democratic portion bitterly opposing it and 
assailing Roosevelt personally. As, on the occasion of his 
first speech in the Assembly, these press comments are of 
illuminating value, especially in view of other comments 
which were made at various stages of his career. 

In reference to his speech in presenting the resolution 
the New York Times said it was ' ' A very concise and vigor- 
ous presentation of the essential facts in the case," and 
added : 

''Mr. Roosevelt has a most refreshing habit of calling 
men and things by their right names, and in these days of 
judicial, ecclesiastical, and journalistic subserviency to the 
robber-barons of the Street, it needs some little courage 
in any public man to characterize them and their acts in 
fitting terais. There is a splendid career open for a young 
man of position, character, and independence like Mr. 
Roosevelt who can denounce the legalized robbery of Gould 
and his allies without descending to the turgid abuse of the 
demagogue, and without being restrained by the cowardly 
caution of the politician." 

The New York World represented the opposite view and 
taking the side of Tammany and its Republican allies, said 
on various occasions: 

''The son of Mr. Theodore Roosevelt ought to have 
learned, even at this early period of his life, the difference 



LEGISLATURE— FIRST TERM 13 

between a call for a legislative committee of inquiry and a 
stump speech. 

"Why not allow Mr. Roosevelt to impeach the Judge at 
once, try him and convict him? Why irritate an estimable 
youth into making a spectacle of himself to no purpose?" 

Concerning the quality of Mr. Roosevelt's speech, the 
Albany correspondent of the New York Sun said : * ' It was 
delivered with deliberation and measured emphasis, and 
his charges were made with a boldness that was almost 
scathing." Another correspondent wrote: ''The bold 
language used by Mr. Roosevelt to-day has been the prin- 
cipal topic of conversation among the members to-night." 

Every parliamentary trick and device was used to defeat 
the resolution. An ex-Governor of the State, who was the 
oldest Republican member and an expert "dealer" of many 
years' practice, talked against time when the resolution 
was introduced and prevented a vote being reached. He 
alluded to Roosevelt repeatedly as the "young man from 
New York," and in this and subsequent sessions led the 
opposition on the floor, upheld invariably by the Republi- 
can Speaker in the chair, who represented the district in 
which the accused Judge lived. Among other efforts to 
secure defeat it was asserted on the floor that a member 
of the Roosevelt family had been "squeezed" in some 
operation by the elevated railway authorities and he was 
trying to "get even" with them by assailing the Judge. 
This was promptly refuted. Roosevelt, undaunted and' 
undismayed, overcame all obstacles, steadily pressing for 
a vote, and when the time for it arrived the resolution was 
adopted by a vote of 104 in favor to only 6 against. So 
strong was popular sentiment throughout the State in 
favor of Roosevelt's course that few of the members who 
had been opposing it in private ventured to do so openly 
when they were forced to go on the record. 

Commenting on this result. Harper's Weekly, then edited 
by George William Curtis, said : 

"It is with the greatest satisfaction that those who are 
interested in good government see a young man in the 



14 THEODORE ROOSEVELT AND HIS TIME 

Legislature who, like Mr. Roosevelt, does not know the* 
meaning of fear, and to whom the bluster and bravado of! 
party and political bullies are as absolutely indifferent ass 
the blowing of the wind." 

The investigation resulted in two reports from the Judi- 
ciary Committee, one by the majority against impeachment! 
of the Judge and one by a minority in favor of impeach- 
ment. The ''Black Horse Cavalry," as the forces of evil iui 
politics were called, had triumphed. The Committee mem- 
bers whom they controlled had voted, without the slightest! 
regard to the evidence, against impeachment. Their action i 
was fore-ordained from the beginning. Roosevelt made am 
earnest effort to have the Assembly adopt the minority 
report, but without success, for the same forces were in 
control there. The majority report was adopted by a vote • 
of 77 to 35. This action was denounced by the reputable 
press of the city and State as a disgrace to the Assembly 
and a shameless act of "whitewashing." Unbiased public! 
opinion throughout the State was virtually unanimous ini 
the belief that the evidence presented had established! 
beyond question the guilt of the Judge. The Assembly 
won a temporary triumph, but a great moral victory was< 
accredited to Roosevelt, who stood higher than ever im 
public estimation. 

Roosevelt further incurred the bitter enmity of the 
Elevated Railway Company by opposing and securing the ; 
'failure of a measure designed to relieve it of the burdeni 
of about one-half of its just taxes. A bill which had I 
passed the Assembly relating to the taxation of corpora- 
tions was surreptitiously amended in the Senate and passed 
by that body in such form as to fix the rate of taxation i 
to be levied upon the elevated railway corporation at 4 per 
cent of gross receipts, instead of 8 per cent as levied by the ■ 
city authorities on that and other corporations. An effort 
was made by the ' ' Black Horse Cavalry, ' ' assisted by one 
of their number in the chair, to force the bill through the 
Assembly under ''gag law." Roosevelt objected, insisted i 
upon reading official protests from the New York city 



LEGISLATURE— FIRST TERM 15 

authorities, showing that the bill would deprive the city of 
at least a quarter of a million dollars, and in explaining his 
vote declared: "It is a steal pure and simple, the most 
monstrous that has been perpetrated here this year. The 
way it is being pushed through under the gag law shows 
the motives of those who are thus acting." He was unable 
to defeat the bill in the Assembly, but his denunciation led 
to full publicity in the press regarding its nature and the 
method of its passage, raising a storm of protest through- 
out the State, and leading to a veto by the Governor. 
Eoosevelt's opposition was justified three years later when, 
after much litigation, the courts decreed that the Elevated 
companies owed taxes in excess of $1,500,000, as levied by 
the city authorities. 

Roosevelt's experience made upon him what was shown in 
later years to be a lasting impression. "Various men," 
he says in his 'Autobiography,' "whom I had known so- 
cially and had been taught to look up to, prominent business 
men and lawyers, acted in a way which not only astounded 
me, but which I was quite unable to reconcile with the 
theories I had formed as to their high standing." He 
relates a conversation with a member of a prominent law 
firm,, an old family friend, which should be reproduced here, 
not only because of its bearing upon Roosevelt's subsequent 
career, but for another reason which will be mentioned 
presently. He records that this family friend took him to 
lunch one day with this outcome: » 

"He explained that I had done well in the Legislature, 
that it was a good thing to have made the 'reform play,' 
that I had shown that I possessed ability such as would 
make me useful in the right kind of law office or business 
concern ; but that I must not overplay my hand ; that I had 
gone far enough, and that now was the time to leave poli- 
tics and identify myself with the right kind of people, the 
people who would always in the long run control others and 
obtain the real rewards which were worth having. I asked 
him if that meant that I was to yield to the ring in politics. 
He answered somewhat impatiently that I was entirely 



16 THEODORE ROOSEVELT AND HIS TIME 

mistaken (as in fact I was) about there being merely a 
political ring, of the kind of which the papers were fond 
of talking; that the 'ring,' if it could be called such — that 
is, the inner circle — included certain big business men, and 
the politicians, la^\yers and judges who were in alliance 
with and to a certain extent dependent upon them, and that 
the successful man had to win his success by the backing of 
the same forces, whether in law, business, or politics. 

''This conversation not only interested me, but made such 
an impression that I always remembered it, for it was the 
first glimpse I had of that combination between business 
and politics which I was in after years so often to oppose." 

The gist of this friend's advice was that Theodore Roose- 
velt should cease to be himself, change the personality to 
which his first success as a public man was due, and become 
somebody else. Time was to show that this disinterested 
friend was the forerunner of a vast host of the same type. 
Throughout his career, at every stage of its progress, 
politicians, statesmen, editors, clergyonen, educators and 
others bestowed upon him like advice, begged him to go 
their way instead of his own, cease to be himself, and 
become the sort of man they thought he should be. Abun- 
dant evidence on this point will be forthcoming as this 
narrative proceeds. 



CHAPTER III 

LEGISLATURE— SECOND TERM 

The prestige that he had won during his first term in the 
Legislature secured Roosevelt a renomination without 
opposition by the Republican organization of his district, 
and with the warm support of the press he was reelected 
by an increased majority. His conduct during this session 
showed the same characteristics that had marked the pre- 
ceding one. In spite of the advice of well-meaning friends, 
he persisted in being himself. He received his party's 
nomination for Speaker, which was merely honorary, as 
the Democrats had a majority in the body. At the preced- 
ing session a bill had been introduced reducing the fare on 
the elevated railways in New York City from 10 cents to 5. 
It was introduced as a ''strike" upon the railway company, 
that is, with the intention of making the company use money 
to secure its defeat. When they were convinced that money 
was being so used, Roosevelt and his reform associates 
supported it, and were confirmed in their conviction when 
on final passage the very members who had introduced it 
voted against it. It was reintroduced at the succeeding 
session, when the company decided not to use money for its 
defeat but to fight it on its merits. The entire "Black 
Horse Cavalry," including its original supporters, voted 
against it, but the honest members, including Roosevelt and 
his associates, voted for it, though doubtful about its prin- 
ciple, being influenced largely in their action by the charac- 
ter of the opposition. It was passed, and when it reached 
the Governor, Grover Cleveland, he vetoed it on the ground 
of unconstitutionality. When an attempt was made to pass 
it over the veto, Roosevelt supported the veto in a speech 

17 



18 THEODORE ROOSEVELT AND HIS TIME 

which will always stand among the most thoroughly charac- 
teristic utterances of his career. Never was he more 
entirely himself than he was in this confession of error in 
judgment and act. In the course of it he said: 

'*I have to say with shame that when I voted for this 
bill I did not act as I think I ought to have acted and as I 
generally have acted on the floor of this House. I have to 
confess that I weakly yielded, partly in a vindictive spirit, 
toward the infernal thieves and conscienceless swindlers 
who have had the elevated railroad in charge, and partly 
to the popular voice of New York. 

'*I realize that they (managers of the railway) have done 
the most incalculable wrong to this community with their 
hired newspapers, with their corruption of the judiciary, 
with their corruption of past legislatures. It is not a ques- 
tion of doing right to them. They are merely common 
thieves. It is not a question of doing justice to them. It is 
a question of doing justice to ourselves. It is a question of 
standing by what we honestly believe to be right, even if in 
so doing we antagonize the feelings of our constituents. 

''We have heard a great deal about the people demand- 
ing the passage of this bill. Now, anything that the people 
demand that is right, it is most clearly and most emphat- 
ically the duty of this Legislature to do; but we should 
never yield to what they demand if it is wrong. 

"I would rather go out of politics feeling that I had done 
what was right than stay in with the approval of all men 
knowing in my heart that I had acted as I ought not to." 

This remarkable declaration, the like of which was rarely 
ever heard in a legislative body, w^as received with jeers 
and veritable howls of delight by the newspapers that had 
abused Eoosevelt in the impeachment controversy and in 
his other assault upon the elevated railway tax relief bill. 
They were quite sure that he had wrecked his political 
career and that little more would be heard of him. One of 
them spoke of him as a young man of whom it could be 
truly said 



LEGISLATURE— SECOND TERM 19 

"His strong point is his bank account, 
His weak point is his head." 

Another one said : ''The popular voice of New York will 
probably leave this weakling at home hereafter," Another 
spoke of the deliverance as the "last dying speech and con- 
fession" and declared that to say it showed "characteristic 
manliness," as a contemporary had done, was, "if not 
trampling on a grave, certainly amounts to dancing on the 
side of it." Still another regretted that "a son of Theo- 
dore Roosevelt should have brought this discredit upon a 
name made honorable by the private virtues and public 
services of his father." 

These prophets undoubtedly had faith in their predic- 
tions. Roosevelt had opposed what seemed to be an over- 
whelming popular sentiment and his critics could not be- 
lieve that a public man could do that and not invite political 
ruin. Roosevelt himself had grave doubts on the subject 
but they had not influenced his action. When, in 1918, I 
was going over with him the account here given of this 
portion of his career, we read together the passages I have 
cited from this memorable speech. After a moment's 
thought he said: "Let it stand. I expressed myself more 
strongly at the time than I would have done had the inci- 
dent occurred later in my life, but I am willing to have 
what I said go into the record unchanged for the position 
I took then I have always held and hold to-day." 

Among his letters I find one to his son Theodore at Har- 
vard, written on October 20, 1903, which contains an inter- 
esting allusion to this episode in his legislative career: 

"Immediately after leaving college I went to the Legis- 
lature. I was the youngest man there, and I rose like a 
rocket. I was reelected next year by an enormous majority 
in a time when the Republican party as a whole met with 
great disaster; and the Republican minority in the Assem- 
bly, although I was the youngest member, nominated me for 
Speaker, that is, made me the leader of the minority. I 
immediately proceeded to lose my perspective, and the 



20 THEODORE ROOSEVELT AND HIS TIME 

result was that I came an awful cropper and had to pick 
myself up after learning by bitter experience the lesson 
that I was not all-important and that I had to take account 
of many different elements in life. It took me fully a year 
before I got back the position I had lost, but I hung steadily 
at it and achieved my purpose." 

Another man who took a leading part in the incident and 
who, like Roosevelt, was destined to attain the highest office 
in the gift of the people of the nation, was Grover Cleve- 
land. Many years later, in the fall of 1891, in the course 
of an intimate conversation with him at his residence in 
New York City, I spoke of his veto of the five cent fare bill. 
With that unrestrained frankness which was characteristic 
of him, he said : 

"I was convinced that the bill was wrong, that it was 
unjust and might lead to practical confiscation. I had no 
choice but to veto it, but I had not a doubt in the world that 
by so doing I was ruining my political career. As I got into 
bed that night after writing and signing my veto message 
I said to myself, 'Grover Cleveland, you've done the busi- 
ness for yourself to-night. ' The next morning I went down 
to the Executive Office feeling pretty blue but putting a 
smiling face on it. I didn't look at the morning papers, 
didn't think they had anything to say that I cared to see. 
I went through my morning mail with my secretary, Dan 
Lamont, pretending all the time I didn't care about the 
papers but thinking of them all the time just the same. 
When we had finished I said, as indifferently as I could, 
'Seen the morning papers, Dan?' He said 'yes.' 'What 
have they got to say about me, anything?' 'Why, yes, they 
are all praising you.' 'They are! Well, here, let me see 
them!' I tell you I grabbed them pretty quickly and felt 
a good deal better." 

Roosevelt soon made it apparent that whatever might 
be the effect upon his political fortunes, the affair had not 
in the slightest degree lessened his courage or modified his 



LEGISLATURE— SECOND TEEM 21 

determination to follow his own convictions in spite of all 
obstacles. He continued to be himself, and in doing so 
demonstrated very quickly that he had not lost his popu- 
larity, neither had his fighting vigor abated. Several acts 
and utterances during the remainder of the session are 
worthy of record for they were the keynotes of his subse- 
quent career. 

One that all the veteran politicians regarded as 
''suicidal" had occurred during his first term in the Legis- 
lature and was repeated in the second. An item was 
included in the regular Supply Bill appropriating a sum 
of money for a private institution called the Catholic Pro- 
tectory. Roosevelt objected to it on the ground that it was 
unconstitutional because it violated the stipulation of the 
State constitution which forbade the use of public money 
for a private institution. Furthermore, such proposals 
brought into the Legislature the question of politics and 
religion. He had opposed a similar grant to a Protestant 
institution on precisely the same grounds and he should 
continue to fight all such tooth and nail. He had many 
warm personal friends in the Catholic faith and the man 
who had done more for him politically than any one else 
was a Catholic. He believed that he was acting in unison 
with the sentiment of those intelligent members of the 
Catholic Church Avho indorsed the utterances of one of the 
greatest of Catholics, Daniel 'Council, that religion ought 
to be kept from politics. 

Roosevelt's opposition did not avail to defeat either the 
Catholic or Protestant appropriation, both being voted by 
a large majority. This early stand is noteworthy as being 
the first assertion of a rule of conduct which he maintained 
inflexibly throughout his career, and which, be it said to the 
honor of the great body of both Catholics and Protestants, 
won for him their confidence and esteem. 

On several other occasions he gave utterance to convic- 
tions and principles of conduct which he ever afterwards 
upheld, showing that at this early stage of his career his 
character was already established on immutable lines. A 



22 THEODORE ROOSEVELT AND HIS TIME 

bill was introduced to amend the Penal Code so as to permit 
publishers and editors of newspapers to be sued for libel 
in any place in the state in which their newspapers circu- 
lated. This was declared to be an effort to gag the press, 
and a motion was made to kill the bill by striking out its 
enacting clause. In supporting this motion, Roosevelt said : 
* ' Taking it for granted that this is a bill for gagging the 
newspapers, I trust that the motion will prevail. I think 
that if there is one thing we ought to be careful about it is 
in regard to interfering with the liberty of the press. We 
have all of us at times suffered from the liberty of the press, 
but we have to take the good and the bad. I think we 
certainly ought to hesitate very seriously before passing 
any law that will interfere with the broadest public utter- 
ance. I think it is a great deal better to err a little bit on 
the side of having too much discussion and having too viru- 
lent language used by the press, rather than to err on the 
side of having them not say what they ought to say, 
especially with reference to public men and measures. I 
heartily agree with the propositon to have the enacting 
clause of the bill stricken out." 

The motion was carried without a division. Thirty-four 
years later, during the European War, Roosevelt upheld 
the same position in regard to criticism of the Wilson 
Administration's conduct of the war, having never varied 
from his first adherence to it. 

Roosevelt succeeded in getting before the Assembly at 
this session a bill reforming the Civil Service of New York 
City by applying to it the provisions of the national Civil 
Service law. He could not get it passed by the Democratic 
body, but he was able, at a committee hearing on its provi- 
sions, to get his views on the subject placed upon record. 
''My object," he said, "in pushing this measure is less to 
raise the standard of the civil service than it is to take the 
office-holders out of politics. It is a good thing to raise 
the character of our public employees but it is better still 
to take out of politics the vast band of hired mercenaries 



LEGISLATURE— SECOND TERM 23 

whose very existence depends on their success, and who can 
ahnost always in the end overcome the efforts of men whose 
only care is to secure a pure and honest government, for 
in such a contest the discipline of regulars, fighting literally 
for their means of livelihood, is sure in the end to over- 
come the spasmodic ardor of volunteers." 

This was a thoroughly bad session of the Legislature and 
the most that Roosevelt and the little band of men whom 
he led could accomplish was to defeat some of the worst 
jobs. Roosevelt, instead of being a ruined man, came out 
of the session standing higher in public esteem than ever 
before. One of the press commentators said : '*Mr. Roose- 
velt lasted to the end, when he was stronger than at the 
beginning." Another: "Mr. Roosevelt enjoys the dis- 
tinction of having convictions and living up to them." 
Another: ''Mr. Roosevelt's voice and vote are sure for 
what is honest, wise and progressive." 



CHAPTER IV 
LEGISLATURE— THIRD TERM 

In the State election of 1883 the Republicans secured a 
majority in both houses of the Legislature. Roosevelt was 
reelected, in spite of the opposition of some of the party 
machine leaders of his district whose interests and schemes 
he had antagonized. It was quite generally admitted that 
his course in the two preceding Legislatures had been the 
chief influence in causing the Democratic defeat. One of 
the most influential of the Republican newspapers outside 
the city of New York said: ''It should not be forgotten 
that Theodore Roosevelt led the Republican minority in 
the last Assembly and that the minority has gro^vn into a 
powerful majority. Much of the success of the Republicans 
in the recent elections was due to the record made by these 
legislators in opposition to Democratic schemes of extrava- 
gance and corruption. Much of that record was due to the 
sleepless activity of their intrepid leader, Theodore Roose- 
velt. He led the minority to victory, and it is only fitting 
that he should now receive a grateful acknowledgment of 
his services by being elevated to the Speakership." 

He frankly declared himself a candidate for Speaker and 
received the warm support of all except the most avowedly 
partisan of the Republican journals of the State. But from 
the outset of the canvass, the old leaders of the party who 
represented the interests which he had antagonized in his 
fearless opposition to "deals" with Tammany Hall and 
other disreputable partisan doings, formed a combination 
against him and in the end adroitly compassed his defeat. 
They brought this about by having the most discredited of 
the machine leaders in his district pretend to support him 

24 



LEGISLATURE— THIRD TERM 25 

till the vote in caucus was reached, when they deserted him 
and nominated the rival candidate. 

The Speaker thus chosen soon revealed his obligations 
to the members of the combination to which he owed his 
election. He could not refuse to appoint Roosevelt to the 
chairmanship of the Committee on Cities, but in placing 
him there he associated him with a body of men who were 
known not to be in harmony with his views and who could 
be depended upon to hinder rather than help him in work 
of great importance which he had avowed his intention to 
undertake. Once again, the newspapers that had persist- 
ently assailed him since his appearance in public life, in- 
dulged joyfully in prophecy of his ruin, either as accom- 
plished or speedily to ensue. ''This will not be a Happy 
New Year to the exquisite Mr. Roosevelt," said the chief 
of them, "but Mr. Roosevelt is comparatively young, and 
time is a kind physician." This prophet was not long in 
discovering that this year was destined to be, if not the 
happiest of Roosevelt's life thus far, the most active and 
most useful of his Legislative career. 

The Speaker, in addition to "packing" the Committee 
on Cities against Roosevelt, sought to thrust upon him a 
clerk whom he had not chosen and did not desire, but ener- 
getic personal protest persuaded the Speaker to abandon 
his purpose. It soon became apparent that, whatever might 
be the predilections of the members of the Committee, the 
chairman had views of his own and was determined to put 
them into practice. His first act was to introduce two 
measures of great importance to New York City, one giving 
the Mayor absolute power of appointment and removal of 
heads of departments, abolishing the confirming power over 
such appointments exercised by the Board of Aldermen. 
The other was a High License bill, greatly increasing the 
liquor license fees in cities of over 100,000 inhabitants. 
Few measures could be devised that would be more certain 
to incur the bitter hostility of corrupt political interests 
than these two. Through their confinning powers, the 
Aldermen were able to thwart all efforts for good govern- 



26 THEODORE ROOSEVELT AND HIS TIME 

ment of the city that a Mayor might make. They would 
confirm the appointment only of men of their own sort and 
a worse sort could not be imagined. They gave a bad 
Mayor full excuse for all objectionable selections that he 
might make for he could always say that no others would 
be confirmed. In regard to high license, the politicians of 
both parties catered to and were in close alliance with the 
liquor-dealers, and viewed with wrath and alarm any 
measure that threatened to disrupt those relations. 

Closely follomng the organization of the Legislature, 
special committees were appointed in both houses to inves- 
tigate municipal departments in the city of New York. 
Roosevelt was placed at the head of the Assembly Com- 
mittee and he entered at once upon the task assigned to it 
with enthusiasm and determination. There had been many 
such committees in the past but few of them had accom- 
plished much of permanent value, for the reason that as 
soon as they began to make revelations that were damag- 
ing to the city's rulers, the political machinerj^ of both 
parties was put in operation to "call them off," that is, 
stop the inquiry or sidetrack it into comparatively harm- 
less channels. An attempt was made at the outset to estab- 
lish a check on the Assembly Committee by a proposal to 
have it work jointly with the Senate Committee. Roosevelt 
defeated this by flatly declining the proposal, a proceeding 
which was fully justified by the obvious fact that the Senate 
Committee had been made up, not for a genuine investiga- 
tion, but for one of the old kind. 

He took full control of the Assembly Committee from 
the start, and began at once to make revelations which 
startled the city and ultimately attracted the attention of 
the country. Various well-established devices were tried 
by the disreputable politicians of both parties to arrest his 
progress, but for the first time in the history of legislative 
investigations they failed utterly because of his vigilance 
in foreseeing and thwarting them. Within a few weeks 
he had aroused such an overwhelming popular sentiment in 
his support that all efforts to hamper him ceased. His 



LEGISLATURE— THIRD TERM 27 

committee made a report summing up in the plain and 
vigorous language of its chairman the results of its labors 
and proposing for enactment seven measures of reform 
which provided for a complete change in the methods of 
city government, abolishing the old system under which 
the corrupt politicians of both parties had been robbing 
the city for many years. These became known as the Eoose- 
velt reform bills. The city press, with a few insignificant 
exceptions, supported these measures. Great mass meet- 
ings of citizens were held to advocate their passage as well 
as that of the bill abolishing the confirming powers of the 
Aldermen and that decreeing high liquor licenses. In the 
end, the seven, as well as the Aldermanic measure, were 
passed, but the High License bill, although favored by the 
Church Temperance Society and the leading Protestant 
clergymen of the city, failed of final passage. This was 
many years before the appearance of the prohibition wave 
which later swept over the country and Roosevelt's posi- 
tion at the time was in harmony with that held by the great 
body of temperance advocates. 

In addition to the city reform bills, Roosevelt succeeded 
in securing the passage of a civil service bill, applying the 
provisions of the national Civil Service law to all cities of 
the State having a population of 20,000 or more. A des- 
perate effort was made to have the police force of New 
York City exempted from the provisions of the law, but 
Roosevelt defeated this by investigating the Police Depart- 
ment and showing that the worst evils in the force were 
due to the practice of making appointments to it on political 
influence alone. He tried also to have the Police Depart- 
ment put under a single head and to abolish the Bureau of 
Elections, which was under the control of an expert Repub- 
lican ''dealer," the most pernicious and rascally specimen 
of his class and time, but the political mercenaries of the 
two parties, grievously crippled in their business as they 
were by the other Roosevelt reform bills, were able to rally 
sufficient strength to defeat these additional assaults. 

It is worth while, in order to show the high place which 



28 THEODORE ROOSEVELT AND HIS TIME 

Roosevelt had won in public estimation during this third 
session, to quote a few of the comments which the press of 
all parties and shades of opinion, in New York and else- 
where, made upon him at the time. The Democratic jour- 
nal which had so often predicted his ruin and had informed 
him that his New Year was not to be a happy one, was one 
of the warmest in his praise. When his seven bills were 
before the Legislature, this journal said of him: 

"Mr. Roosevelt, to whom the credit of the bills already 
passed or certain to pass is due, has displayed a boldness, 
directness and energy of which much older and more 
experienced politicians might well be proud. We are will- 
ing to accord honor wherever it is due. We only wish we 
had a Democratic House of Representatives at Washington 
as efficient and vigorous as the Republican State Legisla- 
ture, and a Democratic Congressman as active, resolute and 
practical as Assemblyman Roosevelt." 

Another city journal, which was later to become one of 
his most captious critics, spoke of his work in the Legisla- 
ture as "influential and memorable," adding: "There 
have been no disagreements among the members of his 
Investigating Committee. He has been able to inspire his 
associates with something of his own zeal for reform, and 
has apparently had no difficulty in securing their complete 
faith in the fearless disinterestedness of his labors." 

During the exciting scenes in the Legislature when the 
Roosevelt bills were on final passage, with all the "dealers" 
seeking, sometimes with the covert aid of the Speaker, to 
defeat them, the city newspapers placed their Albany 
despatches under such headlines as "A Big Day for Roose- 
velt"; "Under Roosevelt's Whip"; "Roosevelt's Brilliant 
Assault on Corruption"; "Theodore, the Cyclone Hero of 
the Assembly." 

In sections of the country outside of New York State, 
the newspapers held up Roosevelt as a model for imitation 
by young men everywhere. A Boston journal said of his 
political career, "Though less than three years in length, 
it is long enough to show how much can be achieved by a 



LEGISLATURE— THIRD TERM 29 

young man of ability and integrity, who has the wit to 
organize practical reforms, the faculty to inspire others 
with his own faith in his measures, and the tact and persis- 
tency to secure their adoption by the requisite majority." 
Another journal in the same city called attention to a purely 
Kooseveltian method which he followed throughout his 
career: "His example and career should stimulate others 
equally favorably situated to do something in the line where 
he has wrought so well. We never heard that Roosevelt 
sneered at American politics or affected to deride those 
engaged in the comparatively humble business of law- 
making. On the contrary, he has sought to elevate politics 
by turning it into right channels and has honored the office 
of State representative." Another New England journal 
said: "Mr. Roosevelt is rapidly making toward the front 
rank of leadership in New York. And his progress comes 
as the natural result of vigorous, effective and unimpeach- 
ably honest work for the city in which he dwells. He has 
been called a * swell, ' but it would be well if every State had 
just such swells who are not afraid of the people, know 
what they want and, more than that, know how to satisfy 
the popular desire for relief from municipal burdens." 

A Philadelphia newspaper said: "The career of this 
young man, who has gone boldly and honorably into public 
life, ought to shame thousands who complain that politics 
are so dirty that no decent gentleman can engage in them. ' ' 
A Western journal said: "Mr. Roosevelt, like William 
Pitt, is accused of the awful crime of being a young man. 
It is a very great pity that we have not some more young 
men like him in public life. Let them all come to the front 
and take part in the government." 

The weekly illustrated journals broke out in full page 
cartoons of Roosevelt in various gujses. One of them repre- 
sented him with a huge pair of scissors clipping the claws 
of the Tammany Tiger ; another as Ajax defying the cor- 
rupt influences behind police corruption ; another as a wood- 
man cutting down a huge tree of municipal graft and 
rascality; another represented him garbed as a policeman, 



30 THEODORE ROOSEVELT AND HIS TIME 

entitled ''Our New Watchman, Roosevelt," in the act of 
dismissing the political bosses. When Governor Cleve- 
land signed the Roosevelt bills, Nast published a cartoon, 
representing Roosevelt standing with the bills before 
Cleveland, who was seated at his desk, pen in hand, in the 
act of signing. This was entitled "Reform without 
Bloodshed." 

The action of the highest court of the State in regard to 
the constitutionality of a measure which he had succeeded 
in having made a law during his final term in the Legisla- 
ture is worthy of special record here for reasons which will 
be stated presently. The measure, which had been pro- 
posed by the Cigar-Makers' Union, prohibited the manu- 
facture of cigars in tenement houses. Roosevelt was ap- 
pointed one of a committee of three to investigate condi- 
tions in tenement houses and see if the legislation was 
desirable. He made several visits to the houses in which 
the work was carried on, going sometimes with other mem- 
bers of the committee and at other times alone. What he 
saw convinced him that the legislation was not only desir- 
able but vitally necessary if the children of the workers in 
question were to grow up fitted for the duties of American 
citizenship. He ardently championed the bill and per- 
suaded Governor Cleveland to sign it, though it was a 
crudely drawn measure. When it was carried to the Court 
of Appeals, on a question of its constitutionality, the court 
in 1885, held that it was not a proper exercise of the police 
power, that it interfered with the profitable and free use 
of his property by the owner or his lessee, and that a con- 
stitutional g-uaranty was violated. In rendering its deci- 
sion, the court said : 

''It cannot be perceived how the cigar-maker is to be 
improved in his health or his morals by forcing him from 
his home and its hallowed associations and beneficent influ- 
ences to ply his trade elsewhere. ' ' 

As Roosevelt in his personal visits to the tenement houses 
had found that in nearly all cases the work had been car- 
ried on by men, women and children living, working, eating 



LEGISLATURE— THIRD TERM 31 

and sleeping in the same rooms, sometimes in one room, 
and in one instance, by two families in one room, two 
women, two men, several children and an adult male 
boarder, Ms disgust and wrath at these remarks about 
"hallowed associations" and "beneficent influences of his 
home" were deep and abiding. He says in his 'Auto- 
biography': 

"It was this case which first waked me to a dim and 
partial understanding of the fact that the courts were not 
necessarily the best judges of what should be done to better 
social and industrial conditions. The judges who rendered 
this decision were well-meaning men. They knew nothing 
whatever of tenement-house conditions ; they knew nothing 
whatever of the needs, or of the life and labor, of three 
fourths of their fellow-citizens in great cities. They knew 
legalism but not life . . . This decision completely 
blocked tenement-house reform legislation in New York for 
a score of years. It was one of the most serious set-backs 
which the cause of industrial and social progress and 
reform ever received." 

Viewed in the light of his subsequent career the lasting 
impression that his legislative experience had made upon 
Eoosevelt's mind can easily be traced. His early view that 
the laws of the land, as expounded in text books and class- 
rooms and interpreted by lawj^ers and courts, operated 
often against rather than in favor of the attainment of 
justice, had been confirmed by that experience. This was 
the inevitable effect of his unsuccessful attempt to secure 
the impeachment of a judge notoriously guilty of improper 
dealings with a railway corporation, and equally so of the 
decision of the Court of Appeals upon the measure cited 
above. His course as President in regard to the regulation 
and control of great corporations, and his later views in 
regard to the recall of judicial decisions, were no new 
developments of opinion, but the logical result of many 
years of serious thought. Equally so was the stand which 
he took during his service as President and maintained with 
undiminished zeal afterwards, in favor of social and indus- 



32 THEODORE ROOSEVELT AND HIS TIME 

trial betterment or reform. Whatever opinion may be held 
in regard to his course on these questions, no one can say 
truthfully that it was due to sudden impulse, or was in- 
spired by a desire to gain temporary political capital. His 
conduct was based on precisely the same ideas and prin- 
ciples that had actuated his course in the Legislature many 
years earlier, and was inherent in the character of the man. 



CHAPTER V 

FIRST APPEARANCE IN NATIONAL POLITICS— MR. 
BLAINE'S CANDIDACY 

At the end of his third term in the Legislature, Roosevelt 
had become a distinct personality in national politics. His 
advance had been remarkably rapid. When in the summer 
of 1881 he decided to take an active part in political affairs 
he was, as I have said, practically unknown outside the 
limits of his own Assembly district. Before the end of his 
third term his fame had extended over the entire country. 
He had won such a position of leadership in his party in the 
State that when the time came to elect delegates to the 
Republican National Convention in the spring of 1884, he 
was, with the hearty approval of the great mass of his 
party, chosen as the chief of the four delegates-at-large. 
So strong was popular sentiment in his favor that he easily 
overcame an organized effort by the old machine leaders 
in the State Convention to prevent his selection. 

He went to the National Convention an avowed advo- 
cate of the nomination of Senator George F. Edmunds of 
Vermont as the Republican candidate for the Presidency 
in preference to James G. Blaine, who was the favorite of 
a majority of the delegates. The Blaine supporters were 
in control of the National Republican Committee and sought 
to organize the Convention in their interest by having a 
man of their choice, ex-Senator Powell Clayton, of Ala- 
bama, made temporary Chairman. The National Com- 
mittee submitted this selection to the Convention for ap- 
proval. Senator H. C. Lodge, a delegate from Massachu- 
setts and like Roosevelt an avowed Edmunds supporter, 
nominated a colored man, ex-Congressman John R. Lynch 
of Mississippi. In support of Senator Lodge's motion, 

33 



34 THEODORE ROOSEVELT AND HIS TIME 

Eoosevelt took the floor and made his first speech in a 
national convention. As this was his first appearance in 
the field of national politics the impression which he made 
upon his audience is worthy of record. The Xew York 
Times of June 4, 1894, published this account from its 
convention correspondent : 

*'Up from the midst of the Empire State delegates rose 
a slight, almost boyish figure. It was that of an active, 
nervous, light-haired, gray-eyed man who had just thrown 
off a straw hat and scrambled to his perch on the chair, ^\ath 
juvenile activity. Everybodj^ knew the man, for there is 
not a State headquarters which he has not visited in his 
canvass for Edmunds, and scarce an influential delegate 
with whom he has not conversed in a straightforward, 
manly way, carrying conviction even when he could not 
convert. It was Theodore Roosevelt, of New York, the 
leader of the younger Eepublicans, and he was greeted 
with a rousing burst of applause as he stood waiting to 
speak. When he spoke it was not the voice of a youth, but 
of a man — and a positive, practical man. His sensible 
speech was in delightful contrast with the plausible apol- 
ogies of the men who had endeavored to excuse the outrage 
which the National Committee had committed." 

The speech itself is of historic value for in it Roosevelt 
established a precedent for a similar position which he 
took 28 years later in another national convention. Its full 
text was as follows: 

''I trust that the motion made by the gentleman from 
Massachusetts (Mr. Lodge) will be adopted, and that we 
will select as chairman of this convention that representa- 
tive Republican, Mr. Lynch, of Mississippi. Mr. Chairman, 
it has been said by the distinguished gentleman from Penn- 
sylvania (Mr. Stewart) that it is without precedent to 
reverse the action of the National Conunittee. Who has 
not known numerous instances where the action of a State 
committee has been reversed by the State convention? Not 
one of us but has known such instances. Noiv there are, 
as I understand it, hut two delegates to this convention who 



FIRST APPEARANCE IN NATIONAL POLITICS 35 

have seats on the National Committee; and I hold it to he 
derogatory to our honor, to our capacity for self-govern- 
ment, to say that we must accept the nomination of a pre- 
siding officer by another body; and that our hands are tied, 
and we dare not reverse its action. 

''Now, one word more. I trust that the vote will be taken 
by individual members, and not by States. Let each man 
stand accountable to those whom he represents for his vote. 
Let no man be able to shelter himself behind the shield of 
his State. What we say is, that one of the cardinal doc- 
trines of the American political government is the account- 
ability of each man to his people; and let each man stand 
up here and cast his vote, and then go home and abide by 
what he has done. 

"It is now, Mr. Chairman, less than a quarter of a cen- 
tury since, in this city, the great Republican party for the 
first time organized for victory, and nominated Abraham 
Lincoln, of Illinois, who broke the fetters of the slave and 
rent them asunder forever. It is a fitting thing for us to 
choose to preside over this convention one of the race whose 
right to sit within these walls is due to the blood and the 
treasure so lavishly spent by the founders of the Republi- 
can party. And it is but a further vindication of the prin- 
ciples for which the Republican party so long struggled. 
I trust that the Honorable Mr. Lynch will be elected tem- 
porary chairman of this convention." 

The etfect of the speech was shown in the result of the 
ballot, for Mr. Lynch was elected by a vote of 431 to 382. 
The convention asserted its right to reverse the action of 
the National Committee, even if by doing so it ''violated 
precedent." 

By the nomination of Mr. Blaine, which followed later, 
Roosevelt was confronted with what in many respects was 
the most serious crisis of his career. He had to decide 
which of two courses he should choose. He must separate 
himself completely from his party and become an absolute 
Independent, or stay within his party and support its regu- 
larly nominated candidate. The nomination of Mr. Blaine 



36 THEODORE ROOSEVELT AND HIS TIME 

had been fairly won. He was unquestionably the choice 
of the convention. There was no claim that the will of the 
majority had been subverted either through the action of 
a committee on contested seats or in any other way. The 
problem before him was thus a quite different one from that 
presented to him twenty-eight years later in the National 
Eepublican Convention of 1912. In opposing the nomina- 
tion of Mr. Blaine he and his Republican associates had 
been acting with a considerable body of professional Inde- 
pendents, that is, men without allegiance to either of the 
great political parties. Though he had been during his 
brief public career an avowed Republican, seeking to 
accomplish all his reforms through Republican aid and 
inside party lines, his Independent associates, as soon as 
the Blaine nomination was made, assumed that he 
would leave his party and join them in seeking to ac- 
complish Blaine's defeat by supporting the Democratic 
candidate. In fact, they not merely asked but demanded 
that he abandon the course which he had followed since his 
entry into political life and upon which he had built his 
public career. They were sincere in their belief that he 
should do this. It seemed incredible to them that he could 
do anything else. He gave them full credit for sincerity, 
but declared that the question was one that he must insist 
upon deciding for himself. He admitted frankly that he 
had worked hard for the nomination of Edmunds and was 
savagely indignant at his defeat, but he declined to say at 
once what course he should pursue in regard to the nomi- 
nation of Mr. Blaine. Various devices were used to force 
him to declare his intentions, some by Republican politi- 
cians, and others, not entirely creditable, by leading Inde- 
pendents, but all in vain. He insisted upon deciding the 
question for himself, and in his own way and time. He went 
direct from the convention in Chicago to his ranch in 
Dakota, and several weeks later put forth a formal state- 
ment in which he defined his decision as follows : 

'*I intend to vote the Republican Presidential ticket. 
While at Chicago I told Mr. Lodge that such was my inten- 



FIRST APPEARANCE IN NATIONAL POLITICS 37 

tion, but before announcing it I wished to have time to 
think the matter over. A man cannot act both without and 
within the party; he can do either, but he cannot possibly 
do both. Each course has its advantages and each has its 
disadvantages, and one cannot take the advantages or the 
disadvantages separately. I went in with my eyes open to 
do what I could within the party; I did my best and got 
beaten, and I propose to stand by the result. It is impos- 
sible to combine the functions of a guerilla chief with those 
of a colonel in the regular army; one has a greater inde- 
pendence of action, the other is able to make what action he 
does take vastly more effective. In certain contingencies 
the one can do most good, in certain contingencies the 
other; but there is no use in accepting a commission and 
then trying to play the game out on a lone hand. 

"During the entire canvass for the nomination Mr. Blaine 
received but two checks — one was at the Utica Convention, 
the other was the Powell Clayton incident. I had a hand in 
both, and I could have had a hand in neither had not those 
Republicans who at Utica elected me as the head of the 
New York State delegation supposed that I would in good 
faith support the man who was fairly made the Republican 
nominee. I am by inheritance and by education a Repub- 
lican; whatever good I have been able to accomplish in 
public life has been accomplished through the Republican 
party; I have acted with it in the past, and wish to act with 
it in the future ; I went as a regular delegate to the Chicago 
Convention, and I intend to abide by the outcome of that 
Convention. I am going back in a day or two to my West- 
ern ranch, as I do not expect to take any part in the cam- 
paign this fall." 

This determination not to take part in the campaign he 
recalled later, for reasons which were eminently charac- 
teristic. "When I started out to my ranch two months 
ago," he said in October, "I had no intention of taking any 
part whatever in the Presidential canvass, and the decision 
I have now come to is the result of revolving the matter in 



38 THEODORE ROOSEVELT AND HIS TIME 

my mind during that time. It is altogether contrary to my 
character to occupy a neutral position in so important and 
exciting a struggle, and besides my natural desire to occupy 
a positive position of some kind, I made up my mind that 
it was clearly my duty to support the ticket. ' ' 

His decision called forth bitter denunciation from the 
Independents, who declared that he had deserted his prin- 
ciples, and predicted with absolute con\4ction that he had 
wrecked his career. The Democratic press took a similar 
view of his future and declared that he had always been a 
''humbug" and a ''political charlatan," a "reform fraud" 
and a "Jack-in-the-box politician," who had now been thor- 
oughly found out. He faced the storm of disapproval and 
abuse calmly, and in a reply to an open letter of regret 
and remonstrance from an Independent he wrote: 

"I thank you for your good opinion of my past services. 
My power, if I ever had any, may or may not be as utterly 
gone as you think, but most certainly it would deserve to 
go if I yielded any more to the pressure of the Independents 
at present, when I consider them to be wrong, than I yielded 
in the past to the pressure of the machine when I thought 
it wrong." 

He declined a renomination for the Assembly, which he 
could have had without opposition, and two separate offers 
of a nomination for Congress in as many districts in which 
he was eligible as a candidate, on the ground that his 
private interests, which had been neglected during his 
service in the Legislature, demanded all of his attention. 



CHAPTER VI 

LITERARY LABORS— TILT WITH JEFFERSON DAVIS- 
CANDIDATE FOR MAYOR 

During his first term in the Legislature Roosevelt pub- 
lished, in May, 1882, ''The Naval War of 1812," the open- 
ing chapters of which he had written w^hile a student in 
Harvard. He had finished it while engaged in his tussle 
with machine politics in the Legislature, demonstrating 
thus early in his career his ability to turn aside from public 
and political duties and concentrate his mind upon literary 
work. This was merely the first of many instances of the 
kind which occurred quite regularly in his subsequent 
career. The publication of the Naval History came at the 
moment when his efforts to secure the impeachment of a 
judge were nearing their climax and when the fight over 
his other reform measures was absorbing public attention. 
The book was everywhere well received and the compli- 
mentary reviews of it in the press appeared side by side 
with comments, favorable and unfavorable, upon his legis- 
lative achievements. The book is notable as containing a 
warning to the nation of the need of thorough preparedness 
for war as the surest guaranty of peace — a warning which 
he repeated at every opportunity during the succeeding 
thirty-five years, the wisdom of which was amply justified 
when the folly of persistent disregard of it was demon- 
strated with such disastrous consequence at the entry of the 
United States into the European War in 1917. In his 
preface, written in 1882, he said : 

' ' The operations of this war on land teach nothing new ; 
it is the old, old lesson that miserly economy in preparation 
may in the end involve a lavish outlay of men and money 
which, after all, comes too late to more than partially off- 

39 



40 THEODORE ROOSEVELT AND HIS TIME 

set the evils produced by the original shortsighted parsi- 
mony. It was criminal folly for Jefferson and his follower, 
Madison, to neglect to give us a force either of Regulars 
or of well-trained Volunteers during the 21 years they had 
in which to prepare for the struggle that any one might see 
was inevitable." 

''The necessity for an efficient Navy is so evident that 
only our almost incredible shortsightedness prevents our 
at once preparing one." 

In a condensed history of the same war, which he wrote 
for an English Naval History in 1897, fifteen years later, 
he reiterated his earlier views, saying: 

''There never was a better example of the ultimate evil 
caused by a timid effort to secure peace and the refusal to 
make preparations for war than that afforded by the 
American people under the Presidencies of Jefferson and 
Madison." 

Another notable passage in this condensed history was 
the following in regard to pacifists, who many years later 
played so harmful and despicable a part in the European 
War: 

"Both Britain and America have produced men of the 
'peace-at-any-price' pattern, and in America, in one great 
crisis at least, these men cost the Nation more in blood and 
wealth than the political leaders most recklessly indifferent 
to war have ever cost it." 

After the close of the Presidential campaign of 1884, 
Roosevelt returned to his ranch in Dakota, spending much 
of his time there for several years, making occasional visits 
to his home in New York. He took charge of two cattle 
ranches and varied his duties as ranchman with hunting 
trips and in writing magazine articles and books. In 1885 
he published "The Hunting Trips of a Ranchman," two 
volumes; in 1886, the "Life of Thomas H. Benton"; in 
1887, the "Life of Gouverneur Morris"; in 1888, "Ranch 



LITERARY LABORS— TILT WITH JEFFERSON DAVIS 41 

Life and Hunting Trail"; in 1890, "History of New York"; 
and in 1893, *'The Wilderness Hunter." All of these books 
were written in whole or in part during this period. 

In his Life of Benton, written thirty years before the 
entry of the United States into the European War, there 
appears this additional reference to pacifists: 

*'A class of professional noncombatants is as hurtful to 
the healthy growth of a nation as a class of fire eaters, for 
a weakness or folly is nationally as bad as a vice, or worse. 
No man who is not willing to bear arms and to fight for 
his rights can give a good reason why he should be entitled 
to the privilege of living in a free country." 

Two manuscript letters of rare interest appear in Eoose- 
velt's correspondence of 1885. One is from Jefferson Davis, 
written apparently in his own hand, and the other is a 
copy, in Roosevelt's own hand, of his reply. They are; 

Beauvain, Miss., 
September 29, 1885. 
Mr. Theodore Roosevelt, 

New York, New York. 
Sir: 

You have recently chosen publicly to associate the name 
of Benedict Arnold with that of Jefferson Davis, as the 
only American with whom the traitor Arnold need not fear 
comparison. 

You must be ignorant indeed of American history if you 
do not know that the career of those characters might be 
aptly chosen for contrast, but not for similitude ; and if so 
ignorant, the instinct of a gentleman, had you possessed it, 
must have caused you to make inquiry before uttering an 
accusation so libelous and false. 

I write you directly to repel the unproved outrage, but 
with too low an estimate of you to expect an honorable 
retraction of your slander. 

Yours, etc., 

(Signed) Jeffebson Davis, 



42 THEODORE ROOSEVELT AND HIS TIME 

New York, October 8, 1885. 
*'Mr. Theodore Eoosevelt is in receipt of a letter pur- 
porting to come from Mr. Jefferson Davis, and denying 
that the character of Mr. Davis compares unfavorably with 
that of Benedict Arnold. Assuming the letter to be genuine 
Mr. Eoosevelt has only to say that he would indeed be sur- 
prised to find that his views of the character of Mr. Davis 
did not differ radically from that apparently entertained 
in relation thereto by Mr. Davis himself. Mr. Roosevelt 
begs leave to add that he does not deem it necessary that 
there should be any further communication whatever be- 
tween himself and Mr. Davis." 

In the autumn of 1886 he was offered and accepted the 
Republican nomination for Mayor of New York City. He 
was also nominated for the office by a Committee of Busi- 
ness Men and an Independent Committee of Citizens. His 
nomination was based upon his record in the Legislature, 
and in his letter of acceptance and campaign speeches he 
pledged himself, if elected, to devote all his energies to 
securing honest and efficient city government without re- 
gard to partizan considerations of any sort. The contest 
was a three-cornered one, wdth Abram S. Hewitt as the 
nominee of Tammany and other Democratic organizations, 
and Henry George as the nominee of labor and socialist 
organizations. The Independents, or Mug-wumps as they 
were called, unable to forgive Roosevelt for his advocacy 
of Blaine, supported Mr. Hewitt, who was elected. He was 
a man of ability and probity, w^ho had made an excellent 
record in Congress, and the Independents took the ground 
that even with his Tammany support he could be depended 
upon to be a better and more useful Mayor than Roosevelt 
would be able to be with the support of the Republican 
Machine. Time was to show within a few years that Roose- 
velt as a city official could be depended upon so thoroughly 
to give the city valuable service in spite of Republican 
Machine support that the same Independents would lament 
his departure from municipal administration. 



CHAPTEE VII 
CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSIONER 

In May, 1889, President Harrison appointed Roosevelt a 
member of the United States Civil Service Commission. 
The conditions of the civil service at this time were such as 
to make the position an alluring one to Roosevelt. He had 
been an active and zealous advocate of civil service reform 
since the moment of his entry into public life. Various 
efforts had been made for twenty years or more to over- 
throw the spoils system as applied to the civil service of 
the country, but with only slight success. In 1871, Presi- 
dent Grant yielded sufficiently to the demands of civil 
service reform advocates to appoint a Civil Service Advi- 
sory Board of seven members, with George William Curtis 
as chairman. This Board proposed a set of rules and regu- 
lations which in the following year were enlarged so as to 
make them applicable to the Departments at "Washington 
and the Federal offices in New York City. These rules and 
regulations were put in force, with a very moderate amount 
of success, and continued in force till 1875, under constant 
assault by the politicians of both parties. In 1875 the oppo- 
sition of the politicians became so formidable that Con- 
gress yielded to it and refused to grant an appropriation 
for the expenses of the Advisory Board, whereupon Presi- 
dent Grant suspended the operation of the rules. 

There was organized immediately in New York, under 
the leadership of Mr. Curtis, the Civil Service Reform 
Association, which developed into The National Civil 
Service Reform League with Mr. Curtis as President. 
Roosevelt was a member of this League and took a leading 
part in the campaign of education which it conducted 
throughout the country. Its agitation of the reform re- 

43 



44 THEODORE ROOSEVELT AND HIS TIME 

suited in January, 1883, in the introduction, by Senator 
Geo. H. Pendleton of Ohio, of a bill to establish the merit 
system in the civil service of the Government. It was 
passed by both houses of Congress and went into effect in 
July, 1883. As recorded in previous chapters, Roosevelt 
endeavored in the same year to have the provisions of this 
law applied to the civil service of New York City, but was 
prevented by the opposition of the Democratic majority. 
In the succeeding Legislature, that of 1884, which had a 
Republican majority in both houses, he succeeded in hav- 
ing a bill passed which applied the provisions of the law to 
all cities of the State having a population of 20,000 or more. 
There were 23 such cities at the time. 

When the Pendleton law went into effect it brought about 
14,000 Government employees into the classified service, 
but the enforcement of its provisions was fiercely and per- 
sistently obstructed by the politicians of both parties. 
Wlien Hayes entered upon the Presidency under pledges 
of support to the reform, high hopes were cherished by its 
advocates that valuable progress would be made during his 
administration, but these were not realized. Little prog- 
ress was made. President Garfield did not live long enough 
to take action in the matter, and only slight progress was 
made under President Arthur. He appointed an eflScient 
Commission of three members, with Dorman B. Eaton, one 
of the leading advocates of the reform, as chairman, but 
beyond drawing up a set of rules this Commission was able 
to accomplish little. President Cleveland came into office 
with the confident hope of the Mugwumps, who had given 
his candidacy valuable support, that he would greatly 
enlarge the scope of the rules. By Executive Order he 
brought 7,000 additional places into the classified service, 
and during his term, by natural growth, 4,500 others were 
included. At the close of his term he extended the rules 
so as to include employees in the railway mail service. He 
had during this, his first term, greatly disappointed the 
advocates of the reform by making what was very nearly a 
''clean sweep" in the Presidential appointees and unclassi- 



CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSIONER 45 

fied offices in the service, including fourth class postmasters. 

When Harrison became President he extended the time 
for enforcing Cleveland's order in regard to the inclusion 
of railway mail service employees for so long a period that 
before it went into effect nearly all Democratic employees 
had been removed. 

When Roosevelt entered upon his duties, on May 13, 1889, 
the situation of affairs in the Commission was one quite 
satisfactory to the politicians. There had been at the time 
of his appointment only a single member of the Commis- 
sion. One had resigned in October, 1888, and one had been 
removed in February, 1889. The work of the Commission, 
which had been dallying on in a merely perfunctory man- 
ner, had come to virtual stagnation. The appropriation 
for it was quite inadequate for effective service, and the 
salary of a Commissioner, which had been fixed purposely 
at $3,500, was so small as to give reasonable assurance that 
no one with an alarming amount of ability or force would 
be likely to accept the position. The contingency of a 
young man of private means, with a patriotic desire to per- 
form useful public service, as was the case with Roosevelt, 
being willing to accept such a place, had not been foreseen. 
During the six years of the law's existence its enforcement 
had been quite uniformly so gentle that the business of 
practical politics had not been seriously disturbed. The 
various Commissions had been composed of men of quiet 
disposition and mature years, whose natural inclination was 
to follow the lines of least resistance in all matters of policy. 
They were affected more or less by the attitude of both the 
politicians and the public generally toward the law as being 
not a real law but a kind of sentimental proposition put 
forth to please a lot of ''fool reformers." For many years 
declarations in the national platforms of both political 
parties had been composed and adopted on this basis alone. 
The law of 1883 had been passed with the same general idea 
in the minds even of those who had voted for it. It would 
serve as a sop for a few ''long-haired cranks," and would 
amount to nothing in practise. 



46 THEODORE ROOSEVELT AND HIS TIME 

The manner in which the law was enforced during the 
first six years justified this view. In many instances its 
administration was a sham, and in all instances no effort 
was made to detect, expose and punish violations of either 
its letter or spirit. There Avas no more peaceful abode of 
official life in Washington in May, 1889, than the serene 
home of the Civil Service Commission when Theodore 
Roosevelt, in abounding health and vigor from his six years 
of ranching and hunting life, walked in and took possession, 
after the retirement of the incumbents. While he was nom- 
inally one of a Commission of three members, from the 
moment of his entry he was, in the words of the newspaper 
correspondents at Washington, himself the whole Commis- 
sion. This was true, so far as leadership in its activities 
was concerned, but he was cordially supported by Hugh S. 
Thompson, whom President Harrison had appointed a mem- 
ber at the same time, and later by John R. Proctor, who was 
added to the Commission in December, 1893. 

Of these two associates Roosevelt always spoke in the 
highest terms. In his ' American Ideals ' he says : 

*'I was myself a Republican from the North. Messrs. 
Thompson and Proctor were from the South, and were both 
Democrats who had served in the Confederate armies ; and 
it would be impossible for any one to desire as associates, 
two public men with higher ideals of duty, or more resolute 
in their adherence to those ideals." 

When in 1869 Charles W. Eliot became President of Har- 
vard University and introduced radical changes, Oliver 
Wendell Holmes said of him that he ''turned the whole Uni- 
versity over like a flapjack." A revolution, no less com- 
plete, took place immediately in the Commission 's peaceful 
home. Roosevelt entered upon his duties on May 13, 1889. 
Accompanied by Commissioner Thompson, he went almost 
immediately to New York and conducted an investigation 
of the manner in which the Civil Service Law was adminis- 
tered in the Custom House there. On June 5, the Commis- 
sion published a report in which it declared that examina- 



CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSIONER 47 

tions for admissions to the service, as conducted by the 
local board, were characterized by "great laxity, negligence 
and fraud;" that the ''members of the board openly sneered 
at and ridiculed the law which they were supposed to en- 
force;" that the testimony adduced as to the misconduct of 
three employees was conclusive and they should be removed 
by the Collector ; and that one of them should be prosecuted 
by the U. S. District Attorney for ' ' criminal violation of the 
law." This action was so radical a departure from the 
established procedure of the Commission that it caused a 
genuine sensation. It was the first formal notice that the 
Civil Service Law was a real law and capable of enforce- 
ment by the courts like any other law. From New York 
City, the Commissioners visited various post offices in New 
York State, finding irregularities, and on June 18 they 
started on a tour of the principal Western cities, inquiring 
into the manner in which the law was enforced in the Gov- 
ernment service in each. On the eve of departure Roose- 
velt made a frank statement for the press in regard to the 
Commission's ideas and purposes. "We have," he said, 
"to do two things. One is to make the officials themselves 
understand that the law is obligatory, not optional, and the 
other is to get the same idea into the heads of the people." 
The tour was a veritable campaign of education, for full 
publicity was given to its proceedings and discoveries, and 
a convincing demonstration was made that the full power 
of the Commission would be exerted to have the law rigidly 
enforced and violators of it punished. Several postmasters 
were convicted of violations and were removed, and a great 
awakening of public interest was caused. 

During 1889, 1890 and 1891, Roosevelt pushed this cam- 
paign forward relentlessly, without regard to the political 
character of the persons affected. When he inquired into 
the methods pursued in the Baltimore Post Office, he became 
involved in a controversy with the Secretary of the Treas- 
ury, Charles Foster, and John Wanamaker, the Postmaster 
General, both of President Harrison's Cabinet, and a tre- 
mendous uproar filled the entire land. The wrath of the 



48 THEODORE ROOSEVELT AND HIS TIME 

politicians of the Republican party, which had been steadily 
rising since Eoosevelt began his campaign, fairly burst into 
flame. Mr. Foster and Mr. Wanamaker protected the ac- 
cused officials in Baltimore, whose removal was demanded 
by the Commission, and in doing so Mr. Wanamaker made 
assertions that Roosevelt, speaking for the Commission, 
declared to be false. An investigation was conducted by a 
Committee of Congress, and Roosevelt's position was sus- 
tained. He had not only assailed members of the Cabinet, 
who were his superiors in the Harrison Administration, 
but had charged one of them with seeking to condone wrong- 
doing in his department, and, what was more, had proved 
his charge. This treatment of a man who was not only a 
Cabinet officer, but the founder of the famous Bethany 
Sunday-School in Philadelphia, shocked the sensibilities 
of everj^ Republican politician in the country and the outcry 
for Roosevelt's official head was vociferous and insistent. 
Fury was added to the demand by the shrieks of joy which 
came from the Independent or Mugwump press, whose edi- 
tors forgot their lack of faith in Roosevelt because of his 
Blaine support and hailed him as the nation's most valiant 
reformer. The very citadel of spoils politics, the hitherto 
impregnable fortress that had existed unshaken since it was 
erected on the foundation laid by Andrew Jackson, was tot- 
tering to its fall under the assaults of this audacious and 
irrepressible young man. In Congress and in the party 
press, in all quarters where politicians gathered, a situation 
existed like that described by Thackeray in his ''White 
Squall": 

**Then all the fleas in Jewry 
Jumped up and bit like fury." 

The biting of the spoils fleas in Congress was especially 
sharp. An investigation of the Commission was proposed, 
and eagerly welcomed by Roosevelt, who met his accusers 
face to face and demolished ruthlessly all their assertions 
as to the character of his work. He demonstrated that the 
examinations for admission to the service which the Com- 
mission conducted were thoroughly practical and designed 



CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSIONER 49 

especially to test the fitness of each candidate for the work 
that he was to do. He showed that in each instance in which 
fraud or misconduct had been charged against employees 
ample proof had been adduced, and that in each and every 
instance the offender had been recommended for punish- 
ment without regard to his political affiliations. The good 
old spoils doctrine of asking in regard to a rascal before in- 
flicting punishment, *' Whose rascal is he — ours or the other 
party's!" had been utterly disregarded by him. 

Some of the efforts made by the distracted Congressmen 
to save their cherished system reveal how complete was 
their misconception of the man with whom they had to deal. 
In the first annual report of the Commission, under date of 
June 30, 1889, occurs this passage, evidently penned by 
Roosevelt : 

"The object of the law is to give to the average American 
citizen what it takes away from the professional politician. 
How little this object is understood by some men in public 
life may be gathered from recent proposals to parcel out 
all the offices among the different Congressional districts 
according to the political faith of the Congressmen repre- 
senting them. This would, of course, simply mean a revival 
of the patronage system, with an added touch of chaos. It 
is apparently brought forward in the simple faith that all 
that is needed is to divide the offices among the politicians 
of both parties instead of among those of only one, and 
ignores the very common-sense view, which insists that the 
offices are not the property of the politicians at all, whether 
of one party or of the other or of both ; but, on the contrary, 
that they belong to the people, and should be filled only with 
reference to the needs of public service." 

V^ile defending himself in Congress, Eoosevelt made 
frequent addresses in various parts of the country, explain- 
ing and expounding his acts and policy, and contributed 
promptly to the newspapers various replies to all attacks 
of consequence made through their columns. Before many 
months had passed he had won to his support all the more 



50 THEODORE ROOSEVELT AND HIS TIME 

reputable and influential newspapers of the country, and 
had secured both the attention and confidence of the great 
body of public intelligence. So strong was public opinion 
in his favor that even the irate Congressmen felt compelled 
to bow to it, for when in 1890 a proposal was made to repeal 
the Pendleton law they almost unanimously declined to 
support it. 

Heroic efforts were made by the editors of extreme parti- 
san Republican newspapers to find language adequate to the 
needs of the occasion. One editor in a single article spoke 
of Roosevelt, as ''Mr. Theossehoss Roosevelt;" ''Rosy 
Roosy;" ''Tintinnabulating Ted;" "Rollicking Ranch- 
man;" ''Scion of a diluted ancestry who has slapped Mr. 
Harrison and Mr. Wanamaker ; " " Terrapin Tedd}^ ; " " Fa- 
vorite-son-of-a-gun of reformer;" "Descendant of the way- 
back Roosevelts from Rooseveltville," and a "Jane dandy." 

Other partisan editors, less gifted in the use of vitupera- 
tive epithets, assumed to believe that Roosevelt's rigorous 
enforcement of the law would have the beneficent effect of 
securing its repeal by showing what a foolish and imprac- 
ticable statute it was. One of these, in the Albany 
Evening Journal, whose publisher, William Barnes, was 
destined later to develop into one of Roosevelt's most bitter 
political enemies, was particularly strong in holding this 
view. ' ' Go it, Roosevelt, ' ' he said. ' ' If any man can repeal 
the Pendleton law during the coming four years his name is 
Teddy. H Teddy Roosevelt is not chained down, no power 
under heaven can prevent the repeal of the law before 
President Harrison's term shall have expired. The Amer- 
ican idea of party, party power and party responsibility 
will survive the Mugwump attack made under the guise of 
Civil Service reform." 

Another editor, in the New York Sim, which was an open 
defender of the spoils system, said: 

"Mr. Roosevelt deserves the thanks of the spoilsmen. He 
is proving almost every week that the Civil Service Law is 
incapable of enforcement. The only men who could live up 



CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSIONER 51 

to it are the Mugwumps, and they do not appoint to office or 
get appointed. 

*'Mr. Roosevelt and his brethren in belief simply postu- 
late a state of things which does not exist. They assume 
that the American people are poor unfortunates who suffer 
from the spoils system. The American people are all right 
and they know it. The professors of Chinese quackery 
cannot persuade them that they are ill. Besides the Gov- 
ernment of the United States belongs to them; and don't 
you forget it." 

The enraged spoilsmen, including Senators and Repre- 
sentatives in Congress, descended in swarms on President 
Harrison and besought him to remove Roosevelt for the 
sake of party and country. They pointed out to him that 
he had ample justification for such a course in Roosevelt's 
treatment of Mr. Wanamaker, which was virtually an attack 
on the President himself. They started a report that the 
President had decided on his removal and the partisan press 
warmly commended such action. When such action failed 
to be taken, they began to express pity, even contempt for 
him and represented him as in a state of great irritation 
about Roosevelt's course but lacking the courage to get rid 
of him. ''Poor Harrison!" said the New York Sun. **If 
he has erred he has been punished. The irrepressible, bel- 
ligerent, and enthusiastic Roosevelt has made him suffer 
and has more suffering in store for him." 

Whatever may have been the feelings of the President — 
and there is little doubt that he had no idea when he ap- 
pointed Roosevelt that he would prove to be so veritable a 
bull in a china shop — ^he refused to remove him and stood 
by him firmly till the end of his term. 

When Cleveland succeeded him in 1893, it was declared 
by the partisan press of both parties that he would not 
think for a moment of retaining Roosevelt. The most 
earnest advocates of his retention were the civil service 
reformers. Carl Schurz, who was President of the Civil 
Service Reform League, was especially active, as the fol- 



52 THEODORE ROOSEVELT AND HIS TIME 

lowing letter, written two months before Cleveland's inau- 
guration, shows: 

"Solitude," 
PocANTico Hills, Westchester, 
January 4, 1893. 
My dear Mr. Roosevelt: 

I trust you will not take it as an indiscretion on my part 
that I communicated to Mr. Cleveland what you had written 
me about calling upon him. I have just received his answer. 
He writes: "I want to see Mr. Roosevelt and if he will 
indicate when and where he can meet me I am quite sure 
I can suit my engagements to his convenience." 

I take this to indicate that Mr. Cleveland wishes very 
much to see you, and I would suggest that you meet him as 
soon as possible. You might communicate w^ith him directly 
in order to agree with him as to the when and where. Or, 
if you prefer to make the necessary arrangement through 
me; I am perfectly willing to serve as an intermediary and 
shall do so with pleasure. 

I must confess that the tone of Mr. Cleveland's invita- 
tion to you gratifies me exceedingly. It is a very good sign 
of his disposition. I have had no conversation with him 
upon the subject and do not know whether he intends to ask 
you to remain a member of the Civil Service Commission 
during his presidency. That part of his letter which I have 
quoted seems to suggest that such a thing is possible. If he 
should make such a request then I most earnestly hope— 
and I think this is the universal feeling of the civil service 
reformers throughout the country— that you will not a mo- 
ment think of saying no. I trust you will consider what a 
great work you can do, and that there is not another man 
in the country who can do it as well as you can. Your con- 
tinuance in your position at Mr. Cleveland's request would 
be a great event, and in itself a large program for the 
next four years. 
Perhaps we may meet before you see Mr. Cleveland. 

Sincerely yours, 

C. SCHURZ. 



CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSIONER 53 

Cleveland retained Koosevelt as Commissioner and he 
remained in the position till May 5, 1895, when he resigned 
to accept the position of Police Commissioner in New York 
City. Cleveland, like Harrison, stood by Roosevelt when 
in 1894 he assailed John G. Carlisle, Secretary of the Treas- 
ury, for removing subordinates in his department for polit- 
ical reasons. Roosevelt says in his 'Autobiography': "I 
was treated by both Presidents with the utmost considera- 
tion." 

When he resigned in 1895, the classified service had been 
extended to practically the entire executive forces through- 
out the United States, including approximately 85,000 
places. The great value of his six years of service, how- 
ever, did not lie in the increased number of places brought 
within the rules but in the revolution that he had accom- 
plished in the minds of both the politicians and the people 
regarding the law and its merits. The old idea that it was 
a "fool law," the outcome of the impracticable dreams of 
a lot of ''crank reformers," had been dispelled forever. 
Its character as a real law with beneficent effects, was firmly 
established. The time-honored theory that 'Ho the victors 
belong the spoils," if not completely destroyed, had re- 
ceived shocks from which it could never recover. Not only 
had there been created a public sentiment in favor of the 
law and its enforcement, but against such features of the 
spoils system as levying assessments upon office-holders 
and members of the civil service and the slavish employ- 
ment of them for partisan political work, — against these 
practises a vigilant moral sense had been aroused which 
made it not only difficult but dangerous for party bosses to 
continue them, lest the severe penalties of the law be in- 
curred. Whatever violations were committed subsequently, 
were conducted with extreme caution and in lessening num- 
ber as time advanced. If civil service reform had not been 
completely accomplished, it had been placed upon a firm 
foundation and its steady progress in the future in spite 
of all attempts to overthrow it had been assured. 

When in the spring of 1895, it was announced that the 



54 THEODORE EOOSEVELT AND HIS TIME 

Mayor of New York had offered the position of Police Com- 
missioner to Roosevelt and the latter had declared his pur- 
pose to accept it, the Washington correspondent of the New- 
York Sum, a newspaper often conspicuously unfriendly to 
Roosevelt, wrote, under date of April 23: ''What will be- 
come of the Civil Service Commission when Mr. Roosevelt 
leaves it can only be conjectured. He has been the only 
vital force in the Commission since it came into existence, 
and any man who shall take the place after him must show 
extraordinary enthusiasm, ability, and moral principle, or 
suffer in comparison." 

Roosevelt's correspondence during the six years that he 
was Civil Service Commissioner, like that of all other pe- 
riods of his career, reveals him as the eager and indefati- 
gable reader of books and the interested companion of 
writers of them. An essayist, critic and author in whose 
work he took keen interest was Brander Matthews, and 
from a large number of letters, many of them in his own 
hand, that Roosevelt wrote to him at this time, I am cour- 
teously permitted by Mr. Matthews to make a few citations 
which I have chosen as showing both the wide range of his 
reading and the irrepressible play of his humor. 

His interest in Revolutionary War history was disclosed 
in many letters, notabdy so in some that he wrote while he 
was President to Sir George Otto Trevelyan, author of 
'The American Revolution,' from which I shall quote in 
later chapters of this narrative. Writing to Mr. Matthews, 
on May 7, 1893, in reference to a work on the Revolutionary 
period that had appeared recently, he said : 

"There is a wealth of picturesque incident which has 
never been utilized in the fighting between Tarleton's red 
dragoons, Ferguson's riflemen, Cornwallis's admirable 
grenadiers of the line, and the stolid, well drilled, valiant 
Hessian infantry on the one side, and on the other the 
continental line troops of Greene and Wayne, the light 
horse of Harry Lee, the homespun militia-men, and the wild 
riflemen of the backwoods, with their wolfskin caps, and 



CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSIONER 55 

their hunting tunics, girded in with bead-worked belts; 
while the painted Indian tribes add yet another element. It 
ought to be written up purely from the military side, by 
some one able to appreciate brave deeds by whomsoever 
done, and the equal valor displayed by friend and foe.'* 

In another letter to Mr. Matthews, on June 29, 1894, he 
says of a volume of essays by a young writer who was win- 
ning his way to fame : 

'*Mr. Blank is entirely wrong in thinking that Shake- 
speare, Homer and Milton are not permanent. Of course 
they are ; and he is entirely in error in thinking that Shake- 
speare is not read, in the aggregate, during a term of years, 
more than any ephemeral author of the day. Of course 
every year there are dozens of novels, each one of which 
will have many more readers than Shakespeare will have in 
the year ; but the readers only stay for about a year or two, 
whereas in Shakespeare's case they have lasted, and will 
last, quite a time! I think that Mr. Blank's ignorance, 
crudity and utter lack of cultivation make him entirely unfit 
to understand the effect of the great masters of thought 
upon the language and upon literature. Nevertheless, in his 
main thought, as you say, he is entirely right. We must 
strike out for ourselves; we must work according to our 
own ideas, and must free ourselves from the shackles of 
conventionality, before we can do anything. As for the lit- 
erary center of the country being New York, I personally 
never had any patience with the talk of a literary center. 
I don 't care a rap whether it is New York, Chicago, or any 
place else, so long as the work is done. I like or dislike 
pieces in the Atlmitic Monthly and the Overland Monthly 
because of what they contain, not because of one's being 
published in San Francisco or the other in Boston. I don't 
like Edgar Fawcett any more because he lives in New York, 
nor Joel Chandler Harris any the less because he lives at 
Atlanta ; and I read Mark Twain with just as much delight, 
but with no more, whether he resides in Connecticut or in 
Missouri." 



56 THEODORE ROOSEVELT AND HIS TIME 

The joyous humor of Roosevelt is visible in the following 
citations from the letters to Mr. Matthews : 

Washington, Aug. 26, 1893: **I have a rather good 
story for you. Recently a sister of a friend of mine was 
at a dinner in London, where there was also that some^vhat 
heavy English wit, Comyns Carr. He began inveighing 
against the 'higher education of women,' and stated that 
he was going to introduce a society to promote their lower 
education. She sweetly asked what women he meant — ■ 
English, French or American? He fixed her with an eye of 
cold disapproval, and, prancing into the trap, responded: 
' I should begin with American women ! ' to which she, with 
a merely explanatory air: *0h, but you know, Mr. Carr, 
American ivomen are not at all too highly educated for 
American men!' *' 

Washington, Dec. 9, 1894: ''When you see your friend 
Kipling again tell him that his 'Walking Delegate' has been 
used as a tract in the Senate. Manderson, of Nebraska, first 
saw its possibilities. Do you know him? He has a most 
gallant record in the Civil War, where he was badly 
wounded ; and now has at last overthrown the populists in 
his State, in a square knock-down-and-drag-out fight, and 
is going to leave the Senate, as he finds he can't afford to 
stay in politics. He tried the article on Peffer, who is a 
well-meaning, pin-headed, anarchistic crank, of hirsute and 
slab-sided aspect; it didn't do Peffer any good — he isn't 
that kind — but it irritated him, and so it pleased Mander- 
son. Wolcott, of Colorado, whom you met here, is now 
going to try it on Kyle, of South Dakota. Lodge would 
like to use it, but he is anathema to the populists anyhow, 
as he comes from Massachusetts and is a Harvard man — 
a record that would taint anything." 

Washington, June 7, 1904 : "I simply must send you this 
choice bit of wisdom from a British brother. It comes in a 
letter of Mrs. Edith Wharton 's to young Lodge : 

" 'I sat last night next to a Mr. F., Lord S's son, who had 
been all over the South African War and was very keen 
about military matters. We talked about Conan Doyle's 



CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSIONER 57 

book, and then I asked him if he had ever read Sir G-eorge 
Trevelyan's history of the 'American Revolution.' No, he 
hadn't, but would make a note of it. Capital book, eh? I 
said the descriptions of the fights were wonderful; that I 
had told Sir G. T. that I thought his 'Battle of Bunker 
Hiir was the best battle picture I knew and he had an- 
swered that Lord Wolseley had told him the same thing. 

"Mr. F. (keenly interested). 'Oh, really! I must read 
that. Trevelyan's an army man himself, I suppose?' 

"Me. 'No, I think not. You know he was ' 

"Mr. F. 'Oh, of course. Out there as a correspondent, 
I suppose.' " ! ! ! 

"Is not this really too good to be true?" 



CHAPTER VIII 

POLICE COMMISSIONER 

With the entrance of Roosevelt upon his service as Police 
Commissioner in New York City, in the spring of 1895, 
there began between him and myself a close personal friend- 
ship which continued unbroken throughout his career, grow- 
ing steadily in mutual confidence and affection with time. 
The present narrative from this point onward will be writ- 
ten in the light which this intimacy threw upon his motives 
and character, and its statements will be illuminated and 
corroborated by citations from confidential letters written 
by him both to myself and to other persons, and by authentic 
anecdotes and episodes which have hitherto either not been 
made public or given publication in inaccurate form. 

Kipling once said of New York City, as the result of his 
observations during several visits, that it had a gov- 
ernment of the worst elements of the population tempered 
by occasional insurrections of respectable citizens. An in- 
surrection of this kind occurred in November, 1894, when a 
reform Mayor, William L. Strong, was chosen on a non- 
partisan ticket. The uprising of righteous indignation had 
been caused by revelations of shameful misconduct on the 
part of the Tammany govermnent, especially in the Police 
Department, and in the care of the city's streets. Mayor 
Strong at first asked Roosevelt to accept the office of Street 
Cleaning Commissioner but he, feeling that he had no spe- 
cial fitness for it, declined. The Mayor then appointed him 
a Police Commissioner in a Board of four members, he to 
be the President of the Board. As this was a position in 
the line of good municipal government to which he had 
devoted himself while in the Legislature, he accepted gladly 
and with the distinct understanding that he should admin- 

58 



POLICE COMMISSIONER 59 

ister the affairs of the department with entire disregard 
of partisan politics and solely as a good citizen interested 
in promoting the welfare of good citizens. 

The task before him was not a light one. For many years, 
in fact from tlie very beginning of its organization, the 
Police Department had been subjected to political influences 
of the most demoralizing sort. Its powers of administra- 
tion were vested in a bi-partisan board, composed of two 
members of each political party, selected by the party 
bosses for the position. They divided both the spoils of 
the department and the appointments to the force. When 
Roosevelt took oflSce there was a regular tariff for appoint- 
ments and promotions, and these could be obtained only 
by its payment. The entire force was permeated with cor- 
ruption in every department of activity. A very large 
revenue was collected by the force from vice and crime and 
the unlawful sale of liquor, and this was divided among 
the higher officials of the force and the political leaders. 
In fact, the entire Department was organized for the pur- 
pose of exercising a licensing power, outside of the law, 
which was far more valuable in pecuniary results than the 
license laws of the city themselves. As both party organi- 
zations shared in these illicit gains, to attack the system 
was to assail both and to challenge the furious wrath and 
bitter hostility of both. 

This was a fight after Roosevelt's own heart. It was in 
essence the counterpart of his fight in the Legislature and 
his subsequent fight in the Civil Service Commission — a 
fight against political criminals and lawbreakers, corrupt 
methods in politics and corrupt politicians, wherever found 
and without regard to party names or affiliations. He be- 
gan the fight at once, using in it the weapons he had em- 
ployed in its predecessors, full publicity, strict enforcement 
of law, and utter disregard of partisan political considera- 
tions. Trials of members of the force on various charges 
of neglect or misconduct, which had previously been con- 
ducted in secret, were conducted before the full Board in 
public. Appointments and promotions were made after 



60 THEODOEE ROOSEVELT AND HIS TIME 

examinations and on naerit and fitness alone. Neither the 
pajTnent of money nor the word of a political boss was any 
longer sufficient to '^get a man on the force," or to secure 
his promotion in its service. 

One of the chief sources of blackmail by the police, in 
fact, the fundamental source, was the law requiring liquor 
saloons to be closed on Sunday. This law was in 1895 the 
b^lwark of the most stupendous system of political black- 
mail any modern city has known. The largest saloons were 
owned by the great breweries, and these paid blackmail in 
large sums to the party bos-ses as the price of immunity 
from police interference with Sunday side-door selling. 
The small saloons, operated by their owners, were left to 
the police to blackmail as they chose. This state of affairs 
was well known, but all efforts to put an end to it by so 
amending the law as to permit the sale of liquor during 
certain hours on Sunday were defeated in deference to the 
religious sentiment of the State, and were not supported 
by more than a small portion of the religious elements of 
the city itself. It was held to be a ** compromise with evil" 
to legalize any degree of selling on Sunday. In fact, it 
was held, perhaps not openly but tacitly, that illegal selling 
through side-doors on Sunday was preferable to open sell- 
ing by permission of law. 

If police blackmail had been confined to Sunday liquor- 
selling, the evil would have been serious enough, but this 
was not the case. From blackmailing the illegal liquor- 
dealer the police turned naturally for additional revenue 
to all other f onus of illegal industry, — vice, gambling, crime 
of all kinds, pedlers, merchants who wished to make for- 
bidden use of sidewalks and streets, and to every practise 
or proceeding that depended upon police favor. The reve- 
nue from these sources ran up into the millions, and the 
politicians of both parties were sharers of it. 

When, therefore, Roosevelt declared his intention to en- 
force the Sunday-closing law rigorously, the outcry from all 
political quarters was tremendous. The politicians and the 
newspapers that they were able to control were as furious 




THEODORE ROOSEVELT, POLICE COMMISSIONER, 1895 



POLICE COIVEVIISSIONER 61 

in their wrath as their kind had been when Roosevelt began 
to enforce the Civil Service law. They declared that the 
attempt was pure foolishness, that the law was obsolete, 
a mere "blue law," and was never intended to be enforced 
anyway. A Tammany spokesman said, ''We believe the 
law should be enforced, but with intelligence and discrimi- 
nation," to which Roosevelt retorted: "That is a good deal 
like believing in truthful mendacity." To another objector 
who advocated less rigor, he replied: "You cannot half 
obey the law." To another: "I am enforcing honestly a 
law that hitherto has been enforced dishonestly." It was 
. predicted that the proceeding was useless because it was 
not possible to enforce the law, but for several months it 
was enforced with beneficial results, as the records of crime 
and disorder showed. At the end of that period a magis- 
trate was discovered who was able to decide that under the 
law a drink could be had with a meal and that a sandwich 
or a pretzel constituted a meal, and Sunday selling was 
partially resumed; but the main object, the stopping of 
blackmail, had been largely attained. Although Sunday- 
selling through side-doors of saloons was gradually re- 
sumed, it was done more furtively than before and never 
again attained anything approaching its former dimen- 
sions. 

At the outset of his police administration Roosevelt had 
what seemed to be the cordial support of his three asso- 
ciates in the Board. They professed full agreement with 
him, and he accepted their professions in good faith, be- 
lieving them to be as sincere as he was himself. They con- 
tinued to work in harmony with him for several months, 
but at the end of that period two of them, yielding to the 
demands of the political organizations to which they owed 
their selection for their positions, broke away and sought 
to defeat his purposes by causing a permanent deadlock in 
the Board. This was the method the political bosses, who 
found themselves powerless to control Roosevelt's action, 
or to persuade the Mayor to attempt to control it, resorted 
to as the only means of defeating his policy and saving their 



62 THEODORE ROOSEVELT AND HIS TIME 

illicit profits from total annihilation. They had tried in 
various other ways to get rid of him. One was a proposal 
for the Legislature to pass a law abolishing the City Police 
Board and creating a State police force with a head ap- 
pointed by the Governor. This was defeated by an over- 
whelming popular protest. They subsequently succeeded 
in getting the Civil Service law impaired, under the guise 
of amendments which *Hook the starch out of it." Roose- 
velt says in his 'Autobiography^: "They attempted to 
seduce or frighten us by every species of intrigue and ca- 
jolery, of promise of political reward and threat of polit- 
ical punishment." 

I had intimate personal knowledge on this point for I 
was closely associated with Roosevelt during the entire 
period of his police service. The Evening Post, of which I 
was at the time a subordinate editor, was cordially support- 
ing his policy and I was in almost daily confidential confer- 
ence with him. Having as a journalist of many years' ex- 
perience in the devious ways of New York politicians, 
acquired an exact knowledge of many of them, I had warned 
Roosevelt when he entered upon his duties to be on his 
guard against one of his fellow commissioners who was in 
the Board as the representative of a small and particularly 
vicious political organization. In accordance with an inva- 
riable and incurable tendency — which he was never able to 
overcome — he persisted in placing full confidence in this 
man, simply because the man professed full devotion to 
him. ''He may be, as you say," he replied to my repeated 
warnings, "a tricky politician, but I am sure that he is 
loyal to me." To this I could only say, as I did many 
times: "He is a snake in the grass, and sooner or later 
he will smite you." 

It was this member that the enraged politicians selected 
as their first agent for the undermining and paralyzing of 
Roosevelt's policy. The man was a political schemer by 
nature, possessing a certain order of low cunning, and cov- 
ering his designs with plausible professions of virtuous 
convictions. He was frequently present at the conferences 



POLICE COMMISSIONER 63 

with Roosevelt and myself and always expressed accord 
with us. On one occasion when the three of us had been din- 
ing together, he accompanied me toward my home after 
we had separated from Roosevelt. As soon as we were 
alone, he said: *'You have great influence with Roosevelt. 
I wish you would stop him from talking so much in the 
newspapers. He talks, talks, talks all the time. Scarcely 
a day passes that there is not something from him in the 
papers about what he is doing and the Police Board is 
doing, and the public is getting tired of it. It injures our 
work. ' ' 

I laughed and said: "Stop Roosevelt talking? Why, 
you would kill him. He has to talk. The peculiarity about 
him is that he has what is essentially a boy's mind. What 
he thinks he says at once, thinks aloud. It is his distin- 
guishing characteristic, and I don't know as he will ever 
outgrow it. But with it he has great qualities which make 
him an invaluable public serv^ant — inflexible honesty, abso- 
lute fearlessness, and devotion to good government which 
amounts to religion. We must let him work in his own way 
for nobody can induce him to change it. Furthermore, he 
is talking for a purpose. He mshes the public to know 
what the Police Board is doing so that it will have popular 
support." 

The connnissioner said nothing further and we parted 
rather coldly. About noon of the following day, Roosevelt 
called me on the telephone and asked me to lunch with him. 
As soon as we were seated at a narrow table he leaned for- 
ward, bringing his face close to mine, and with appalling 
directness said: '*P came into my office this morn- 
ing and said : 'You think Bishop is a friend of yours, don't 
you I ' ' Yes, ' I replied. ' Well, you know what he said about 
you last night? He said you had a boy's mind and it might 
never be developed.' " 

Roosevelt's eye-glasses were within three inches of my 
face and his eyes were looking straight into mine. Know- 
ing my man, I did not flinch. "Roosevelt, I did say that. 
Did he tell you what else I said ? " " No, that is what I want 



64 THEODORE ROOSEVELT AND HIS TIME 

to hear." When I had told him, he brought his fist down 
on the table with a bang, exclaiming : ' ' By George, I knew 
it!" "There, Eoosevelt," said I, *'is your snake in the 
grass, of which I warned you — the meanest of mean liars, 
who tells half the truth." 

I relate this incident fully because of the light it throws 
upon a dominating element in Roosevelt's character — its 
unflinching directness. How many men in like situation 

would have acted as he did! P surely did not suspect 

such a proceeding. His hope was to put an end to the pub- 
licity which Roosevelt was systematically giving to the 
Police Board's work for the purpose of securing popular 
support and thus making it both difficult and dangerous for 
the politicians to stop it. 

When the scheme failed, this commissioner threw off all 
disguise and became an open opponent of the Roosevelt 
policy. He was soon afterwards joined by a second member 
who succumbed to the pressure of the Republican boss, and 
the two established a permanent deadlock in the Board by 
refusing to attend its meetings. The conduct of the first 
revolting commissioner became so notoriously bad that the 
Mayor preferred charges against him and after public 
hearings on the same, recommended his removal by the 
Governor. The Governor, who was the man who had origi- 
nated the proposal to ''take the starch out" of the Civil 
Service law, declined to approve the Mayor's recommenda- 
tion. 

While the deadlock paralyzed to considerable extent fur- 
ther progress of Roosevelt's policy, it did not undo the 
very important results which had been achieved. Not only 
had the practise of blackmail been to a great extent ban- 
ished permanently from the force but there had been cre- 
ated throughout its members a distinct morale which had 
been almost totally lacking when he entered upon his duties. 
This had been accomplished not only by making appoint- 
ments and promotions on merit and fitness but by prompt 
recognition in all cases of individual service which displayed 
courage and devotion in the performance of duty. Every 



POLICE COMMISSIONER 65 

man in the force had become convinced that faithful per- 
formance of duty was certain to receive quick recognition 
and full reward — that promotion was sure along that line, 
and that it could be obtained in no other way. The mem- 
bers of the force discovered that the Roosevelt policy was 
securing for them what they had not formerly possessed, — 
the respect of the public, and this knowledge gave them the 
most powerful of all incentives to upright conduct, — a feel- 
ing of self-respect. When he resigned from the Board in 
April, 1897, Roosevelt left in the Department a force that 
had to a large extent undergone a moral transformation. 
It had received a large transfusion of members who had 
come into it under honorable conditions, free from all de- 
basing characteristics, and who owed their presence to their 
personal merits and not to the favor of bosses and not to 
the payment of money. Not all the old evils had been eradi- 
cated, for the evil results of years of corrupt management 
could only be completely removed by the abolition of the 
force, but a new standard had been set which was destined 
to endure. Although under a partial reversion to the old 
order of control which followed his exit, some of the former 
evils were restored, the force never reverted to the dis- 
graceful condition in which he found it. Appointments and 
promotions were never again made on the basis of boss 
favor and cash payment alone, but mainly on merit, and 
the levying of blackmail as a general police practise was 
never resumed. 

A clear statement of Roosevelt's method of dealing with 
members of the force appears in a letter which he wrote, 
on January 10, 1898, while Assistant Secretary of the Navy, 
to John McCullagh on his appointment to the position of 
Chief of Police. After expressing his delight at the pro- 
motion, he said : 

''Now, Chief, I want you to let me say a word to you 
merely as a man who has backed you and been your friend. 
You have drawn one of the big prizes ; and in my opinion 
you have fairly won it by courage, ability and good con- 



66 THEODORE ROOSEVELT AND HIS TIME 

duct. The Chief of the Police of Greater New York is the 
foremost police officer in the entire world, and he is one | 
of the six or eight most important men in New York itself. 
You have reached the pinnacle. Your place is assured. 
You will leave a name and a great reputation to your chil- 
dren. Now, on the other hand, it is a place of great tempta- 
tion, — apolitical, and worse than political, temptation. All f 
kinds of chances to go crooked without much risk of detec- 
tion will offer themselves. I have the utmost confidence in 
you. I feel that in the future, as during my own two years 
of service, your conduct will amply and 'over and over jus- 
tify the attitude your friends took on your behalf. But 
I do want you to realize most seriously that you must not 
ever make the least slip, for if you make even a small one 
it will give men a hold upon you. Both Byrnes and Conlin 
had very great chances before them, but they could not 
stand the strain; only a man of indomitable will, of great 
power, and a resolute i)urpose for integrity, can. I am very 
sure you are such a man, and I confidently look forward 
to the event proving my belief to be right, and that every 
man of us will be able to be proud of you and proud of the 
officers under you." 

An ultimate result, not by any means the least beneficial 
of the Roosevelt policy, was the abolition a few years later 
of the bi-partisan board method of control and a substitu- 
tion of control by a single commissioner responsible solely 
to the Mayor. This reform was due in large measure to the 
demonstration which had been made during Roosevelt's 
term of the evils of bi-partisan management through a 
board of four members. It was a demonstration of the evils 
of divided responsibility, rather than of bi-partisan con- 
trol, for his board had not divided on partisan lines, one 
of his opposing members being a Democrat and the other a 
Republican. His faithful and loyal supporter, Avery D. 
Andrews, was a Democrat, a graduate of West Point, and 
an honest and fearless man who proved himself as inhos- 
pitable to partisan political influences as Roosevelt himself. 



POLICE COMMISSIONER 67 

While Police Commissioner, Roosevelt continued and 
deepened the interest in the welfare of the poorer classes 
of the Community which he had developed while member 
of the Legislature. As President of the Police Board he 
was also a member of the Health Board, and in the latter 
capacity he was brought into close relations with conditions 
of life in the tenement house districts. He had made per- 
sonal visits to these districts as a member of a legislative 
investigating committee ^bout ten years earlier and the 
impressions which had then been made upon his mind as to 
the crying need of reform and betterment remained un- 
impaired. These impressions had been strengthened by 
the revelations made in a very remarkable book by Jacob 
A. Riis, entitled ''How the Other Half Lives," which was 
published in 1890. He formed an intimate friendship with 
Riis, which lasted throughout the latter 's life, and spoke 
of him when he died as next to his father the best man he 
had ever known, saying of his book that it had been to him 
both an enlightenment and an inspiration for which he 
could never be too grateful. In company with Riis he 
visited the tenement house regions, often at midnight, in 
order to see for himself just what conditions were, just 
what the police were doing in regard to them, and what the 
Health Department was doing to regulate and improve 
them. That a fresh and powerful impetus was imparted 
to his interest in the social welfare of the masses by these 
visits is recorded in his 'Autobiography': 

"My experience in the Police Department taught me 
that not a few of the worst tenement houses were owned by 
wealthy individuals who hired the best and most expensive 
lawyers to persuade the courts that it was 'unconstitu- 
tional' to insist on the betterment of conditions. These 
business men and lawyers were very adroit in using a word 
with fine and noble associations to cloak their opposition to 
vitally necessary movements for industrial fair play and 
decency. They made it evident that they valued the Con- 
stitution, not as a help to righteousness, but as a means for 
thwarting movements against unrighteousness. After my 



68 THEODORE ROOSEVELT AND HIS TIME 

experience with them I became more set than ever in my 
distrust of those men, whether business men or lawyers, 
judges, legislators, or executive officers, who seek to make 
of the Constitution a fetich for the prevention of the work 
of social reform, for the prevention of work in the interest 
of those men, women, and children on whose behalf we 
should be at liberty to employ freely every governmental 
agency.'* 

A striking tribute to Roosevelt's character and public 
usefulness was paid to him at the time of his departure 
from the Police Department by Mr. E. L. Godkin, Editor 
of the New York Evening Post, who had been on many 
occasions one of his most severe critics. When it was an- 
nounced that Roosevelt had been nominated by President 
McKinley as Assistant Secretary of the Na\'y, Mr. Godkin 
wrote him an earnest letter of protest, in which he said : 

*'I have a concern, as the Quakers say, to put on record 
my earnest belief that in New York you are doing the 
greatest work of which any American to-day is capable, 
and exhibiting to the young men of the country the spec- 
tacle of a veiy important office administered by a man of 
high character in the most efficient way amid a thousand 
difficulties. As a lesson in politics I cannot think of any- 
thing more instructive." 

That he firmly believed during his service as Police Com- 
missioner that he would never again hold a public office, I 
have personal knowledge. Toward the end of that service 
he said to me during a long and intimate conversation rela- 
tive to the difficulties and obstacles he was encountering: 
''This is the last office I shall ever hold. I have offended 
so many powerful interests and so many powerful politi- 
cians that no political preferment in future will be possible 
for me. All the liquor interests, including the great brew- 
eries, and all the party bosses will oppose me, and no politi- 
cal party will venture to defy an opposition so fatal as that 
is. I realized this when I began my fight for the enforce- 



POLICE COMMISSIONER 69 

ment of the Sunday law and against police bribery and cor- 
ruption, but it was the only course I could honestly pursue 
and I am willing to abide by the consequences. ' ' 

An interchange of views between Roosevelt and Presi- 
dent Cleveland in regard to the importance of strict main- 
tenance of the Monroe Doctrine, which took place while 
Roosevelt was Police Commissioner, may be noted here. 
When in December, 1895, Cleveland startled the country 
with his famous Venezuela message, Roosevelt wrote of his 
action: ''It would be difficult to overestimate the good 
done in this country by the vigorous course taken by the 
National Executive and legislature in this matter." In 
recognition. President Cleveland wrote to Roosevelt, on 
March 26, 1896 : 

"I note with pleasure what you write in regard to the 
Venezuela affair and thank you for it. It has taken a little 
time and thought for the good people to understand our 
position in the matter but as usual they are coming around. 

"It seems to me that you and I have both been a little 
misunderstood lately." 



CHAPTER IX 

ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF THE NAVY 

Soon after the election of McKinley to the Presidency 
in 1896, friends of Roosevelt began to urge upon the new 
President the desirability of appointing him to some posi- 
tion in his administration, preferably in the Navy Depart- 
ment, because of his well-known interest in naval matters. 
Chief among these friends was Senator H. C. Lodge, who 
was as earnest an advocate of the building of an efficient 
imvj as Roosevelt himself. Senator Lodge made a visit to 
McKinley, at the latter 's home in Canton, Ohio, in Decem- 
ber, 1896, and had an intimate conversation with the Presi- 
dent-elect w^hich he set forth in' a confidential letter to 
Roosevelt under date of December 2. This letter is of his- 
torical interest as revealing ]\IcKinley's attitude of mind 
not only toward Roosevelt, but toward the most pressing 
question that w^as to confront the new President on taking 
office — the situation in Cuba. 

*'He asked me about Cuba," wrote Senator Lodge, "and 
we w^ent over the whole of that very perplexing question. 
It is very much on his mind and I found he had given it a 
great deal of thought. He very naturally does not want to 
be obliged to go to war as soon as he comes in, for, of 
course, his great ambition is to restore business and bring 
back good times, and he dislikes the idea of such interrup- 
tion. He would like the crisis to come this winter and be 
settled one way or the other before he takes up the reins, 
but I was greatly pleased to see how thoroughly he appre- 
ciates the momentous character of the question." 

Striking evidence of the reputation for '^ driving force" 
which Roosevelt had earned for himself by his conduct in 

70 



ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF THE NAVY 71 

public office, is furnished in this passage from the Senator's 
letter: 

*'He (McKinley) spoke of you with great regard for your 
character and your services and he would like to have you 
in Washington. The only question he asked me was this, 
which I give you: 'I hope he has no preconceived notions 
which he would wish to drive through the moment he got 
in.' I replied that he need not give himself the slightest 
uneasiness on that score, that I knew your views about the 
Navy, and they were only to push on the policies which had 
been in operation for the last two or three administra- 
tions." 

The possibility mentioned by the President-elect, that 
Roosevelt might prove too strong a man for the place, was 
urged by opponents of his appointment in Washington 
when he was proposed for Assistant Secretary of the Navy, 
after McKinley had been inaugurated and his Cabinet an- 
nounced. A letter from Senator Lodge at Washington to 
Eoosevelt, under date of March 8, 1897, gives interesting 
information as to the high character of his supporters and 
the arguments used in opposition to his selection: 

"I have seen Long (Secretary of the Navy) and he is 
entirely open-minded — has not yet taken the question up — 
will not for some little time — says that McKinley will ap- 
point, but he supposes he will be consulted. He spoke in 
the highest terms of you. The only thing resembling criti- 
cism was this queer one: 'Roosevelt has the character, 
standing, ability and reputation to entitle him to be a Cabi- 
net Minister — is not this too small for him?' 

"The hitch, if there be one, is not with Long but with 
the White House. Whether there is any real resistance I 
cannot tell, and absolutely the only thing I can hear adverse 
is that there is a fear that you will want to fight somebody 
at once. 

"You have enough friends earnest for you to make a 
Secretary of State. John Hay has written and spoken and 
urged in the most earnest way at all opportunities. Hanna 



72 THEODORE ROOSEVELT AND HIS TIME 

is entirely friendly and wants you here. Piatt is not lift- 
ing a finger against you. I saw Bliss (Cornelius N., Secre- 
tary of the Interior) this morning. He spoke of you in the 
warmest terms and in the most affectionate way — said you 
were just the man. Hobart (Vice-President) after adjourn- 
ment to-day, came up to me and said: 'You are, I know, 
interested in Roosevelt. He is a splendid fellow — I think 
everything of him — just the sort of man we ought to get. 
What can I do?' He said he had an appointment with the 
President this afternoon and would urge you then upon 
him. 

'*I believe we are coming out all right. In any event, 
you have, I think, a right to be proud of such support as 
that I have described and you have not raised a finger and 
it has all come voluntarily. All I have done is to plan 
and direct it a little." 

President McKinley sent Roosevelt's name to the Senate 
on April 6, 1897, and the nomination was confirmed on 
April 8. He assumed the duties of the office on April 19. 

On the day of the Senate's confirmation of the nomina- 
tion, the Washington Post, which had bitterly opposed 
Roosevelt while Civil Service Commissioner, made him the 
subject of an editorial article in which it said that it was 
''by no means sure" that his appointment was a "matter 
of regret," and that while "of course he will bring with 
him to Washington all that machinery of disturbance and 
upheaval which is as much a part of his etHourage as the 
very air he breathes, who knows that the service will not 
be a little better for a little dislocation and readjustment?" 
,0f Roosevelt's qualities, the editor added: 
l' "He is inspired by a passionate hatred of meanness, hum- 
bug, and cowardice. He cherishes an equally passionate 
love of candor, bravery and devotion. He is a fighter, a 
man of indomitable pluck and energy, a potent and force- 
ful factor in any equation into which he may be introduced. 
A field of immeasurable usefulness awaits him — will he 
find it?" 




From a photo\;raph by Van der Weyde 

THEODORE ROOSEVELT, ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF THE NAVY, 1897 



ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF THE NAVY 73 

As soon as Roosevelt had familiarized himself with the 
detail work of his office he began a series of visits to the 
various navy-yards and to vessels of the fleet. Early in 
May he took a trip on a torpedo-boat which he had been in- 
specting because of a slight injury caused by an accident, 
and made an official report to the Secretary of the Navy 
which marked a new departure in documents of that kind, 
for instead of being a diy, formal record of an accident, it 
contained decided views as to the qualities and dispositions 
of the men who should command naval vessels, and 
especially torpedo-boats. After saying that no practical 
damage had been caused, he added : 

''Boats so delicate, which, to be handled effectively must 
be handled with great daring, necessarily run great risks, 
and their commanders must, of course, realize that a pre- 
requisite to successfully handling them is the willingness 
to run such risks. That they will observe proper precau- 
tions is, of course, required, but it is more important that 
our officers should handle these boats with dash and daring 
than that the boats should be kept unscratched. There 
must be developed in the men who handle them that mixture 
of skill and daring which can only be attained if the boats 
are habitually used under circumstances which imply the 
risk of an accident. The business of a naval officer is one 
which, above all others, needs daring and decision and if 
he must err on either side the nation can best afford to 
have him err on the side of too much daring rather than too 
much caution." 

This report was hailed by the press with expressions of 
delight as revealing a new spirit in the Navy Department. 
One newspaper correspondent said it had ' ' snap and vigor 
that made it read more like a page out of one of Mr. Roose- 
velt's books than the ordinary red-tape document." An 
editor hoped that the report would prove to be the first of 
a series of papers setting forth his views of naval men and 
things in general, because ''we have been running along 
in a groove for altogether too many years." 



74 THEODORE ROOSEVELT AND HIS TIME 

This hope was soon realized, and the interest which the 
report had aroused in naval matters was greatly stimulated 
a few weeks later when Roosevelt delivered a carefully 
prepared address before the Naval War College, at New- 
port, R. I., at the opening exercises on June 2, 1897. This 
address is so notable as the first elaborate expression of 
Roosevelt's views on the subject of national preparedness 
that somewhat liberal quotation from it is desirable in 
order to show the lifelong consistency of his course on this 
question. He had first given expression to those views in 
his history of ''The Naval War of 1812," in 1882, and had 
repeated them in his ''Life of Benton," in 1887, and in his 
condensed history of the war of 1812, which he wrote in 
1896 for the English Naval History, liut in each of these 
instances he had written briefly and in general terms. The 
Naval War College address was clearly the result of several 
years of serious thought and study of the subject. Read 
in the light of his virtually continuous advocacy of the same 
subject during the years Avhich intervened between our war 
with Spain and the outbreak of the great European A¥ar in 
1914, it is found to contain all the principal ideas which ho 
expounded with such tireless energy during that period, and 
especially when he foresaw that Germany's conduct was 
certain to force the United States into the war. A few cita- 
tions will demonstrate the accuracy of this statement : 

' "A century has passed since Washing'ton wrote 'To be 
prepared for war is the most etfectual means to promote 
peace.' We pay to this maxim the lip-loyalty we so often 
pay to Washington's words ; but it has never sunk deep into 
our hearts. Indeed of late years many persons have re- 
fused it even the poor tribute of lip-loyalty, and prate about 
the iniquity of war as if somehow that was a justification 
for refusing to take the steps which alone can in the long 
run prevent war or avert the dreadful disasters it brings 
in its train." 

"In this country there is not the slightest danger of an 
over-development of warlike spirit, and there never has 



ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF THE NAVY 75 

been any such danger. In all our history there has never 
been a time when preparedness for war was any menace to 
peace. On the contrary, again and again we have owed 
peace to the fact that we were prepared for war; and in 
the only contest which we have had with a European power 
since the Kevolution, the war of 1812, the struggle and all 
its attendant disasters, were due solely to the fact that we 
were not prepared to face, and were not ready instantly 
to resent, an attack upon our honor and interest; while the 
glorious triumphs at sea which redeemed that war were 
due to the few preparations which we had actually made. ' ' 

"The danger is of precisely the opposite character. If 
we forget that in the last resort we can only secure peace 
by being ready and willing to fight for it, we may some day 
have bitter cause to realize that a rich nation which is sloth- 
ful, timid, or unwieldy is an easy prey for any people which 
still retains those most valuable of all qualities, the soldier- 
ly virtues." 

"Preparation for war is the surest guarantee for peace. 
Arbitration is an excellent thing, but ultimately those who 
wish to see this country at peace with foreign nations will 
be wise if they place reliance upon a first-class fleet of first- 
class battle-ships rather than on any arbitration treaty 
which the wit of man can devise." 

"A really great people, proud and high-spirited, would 
face all the disasters of war rather than purchase that base 
prosperity which is bought at the price of national honor." 

"Cowardice in a race, as in an individual, is the unpar- 
donable sin, and a wilful failure to prepare for danger may 
in its effects be as bad as cowardice. The timid man who 
cannot fight and the selfish, shortsighted or foolish man 
who will not take the steps that will enable him to fight, 
stand on almost the same plane." 

"As yet no nation can hold its place in the world or can 
do any work really worth doing unless it stands ready to 



76 THEODORE ROOSEVELT AND HIS TIME 

guard its rights with an armed hand. That orderly liberty 
which is both the foundation and the capstone of our civi- 
lization can be gained and kept only by men who are willing 
to fight for an ideal ; who hold high the love of honor, love 
of faith, love of flag, and love of country. ' ' 

'*It has always been true, and in this age it is more than 
ever true, that it is too late to prepare for war when the 
time of peace has passed." 

''Tame submission to foreign aggression of any kind is 
a mean and unworthy thing; but it is even meaner and 
more unworthy to bluster first, and then submit or else 
refuse to make those preparations which can alone obviate 
the necessity for submission." 

''In public as in private life a bold front tends to insure 
peace and not strife. If we possess a formidable navy, 
small is the chance indeed that we shall ever be dragged 
into a war to uphold the Monroe Doctrine. If we do not 
possess such a navj, war may be forced on us at any time. " 

"Diplomacy is utterly useless where there is no force 
behind it; the diplomat is the servant, not the master, of 
the soldier." 

"No nation should ever wage war wantonly, but no nation 
should ever avoid it at the cost of the loss of national honor. 
A nation should never fight unless forced to ; but it should 
always be ready to fight." 

V ' ' Every feat of heroism makes us forever indebted to the 

man who performed it. All daring and courage, all iron 
endurance of misfortune, all devotion to the ideal of honor 
and of the glory of the flag, make for a finer and nobler 
type of manhood. ' ' 

"If ever we had to meet defeat at the hands of a foreign 
foe, or had to submit tamely to wrong or insult, every man 
^ among us worthy of the name of American would feel dis- 
honored and debased." 



ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF THE NAVY 77 

'*We ask for a great navy, partly because we think that 
the possession of such a navy is the surest guarantee of 
peace, and partly because we feel that no national life is 
worth having if the nation is not willing, when the need 
shall arise, to stake everything on the supreme arbitrament 
of war, and to pour out its blood, its treasure, and tears 
like water rather than submit to the loss of honor and 
renown." 

Published in full in the principal newspapers of the land, 
the address attracted wide attention and aroused animated 
discussion. It was universally recognized as sounding a 
new note in the conduct of national affairs. Nothing similar 
to it had been heard in the deliverances of other public 
men. It was the voice of Roosevelt, and of Roosevelt alone, 
and it stirred the country like the sound of a trumpet. 
There had been many addresses by naval officials at the 
War College, but never before had an Assistant Secretary 
of the Navy or any other navy official made an address like 
this. What did it mean? To an apparent majority of the 
people, if the comments of the newspapers were an accu- 
rate reflection of popular sentiment, it meant a welcome 
change. With few exceptions, the leading journals of the 
country expressed warm approval of the address. The 
New York Sun, seldom friendly to Roosevelt, called it a 
"manly, patriotic, intelligent and convincing appeal to 
American sentiment in behalf of the national honor, and 
for the preservation of the national strength by means 
requisite for self-defense and vigorous aggressive resist- 
ance to efforts to interfere with our progress and natural 
dominion." The New York Herald said: ''The current of 
this fine address is filled with a flow of splendid patriotism, 
from its opening sentence to its close, and its careful read- 
ing can scarcely fail to inspire the youth of America with 
the same lofty spirit of devotion to our country's honor, 
glory and prosperity that actuated its utterance by the 
speaker." The Washington Post, dropping its uniformly 
captious attitude toward Roosevelt, declared that in his 



78 THEODORE ROOSEVELT AND HIS TIME 

address be had "honored both himself and the country," 
and exclaimed: ''Well done, nobly spoken! Theodore 
Roosevelt, you have found your proper place at last — all 
hail!" From Maine to California, the general verdict was 
expressed in similar terms. 

That Roosevelt was endowed, in a really marvelous de- 
gree, with the gift of vision his correspondence indubitably 
shows. He saw clearly what men would do because he had 
accurate knowledge of and calm judgment upon what men 
had done. He saw clearly into the motives and actions of 
men and nations because he had mastered their history and 
could gage their conduct in the future by that of the past. 
He had read human history, not for the purpose of 
strengthening his prejudices, but of informing his mind, 
and from fulness of mind and matured conviction he spoke. 

When Roosevelt entered upon his duties as Assistant 
Secretary of the Navy, trouble with Spain over conditions 
in Cuba was visibly impending, and the possibility of war 
was foremost in his mind when he made his Naval War 
College address. That he was keeping close watch upon 
developments in other countries, especially in Germany, is 
shown by his letters. In his correspondence during the 
months immediately following his assumption of office, 
reference to ultimate trouble with Germany is of frequent 
occurrence. On August 2, 1897, in a letter to Captain B. H. 
McCalla, U. S. N., he wrote: "I entirely agree with you 
that Germany is the power with which we may very pos- 
sibly have ultimately to come into hostile contact. How I 
wish our people would wake up to the need for a big navy ! ' ' 

A few days later, August 11, he wrote a long letter, re- 
markable for the intimate knowledge that it displayed of 
conditions in European countries, to Cecil Arthur Spring- 
Rice, then with the British Legation at Berlin and afterward 
British Ambassador at Washington. In it he said. "As 
an American I should advocate — as a matter of fact do 
advocate — keeping our navy at a pitch that w^ll enable us to 
interfere promptly if Germany ventures to touch a foot of 
American soil. I would not go into the abstract rights or 



ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF THE NAVY 79 

wrongs of it; I would simply say that we did not intend to 
have Germans on the continent, excepting as immigrants, 
whose children would become Americans of one sort or 
another, and if G-ermany intended to extend her empire here 
she would have to whip us first." 

The same idea was repeated in a letter to General James 
H. Wilson on August 23, 1897: '*We cannot rival England 
as a naval power . . . but I do think we ought to stand 
ahead of Germany." 

In two letters, written early in 1898, he predicted trouble 
with Germany in South America if the Kaiser should at- 
tempt to acquire territory there. In one, February 5, 1898, 
addressed to F. C. Moore, New York City, he wrote: *'0f 
all the nations of Europe it seems to me Germany is by far 
the most hostile to us. With Germany under the Kaiser 
we may at any time have trouble if she seeks to acquire 
territory in South America." 

In another, addressed to Charles A. Moore, New York 
City, February 14, 1898, the prediction was repeated. The 
literal accuracy of the prophecy was confirmed in 1902, 
when the Kaiser attempted to acquire territory in Vene- 
zuela and was prevented by the prompt action of Roosevelt, 
as President, in serving notice upon him that unless he de- 
sisted the American fleet under Admiral Dewey would sail 
for Venezuela and oppose his project by force of arms. 

Writing again to F. C. Moore, on February 9, 1898, he 
gave this comprehensive statement of his views in regard 
to an American foreign policy: 

' ' I should myself like to shape our foreign policy with a 
purpose ultimately of driving off this continent every Euro- 
pean power. I would begin with Spain, and in the end 
would take all other European nations, including England. 
It is even more important to prevent any new nation from 
getting a foothold. Germany as a republic would very 
possibly be a friendly nation, but under the present des- 
potism she is much more bitterly and outspokenly hostile 
to us than is England. 



80 THEODORE ROOSEVELT AND HIS TIME 

''What I want to see our people avoid is the attitude 
taken by the great bulk of Americans at the beginning of 
this century, and the end of the last, when the mass of the 
Jeffersonians put the interests of France above the inter- 
est and honor of America, and the mass of the Federalists 
did the same thing in England. I am not hostile to any 
European power in the abstract. I am simply an American 
first and last, and therefore hostile to any power which 
wrongs us. If Germany wronged us I would fight Ger- 
many; if England, I would fight England." 

It should be said in regard to this reference to England, 
that after what he considered to be the handsome way in 
which England acted toward the United States during the 
Spanish War, Roosevelt's attitude toward that country 
underwent a radical change — a change that was strength- 
ened later by England's course in the war with Germany. 

The most striking of Roosevelt's predictions at this time 
appears in his letter to Mr. Spring-Rice, already alluded 
to. In his review of conditions in foreign countries, he 
paid especial attention to Russia, a country which Mr. 
Spring-Rice had recently visited, and in concluding fore- 
shadowed, with remarkable accuracy, twenty years in ad- 
vance, the revolution of 1918 : 

''If Russia chooses to develop purely on her own line 
and to resist the growth of liberalism, then she may put 
off the day of reckoning; but she cannot ultimately avert 
it, and instead of occasionally having to go through what 
Kansas has gone through with the Populists, she will some 
time experience a red terror which will make the French 
Revolution pale." 

These predictions in regard to the course of events in 
foreign countries, interesting as they are, occupied only 
casual space in the great mass of correspondence that 
Roosevelt conducted during the year in which he held the 
oflSce of Assistant Secretary of the Navy. His dominating 
idea during the early part of that period was the condi- 



ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF THE NAVY 81 

tion of affairs in Cuba and the imperative necessity of 
American interference. He was frankly and ardently in 
favor of interference in Cuba on the ground of humanity, 
and, after the blowing up of the Maine, in favor of war 
with Spain in defense of the national honor. He was vir- 
tually alone in the McKinley Administration in advocating 
this policy. So completely was this the case that he might 
have said of his function in the Administration during the 
year which preceded the war with Spain what Socrates in 
his 'Apology' said of his function in the Athenian state: 
''The state is exactly like a powerful high-bred steed, which 
is sluggish by reason of his very size, and so needs a gadfly 
to wake him up. And as such a gadfly does God seem to 
have fastened me upon the state ; wherefore, besetting you 
everywhere the whole day long, I arouse and stir up and re- 
proach each one of you." 

In his 'Autobiography' Roosevelt calls the war with 
Spain ' ' The War of America the Unready. ' ' It might with 
equal truth be called "The War of McKinley the Unwill- 
ing," for he and his official associates refused to engage in 
it till refusal was no longer possible without dishonor. 
They were supported in this course by Thomas B. Reed, 
Speaker of the House of Representatives, and by a group 
of Senators under the leadership of the Senate's most 
powerful member, Eugene Hale, of Maine. Secretary Long, 
Roosevelt's superior officer, was more than lukewarm upon 
the question of building up the navy, which Roosevelt con- 
sidered to be of the highest importance. Upon all these 
persons Roosevelt acted as the persistent and irritating 
gadfly. The full story of his efforts and of the develop- 
ments of this interesting period stands revealed in his 
correspondence. 

Roosevelt had been an earnest and persistent advocate of 
a big navy for ten years or more before he entered the 
Navy Department, and it was inevitable, therefore, that in 
assuming office his first thought should be in that direction. 
One of his early letters, addressed to the editor of the New 
York Sim, August 16, 1897, contains this passage: "I am 



82 THEODORE ROOSEVELT AND HIS TIME 

rather afraid that there is a very foolish feeling growing 
that we now have enough of a navy. It would be horrible 
folly to stop building up our navy now." 

Secretary Long's lukewarm attitude on the subject was 
revealed quite early in their official intercourse, and on 
August 26, 1897, Roosevelt mildly expressed his regret in 
a letter to the Secretary who w^as away on a vacation : "I 
know you will excuse my saying that I can't help being 
sorry you have reached the conclusion that we are not to 
go on at all in building even, say, one battleship and five 
torpedo-boats." 

A letter to Senator Lodge, written a few weeks later, 
September 15, 1897, reveals the fact that Roosevelt had 
brought the subject to the President's attention and secured 
the overruling of the Secretary. This letter is interesting 
also for the glimpse it affords of McKinley's personality: 

"The President has returned and yesterday I went driv- 
ing with him. Generally, he expressed great satisfaction 
with what I had done, especially during the last seven weeks 
that I have been in charge of the Department. Of course 
the President is a bit of a jollier, but I think his words did 
represent a substratum of satisfaction. 

"He is evidently by no means sure that we shall not have 
trouble with Spain ; and though he wants to avoid both, yet 
I think he could be depended upon to deal thoroughly and 
well -with any difficulty that arises. ... I told him that 
I would guarantee that the Department would be in the 
best possible shape that our means would permit when war 
began, and that, as he knew, I myself would go to the war. 
He asked me what Mrs. Roosevelt would think of it, and I 
said that both you and she would regret it, but this was one 
case where I would consult neither. He laughed and said 
that he would do all he could to guarantee that I should 
have the opportunity I sought if war by any chance arose. 

"To my great pleasure he also told me that he intended 
we should go on building up the Navy, with better ships 
and toi'pedo-boats, and that he did not think the Secretary 



ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF THE NAVY 83 

would recommend anything he (the President) did not ap- 
prove of." 

Two efforts were made by Roosevelt in the latter part of 
September, 1897, when the Cuban situation seemed threat- 
ening, to induce Secretary Long to take decisive action of 
some sort in the direction of naval preparedness. On Sep- 
tember 20 he wrote to him at Hingham, Mass. : 

'*From what the President and Judge Day (Secretary 
of State) say it would seem that advices from Spain are 
not altogether satisfactory. I do not anticipate any trouble, 
but if there is we should have warning just as far in ad- 
vance as the President will permit, and should be ready 
to take the initiative at once. If in the event of trouble we 
wait to receive the attack we will have our hands full, and 
the greatest panic would ensue, but if we move with the 
utmost rapidity with our main force on Cuba, say under 
Admiral Walker, and a flying squadron under Evans, or 
some such man, against Spain itself, while the Asiatic 
squadron operates against the Philippines, I believe the 
affair would not present a very great difficulty. ' ' 

And on September 30, he sent a long and formal letter 
urging the steady and rapid upbuilding of the Navy, and 
saying : 

'*A great Navy does not make for war but for peace. It 
is the cheapest kind of insurance. No coast fortifications 
can really protect our coasts; they can only be protected 
by a formidable fighting Na\^. 

''I believe Congress should at once give us 6 new battle- 
ships, 6 large cruisers, and 75 torpedo-boats, 25 for the 
Pacific and 50 for the Atlantic. I believe we should set 
about building all these craft now, and that each one should 
be, if possible, the most formidable of its kind afloat." 

About the same time he saw the President again, writing 
to Senator Lodge on September 21: ''The President has 
been most kind. I dined with him Friday evening, and yes- 



84 THEODORE ROOSEVELT AND HIS TIME 

terday he sent over and took me out to drive. I gave him 
a paper showing exactly where all our ships are and I also 
sketched in outline what I thought ought to be done if 
things looked menacing about Spain, urging the necessity 
of taking an immediate and prompt initiative if we wished 
to avoid the chance of some serious trouble." 

In December the outlook was even more threatening and, 
with a side glance still on Germany, he wrote on the 17th, 
to Lieutenant-Commander W. W. Kimball, U. S. N. : "I 
doubt if those Spaniards can really pacify Cuba, and if the 
insurrection goes on much longer I don't see how we can 
help interfering. Germany is the power with whom I look 
forward to serious difficulty; but oh, how bitterly angry I 
get at the attitude of some of our public men and some of 
our publicists!" 

On January 14, 1898, Roosevelt again sent a formal letter 
to Secretary Long, giving the location and armament of 
the various ships of the Navy at the moment, and fairly 
imploring him to act : 

*'I feel that I ought to bring to your attention the very 
serious consequences to the Government as a whole, and 
especially to the Navy Department — upon which would be 
visited the national indignation — for any check, no matter 
how little the Department was really responsible for the 
check — if we should drift into a war with Spain and sud- 
denly find ourselves obliged to begin it without prepara- 
tion, instead of having at least a month's warning, during 
which we could actively prepare to strike. Some prepara- 
tion can and should be undertaken now on the mere chance 
of having to strike. 

** Certain things should be done at once if there is any 
reasonable chance of trouble with Spain during the next 
six months. For instance, the disposition of the fleet on 
foreign stations should be radically altered, and altered 
without delay. For the past six or eight months we have 
been sending small cruisers and gunboats off to various 
parts of the world with a total disregard of the fact that 
in the event of war this would be the worst possible policy 



ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF THE NAVY 85 

to have pursued. ... If we have war with Spain there 
will be immediate need for every gunboat and cruiser that 
we can possibly get together to blockade Cuba, threaten or 
take the less protected ports, and ferret out the scores of 
small Spanish cruisers and gunboats which form practical- 
ly the entire Spanish naval force around the island." 

On February 15, 1898, the battleship Maine was blown up 
in Havana harbor, and on the following day Roosevelt 
wrote to a friend: ** Being a Jingo, as I am writing coU' 
fidentially, I will say, to relieve my feelings, that I would 
give anything if President McKinley would order the fleet 
to Havana to-morrow. This Cuban business ought to stop. 
The Maine was sunk by an act of dirty treachery on the part 
of the Spaniards, I believe ; though we shall never find out 
definitely, and officially it will go down as an accident." 

Secretary Long had returned to Washington and was on 
duty when the Maine explosion occurred. On February 19, 
Roosevelt addressed a formal letter to him which was the 
most solemnly earnest of the series of prods thus far ad- 
ministered to him. One passage which I have placed in 
italics was especially significant in view of the Secretary's 
well-known attitude toward building up the navy: 

"In reference to our conversation of yesterday, and to 
a brief conversation which I had with Judge Day this morn- 
ing before you came, let me again earnestly urge that you 
advise the President against our conducting any examina- 
tion in conjunction with the Spaniards as to the Maine's 
disaster. I myself doubt whether it will be possible to tell 
definitely how the disaster occurred by an investigation, 
and it may be that we could do it as well in conjunction 
with the Spaniards as alone. But I am sure we could never 
convince the people at large of this fact. 

''There is another subject of which I spoke to you yes- 
terday, and about which I venture to remind you. This is 
in reference to additional warships. I was informed that 
both Speaker Reed and Senator Hale had stated that we 
should cease building any more battleships, in view of the 



86 THEODORE ROOSEVELT AND HIS TIME 

disaster to the Maine, I cannot believe that the statement 
is true, for of course sioch an attitude, if supported hy the 
people, woidd mean that we hud reached the last pitch of 
fKitional cowardice and baseness. I earnestly wish that you 
could see your way clear now, without waiting a day, to 
send in a special message, stating that in view of the disas- 
ter to the Maine (and perhaps in view of the possible needs 
of this country) instead of recommending one battleship 
you ask for two, or better still, that four battleships be 
authorized immediately by Congress." 

This letter evidently alarmed Secretary Long, for a few 
days later, on February 25, he wrote a personal note to 
Eoosevelt in his own hand, saying he should be absent from 
the Department for a day's quiet rest, directing him to re- 
voke an order Eoosevelt had issued in regard to getting 
the naval vessels ready for action, and adding: **Do not 
take any such step affecting the policy of the Administra- 
tion without consulting the President or me. I am not away 
from town and mp intention was to have you look after the 
routine of the office while I get a quiet day off. I write to 
you because I am anxious to have no unnecessary occasion 
for a sensation in the papers." The passage which I have 
placed in italics is especially significant. 

Writing to Henry White, then Secretary of the American 
Embassy at London, on March 9, 1898, Roosevelt said: 
**0f course I have nothing to say as to the policy of the 
Government, but I hope this incident (Maine) will not be 
treated by itself, but as part of the whole Cuban business. 
There is absolutely but one possible solution of a perma- 
nent nature to that affair, and that is Cuban independence. 
The sooner we make up our minds to this the better. If 
we can attain our object peacefully, of course we should try 
to do so J but we should attain it one way or the other any- 
how. ' ' 

When the news arrived of the sailing of the Spanish 
torpedo flotilla from the Canaries for Porto Rico, on March 



ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF THE NAVY 87 

15, 1898, Eoosevelt went at once to the President, and, as 
he wrote to Captain R. D. Evans of the navy on the follow- 
ing day, told him that ''we ought to treat the sailing of the 
flotilla exactly as a European power would the mobilizing 
of a hostile army on its frontier." He did not confine his 
exhortations to the President, but, as appears from the sub- 
joined extract from a letter to Brooks Adams, on March 21, 
1898, extended them to the Cabinet as well : 

** Personally, I feel that it is not too late to intervene in 
Cuba. What the Administration will do I know not. In 
some points it has followed too closely in Cleveland's foot- 
steps to please me, excellently though it has done on the 
whole. In the name of humanity and of national interest 
alike, we should have interfered in Cuba two years ago, a 
year and a half ago last April, and again last December. The 
blood of the Cubans, the blood of women and children who 
have perished by the hundred thousand in hideous misery, 
lies at our door; and the blood of the murdered men of the 
Maine calls not for indemnity but for the full measure of 
atonement which can only come by driving the Spaniard 
from the New World. I have said this to the President 
before his Cabinet; I have said it to Judge Day, the real 
head of the State Department; and to my own Chief. I 
cannot say it publicly, for I am of course merely a minor 
official in the Administration. At least, however, I have 
borne testimony where I thought it would do good." 

The response that he received was clearly not encourag- 
ing, for on March 24 he wrote to Captain A. T. Mahan, who 
was a cordial sympathizer in his efforts: ''I think I told 
you that I advised the President and the Secretary to treat 
the sailing of the torpedo flotilla from the Canaries for 
Porto Rico as an act of hostility. I have repeated the ad- 
vict3 to-day. I do not think it will be regarded." 

His inability to stir the Administration to action was both 
discouraging and depressing to him. On March 27, he re- 
ceived a letter, written the day before, from William Tudor, 



88 THEODORE ROOSEVELT AND HIS TIME 

an old and valued friend in Boston, in which the writer 
said: 

*'It is hard to credit the newspaper reports that the 
Cabinet by a large majority intend to pass over the blow- 
ing up of the Maine. Those of us who are not speculating 
in the stock market believe that this is merely put forward 
by the Administration to gain time. 

' * I believe that the blowing up of the Maine with the con- 
nivance of the Spanish authorities cannot be passed over. 
With wholesale murder there can be no question of arbitra- 
tion. If you allow Spain to get her torpedo fleet across the 
Atlantic the Administration will be responsible for the loss 
of more ships. The first act of war was the blowing up of 
the Maine; the second is the sending of this torpedo fleet to 
Porto Rico. Are we to wait until more of our ships are de- 
stroyed before acting? I protest against this peace-at-any- 
price policy of the Government, which does not represent 
the views of a tenth of the American people." 

To this Roosevelt responded on March 28: ^'I agree 
from the bottom of my heart with all you say. I feel 
humiliated and ashamed. Every argument you advance I 
have personally advanced with all the force there was in 
me, both to the President and the Cabinet; and in vain." 

To his brother-in-law, Captain W. S. Cowles, of the navy, 
he wrote in similar strain on March 29 : 

*'I am utterly disgusted at the present outlook in foreign 
relations. I can only hope that the Senate, under the 
leadership of men like Lodge, will rise to the needs of the 
hour and insist upon immediate independence for Cuba and 
armed intervention on our part. Nothing less than this 
will avail. Shilly shallying and half measures at this time 
will merely render us contemptible in the eyes of the world ; 
and what is infinitely more important, in our own eyes too. 
Personally I cannot understand how the bulk of our people 
can tolerate the hideous infamy that has attended the last 
two years of Spanish rule in Cuba ; and still more how they 
can tolerate the treacherous destruction of the Maine and 



ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF THE NAVY 89 

the murder of our men! I feel so deeply that it is with 
very great difficulty I can restrain myself." 

On the following day, March 30, he wrote again to Cap- 
tain Cowles: 

*'0f course I cannot speak in public, but I have advised 
the President in the presence of his Cabinet, as well as 
Judge Day and Senator Hanna, as strongly as I knew how, 
to settle this matter instantly by armed intervention; and 
I told the President in the plainest language that no other 
course was compatible with our national honor, or with the 
claims of humanity on behalf of the wretched women and 
children of Cuba. I am more grieved and indignant than 
I can say at there being any delay on our part in a matter 
like this. A great crisis is upon us, and if we do not rise 
level to it, we shall have spotted the pages of our history 
with a dark blot of shame." 

On the same day, to another brother-in-law, Douglas 
Kobinson, of New York, he wrote : 

"Neither I nor any one else can give you more than the 
merest vague forecast of events. The President is resolute 
to have peace at any price. As far as he is concerned, un- 
less the Spaniards declare war, we will not have it. Con- 
gress, however, is in an entirely different temper. The 
most influential man in it, Tom Reed, is as much against 
war as the President, and the group of Senators who stand 
closest to the President are also ferociously against war. 
Nevertheless, Congress as a whole wishes either war or 
action that would result in war. Their most patriotic and 
able men take this view, and I doubt if they can be much 
longer restrained. Therefore I think it about a toss-up 
whether we have war or peace. The trend of events is for 
war. Congress is for war. All it needs is a big leader; 
but the two biggest leaders, the President and the Speaker, 
both of whom have enormous power, are almost crazy in 
their eagerness for peace, and would make almost any sac- 
rifice to get peace." 



90 THEODORE ROOSEVELT AND HIS TIME 

Writing to Elihu Root, on April 5, 1898, he reveals the 
sources from which came the most powerful pressure 
against war and to which the Administration was yielding: 

*' You would be amazed and horrified at the peace-at-any- 
price telegrams of the most abject description which come 
in multitudes from New York, Boston, and elsewhere to the 
President and Senators. 

**Not only is the peace sentiment of the eastern seaboard 
not the sentiment of the country at large, but I doubt 
whether this sentiment exists in the strata lower than the 
wealthiest even in the East. 

"The President has taken a position from which he can- 
not back down without ruin to his reputation, ruin to his 
party, and, above all, lasting dishonor to his country; and 
I am sure he will not back down. 

"Thank Heaven, this morning it looks as if the Admin- 
istration had made up its mind to lead the movement in- 
stead of resisting it with the effect of shattering the party 
and of humiliating the nation. Judge Day, who together 
with that idol of the Mugwumps, Secretaiy Gage, has been 
advocating peace under almost any conditions, has just 
told me that he has given up and that the President seems 
to be making up his mind to the same effect. Of course 
from the military standpoint it is dreadful to have delayed 
so long." 

To a college classmate, Dr. Henry Jackson, of Boston, 
who had written to him in support of peace-at-any-price, 
he sent this characteristic rejoinder on April 6, 1898 : 

"I believe it criminal for us to submit to the murder of 
our men, and to the butchery of Cuban women and chil- 
dren. The resources of diplomacy have been exhausted. 
This nation has erred on the side of over-bearance. 
When you talk of this war being undertaken to satisfy the 
political greed of a parcel of politicians you show the most 
astounding ignorance of the conditions. The only effective 
forces against the war are the forces inspired by greed and 



ASSISTANT SECEETARY OF THE NAVY 91 

fear, and the forces that tell in favor of war are the belief 
in national honor and common humanity." 

The pre-war portion of the correspondence closes with 
this despondent view of the situation as it appeared to him 
on April 7, 1898 : *'If you are puzzled you can imagine the 
bitter wrath and humiliation which I feel at the absolute 
lack of plans. We have our plans in the Navy, and beyond 
that there is absolutely nothing. The President doesn't 
know what message he will send in or what he will do if we 
have war. ' ' 

Four days later, April 11, 1898, President McKinley, left 
with no alternative by the obviously tricky conduct of the 
Spanish government in proposing an armistice which was a 
sham on its face, made up his mind that war was inevitable, 
and sent a message to Congress asking it to empower him 
to end hostilities in Cuba and to secure the establishment 
of a stable government ' ' capable of maintaining order and 
observing its international obligations." Congress, after 
full discussion, adopted, on April 19, joint resolutions de- 
claring the people of Cuba free and independent, demand- 
ing the surrender of all Spanish authority in the island, and 
directing and empowering the President to enforce the 
resolutions by using the full land and naval forces of the 
United States. Spain declared war formally on April 24, 
and the United States did the same on April 25. 



CHAPTER X 
THE WAR WITH SPAIN 

That the Navy was reasonably well prepared for the war 
solely because of the efforts of Roosevelt, is clearly revealed 
by these citations from his correspondence. For months 
he had been working unceasingly with the hearty co-opera- 
tion of the ablest men in the service to get material in 
readiness and have the ships properly equipped and com- 
manded. It was due solely to him also that Admiral Dewey 
was in command of the Asiatic squadron and that that 
squadron was ready to sail from Hong Kong to the Philip- 
pines at a moment's notice and was in condition to win the 
battle of Manila. There is abundant proof in support of 
these statements. 

When the question of appointing a commander of the 
Asiatic squadron arose in the fall of 1897, Roosevelt, in 
accordance with his established policy of gathering from 
every source information as to who were the best men to 
occupy the fighting positions, ascertained that sound naval 
opinion was overwhelmingly in favor of Dewey for the com- 
mand of a squadron. He had been struck by an incident 
in Dewey's career in which he had, without authority from 
the Navy Department and on his own responsibility, bought 
a supply of coal in preparation for a threatening emer- 
gency. ''The incident," Roosevelt says in his 'Autobi- 
ography,' "made me feel that here was a man who could be 
relied upon to prepare in advance, and to act promptly, 
fearlessly, and on his own responsibility when the emer- 
gency arose. Accordingly I did my best to get him put in 
command of the Asiatic fleet, the fleet where it was most 
essential to have a man who would act without referring 
things back to the home authorities." 

92 



THE WAR WITH SPAIN 93 

The manner in which Roosevelt's desire was accom- 
plished is told as follows by Admiral Dewey himself in his 
* Autobiography' (Charles Scribner's Sons, 1913) : 

' ' The most influential officer in the distribution of assign- 
ments was Rear-Admiral A. S. Crowninshield, chief of the 
Bureau of Navigation, and a pronounced bureaucrat, with 
whose temperament and methods I had little more sym- 
pathy than had the majority of the officers of the navy at 
that time. He would hardly recommend me to any com- 
mand ; and his advice had great weight with John D. Long, 
who was then Secretary of the Navy. 

"Theodore Roosevelt was Assistant Secretary of the 
Navy. He was impatient of red tape, and had a singular 
understanding both of the importance of preparedness for 
war and of striking quick blows in rapid succession once 
war was begun. With the enthusiastic candor which char- 
acterizes him, he declared that I ought to have the Asiatic 
Squadron. He asked me if I had any political influence. 
I expressed a natural disinclination to use it. He agreed 
with the correctness of my view as an officer, but this was a 
situation where it must be used in self-defense. One letter 
from an influential source in favor of Howell had already 
been received by the department. 

" 'I want you to go,' Mr. Roosevelt declared. 'You are 
the man who will be equal to the emergency if one arises. 
Do you know any Senators ? ' 

''My heart was set on having the Asiatic Squadron. It 
seemed to me that we were inevitably drifting into a war 
with Spain. In command of an efficient force in the Far 
East, with a free hand to act in consequence of being so far 
away from Washington, I could strike promptly and suc- 
cessfully at the Spanish force in the Philippines. 

" 'Senator Proctor is from my State,' I said to Mr. 
Roosevelt. 'He is an old friend of the family, and my father 
was of service to him when he was a young man. ' 

" 'You could not have a better sponsor,' Mr. Roosevelt 
exclaimed. 'Lose no time in having him speak a word for 
you.' 



94 THEODORE ROOSEVELT AND HIS TIME 

**I went immediately to see Senator Proctor, who was 
delighted that I had mentioned the matter to him. That 
very day he called on President McKinley and received the 
promise of the appointment before he left the White House. 

"When I next met Crowninshield he told me that al- 
though I was to have the appointment — a fact which did 
not seem to please him any too well — Secretary Long was 
indignant because I had used political influence to obtain it. 
I went at once to see Mr. Long and said to him : 

** 'Mr. Secretary, I understand that you are displeased 
with me for having used influence to secure command of 
the Asiatic Squadron. I did so because it was the only way 
of offsetting influence that was being exerted on another 
officer's behalf.' 

" 'You are in error, Commodore,' said Mr. Long. 'No 
influence had been brought to bear on behalf of any one 
else.' 

"Only a few hours later, however, Mr. Long sent me a 
note in which he said that he had just found that a letter 
had been received at the Department which he had seen for 
the first time. It had arrived while he was absent from the 
office and while Mr. Eoosevelt was Acting Secretary, and 
had only just been brought to his attention." 

Dewey was appointed, sailed for his post on December 
7, 1897, and in February began to assemble the fleet at Hong 
Kong, doing so "entirely on my own initiative, without any 
hint whatever from the department that hostilities might 
be expected. It was evident that in case of emergency Hong 
Kong was the most advantageous position from which to 
move to the attack." 

News of the blowing up of the Maine did not reach him 
officially till February 18, 1898, when he received the fol- 
lowing cable message: 

Dewey, Hong Kong: 

Maine destroyed at Havana February 15th by accident. 
The President directs all colors to be half masted until fur- 



THE WAR WITH SPAIN 95 

ther orders. Inform vessels under your command by tele- 
graph. Long. 

Of this message Dewey writes : "Its wording shows how 
carefully our government was moving in a moment of such 
intense excitement. ' ' What happened next, is described by 
him as follows: 

"Though President McKinley was still confident that 
war could be averted, active naval measures had already 
begun, so far as navy-yard work upon ships and initial in- 
quiries with regard to the purchase of war material was 
concerned. But the first real step was taken on February 
25, when telegraphic instructions were sent to the Asiatic, 
European, and South Atlantic Squadrons to rendezvous at 
certain convenient points where, should war break out, they 
would be most available. 

"The message to the Asiatic Squadron bore the signa- 
ture of that Assistant Secretary who had seized the oppor- 
tunity, while Acting Secretary, to hasten preparations for 
a conflict which was inevitable. As Mr. Roosevelt reasoned, 
precautions would cost little in time of peace and would 
be invaluable in case of war. His cablegram was as follows : 

WASHiNeTON, February 25, 1898. 
Dewey, Hong Kong: 

Order the squadron except the Monocacy to Hong Kong. 
Keep full of coal. In the event of declaration of war Spain, 
your duty will be to see that the Spanish Squadron does 
not leave the Asiatic coast, and then offensive operations in 
Philippine Islands. Keep Olympia until further orders. 

Roosevelt. 

* * The reference to keeping the Olympia until further or- 
ders was due to the fact that I had been notified that she 
would soon be recalled to the United States." 

Dewey obeyed these instructions and proceeded to get 
his fleet in readiness for sailing for Manila at a moment's 



96 THEODORE ROOSEVELT AND HIS TIME 

notice, so that when the following order came from Secre- 
tary Long, on April 25, two months after Roosevelt's mes- 
sage to Dewey, he was ready to obey : 

''War has commenced between the United States and 
Spain. Proceed at once to Philippine Islands. Commence 
operations particularly against the Spanish fleet. You must 
capture vessels or destroy. Use utmost endeavor." 

Thus was the famous battle of Manila fought and won 
by a commander whose appointment had been secured by 
Roosevelt against the wishes of Secretary Long and whose 
fleet had been thoroughly equipped for the conflict by an 
order that Roosevelt had sent on his own responsibility in 
the absence of his chief. 

A few months later Secretary Long's personal attitude 
toward the course pursued by his assistant was revealed in 
the following letter to Roosevelt from Senator Lodge, de- 
cidedly the most interesting and illuminating letter in the 
present collection: (The italics are mine.) 

Nahant, Mass., September 21, 1898. 
Dear Theodore: 

I am going to ask for five minutes of your crowded time 
to read this letter and give me a little help. I am getting 
together of course the necessary materials for my war 
articles. The second one will be about Manila, and as the 
first is well advanced I am already gathering facts for the 
second. I intended to begin by a reference to your order to 
Dewey of February 25th. You no doubt remember that 
memorable Saturday afternoon when I came in and found 
you and Crowninshield sending out this order which was 
of such enormous importance and value in the subsequent 
operations. I wrote to CrowTiinshield that I knew the pur- 
port of the order, but that as a matter of caution I should 
be much obliged if I could have its exact terms. Here is a 
copy of what he said in reply. If you do not smile when 
you read it I shall be surprised : 



THE WAR WITH SPAIN 97 

** Replying to your note of September 19th, I have spoken 
to the Secretary and he is unwilling to give you the exact 
language of the order referred to. You will probably see 
yourself that to do so might appear to put us in a light of 
being almost over-prepared; in other words, it might seem 
that the Department, had as early as February 25th, the 
date of the order, made up its mind thut there was to be war 
anyway. Other orders issued about this time could only be 
called precautionary, but by some this particular order 
might be construed as indicated above." 

Here follows what I have said in reply to him, which I 
think will make you smile also : 

''Many thanks for your letter of September 19th. I only 
asked for the language of the order of February 25th to Ad- 
miral Dewey out of a spirit of caution which many years of 
historical studies have cultivated in me. I know the purport 
of the order as I happened to be in the office that afternoon 
when you and Mr. Roosevelt were sending it off, and a 
general statement such as I can make from memory will 
serve my purpose perfectly well. I confess that now that 
the war is over and when one of the things of which every- 
body is most proud and for which the Department received 
the most unstinted praise was the state of preparation in 
which the Navy found itself, I cannot conceive that any 
human being should criticize the Department for being 
over-prepared, but of this no doubt the Department is the 
better judge. I shall speak of the order sent out by you 
and Mr. Roosevelt in my articles as one of the wisest things 
that was done, a proposition which I consider proved by the 
little affair at Manila on the 1st of May. My intention was 
simply to refer to it as an order of the Department, but if 
the Secretary has the slightest objection to my doing so I 
will say that the order w^as sent by Mr. Roosevelt as Acting 
Secretary, and / have no doubt the Colonel of the Rough 
Riders will accept the responsibility of being over-prepared 
with perfect equanimity.' ' 

Now what I want of you is to give me your best recollec- 
tion of the general purport of the order. I remember it 



98 THEODORE ROOSEVELT AND HIS TIME 

pretty well myself, but I want to have your memory to con- 
firm mine, and that will be all-sufficient for the statement 
I wish to make. There is something very comic in our dear 
Secretary thinking he will be criticized for being over- 
prepared and precipitating the war if that order is pub- 
lished. 

H. C. Lodge. 

In his book, *'The War with Spain" (Harper & Brothers, 
1899), Senator Lodge records the incident as follows: 

*'0n February 25 a cable message was sent to Commo- 
dore Dewey by Mr. Roosevelt directing him to assemble 
his squadron at Hong Kong, retain the Olympia which had 
been ordered back to San Francisco, and be prepared in 
case of war for offensive operations in the Philippines. On 
the 3d of March the Mohican was sent with ammunition to 
Honolulu, there to await the Baltimore, which was to take 
the ammunition on board and proceed at once to join the 
Asiatic Squadron. No wiser or more far-sighted precau- 
tions were ever taken by an administration than these, and 
it was all done so quietly that no one on the outside knew 
what was happening." 

Writing to John Hay, Secretary of State, on July 1, 1899, 
Roosevelt gave his own view of what would have been the 
outcome at Manila if Dewey had not been in command and 
if the fleet had not been in a condition of thorough prepara- 
tion. 

**In last year's fighting, as the President knows, there 
was a good deal of hesitation in sending Dewey to the 
Asiatic Squadron. It was urged very strongly by the 
Bureau of Navigation that Howell was entitled to go. 
Finally, and most wisely, the Secretary decided to disre- 
gard the argument of seniority and to send Dewey. If he 
had not done so, there would have been no Philippine prob- 
lem at present, for our fleet would have done nothing more 
than to conduct a solemn blockade of Manila until our coal 
gave out, and then go away." 



THE WAR WITH SPAIN 99 

An additional instance of Secretary Long's personal at- 
titude toward Roosevelt was revealed several years later 
in an article which he published in the Outlook magazine. 
Concerning this Roosevelt wrote to him on October 12, 1903 : 

''In the Outlook, in an article written by you, there has 
appeared this statement about me when I was Assistant 
Secretary to you : 'Just before the war he, as well as some 
naval officers, was anxious to send the squadron across the 
ocean to sink the ships and torpedo-boat destroyers of the 
Spanish fleet while we were yet at peace with Spain. ' I am 
sure that you did not intend to state the proposition just 
as it is here expressed. My memory is that I wished to 
treat the sending over by Spain of her battleships and de- 
stroyers as a cause of war. My memory is also that when 
two or more of the armor-clads of Spain were in Havana — 
not on the coast of Spain — just before the outbreak of hos- 
tilities, I desired some of our ships sent down to watch 
them. Do you not refer to these two facts? 

"I would not bother you about this, my dear Governor, 
but it seems to me to be a very serious accusation, when 
brought against me by a gentleman of your high standing, 
my former chief ; and it has seemingly been so accepted by 
the public at large, if I am to judge by the activity of the 
gentlemen of the press in seeking interviews with me this 
morning. ' ' 

To this letter Mr. Long wrote a reply in which he pro- 
fessed to see no difference between what he had written and 
what Roosevelt thought he should have written. In a 
second letter, October 15, 1903, Roosevelt wrote: 

''I thank you for your letter. I am sure I need not tell 
you how well I know your kindly feelings toward me, which 
feelings found full expression in the general tenor of your 
article. I think, however, that it was a pity that in such 
an important matter as this I was not given a chance to try 
to refresh your memory on any point where we differed. 
It is perfectly true that I wished a declaration of war long 
before we did declare it ; and I also desired notice to be sent 



100 THEODORE ROOSEVELT AND HIS TIME 

to the Spanish Government that we should treat the sailing 
of the fleet as an act of war, and then meet the fleet on the 
seas and smash it before it could act on the defensive. It 
was to my mind obvious that armed cruisers and torpedo- 
boats could not be used against the insurgents, and could 
only be intended for use against us. But this last is aside 
from the point. Don't you think the two statements you 
have made as to my attitude are in themselves a little in- 
consistent? You speak in one case as if I wished to send a 
fleet over to Spain and sink the Spanish boats while we 
were still at peace. In the other case you speak of the 
Spanish vessels as having sailed, and my being anxious to 
meet them on the sea and smash them. 1 am sure that you 
will recall that I had been urging a declaration of war for 
some time — that is, urging a declaration that we should 
take certain acts, or failures to act, as warranting such 
declaration after notice had been given. In the case of the 
sailing of the torpedo-boats, I did wish us to notify the 
Spanish Government that we should treat their being sent 
as an act of war. In the form in which the statement is 
made in the Outlook, I cannot admit that either I or any 
naval officer whom I was associated wdth made it — indeed 
I do not recall such a suggestion made by any one, and cer- 
tainly I never made any such suggestion myself, as that 
we should send a squadron across the ocean to sink the 
ships and torpedo-boat destroyers while we were yet at 
peace with Spain. As I recall it and all that I remember 
any naval officer urging, was that we should notify the 
Spanish Government that we should treat their sailing as 
an act of war and that we should then conduct ourselves 
accordingly. ' ' 

As shown in his correspondence, Eoosevelt had resolved 
very early in the controversy about Cuba that if there 
should be a war with Spain he w^ould take part in it. He had 
mentioned this purpose to McKinley in his interview with 
him in September, 1897, quoted above, and in January fol- 
lowing, when the probability of war became strong, he 



THE WAR WITH SPAIN 101 

sought to get into the service in a New York militia regi- 
ment as a major under Colonel Francis Vinton Greene, 
saying he ''was going to go somehow." On March 9, 1898, 
he wrote to Captain C. H. Davis of the navy that "if there 
is a war I want to get away from here and get to the front 
if I possibly can." On the following day he wrote to Gen- 
eral Whitney Tillinghast, Adjutant-General of New York: 
*'0f course I can't leave this position until it is perfectly 
certain we are going to have a war, and that I can get down 
to it. I don't want to be in office during war, I want to be 
at the front ; but I would rather be in this office than guard- 
ing a fort and no enemy within a thousand miles of me. Of 
course being here hampers me. If I were in New York City 
I think I could raise a regiment of volunteers in short order 
when the President told me to go ahead, but it is going to be 
difficult from here." 



Colonel Greene had written that for various reasons it 
was not practicable for Roosevelt to go to war under him, 
and on March 15 Roosevelt again wrote to him: 

*'I don't agree with you as to my post of duty. I don't 
want to be in an office instead of at the front; but I dare 
say I shall have to be, and shall try to do good work wher- 
ever I am put. I have long been accustomed, not to taking 
the positions I should like, but to doing the best that I was 
able to do in a position I did not altogether like, and under 
conditions which I didn 't like at all. But I shall hope still 
that in the event of serious war I may have a chance to 
serve under you." 

Writing to Adjutant-General Tillinghast again on March 
26, he said: 

''It looks to me as though matters were coming to a 
climax, and we should soon see actual trouble with Spain. 
I wish the Governor would say whether or not he believes 
that the State militia would be sent out of the State, that 
is, down to Cuba as part of an expeditionary force, or 



102 THEODORE ROOSEVELT AND HIS TIME 

whether we shall raise volunteers. If the latter, will you 
present my regards to him and ask if I may not be allowed 
to raise a regiment! I think I can certainly do it." 

On the same date he wrote as follows to William Astor 
Chanler, a member of Congress from New York : ' ' Things 
look as though they were coming to a head. Now, can you 
start getting up that regiment when the time comes? Do 
you want me as Lt.-Colonel? Also, remember that to try 
to put toughs in it — still worse to try to put political heelers 
in — will result in an utterly unmanageable regiment, for- 
midable to its own officers and impotent to do mischief to 
the foe.'' 



His reasons for desiring to get into the war were set 
forth in full in a very striking letter which he wrote, on 
March 29, 1898, to Doctor Sturgis Bigelow, in Boston. 
There is much material for sober thought in this letter for 
those critics of Eoosevelt who have charged him with favor- 
ing war because of sheer love of fighting: 

* * I do not know that I shall be able to go to Cuba if there 
is a war. The army may not be employed at all, and even 
if it is employed it will consist chiefly of regular troops ; and 
as regards the volunteers only a very small proportion can 
be taken from among the multitudes who are even now 
coming forward. Therefore it may be that I shall be un- 
able to go, and shall have to stay here. In that case I shall 
do my duty here to the best of my ability, although I shall 
be eating out my heart. But if I am able to go I certainly 
shall. It is perfectly true that I shall be leaving one duty, 
but it will only be for the purpose of taking up another. 
I say quite sincerely that I shall not go for my own pleasure. 
On the contrary, if I should consult purely my own feelings 
I should earnestly hope that we would have peace. I like 
life very much. I have always led a joyous life. I like 
thought and I like action, and it will be very bitter to me 
to leave my wife and children ; and while I think I could face 



THE WAR WITH SPAIN 103 

death with dignity, I have no desire before my time has 
come to go out into the everlasting darkness. So I shall 
not go into a war with any undue exhilaration of spirits or 
in a frame of mind in any way approaching recklessness 
or levity. 

''Moreover, a man's usefulness depends upon his living 
up to his ideals in so far as he can. Now, I have consist- 
ently preached what our opponents are pleased to call 
'Jingo doctrines' for a good many years. One of the com- 
monest taunts directed at men like myseK is that we are 
armchair and parlor Jingoes who wish to see others do 
what we only advocate doing. I care very little for such 
a taunt, except as it affects my usefulness, but I cannot 
afford to disregard the fact that my power for good, what- 
ever it may be, would be gone if I didn 't try to live up to the 
doctrines I have tried to preach. Moreover, it seems to me 
that it would be a good deal more important from the stand- 
point of the nation as a whole that men like myself should 
go to war than that we should stay comfortably in offices 
at home and let others carry on the war that we have 
urged. ' ' 

A way was opened for Roosevelt to get into the war when 
Congress authorized the raising of three National Volun- 
teer Cavalry Regiments, wholly apart from State contin- 
gents. The Secretary of War, General Alger, offered him 
the command of one of these regiments, but Roosevelt de- 
clined it, saying that after six weeks' service in the field 
he would feel competent to handle the regiment, but that 
he did not at the time know how to equip it or how to get 
it into the first action. He recommended for the command 
his friend Leonard Wood, who was as eager to get into the 
war as he was, saying to the Secretary that if he could ap- 
point Wood Colonel he would accept the Lieutenant-Colo- 
nelcy. This was done, and the famous regiment of Rough 
Riders was formed. Its official name was the First United 
States Volunteer Cavalry, but because it was largely com- 
posed of Western ranchmen, it was promptly nicknamed 



104 THEODORE ROOSEVELT AND HIS TIME 

Rough Riders, and under that picturesque title passed 
through the war and into history. 

When he sent in his resignation from the Navy Depart- 
ment he received, among others, the following letters: 

Navy Department, Washington, 
May 7, 1898. 
My dear Mr. Roosevelt: 

I have your letter of resignation to the President, but as 
I have told you so many times, I have it with the utmost 
regret. I have often expressed, perhaps too emphatically 
and harshly, my conviction that you ought not to leave the 
post of Assistant Secretary of the Navy, where your ser- 
vices have not only been of such great value, but of so much 
inspiration to me and to the whole service. But now that 
you have determined to go to the front, I feel bound to say 
that, while I do not approve of the change, I do most heart- 
ily appreciate the patriotism and the sincere fidelity to your 
convictions which actuate you. 

Let me assure you how most profoundly I feel the loss I 
sustain in your going, for your energy, industry and great 
knowledge of naval interests, and especially your inspiring 
influence in stimulating and lifting the whole tone of the 
personnel of the Navy have been invaluable. 

I cannot close this reply to your letter without telling 
you also what an affectionate personal regard I have come 
to feel for you as a man of the truest temper and most loyal 
friendship. I rejoice that one who has so much capacity 
for public service and for winning personal friendships 
has the promise of so many years of useful and loving life 
before him. 

My heart goes with you, and I am. 

Very sincerely yours, 

John D. Long. 
Hon. Theodore Roosevelt, 

Assistant Secretary of the Navy, 
Navy Department. 



THE WAR WITH SPAIN 105 

Executive Mansion, Washington, 
May 9, 1898. 
My dear Mr. Secretary: 

Although the President was obliged to accept your resig- 
nation of recent date, I can assure you that he has done 
so with very great regret. Only the circumstances men- 
tioned in your letter and your decided and unchangeable 
preference for your new patriotic work have induced the 
President to consent to your severing your present connec- 
tion with the Administration. 

Your services here during your entire term in office have 
been faithful, able and successful in the highest degree, and 
no one appreciates this fact more keenly than the President 
himself. Without doubt your connection with the Navy 
will be beneficially felt in several of its departments for 
many years to come. 

In the President's behalf therefore I wish at this time to 
thank you most heartily and to wish you all success in your 
new and important undertaking, for which I hope and pre- 
dict a brilliantly victorious result. 

With sincere respect and cordial esteem, believe me, 
always 

Faithfully yours, 

John Addison Porter, 

Secretary to the President. 
Hon. Theodore Roosevelt, 

Assistant Secretary of the Navy, 
Washington, D. C. 

Among the many letters of congratulation that Roosevelt 
received at the close of the war were the following from 
John Hay, then United States Ambassador to England, 
and James Bryce, afterwards Viscount Bryce, author of 
the "American Commonwealth": 

American Embassy, London, July 27, 1898. 
Bear Roosevelt: 

I am afraid I am the last of your friends to congratulate 
you on the brilliant campai^ which now seems drawing to 



106 THEODORE ROOSEVELT AND HIS TIME 

a close, and in which you have gained so much experience 
and glor}^ When the war began I was like the rest ; I de- 
plored your place in the Navy where you were so useful 
and so acceptable. But I know it was idle to preach to a 
young man. You obeyed your own daemon, and I imagine 
we older fellows will all have to confess that you were in 
the right. As Sir Walter wrote : 

One crowded hour of glorious life 
Is worth an age without a name. 

You have written your name on several pages of your 
country's history, and they are all honorable to you and 
comfortable to your friends. 

It has been a splendid little war ; begun with the highest 
motives, carried on with magnificent intelligence and spirit, 
favored by that Fortune which loves the brave. It is now 
to be concluded, I hope, with that fine good nature, which 
is, after all, the distinguishing trait of the American char- 
acter. 

Faithfully yours, 

John Hay. 

HiNDLEAP Lodge, 
Forest Row, Sussex, 
September 12, 1898. 
My dear Roosevelt: 

Our hearty congratulations on your safe return and on 
the laurels you have won. I was sorry you retired from a 
post in which you were doing so much first-rate work as the 
Assistant Secretaryship of the Navy. But you have justi- 
fied your action, and have had an experience which will be 
of the utmost service to yourself and I hope to your coun- 
try, too. 

How stupendous a change in the world these six months 
have brought. Six months ago you no more thought of an- 
nexing the Philippine Isles and Porto Rico than you think 
of annexing Spitzbergen to-day. In the interest of the 
United States, I am uneasy at the change, because the new 
enterprises you will enter on are enterprises for which 



THE WAR WITH SPAIN 107 

your Constitution and government have not been framed ; 
and mistakes may be made, many and serious, before you 
develop the institutions needed. Perhaps it is because 
we have had such a lot of experience, some of it most unsat- 
isfactory, with our tropical colonies, that I am more anxious 
to see the American people purify city government and do 
certain other jobs at home than to see them civilize the 
Malays and aborigines of Luzon. However, you are clearly 
''in for it," and what I hope you will do is to have a healthy 
despotism governing these tropical semi-savages and even 
the Spanish Creoles. No talk of suffrage or any such con- 
stitutional privileges for them, but steady government by 
the firmest, most honest men you can find, and no inter- 
ference if possible by Congress when the firm and honest 
men have been found. 

It is a happy result of the last six months that your people 
and ours seem nearer together in sympathy than ever be- 
fore. You will have noticed that nearly every one here 
applauds your imperialistic new departure. We are here 
growing more imperialistic than ever. 

My wife joins in best regards — I hope by next year to be 
writing to you to Albany. 

Sincerely yours, 

James Brycb. 

An amusing side-light upon the military conduct of the 
operations in Cuba during the Spanish War is cast in this 
letter from Roosevelt to Senator Lodge under date of 
March 3, 1899 : 

*'Lee, the British Military Attache, told me a lovely story 
the other day. He met the Russian Military Attache in 
London and gave him a dinner, at which the Russian waxed 
eloquent over his sufferings at Santiago, and, as capping 
the climax, described how, when he went to pay his respects 
and say good-by to General Shafter, the latter looked at 
him with his usual easy polish and grace, and remarked: 
'Well, good-by. Who are you, anyway, the Russian or the 
German?' I shouted. Think of the feelings of Yemiloff, 



108 THEODORE ROOSEVELT AND HIS TIME 

the nice little military and diplomatic pedant, on the one 
hand, and on the other, of good, vulgar Shafter's magnifi- 
cent indifference to ethnic and diplomatic niceties ! ' ' 

One further citation from Roosevelt's correspondence 
relating to this period may j^roperly be made here. When 
in March, 1901, General Funston executed his brilliant feat 
of capturing Aguinaldo, the leader of the Philippine insur- 
gents, thus completing the American conquest of the Phil- 
ippines, Roosevelt wrote, on March 30, 1901, a letter of con- 
gratulation to Funston, in which he predicted a national 
condition of unpreparedness which was strikingly like that 
in which the country found itself when it was compelled to 
declare war with Germany in 1917 : 

"This is no perfunctory or formal letter of congratula- 
tion. I take pride in this crowning exploit of a career filled 
with cool courage, iron endurance and gallant daring, be- 
cause you have added your name to the honor roll of Amer- 
ican worthies. Your feat will rank with Cushing's when 
he sank the Albemarle. Othervvise, I cannot recall any 
single feat in our history which can compare with it. 

*'Our people as a whole are unquestionably very short- 
sighted about making (war) preparations. Under such cir- 
cumstances it is always possible that we may find ourselves 
pitted against a big military power where we shall need to 
develop fighting material at the very outset, and then I 
am one of many millions who would look with confidence 
to what you would do. Incidentally, if that day is not too 
far distant, I shall hope to be serving under or alongside 
of you. I think I could raise at once a brigade of three or 
four such regiments as I commanded at Santiago." 

As Colonel Roosevelt's active participation in the war 
with Spain has been set forth by himself in his 'Autobiog- 
raphy' and in his book, 'The Rough Riders,' no account 
of it is included in the present narrative. 



CHAPTER XI 

GOVERNOR OF NEW YORK— FIRST YEAR 

On his return from the war with Spain, in September, 
1898, Roosevelt was greeted with great popular enthusiasm, 
and was offered almost immediately two nominations for 
the Governorship of the State. The first offer was made 
tentatively by an emissary from T. C. Piatt, then United 
States Senator and absolute boss of the Republican organi- 
zation in the State. The emissary said he had come, not to 
offer the nomination, but to ascertain if Roosevelt desired 
it, and, if in the event of nomination and election, he would 
''make war" on Mr. Piatt and the organization, or would 
confer with them and give fair consideration to their views 
of party policy and the public interest; he asked for no 
pledges but simply for a frank definition of Roosevelt's 
attitude toward existing party conditions. It was well 
known at the time that Piatt had been forced, quite unwil- 
lingly, to turn to Roosevelt as the only candidate who could 
save his party from what seemed to be certain defeat be- 
cause of the unpopularity of the existing Republican ad- 
ministration under a subservient Piatt man in the Gover- 
norship. Roosevelt replied to the emissary that he would 
like to be nominated, and that if elected he would not make 
war upon Piatt or anybody else, if war could be avoided; 
that he desired to be Governor and not a faction leader; 
that he would confer with the organization men, as with 
everybody else who seemed to him to have knowledge of and 
interest in public affairs, and that as to Piatt and the organ- 
ization leaders, he would do so in the sincere hope that there 
might result always harmony of opinion and purpose ; but 
that while he would try to get on well with the organization, 
the organization must with equal sincerity strive to do 

109 



110 THEODORE ROOSEVELT AND HIS TIME 

what he regarded as essential for the public good ; and that 
in every case, after full consideration of what everybody 
had to say who might possess full knowledge of the matter, 
he should have to act finally as his own conscience and 
judgment dictated and administer the State government as 
he thought it should be administered. This was reported 
to Piatt and ultimately accepted by him. 

While this nomination was pending, the independent or- 
ganizations of the city of New York, on September 9, put 
forth a statement in the press declaring that after full con- 
sideration they had agreed to offer the nomination for Gov- 
ernor to Roosevelt for the following, among other reasons: 

*'Mr. Roosevelt's magnificent record makes him the 
natural candidate for Governor. We need not describe 
Theodore Roosevelt. Our reasons for nominating him are 
plain. We think that the evils of our public life can be 
traced to the exclusive control over nominations by party 
bosses and their creatures. While Roosevelt is a party 
man, he is one in whom the masses of the people of both par- 
ties feel a confidence amounting to devotion, and who in 
his person represents independence and reform. 

''There is nothing which his mind sees as evil that he 
would not expose as readily in his own party as in that of 
his opponents. To have such a man for Governor, with the 
experience in administration which he possesses, would be 
of incalculable benefit to the State." 

To this declaration there was appended a full state ticket 
with Roosevelt at its head for Governor and candidates for 
all other State offices. It was an anti-Republican organiza- 
tion ticket throughout and compelled Roosevelt, if he should 
accept the nomination, to run as an out-and-out indepen- 
dent candidate without hope of support from the Republi- 
can party, and consequently without hope of election. The 
inevitable result of his candidacy under these conditions 
would have been the election of the Democratic ticket. 

After putting forth their declaration, the Independents 
took no further action, making no formal nomination of 



GOVERNOR OP NEW YORK— FIRST YEAR 111 

their ticket. In the meantime, Piatt had accepted Roose- 
velt's terms and, on September 24, Roosevelt wrote a letter 
to the Independents, in which, after saying that it was some- 
what embarrassing to decline a nomination which had never 
been offered to him, he found himself unable to accept for 
the following, among other reasons: 

''It seems to me that I would not be acting in good faith 
toward my fellow candidates if I permitted my name to 
head a ticket designed for their overthrow ; a ticket, more- 
over, which cannot be put up because of objections to the 
character or fitness of any candidate, inasmuch as no can- 
didate has been nominated. 

''I write this with great reluctance, for I wish the sup- 
port of every Independent. If elected Governor, I would 
strive to serve the State as a whole, and to serve my party 
by helping it serve the State." 

The leaders of the Independents, ignoring what they had 
said in their declaration of September 9, — that while he was 
a party man he "represented in his person independence 
and reform," and that he would "expose evil as readily in 
his own party as in that of his opponents" — turned upon 
him in wrath and declared that he had "surrendered to 
Piatt." They ignored also, what was well known to all 
men, that he was acting in strict accord with the line of 
conduct which he had followed unvaryingly from the outset 
of his political career, that is, fighting evil inside of his 
party rather than fighting the party itself because some of 
its leaders and members were guilty of evil deeds. He had 
.followed this policy as a member of the Legislature, as 
Civil Service Commissioner, and as Police Commissioner. 
All efforts to induce him to act as a chartered Independent 
and not as a party man had failed. "My desire," he de- 
clared in response to these efforts, "is to achieve result!^, 
not merely to issue manifestoes of virtue." Nobody 
I knew better than the Independents what his attitude 
was, for he had stated it directly to them many times, but 
on every succeeding occasion for stating it, they persisted 



112 THEODORE ROOSEVELT AND HIS TIME 

in accusing him of deserting his principles. This method ^ 
of treatment they persisted in after he became President, ' 
in spite of the fact that in every public office that he held 
he accomplished more of the results which they professed 
to desire than any other public man of his time. They 
would not reconcile themselves to his refusal to follow their 
method of political conduct in preference to his own. In 
the case of the Governorship nomination, they had sought 
to force Piatt to endorse their nomination of Roosevelt in- I 
stead of having him nominated by the Republican party, , 
and when they failed in this effort they refused to support 
Roosevelt because Piatt had nominated him in another way. 
Finally, they put in the field a complete Independent ticket 
and when election day arrived it polled a total vote of 2,103, j 
which was less than an average of one vote for each election 
district of the State. 

Roosevelt was nominated unanimously for Governor by 
the Republican Convention on September 27, and made a 
vigorous campaign. Piatt says in his 'Autobiography' : 

"Roosevelt made a dramatic campaign. He fairly 
pranced about the State. He called a spade a 'spade,' a 
crook a 'crook.' The Rough Rider romped home on election 
day with over 17,000 plurality. 

"I have always maintained that no man besides Roose 
velt could have accomplished that feat in 1898. ' ' 

Immediately following the election, John Hay, then Sec- 
retary of State, wrote to him as follows : 

"While you are Governor, I believe the party can be 
made solid as never before. You have already shown that 
a man may be absolutely honest and yet practical; a re- 
former by instinct and a wise politician; brave, bold, and 
uncompromising, and yet not a wild ass of the desert. The 
exhibition made by the professional Independents in voting 
against you for no reason on earth except that somebody] 
else was voting for you, is a lesson that is worth its cost." 

Roosevelt was inaugurated Governor on January 1, 1899^ 
and in a brief address he outlined clearly the course of 




THEODORE ROOSEVELT. GOVERNOR, 1899 



GOVERNOR OF NEW YORK— FIRST YEAR 113 

action that he had maintained throughout his political ca- 
reer: 

**We must realize, on the one hand, that we can do little 
if we do not set ourselves a high ideal, and, on the other, 
that we will fail in accomplishing even this little if we do 
not work through practical methods and with a readiness 
to face life as it is, and not as we think it ought to be. 
Under no form of government is it so necessary thus to 
combine efficiency and morality, high principle and rough 
common sense, justice and the sturdiest physical and moral 
courage, as in a republic. It is absolutely impossible for a 
republic long to endure if it becomes either corrupt or cow- 
ardly; if its public men, no less than its private men, lose 
the indispensable virtue of honesty, if its leaders of thought 
become visionary doctrinaires, or if it shows a lack of 
courage in dealing with the many grave problems which it 
must surely face both at home and abroad, as it strives to 
work out the destiny meet for a mighty Nation. 

''It is only through the party system that free govern- 
ments are now successfully carried on, and yet we must 
keep ever vividly before us that the usefulness of a party 
is strictly limited by its usefulness to the State, and that 
in the long run he serves his party best who helps to make 
it instantly responsive to every need of the people and to 
the highest demands of that spirit which tends to drive us 
onward and upward." 

It is perhaps worthy of note that in his inaugural address 
he recommended the admission of women to the suffrage in 
voting upon school matters. Not till manj^ years later, in 
1911, did he come out openly in favor of general suffrage 
for women. 

His first message to the Legislature, sent in on January 
4, attracted unusual attention and was warmly commended 
by the press, by none more so than the few Independent 
journals which had not found themselves able to support 
his candidacy. The part of his message which commanded 
heartiest approval was that in which he condemned the law 



114 THEODORE ROOSEVELT AND HIS TIME 

'^ taking the starch out of the Civil Service," of which his 
Piatt predecessor in the Governorship had secured the en- 
actment, and recommended its repeal and the restoration 
of the original law. 

In considering Roosevelt's administration as Governor 
it should be borne in mind that he came into office when the 
boss system of political control was at the very summit of 
its power. Senator Piatt was the absolute owner of the' 
Republican party in the State. When it was in office, he' 
was the real ruler of the State. He dictated all appoint- 
ments, including those for the bench, and exercised all the ' 
powers of the Legislature. Under the guise of campaign^ 
contributions, he collected vast sums from the corporations 
and these he used to defray the election expenses of can- 
didates for the Legislature, with the tacit or implied un- 
derstanding that when elected they should follow his ** or- 
ders" in all cases in which he chose to issue them. If they 
disobeyed, they knew they would not be renominated. The 
corporations gave their contributions also with the tacit 
understanding that their interests would be protected, that 
legislation which they desired would be enacted, and that 
legislation which they considered hostile would fail. They 
sent no agents to Albany, but personally saw Piatt in his 
New York office. The corporations not only made heavy 
campaign contributions to him as the Republican boss, buti 
to the Democratic boss as well, so that whatever party was 
in power in the State, the interests of the corporations were 
protected. In emergencies, both party bosses worked to- 
gether to give the desired and paid-f or protection. Roose- 
velt knew all about this combination of Big Bosses and Bigj 
Business because of his experience in the Legislature, wherej 
he had on more than one occasion found both bosses united 
in defense of their ''invisible government" against his 
efforts to impair its unlawful and corrupt privileges. He 
entered upon his duties with full knowledge of the evil with, 
which he had to contend. His two years in the Governor- 
ship mark the beginning of an epoch in American history, 
for during those years he dealt the first of a series of deadly 



GOVERNOR OF NEW YORK— FIRST YEAR 115 

blows at the "invisible government" which ended finally 
in its destruction and permanent disappearance from Amer- 
ican political life. The Big Boss is no more. He survives 
in modified form in Tammany Hall, and perhaps in other 
local organizations, but as a national power he has passed 
from the scene. His downfall dates from the advent of 
Governor Roosevelt at Albany, as this narrative ^vill show 
as it proceeds. That of Big Business, as the partner in 
political and business misconduct, dates also from the same 
advent, for a new era in governmental regulation and con- 
trol was inaugurated then. 

Senator Piatt was not long in discovering that Eoosevelt 
and not Piatt was thenceforth Governor of the State. A 
short time before the inauguration, Piatt, who at the time 
was an old and feeble man, asked Roosevelt to call on him, 
which he did. One of the important positions that the new 
Governor would have to fill was that of Superintendent of 
Public Works. Under the previous administration there 
had been gross scandals in the canal construction work, 
which was in charge of this department of the State gov- 
ernment, and the selection of a new head for it was the 
most important one that Roosevelt would have to make. 
When he called upon Piatt the latter informed him that he 
was glad to say he had found an admirable man for 
the place, had offered it to him and had just received a tel- 
egram from him saying he w^ould accept it. Roosevelt, real- 
izing the importance of the crisis thus created, replied that 
he was very sorry but he could not appoint the man. An 
explosion followed, but Roosevelt remained calm, saying 
again that he must decline to accept any man chosen for 
him and must choose one for himself. He politely and 
firmly maintained his position. Piatt ultimately yielded 
and Roosevelt appointed the man of his own choice, an 
eminent engineer and veteran of the Civil War, who admin- 
istered the office with honesty and efficiency. Roosevelt 
also appointed a commission consisting of two Democratic 
lawyers of high standing to investigate the conduct of the 
Republican officials who had mismanaged canal affairs and 



116 THEODORE ROOSEVELT AND HIS TIME 

whom he had declined to reappoint, for the purpose of as- 
certaining if they were criminally liable under the law. His 
desires in appointing this commission were set forth in a 
letter which he wrote, on January 3, 1899, to Benjamin B. 
Odell, Jr., who was then Chairman of the Republican State 
Committee and the foremost of Piatt's trusted lieutenants: 
"I would like to appoint a counsel to represent me in 
this canal business, and in view of the possibility and even 
probability of failure, I want to get a strong man, one who 
is not identified in any way with my interests, so that there 
shall be no possible question as to our having made every 
effort to get a conviction, so far as the effort can properly 
and honestly be made. With this end in view I think I 
shall appoint X., of Buffalo. They say he is a very big 
lawyer, and I believe he supported Bacon (the Independent 
candidate for Governor) — a harmless form of entertain- 
ment on his part." 

The investigation was made and the Commission re- 
ported that it would be inadvisable to prosecute for criminal 
conduct because of the impossibility of securing a convic- 
tion. 

From the beginning of his administration Roosevelt con- 
sulted Piatt in regard to appointments and other matters, 
meeting him generally in New York City at the end of the 
week, usually at breakfast at a hotel or in a private house. 
He did this because Piatt being in Washington and Roose- 
velt himself in Albany, it was the most convenient meeting- 
place, especially for the Senator, who was in infirm health. 
There was never any secrecy about these meetings, Roose- 
velt insisting that full publicity be given to them; never- 
theless they were uniformly interpreted by the Governor's 
Independent critics as affording indubitable evidence of his 
complete subserviency to Piatt and as proof of his infi- 
delity to his virtuous professions. They were nothing of 
the sort. Frequently other persons were present, men 
who were interested in various reform measures, and the 
invariable object was to get Piatt's unwilling consent to 



GOVERNOR OF NEW YORK— FIRST YEAR 117 

legislation and other acts which were distasteful to him. 
No impartial person can examine the records of Roose- 
velt's administration at Albany and not reach the conclu- 
sion that in all matters of serious controversy with Piatt, 
at these breakfasts and elsewhere, Roosevelt came out 
victor. As he says in his * Autobiography': 

*'My object was to make it as easy as possible for him 
(Piatt) to come with me. As long as there was no clash be- 
tween us there was no object in my seeing him; it was only 
when the clash came or was imminent that I had to see him. 
A series of breakfasts was always a prelude to some active 
warfare. In every instance I substantially carried my 
point, although in some cases not in exactly the way I had 
originally haped." 

Piatt himself bears similar testimony, for in his 'Auto- 
biography,' he says: 

''Roosevelt had from the first agreed that he would con- 
sult me on all questions of appointments, Legislature or 
party policy. He religiously fulfilled this pledge, although 
he frequently did just what he pleased. In consulting me, 
Roosevelt proved himself the antithesis of X., who repudi- 
ated every contract he ever made with me." 

An impartial and just verdict was pronounced in the same 
matter many years later by the New York Times. When 
in September, 1918, a member of Tammany Hall was made 
the Democratic candidate for Governor of New York, the 
Evening Bost reverted to its original contention that the 
breakfasts were proof for Roosevelt 's subserviency to Piatt 
by saying: ''Will he (the Tammany candidate) come down 
to the city to lunch regularly with Murphy (the Tammany 
boss) as Theodore Roosevelt used to come to breakfast 
with Piatt." On this the Times commented: "If he does, 
and the luncheons don 't do Murphy any more good than the 
breakfasts used to do Piatt, there is not much for us to 
worry about." 

Roosevelt's method of dealing with the Senator is clearly 



118 THEODORE ROOSEVELT AND HIS TIME 

shown in the letters he wrote to Piatt from time to time. 
One under date of February 10, 1899, when the question of 
appointing a new Surrogate for New York City was under 
consideration, runs as follows: 

**Let me again say, my dear Senator, what I know you 
are aware of, that in this business about the Surrogate, I 
have not the slightest purpose beyond getting a thoroughly 
good man who will do the work well, who is a Republican, 
but who is also a man thoroughly satisfactory to the bar 
and to the people." 

Precisely such a man was ultimately appointed. 

Similar ideas of public service are expressed in a letter 
which he wrote on January 26, 1899, to William M. Collier, 
whom he had appointed a member of the State Civil Service 
Commission : 

"I am sure you will justify my choice. I believe you to 
be a thoroughly excellent man. We must keep the manage- 
ment of the law up to the highest point ; I want to make civil 
service reform a big feature of my administration." 

Early in his administration a very persistent and for- 
midable effort was made to induce him to pardon a woman 
convicted and sentenced to death for the murder of a mem- 
ber of her own sex. Some of his most devoted friends 
joined in this effort, among them Jacob A. Riis, to whom he 
wrote as follows on February 8, 1899 : 

''This is a woman convicted of a very cruel murder of 
another woman. I have exactly the same feeling that you 
have about womanhood and about the burdens which nature 
has placed upon woman and the duty of man to make them 
as light as possible. For instance, where a poor seduced 
girl kills her child to hide her shame, I would infinitely 
rather punish the man who seduced her than the poor 
creature who actually committed the murder. But there 
are some fiends among women, and I hardly think, old man, 
that we help womanhood by helping these exceptions." 



GOVERNOR OF NEW YORK— FIRST YEAR 119 

To another of the petitioners, who had clearly aroused 
his righteous wrath by a suggestion of political conse- 
quences, he wrote on February 21, 1899: 

''You may rest assured that the last thing that will in- 
fluence me will be any statement that no man can become 
President if he allows a woman to be executed. In the first 
place, being myself sane, I have no thought of becoming 
President. In the next place, I should heartily despise the 
public servant who failed to do his duty because it might 
jeopardize his own future." 

He refused to pardon the woman and she was executed 
as sentenced, and no harmful political consequences ensued. 

A very interesting letter, written on February 10, 1899, 
to Andrew D. White, U. S. Ambassador at Berlin, gives a 
frank revelation of his ambition as Governor and his views 
of his own political future : 

''So far I am getting along well but it means an infinity 
of hard work and a great deal of resolution with no small 
amount of tact and good nature. The satisfaction which I 
have is that I don't look for anything more in politics. 
People are continually writing me that my career has only 
begun, and they make me almost angry, for my usefulness 
in my present office is largely conditional in the fact that I 
don't expect to hold another, and so nobody has got a twist 
on me in any way. I could not get along at all if I had to 
try and shape my course with a view to favors to come, 
either from the people or from the politicians. I hope to 
keep the party united and to make a good Governor, and if 
I can go out having done that, I shall be more than con- 
tented." 

One of Roosevelt's most valued and devoted friends was 
James C. Carter, who for many years was universally rec- 
ognized as the leader of the bar of New York City and as 
one of the ablest and most highly honored of its citizens. 



120 THEODORE ROOSEVELT AND HIS TIME 

Mr. Carter had written to the Governor a friendly criticism 
upon some of his public utterances and in reply, on June 7, 
1899, Koosevelt wrote: 

''I am very much obliged to you for your letter of the 2nd 
instant and genuinely appreciate it. I realize just the 
danger that you speak of in making such utterances as I 
make ; but it has always seemed to me that an almost greater 
danger is that of hypocritically stating that one can do more 
than one intends or can possibly be done. I have gone on 
the principle of telling the reformers just as I tell the pol- 
iticians, exactly what I will do, and then doing it right'up to 
the handle. Of course I have made mistakes and I will 
make more, but I don't think they will be vital, and at any 
rate the whole game will be played on the table and not 
under it — if you will pardon the simile." 

The dominating achievement of Roosevelt's first year in 
the Governorship was his success in compelling the Legisla- 
ture to pass a law taxing as realty the franchises of the 
public service corporations of the State. For many years 
valuable franchises of this kind had been granted by the 
Legislature without provision for just compensation to the 
State, generally through arrangements made by the recip- 
ients with the party bosses, often by direct bribery of legis- 
lators. Roosevelt had become familiar with this abuse 
while member of the Legislature and had entered upon the 
Governorship with a clear conviction that the abuse should 
not only be arrested but that means should be devised for 
enabling the State to secure the income of which it had been 
deprived. He refused to permit the grant of new fran- 
chises on the old terms and turned his attention to the prep- 
aration of remedial measures. The most valuable of these 
franchises had been granted to street railway companies in 
the city of New York, made enormously more valuable by 
the substitution of electric for other power. 

A bill had been introduced in the Legislature of 1898 pro- 
viding a form of taxation on public service franchises but 
It had made no progress. It was reintroduced in 1899 



GOVERNOR OF NEW YORK— FIRST YEAR 121 

Roosevelt gave it careful examination, and became con- 
vinced of its wisdom and justice, or, as he expressed it, 
what it proposed to do was ''a matter of plain decency and 
honesty." As under the rules of the Legislature a bill 
could always be taken up out of its turn and passed if the 
Governor sent in a special emergency message on its behalf, 
Roosevelt decided to take that course. The moment his pur- 
pose was made known to Piatt and his machine leaders, they 
implored him, threatened him, and used every means they 
could devise to turn him from his purpose. They assured 
him that if he took this action he could never again be nom- 
inated for any public office, as no corporation would sub- 
scribe to a campaign fund if he was on the ticket, and all 
corporations would subscribe to a fund of the opposite 
party to beat him. 

This was frank recognition of the real cause of their 
wrath and dismay, namely, that the bill aimed a deadly 
blow at the very center of the Big Boss and Big Business 
combination, for if it were to pass the Legislature, no cor- 
poration would buy protection in future because of uncer- 
tainty that the goods would be delivered. 

Roosevelt saw all and listened to all, but declined to be 
swerved. The bill had passed the Senate and had been 
''hung up" in the Assembly. The Legislature was on the 
eve of adjournment, and the opponents of the bill were sure 
that its doom was sealed. On the evening of April 28, the 
Legislature being in session, Roosevelt sent an emergency 
message to the Assembly, demanding the immediate pas- 
sage of the bill. The machine leaders were beside them- 
selves with wrath, and the Piatt Speaker tore up the mes- 
sage without sending it to the Assembly. At seven o'clock 
the next morning the Governor was informed of what had 
occurred. At eight o'clock he reached his office, and sent 
immediately by the hand of his secretary another emer- 
gency message to the Speaker, which opened as follows: 
"I learn that the emergency message which I sent last eve- 
ning to the Assembly on behalf of the Franchise Tax Bill 
has not been read. I therefore send hereby another mes- 



122 THEODORE ROOSEVELT AND HIS TIME 

sage on the subject. I need not impress upon the Assembly 
the need of passing this bill at once." 

The secretary conveyed to the Speaker an intimation from 
the Governor that if this were not promptly read the Gov- 
ernor would appear in person and read it. The opposition 
collapsed and the bill was taken up and passed by a large 
majority. 

The outcry against the bill had not been confined to 
the bosses of the two parties who had united for its defeat 
through the instinct of preservation. A large portion of 
the press had also opposed it, treating it as a demagogic 
measure, conceived in the spirit of unreasoning hostility 
to wealth and advocated by Roosevelt in the hope of gaining 
popular support. As soon as it was passed, the party 
bosses and the lawyers of the corporations aifected, united 
in impressing upon the Governor their profound convic- 
tions that it contained inadvisable provisions in regard to 
the methods of levying taxation, urging him not to sign 
it, but to wait a year until a more perfect measure could 
be passed at the next session. The Governor had 30 days 
in which to sign the bill. He told the objectors that he 
agreed with them as to the defective provisions, but that he 
would rather have it with them than not have it at all ; that 
he was not willing to trust to what might be done a year 
later, and that he would, therefore, reconvene the Legisla- 
ture in special session and seek to have the bill amended; 
that if the Legislature declined to amend it, he would sign 
it in its present form. On May 22, 1899, he issued a call 
for a special session in which he set forth his attitude to- 
ward the form of taxation embodied in the bill, in a state- 
ment which is of permanent interest as showing the motives 
which actuated him not only then but in other efforts in the 
direction of governmental control and regulation which he 
made a few years later as President of the United States : 

''I am perfectly well aware, as Chief Justice Marshall 
says, 'The power of taxation is the power of destruction.' 
But this applies to every species of property. If dema- 



GOVERNOR OF NEW YORK— FIRST YEAR 123 

gognes or ignorant enthusiasts who are misled by dema- 
gogues, could succeed in destroying wealth, they would, of 
course, simply work the ruin of the entire community, and, 
first of all, of the unfortunates for whom they profess to 
feel an especial interest. But the very existence of un- 
reasoning hostility to wealth should make us all the more 
careful in seeing that wealth does nothing to justify such 
hostility. AVe are the true friends of the men of means ; we 
are the true friends of the lawful corporate interests, which 
do good work for the community, when we insist that the 
men of means and the great corporations shall pay their 
full share of taxes and have their full share of the public 
burdens. If this is done, then, sooner or later, will follow 
public recognition of the fact that it is done; and when 
there is no legitimate basis for discontent the American 
public is sure, sooner or later, to cease feeling discontent." 

The critics and opponents of his course in securing the 
enactment of the bill had charged, while the measure was 
pending, among other things, that he was acting from im- 
pulse and in a reckless disregard of consequences, not fully 
realizing what he was doing. When his call for a special 
session appeared they declared that it was a humiliating 
confession of ignorance on his part, of his own inability to 
frame an effective measure. On this form of attack the 
Tribune of May 23, 1899, commented as follows : 

"Governor Eoosevelt's course in calling the extra session 
of the Legislature is in sharp contrast with what would be 
regarded as 'good policy' by 'sharp politicians.' His en- 
gaging frankness in dealing with public problems takes 
their breath away. 

''It is easy to say that the Governor has called the extra 
session to get himself out of a scrape, and people who want 
him to be in a scrape are quick to say it. As a matter of 
fact, the extra session was called at the suggestion of the 
franchise-holders. ' ' 

Efforts were made when the special session came to- 
gether to outwit and defeat the Governor by various de- 



124 THEODORE ROOSEVELT AND HIS TIME 

vices. One was to withdraw the law and thus prevent him 
from signing it in its present form. Another was to pass 
amendments that would nullify its effect. He defeated all 
of these by holding the original bill as a whip over the heads 
of the machine leaders, saying it could not be withdrawn 
and he would sign it at once unless such changes as he de- 
sired were made. The bill was amended as he requested 
and was passed by large majorities in the two houses. 

No sooner had it become law than the lawyers of the 
corporations who had asked for the changes, challenged its 
constitutionality in the courts and based their challenge 
on the changes which they themselves had requested. One 
of these legal luminaries was David Bennett Hill, at various 
times Democratic Governor, Democratic Boss and United 
States Senator. For six years the constitutionality of the 
law was disputed in the courts. It was sustained first in the 
Supreme Court of the State ; then, on April 23, 1903, unan- 
imously sustained by the Court of Appeals of New York; 
and, finally, on May 29, 1905, also unanimously, by the Su- 
preme Court of the United States. Among the counsel 
assailing the constitutionality of the act were several of the 
most eminent corporation la\\yers of New York City. 

When the final decision was rendered there was paid 
over to the State Treasury taxes which had been withheld, 
amounting with interest for six years, to more than $26,- 
000,000. 

In addition to the Franchise Tax Law the Governor, by 
persistent personal effort, secured the passage by the Leg- 
islature of 1899 of a new Civil Service Law which he pro- 
nounced the ''best in the Nation." He had during his ser- 
vice as Governor continued his investigations of tenement 
house conditions in New York and had secured the passage 
of a law which was the first effective exercise of real and 
intelligent supervision of industries carried on in tenement- 
houses. It abolished ''sweat-shops" from New York City 
for all time. "Not a single law," he said in reviewing the 
Legislature's work, "has been put on the statute books 
which ought not to be put there, and not a single appoint- 



GOVERNOR OF NEW YORK— FIRST YEAR 125 

ment had been made which ought not to have been made." 
After the adjournment of the Legislature and before the 
special session was called, Senator Piatt wrote a long letter 
to Eoosevelt which is of interest not only in revealing 
Piatt's mental attitude toward the Franchise Tax measure 
but in revealing also the fact that in forcing the Legisla- 
ture to act in the matter the Governor had not consulted 
the boss. In his letter the Senator said : 

* ' When the subject of your nomination was under consid- 
eration, there was one matter that gave me real anxiety. I 
think you will have no trouble in appreciating the fact that 
it was not the matter of your independence. 

"The thing that did bother me was this: I had heard 
from a good many sources that you were a little loose on 
the relations of capital and labor, on trusts and combina- 
tions, and, indeed, on those numerous questions which have 
recently arisen in politics affecting the security of earnings 
and the right of a man to run his own business in his own 
way, with due respect of course to the Ten Commandments 
and the Penal Code. Or, to get at it even more clearly, I 
understood from a number of business men, and among 
them many of your own personal friends, that you enter- 
tained various altruistic ideas, all very well in their way, 
but which before they could safely be put into law needed 
very profound consideration. . . . You have just ad- 
journed a Legislature which created a good opinion through- 
out the State. I congratulate you heartily upon this fact 
because I sincerely believe, as everybody else does, that 
this good impression exists very largely as a result of your 
personal influence in the Legislative chambers. But at the 
last moment, and to my very great surprise, you did a thing 
which has caused the business community of New York to 
wonder how far the notions of Populism, as laid down in 
Kansas and Nebraska, have taken hold upon the Republican 
party of the State of New York." 

The Senator's curious use of the word ''altruistic" caused 
Eoosevelt much amusement. In his reply he assured the 



126 THEODORE ROOSEVELT AND HIS TIME 

Senator that lie was as nmeh opposed to Populism in every 
stage as the greatest representatives of corporate wealth 
were, and defined his real position as follows : 

''I do not believe that it is wise or safe for ns as a party 
to take refuge in mere negation and to say that there are 
no evils to be corrected. It seems to me that our attitude 
should be one of correcting the evils and thereby showingi 
that, whereas the Populists, Socialists and others really do 
not correct the evils at all, or else only do so at the expense 
of producing others in aggravated form, on the contrary 
we Republicans hold the just balance and set ourselves as 
resolutely against improper corporate influence on the one 
hand as against demagogy and mob rule on the other. 
I understand perfectly that such an attitude of moderation 
is apt to be misunderstood when passions are greatly ex. 
cited and when victory is apt to rest with the extremists 
on one side or the other ; yet I think it is in the long run the 
only wise attitude. ... I appreciate absolutely (what 
Mr. Piatt had said) that any applause I get will be too 
evanescent for a moment's consideration. I appreciate 
absolutely that the people who now loudly approve of my 
action in the franchise tax will forget all about it in a fort- 
night, and that, on the other hand, the very powerful inter- 
ests adversely affected will always remember it. ' ' 

When preparations were in progress for the parade in 
New York City in honor of Admiral Dewey, the hero of the 
Battle of Manila, Governor Eoosevelt wrote on August 8, 
1899, this characteristic letter to Avery D, Andrews, his 
former associate in the Police Board and at the time Adju- 
tant General of the State : 

"Everybody seems to be united in wanting me to ride 
at the head of the militia in the Dewey parade. What do 
you think of it? If you think well of it, will you, in the first 
place, engage for me that black horse I rode up to camp 
as my steed, and will you in the next place tell me what I 
should wear? I know I have got to wear a black coat and a 
top hat. Would it do for me to wear a black cutaway coat, 



GOVERNOR OF NEW YORK— FIRST YEAR 127 

gray riding breeches and black top boots, or do I have to 
wear a black frock coat, which is an uncomfortable thing to 
ride in? The average Governor, I suppose, rides in gray 
trousers. Is this necessary? I suppose I have got to make 
up my mind to look either like a fake riding school master, 
or else like the president of a St. Patrick's day procession 
on parade. Which of these disagreeable alternatives is the 
best?" 

His experience with the Franchise Tax question had 
turned Roosevelt's mind naturally to the consideration of 
trusts. On August 15, 1899, he wrote to Charles F. Scott, 
a Kansas friend: 

**I have been in a great quandary over trusts. I do not 
know what attitude to take. I do not intend to play a dem- 
agogue. On the other hand, I do intend, so far as in me 
lies, to see that the rich man is held to the same accounta- 
bility as the poor man, and when the rich man is rich enough 
to buy unscrupulous advice from very able lawyers ; this is 
not always easy." 

In the midst of his struggles with Senator Piatt and the 
Legislature he began during his first term as Governor to 
write the ''Life of Oliver Cromwell," completing it in the 
summer of 1899. 



CHAPTER XII 
GOVERNOR OF NEW YORK— SECOND YEAR 

Roosevelt's second year as Governor opened with the 
fiercest fight that he had yet had with Senator Piatt. It 
arose out of a difference of opinion between the two con- 
cerning the reappointment of an official, Payn, who was one 
of the most devoted of Piatt's followers, a county boss in 
the Piatt machine, and a thoroughgoing old-time spoils 
politician. He had held the office of Superintendent of In- 
surance for several years and his conduct in its administra- 
tion, as shown by investigations which the Governor had in- 
stituted, was far from being what it should have been. His 
term was about to expire and the Governor announced in 
advance of the meeting of the Legislature in January, 1900, 
his determination not to reappoint him. Piatt at once issued 
an ultimatum to Roosevelt that he must be reappointed or 
he would fight the Governor, saying that the incumbent 
would remain in office anyway, since under the Constitution 
he could only be removed with the consent of the Senate 
and he would continue in office till his successor was con- 
firmed by the Senate, and he, Piatt, could control the Senate 
absolutely. Roosevelt kept his temper, allowing Piatt to 
do the threatening and blustering, and selected a candidate 
for the position who was a man of character, a Republican 
and a friend of Piatt's, whose position in the party was such 
as to make it difficult for the Senate to reject him. Piatt, 
in a stormy interview with Roosevelt in New York City, 
refused to accept the man, saying to Roosevelt that if he 
insisted, it would be war to the knife, and his (Roosevelt's) 
destruction and possibly the destruction of the party. 
Roosevelt replied that he was sorry he could not yield, 
that if the war came it would have to come, and that he 

128 



GOVERNOR OF NEW YORK— SECOND YEAR 129 

should send to the Senate the name of his chosen candidate 
on the following morning. 

Follo^ving closely on the heels of the interview, Roose- 
velt received a message from Piatt's chief agent, asking 
for an appointment for the evening. Roosevelt named the 
Union League Club, and the two met there. The agent 
went over the same ground that Piatt had covered, declar- 
ing that Piatt would never yield, that he ^vas certain to 
win the fight, that Roosevelt's reputation would be de- 
stroyed, and that he wished to save him from such a lament- 
able smash-up as an ending to his career. Roosevelt re- 
peated his decision, and saying that nothing was to be ac- 
complished by further talk, arose to go away. The agent 
repeated that it was Roosevelt 's last chance, that ruin was 
ahead of him if he refused it, but that if he accepted every- 
thing would be easy. Roosevelt shook his head and an- 
swered: '* There is nothing to add to what I have already 
said." ''You know it means your ruin?" said the agent. 
''Well, we will see about that," answered Roosevelt. "You 
understand," continued the agent, "the fight will begin to- 
morrow and will be carried to the bitter end." "Yes," 
replied Roosevelt, as he reached the door, adding "Good 
night" as he opened it. Before he could pass out, the agent 
exclaimed: "Hold on! We accept. Send in Blank's name. 
The Senator is very sorry, but he will make no further op- 
position." 

The name of Roosevelt's candidate was sent to the Senate 
and confirmation followed. Piatt's own account of the in- 
cident, as given in his 'Autobiography,' shows that after 
the struggle was over he was able to take a humorous view 
of it. Speaking of Roosevelt 's ' ' whirlwind fashion of clean- 
ing house ' ' at Albany, he says : 

"He threw Superintendent of Insurance Louis F. Payn 
out of his job so quickly as to send that official to me with 
a cry : ' I warned you that fellow would soon have you dang- 
ling at his chariot wheel. You would not believe me. He 
has begun by scalping members of your ' Old Guard. ' He 'H 
get you, too, soon.' 



130 THEODORE ROOSEVELT AND HIS TIME 

"Roosevelt told me that he proposed to remove Lou 
Payn. I protested, but he was removed, and I was con- 
sulted about the appointment of his successor." 

While Roosevelt's private struggle with Piatt was in 
progress the Independent leaders and newspapers were de- 
manding that he must make open war on the boss as the 
only way of political and moral salvation for himself. At 
the very moment of his triumph he received on January 24, 
1900, from the Rev. Dr. Parkhurst a telegram, which was 
also given to the press, which ran as follows : 

''If you distinctly, uncompromisingly and frankly throw 
down the gauntlet to T. C. Piatt the whole State will stand 
by you. Choose ye this day whom ye will serve." 

Just what would have been the result if the Governor had 
followed this advice, proffered in the unruffled serenity and 
assurance of absolute ignorance of actual conditions, was 
explained by Roosevelt in a letter which he wrote several 
months later, on June 11, 1900, to Henry L. Nelson : 

*'I needed 26 votes. By canvass I found that I would 
have two Democratic votes for me and 21 against me, and 
that I should lose in any event two Republican votes whom 
Payn could control without any reference to Piatt or the 
organization. This left me a leeway of just one vote, and 
it is of course unnecessary to say that in any mere fight 
between Piatt and myself he could have controlled several, 
votes, no matter how strong I made the issue. On the other 
hand, I had succeeded in making the case so strongly that 
as long as I resolutely declined to mix it in any way with 
a factional fight in the Republican party and simply took 
the ground that I would support any thoroughly upright 
and competent man against Payn, I was in a position of im- 
pregnable strength and could win out. What conceivable 
object or purpose even the brain of Dr. Parkhurst could see 
in my, at such a time, wholly changing the issue and secur- 
ing the irrevocable retention of Payn by a denunciation of 
Piatt, who had just assented to my proposition to take 



GOVERNOR OF NEW YORK— SECOND YEAR 131 

the man I had first suggested, it is impossible for me to 
imagine." 

This incident is of value as an illustration of the persist- 
ent inability or unwillingness of the professional Indepen- 
dents to discover any merit in Roosevelt's method of fight- 
ing evil men and evil practises in his own party. They 
could not fail to see that he was accomplishing results, but 
because he was accomplishing them in his owti way rather 
than in the way that they told him he should adopt, they 
saw no virtue in him. Like Dr. Parkhurst, they were con- 
stantly declaring when a crisis arose between him and evil 
powers in his party, that he w^as ''at the parting of the 
ways," and that if he did not select their way he would 
enter on the broad road that led to destruction. He inva- 
riably chose his owii way, but in spite of the fact that de- 
struction never followed, the prediction of ruin was repeated 
with undiminished confidence whenever a new ''parting" 
was discerned. 

This method of treatment continued with unvaried per- 
sistency after he became President, greatly to his amuse- 
ment. After a particularly enjoyable instance of it in 1902 
he wrote to me on April 23 of that year : 

"One delightful feature about the editorials in the 
Evening Post on this perpetual 'parting of the ways' is 
that each time there is an unconscious assumption that they 
must have been mistaken the time before ; for I have always 
gone down w^hat they consider the wrong road, yet on each 
occasion they speak as if I had hitherto been doing right, 
but was now about to commit a criminal blunder!" 

A concise and comprehensive statement of his course iri 
regard to Senator Piatt during the period of his Governor- 
ship was made by Roosevelt in a letter to the Rev. Dr. T. R. 
Slicer on June 29, 1900: 

"I have never done and shall never do one thing I ought 
not to do at the request of Senator Piatt, and the whole suc- 
cess of my administration has been due, as much as to any 



132 THEODORE ROOSEVELT AND HIS TIME 

other one cause, to the fact that I have been able to work 
with the organization. It was because of this fact, coupled, 
of course, with the fact that I intended resolutely without 
wavering to have my own way on questions of deep prin- 
ciple, that I have been able to carry my point as regards 
every important matter." 

Writing again to his friend, James C. Carter of New York 
City, on March 19, 1900, he gave a general statement of his 
tribulations with reformers, enclosing a striking quotation 
from Macaulay: 

"The other day I came across something in Macaulay 
about Scotland in 1690, which runs as follows : 

** 'It is a remarkable circumstance that the same country 
should have produced in the same age the most wonderful 
specimens of both extremes of human nature. Even in 
things indifferent the Scotch Puritan would hear of no com- 
promise ; and he was but too ready to consider all who rec- 
ommended prudence and charity as traitors to the cause of 
truth. On the other hand the Scotchmen of that generation 
who made a figure in Parliament were the most dishonest 
and unblushing time servers that the world has ever seen. 
Perhaps it is natural that the most callous and impudent 
vice should be found in the near neighborhood of unreason- 
able and impracticable virtue. AVhere enthusiasts are ready 
to destroy or be destroyed for trifles magnified into impor- 
tance by a squeamish conscience, it is not strange that the 
very name of conscience should become a byword of con- 
tempt to cool and shrewd men of business.' 

''It seems to me that this paragraph portrays pretty well 
the conditions which make self-government so difiicult in 
New York City. On the one hand we have the sodden 
masses of poor, ignorant and sometimes vicious people who 
are the ready-made tools for Tammany or any other ma- 
chine. On the other, we have good men, or at least well- 
meaning men, who have permitted the practical capacity for 
self-government to atrophy. In Scotland in the last quarter 
of the 17th century, the existence of the unreasonable Puri- 



GOVERNOR OF NEW YORK— SECOND YEAR 133 

tan did not tend to make public life better, but, for the 
reasons given by Macaulay, to make it worse; and it was 
not until he lost some of the very qualities of which I com- 
plain in many reformers to-day, that he became a practical 
force for righteousness. Heaven knows I appreciate the 
need of disinterestedness, of public spirit, of all that we as- 
sociate with the name of reform ; and it is because I do ap- 
preciate the need that I hate to see men in New York who 
ought to be forces on the right side, not only decline to go 
with decent men who are striving practicably for decency, 
but by their course alienate shrewd and sensible men from 
all reform movements." 

During his second year he gave careful consideration to 
a bill which had been introduced in the Legislature which 
aimed to limit the aggregate of insurance that any com- 
pany could assume. After a thorough study of the subject 
he reached the conclusion that whatever evils might exist 
in the insurance business they were not due to the volume 
of it but to the methods employed in obtaining it. He 
reached the conclusion then, which he adhered to without 
variation or modification afterwards in all his efforts to 
regulate and control big business, that the line should not 
be drawn on size but on conduct. He declined to favor the 
pending bill. Several years later, during the Governor- 
ship of Mr. Hughes, a bill of the same nature was made 
law but it worked so badly that Governor Hughes himself 
signed its repeal near the end of his second term. 



CHAPTER XIII 
NOMINATED AND ELECTED VICE-PRESIDENT 

Early in the second year of his tei-m as Governor, in fact, 
near the close of the first year, Roosevelt's peace of mind 
began to be disturbed by proposals to have him nominated 
for Vice-President. On December 29, 1899, he wrote as 
follows about it to Senator Lodge: 

''Piatt told me that you and Chandler wanted me nomi- 
nated; that some of the far- Western Senators wanted me 
because they thought I would strengthen the ticket in their 
States ; but that the general opinion was that it would not 
be a wise move for me personally as I should be simply 
shelved as Vice-President and could do nothing, for if I 
did anything I should attract suspicion and antagonism. 
All my Western friends keep writing me to the same effect. 
I do not think I have had a letter from any of them advis- 
ing me to take the nomination, and I have had scores ad- 
vising me not to take it." 

Writing again to Senator Lodge, on January 22, 1900, he 
said: 

''On Saturday Piatt for the first time stated to me very 
strongly that he believed I ought to take the Vice-Presi- 
dency both for national and for State reasons. I believe 
Piatt rather likes me, though I render him uncomfortable 
for some of the things I do." 

On February 1, 1900, he wrote a long letter to Senator 
Piatt giving his reasons for not desiring the nomination : 

"I can't help feeling more and more that the Vice-Presi- 
dency IS not an office in which I could do anything and not 
an office m which a man still vigorous and not past middle 

134 



NOMINATED AND ELECTED VICE-PRESIDENT 135 

life has much chance of doing anything. I have thoroughly 
enjoyed being Governor. I have kept every promise, ex- 
pressed or implied, I made on the stump and I feel that the 
Kepublican party is stronger before the State because of 
my incumbency. Certainly everything is being managed 
now on a perfectly straight basis and every office is as clean 
as a whistle. Now, I should like to be Governor for an- 
other term, especially if we are able to take hold of the 
canal in serious shape. But as Vice-President I don't see 
there is anything I can do. I would be simply a presiding 
officer and that I should find a bore." 

Writing again to Senator Lodge, on February 2, 1900, he 
said: 

*'In the Vice-Presidency I could do nothing. I am a com- 
paratively young man yet and I like work. I do not like 
to be a figure-head. It would not entertain me to preside 
in the Senate. I should be in a cold shiver of rage at 

inability to answer hounds like P and scarcely more 

admirable M and H . So, old man, I am going to de- 
clare decisively that I want to be Governor and do not want 
to be Vice-President." 

On the follow^ing day, February 3, 1900, in a letter to 
Senator Lodge, he explained why Senator Piatt was in 
favor of the nomination : 

'*I have found out one reason why Senator Piatt wants 
me nominated for the Vice-Presidency. The big moneyed 
men with whom he is in close touch and whose campaign 
contributions have certainly been no inconsiderable factor 
in his strength, have been pressing him very strongly to 
get me put in the Vice-Presidency, so as to get me out of 
the State. It was the big insurance companies, possessing 
enormous wealth, that gave Payn his formidable strength, 
and they to a man want me out. The great corporations 
affected by the franchise tax, have also been at the Sena- 
tor. In fact, all the big moneyed interests that make cam- 
paign contributions of large size and feel that they should 



136 THEODORE ROOSEVELT AND HIS TIME 

have favors in return, are extremely anxious to get me out 
of the State. I find that they have been at Piatt for the last 
two or three months and he has finally begun to yield to 
them and to take their view. Outside of that the feeling 
here is very strong against my going. In fact, all of my 
friends in the State would feel that I was deserting them, 
and are simply unable to understand my considering it." 

Writing to Senator Piatt on February 7, 1900, he ex- 
pressed a decided preference for some other position : 

''The more I have thought over it, the more I have felt 
that I would a great deal rather be anything, say professor 
of history, than Vice-President." 

On April 3, 1900, he sent to Senator Marcus A. Hanna, 
who was opposed to his nomination, his reasons for not 
desiring it : 

''Let me point out that I am convinced that I can do most 
good to the national ticket by running as Governor of this 
State. There will be in New York a very curious feeling of 
resentment both against myself and against the party 
leaders if I run as Vice-President, and tUis will aifect our 
vote I believe; whereas if I run as Governor I can 
strengthen the national ticket more than in any other way. 
I do not thilik we can aflPord to take liberties in this State." 

In common with his other friends I was strongly opposed 
to the nomination of Roosevelt for Vice-President. 
Throughout his service as Governor I had been in constant 
and intimate association with him and had been fully in- 
formed of every step that he had taken in his efforts to put 
his ideas into practise, including liis struggles with Sena- 
tor Piatt. There was no doubt in my mind that desire to 
get him out of the State was the chief if not the sole 
cause of the movement to nominate him for the Vice-Presi- 
dency. His usefulness to the State had been shown to be 
so^ great that it seemed to me nothing less than a public 
misfortune to take him away at what was really only the 



NOMINATED AND ELECTED VICE-PRESIDENT 137 

opening stage of his work, and in the hope of defeating 
the movement, I wrote letters to men of influence in the 
Eepublican party at Washington and elsewhere entreating 
them to oppose it. Among others I wrote to my long-time 
friend John Hay, then Secretary of State. He was a close 
friend and admirer of Senator Hanna, and his reply, which 
undoubtedly reflected the views of the Senator, is of inter- 
est as demonstrating the risk involved in political prophecy. 

Department of State, 
Washington, April 14, 1900. 
My dear Bishop: 

I have your letter of the 10th of April, and I think you 
are unduly alarmed. 

There is no instance on record of an election of a Vice- 
President by violence, and I think people here are looking 
in quite another direction. 

Yours sincerely, 

John Hay. 

If there was at that time no record of an election of a 
Vice-President by violence, a record was soon to be made 
of the nominatioi^ of a candidate for that office by precisely 
that method. 

Only a few days earlier, April 11, 1900, Roosevelt, who 
cordially approved my efforts to secure opposition to the 
Vice-President movement, wrote to me : 

"The dangerous element, as far as I am concerned, comes 
from the corporations. The (naming certain men) crowd 
and those like them have been greatly exasperated by the 
franchise tax. They would like to get me out of politics 
for good, but at the moment they think the best thing to 
do is to put me into the Vice-Presidency. Naturally I will 
not be opposed openly on the ground of the corporations' 
grievance ; but every kind of false statement will continual- 
ly be made, and men like (naming the editors of certain 
newspapers) will attack me, not as the enemy of corpora- 
tions, but as their tool! There is no question whatever 
that if the leaders can they will upset me." 



138 THEODORE ROOSEVELT AND HIS TIME 

111 similar vein he wrote to John Proctor Clarke, on April 
15, 1900 : 

"There is unquestionably a strong desire to make me 
take the Vice-Presidency. Many corporations have served 
notice on the Republican leaders that they won 't contribute 
if I am nominated for Governor, and that they will do 
their best to beat me. This is mainly on account of the 
franchise tax, but also on account of various other acts 
which I am bound to say I still regard as extremely credit- 
able — as, to be frank, I do their whole opposition, if it 
comes to that." 

Senator Piatt's perturbed state of mind is revealed in 
the following letter from Roosevelt to Senator Lodge, on 
June 9, 1900: 

"Senator Piatt is not in a pleasant frame of mind with 
me, chiefly because of the franchise tax. He told me last 
night that he thought it would lose me so many votes as to 
jeopardize my election." 

On June 12, 1900, a week before the assembling of the 
National Republican Convention, Roosevelt wrote to Gen- 
eral F. V. Greene : 

"The Organization, pressed by the corporations, is still 
very anxious to have me nominated for the Vice-Presidency. 
It is, however, entirely too late now for me to alter my 
position. I will not accept under any circumstances, and 
that is all there is about it." 

The National Republican Convention met at Philadelphia 
on June 19, 1900. Roosevelt attended as a delegate from 
New York and was genuinely surprised to discover on ar- 
rival that there was a very strong sentiment among the 
delegates in favor of his nomination. Just what happened 
subsequently is best told in letters that he wrote to his 
friends after the convention adjourned. Writing to the 
Rev. Dr. Lyman Abbott on June 27, 1900, he said : 

''The nomination came to me at Philadelphia simply be- 



NOMINATED AND ELECTED VICE-PRESIDENT 139 

cause the bulk of the enormous majority of the delegates 
were bent upon having me whether I wished it or not, and 
all the more because Senator Hanna objected to it. Sena- 
tor Piatt wished me nominated and, as you saw, I absolute- 
ly upset him and stood the New York machine on its head, 
forcing them without one exception to stand against me 
and support another candidate. When I did this I supposed 
that it completely dissipated the possibility of my nomina- 
tion. The effect was just the opposite. The delegates who 
had already been saying that they would not have Senator 
Hanna dictate whom they should or should not nominate, 
now merely said: 'So Roosevelt has stood Piatt on his 
head, has he? Well, that settles it. We might not wish 
him placed on the ticket by Piatt, but now we have got to 
have him anyway.' " 

To Hon. Geo. H. Lyman, he wrote on June 27, 1900 : 
''Every real friend of mine will consistently speak of 
me as exactly what I am — the man chosen because it is be- 
lieved he will add strength to a cause which, however, is 
already infinitely stronger than any strength of his — a man 
absolutely and entirely, in the second place, whom it is 
grossly absurd and unjust to speak of in any other capacity. 
This is the attitude which must be assumed in the most 
emphatic way.*' 

On the same date he wrote to Senator Hanna proffering 
his campaign services: 

"I wish in this campaign to do whatever you think wise — ■ 
whatever is likely to produce the best results for the Re- 
publican ticket. I am as strong as a bull moose and you 
can use me to the limit. One side of the problem is the fact 
that I must not seem to neglect my duties as Grovernor of 
New York." 

While the nomination had not been welcomed by him, 
Roosevelt accepted it philosophically and regarded it as 
marking the end of his political career. He said to me at 



140 THEODORE ROOSEVELT AND HIS TIME 

the time that he felt neither disappointment nor depres- 
sion ; that he had won a modest amount of military honor, 
had been Governor of N"ew York, as well as held other im- 
portant public offices, and could leave to his children the 
record of a career of which they would not be ashamed. 
As for occupation, he proposed to resume study of the law 
and enter upon active practise of that profession. He 
added: ''If I have been put on the shelf, my enemies will 
find that I can make it a cheerful place of abode." 

To Edward S. Martin, he wrote in similar vein on Novem- 
ber 22, 1900: 

''I do not expect to go any further in politics. Heaven 
knows there is no reason to expect that a man of so many 
and so loudly and not always wisely expressed convictions 
on so many different subjects should go so far ! But I have 
had a first-class run for my money, and I honestly think 
I have accomplished a certain amount.'* 

Among the first to congratulate Eoosevelt on his nomi- 
nation was Secretary Hay who wrote to him on June 21, 
1900: 

' * As it is all over but the shouting, I take a moment of 
this cool morning of the longest day in the year to offer 
you my cordial congratulations. The week has been a rack- 
ing one to you. But I have no doubt the future will make 
amends. You have received the greatest compliment the 
country could pay you, and although it is not precisely 
what you and your friends desire, I have no doubt it is all 
for the best. Nothing can keep you from doing good work 
wherever you are — nor from getting lots of fun out of it. 

*'We Washingtonians, of course, have our own little 
point of view. You can't lose us; and we shall be uncom- 
monly glad to see you here again." 

To which Eoosevelt replied on June 25, 1900, from Saga- 
more Hill : 

"Well, I now join the innumerable throng of New York's 
Vice-Presidential progeny in esse or posse. I should like 
to have stayed where there was real work ; but I would be 



NOMINATED AND ELECTED VICE-PRESIDENT 141 

a fool not to appreciate and be deeply touched by the way 
I was nominated ; and the one great thing at the next elec- 
tion is to reelect the President, and if my candidacy helps 
toward that end, well and good. 

"If only the New York machine (which I had to stand 
on its head, as a preliminary) will defer its policy of feed- 
ing grudges fat until after election ! I earnestly hope they 
will nominate in my place some man who will strengthen, 
not weaken, the national ticket. ' ' 

Before finishing his duties as Governor, Roosevelt had 
an opportunity, which he was prompt to improve to the 
utmost, to show his mettle as the Chief Executive of the 
State. On the eve of the Presidential election in November, 
1900, the Tanomany Chief of Police issued an oflficial order 
to his subordinates directing them to disregard orders that 
had been issued by the Chief of the State Bureau of Elec- 
tions, orders that were essential to the securing of an 
honest election in the city. Roosevelt had, as Governor, no 
power over the Chief of Police but he had power over the 
Mayor of the city, and from his residence in Oyster Bay 
where he was at the time, he sent the following letters: 

State of New York 

Oyster Bay, November 5, 1900. 

To the Mayor of the City of New York. 

Sir: My attention has been called to the official order 
issued by Chief of Police Devei-y, in which he directs his 
subordinates to disregard the Chief of the State Election 
Bureau, John McCullagh, and his deputies. Unless you 
have already taken steps to secure the recall of this order. 
It is necessary for me to point out that I shall be obliged 
to hold you responsible as the head of the city government 
for the action of the Chief of Police, if it should result in 
any breach of the peace and intimidation or any crime what- 
ever against the election laws. The State and city authori- 
ties should work together. I will not fail to call to sum- 
mary account either State or city authority in the event 



142 THEODORE ROOSEVELT AND HIS TIME 

of either being guilty of intimidation or connivance at fraud 
or of failure to protect every legal voter in his rights. I 
therefore hereby notify you that in the event of any wrong- 
doing following upon the failure immediately to recall 
Chief Devery's order, or upon any action or inaction on 
the part of Chief Devery, I must necessarily call you to 

account. 

Yours, etc., 

Theodoee Roosevelt. 

State or New York 

Oyster Bay, November 5, 1900. 
To the Sheriff of the County of New York. 

Sir: My attention has been called to the official order 
issued by Chief of Police Devery, in which he directs his 
subordinates to disregard the Chief of the State Election 
Bureau, John McCullagh, and his deputies. 

It is your duty to assist in the orderly enforcement of 
the law, and I shall hold you strictly responsible for any 
breach of the public peace within your county, or for any 
failure on your part to do your full duty in connection with 
the election to-morrow. 

Yours truly, 

Theodore Eoosevelt. 

State of New York 

Oyster Bay, November 5, 1900. 
To the District Attorney of the County of New York. 

Sir: My attention has been called to the official order 
issued by Chief of Police Devery, in which he directs his 
subordinates to disregard the Chief of the State Election 
Bureau, John McCullagh, and his deputies. 

In view of this order I call your attention to the fact 
that it is your duty to assist in the orderly enforcement of 
the law, and there must be no failure on your part to do 
your full duty in the matter. 

Yours truly, 

Theodore Roosevelt. 



NOMINATED AND ELECTED VICE-PRESIDENT 143 

The effect of the letters was instantaneous. The Mayor 
directed the Chief of PoHce to rescind his order, and the 
Sheriff also took prompt action. The District Attorney re- 
fused to heed the letter addressed to him, assumed an atti- 
tude of defiance of the Governor, and Roosevelt removed 
him from office. A quiet and honest election followed. 

Secretary Hay wrote a congratulatory letter to the Gov- 
ernor on his performance, and to this Roosevelt replied on 
November 10, 1900 : 

''I am really grateful to Croker for making Devery 
commit an overt act which put the whole gang in my power. 
I immediately took some secret steps which have never 
come out, getting into communication with the Adjutant 
General instantly, so that in the event of need I could have 
any regiment of the National Guard out at once. I believed 
that they would take water as they actually did. If they 
had not, I would have taken off the heads of the Mayor, 
Sheriff and District Attorney within 48 hours — that is, just 
long enough for the legal formalities of a trial to be com- 
plied with, and if by any possible construction I could have 
gotten at Croker and Hearst, I should have done all that 
was within my power to make them pay to the last cent 
for any misconduct, which really would have been due to 
them. ' ' 

While devoting his energies unremittingly to his duties 
as Governor, Roosevelt followed closely all developments 
in national and international affairs and expressed his 
views thereon freely in his correspondence with friends. 
When the first Hay-Pauncefote treaty was published, in 
1900, he took a position in regard to its provisions which 
foreshadowed accurately the course that he followed later 
as President in securing the fortification of the Panama 
Canal. Writing to Capt. A. T. Mahan on February 14, 
1900, he said : 

' ' As you know, I am heartily friendly to England, but I 
cannot help feeling that the State Department has made a 
great error in the canal treaty. We really make not only 



144 THEODORE ROOSEVELT AND HIS TIME 

England but all the great continental powers our partners 
in th6 transaction, and I do not see why we should dig the 
canal if we are not to fortify it so as to insure its being 
used for ourselves and against our foes in time of war.** 

He gave public expression also to his disapproval of the 
treaty, with effects described in the following letter to Dr. 
Albert Shaw: 

''My published statement about the canal treaty has, as 
I anticipated it would, caused no little trouble. Hay has 
written me a confidential letter of grieved protest. To me 
his position is simply incomprehensible." 

To Secretary Hay's remonstrance Roosevelt replied as 
follows on February 18, 1900 : 

. State of New York, 

Executive Chamber, Albany, 

February 18, 1900. 

I hesitated long before I said anything about the treaty 
through sheer dread of two moments — that in which I 
should receive your note, and that in which I should re- 
ceive Cabot's (Senator Henry Cabot Lodge). But I made 
up my mind that at least I wished to be on record ; for to 
my mind this step is one backward, and it may be fraught 
with very great mischief. You have been the greatest 
Secretary of State I have seen in my time — Olney comes 
second — but at this moment I cannot, try as I may, see that 
you are right. Understand me. When the treaty is 
adopted, as I suppose it will be, I shall put the best face 
possible on it, and shall back the Administration as heart- 
ily as ever ; but oh, how I wish you and the President would 
drop the treaty and push through a bill to build and fortify 
our own canal. 

My objections are twofold. First, as to naval policy. If 
the proposed canal had been in existence in '98, the Oregon 
could have come more quickly through to the Atlantic ; but 
this fact would have been far outweighed by the fact that 



NOMINATED AND ELECTED VICE-PRESIDENT 145 

Cervera's fleet would have had open to it the chance of 
itself going through the canal, and thence sailing to attack 
Dewey or to menace our stripped Pacific Coast. If that 
canal is open to the warships of an enemy, it is a menace to 
us in time of war; it is an added burden, an additional 
strategic point to be guarded by our fleet. If fortified by 
us, it becomes one of the most potent sources of our pos- 
sible sea strength. Unless so fortified it strengthens 
against us every nation whose fleet is larger than ours. 
One prime reason for fortifying our great seaports is to 
unfetter our fleet, to release it for offensive purposes ; and 
the proposed canal would fetter it again, for our fleet would 
have to watch it, and therefore do the work which a fort 
should do; and what it could do much better. 

Secondly, as to the Monroe Doctrine. If we invite for- 
eign powers to a joint ownership, a joint guarantee, of 
what so vitally concerns us but a little way from our bor- 
ders, how can we possibly object to similar joint action say 
in Southern Brazil or Argentina, where our interests are 
so much less evident? If Germany has the same right that 
we have in the canal across Central America, why not in the 
partition of any part of Southern America? To my mind, 
we should consistently refuse to all European powers the 
right to control, in any shape, any territory in the Western 
Hemisphere which they do not already hold. 

As for existing treaties — I do not admit the ''dead hand" 
of the treaty-making power in the past. A treaty can al- 
ways be honorablj^ abrogated — though it must never be 
abrogated in dishonest fashion. 

Yours ever, 

Theodore Eoosevelt. 

A few weeks after the election, on November 22, 1900, 
Roosevelt wrote this characteristically frank and generous 
letter to ex-President Grover Cleveland: 

** During the last campaign I grew more and more to 
realize the very great service you had rendered to the whole 
country by what you did about free silver. As I said to a 



146 THEODORE ROOSEVELT AND HIS TIME 

Republican audience in South Dakota, I think your letter 
on free silver prior to your second nomination was as bold 
a bit of honest writing as I have ever seen in American 
public life. And more than anything else it put you in the 
position of doing for the American public in this matter 
of free silver what at that time no other man could have 
done. I think now we have definitely won out on the free 
silver business and, therefore, I think you are entitled to 
thanks and congratulations." 

It may not be inappropriate for me to add to this just 
tribute a brief account of a personal interview w^hich I had 
with Mr. Cleveland, at his house in New York City, in the 
udnter of 1891. It was soon after he had written his letter 
on the silver question in which he had come out squarely 
for the maintenance of the gold standard. I told him that 
I had been watching with great interest the reception given 
to the letter by Democratic newspapers throughout the 
country and had been surprised by the small amount of ad- 
verse criticism it had aroused. He said, as nearly as I can 
recall his words and I am sure that I give the substance 
accurately : 

''Well, I have been tempted to say something of the kind 
for several months, but I refrained because I knew if I said 
it there would be a cry raised ' Oh, he wants to be President 
again!' Now, Bishop, I've been President, and a man who 
has had it once is not overanxious to have it again. But 
the time seemed to have arrived when I ought to speak and 
so I let 'em have it.' Then, with a complete change of 
manner, and with a twinkle in his eye, he grasped me by the 
knee and in a confidential tone said: Bishop, you'll find 
there's some pretty good politics in that letter too!" 

And there was, for it secured for its writer a unanimous 
nomination for the Presidency and a triumphant reelection 
a year later. 

Roosevelt's service as Vice-President was destined to be 
very brief. His anticipatory fears lest he should find the 



NOMINATED AND ELECTED VICE-PRESIDENT 147 

duty of presiding over the Senate a bore were never 
realized, for he occupied the chair only a week. "Writ- 
ing, on March 16, 1901, to his friend, Cecil Arthur Spring- 
Eice, he thus described his experience : 

''I have really enjoyed presiding over the Senate for the 
week the extra session lasted. I shall get fearfully tired 
in the future no doubt and of course I should like a more 
active position." 

He adhered to his purpose of resuming the. study of the 
law, and wrote to John Proctor Clarke on the subject, on 
March 29, 1901 : 

''Just a line in reference to my studying law. I have 
been one year in the law school and at that time was also 
in my cousin John's office. Now, could I go into an office 
in New York — say Evarts & Choate — or study in New York 
or here in Oyster Bay, so as to get admitted to the bar be- 
fore the end of my term as Vice President!" 

He also wrote on the same subject to Alton B. Parker, 
then Chief Judge of the Court of Appeals of New York, 
and three years later his Democratic opponent for the Presi- 
dency, and was advised by him to study in the District of 
Columbia Law School. He accepted this advice in a letter 
dated May 31, 1901 : 

''As soon as I get back to Washington I shall begin to 
attend the law school there and when I have completed my 
two years* course and feel myself fit I shall apply for the 
examination. ' ' 



CHAPTER XIV 

PRESIDENT— EARLY DECLARATIONS OF POLICY 

President McKinley, while attending the Pan-American 
Exposition in Buffalo, on September 6, 1901, was shot by an 
anarchist. Roosevelt went at once to Buffalo, as did also 
several members of McKinley 's Cabinet. The wound was 
not regarded by the physicians in attendance as mortal and 
for a day or two the President's condition seemed so favor- 
able that they declared him to be practically out of danger. 
On receiving this assurance Roosevelt joined his family in 
the Adirondacks. A day or two afterwards, September 14, 
1901, he went on a long tramp through the forest, climbing 
Mount Tahawus. As he wae descending the mountain 
and was resting upon a shelf of land which overlooked the 
surrounding country, he saw a guide approaching on the 
trail from below. When the guide reached him he handed 
him a telegram saying that the President was worse and 
that he should go at once to Buffalo. He was ten miles 
away from the clubhouse at which he was lodging, and it 
was then late in the afternoon. It was dark when he 
reached the clubhouse and it was some time before a horse 
and wagon could be procured by which he could be conveyed 
to the nearest railway station. North Creek, which was 
between forty and fifty miles away. The night was dark 
and the roads, being the ordinary ones of the wilderness, 
were far from good. He and the driver were the sole occu- 
pants of the vehicle. The horses were changed three times, 
and the station was reached at dawn, where Roosevelt 
learned that McKinley was dead, and that he was President 
of the United States. A special train was awaiting to take 
him to Buffalo. On the evening of the same day, in the 

148 



PRESIDENT— EARLY DECLARATIONS OF POLICY 149 

house of a friend, Ansley Wilcox, in Buffalo, he took the 
oath of office in the presence of Secretary Root and oihet 
members of McKinley's Cabinet, and a few other persons. 
After taking the oath, he said : 

''In this hour of deep and terrible national bereavement, 
I wish to state that it shall be my aim to continue absolute- 
ly unbroken the policy of President McKinley for the peace, 
prosperity and honor of our beloved country." 

One of the first letters to reach him was the following 
from Secretary Hay, written from Washington on Septem- 
ber 15, 1901, a letter such as only John Hay could write, and 
which touched Roosevelt very deeply : 

BIt/ dear Roosevelt: 

If the Presidency had come to you in any other way, no 
one would have congratulated you with better heart than I. 
My sincere affection and esteem for you, my old-time love 
for your father — would he could have lived to see you where 
you are! — would have been deeply gratified. 

And even from the depths of the sorrow where I sit, with 
my grief for the President mingled and confused with that 
for my boy, so that I scarcely know, from hour to hour, 
the true source of my tears — I do still congratulate you, 
not only on the opening of an official career which I know 
will be glorious, but upon the vast opportunity for useful 
work which lies before you. With your youth, your ability, 
your health and strength, the courage God has given you 
to do right, there are no bounds to the good you can ac- 
complish for your country and the name you will leave in 
its annals. 

My official life is at an end — ^my natural life will not be 
long extended ; and so, in the dawn of what I am sure will 
be a great and splendid future, I venture to give you the 
heartfelt benediction of the past. 

God bless you. 

Yours faithfully, 

John Hay. 



150 THEODORE ROOSEVELT AND HIS TIME 

The new President left Buffalo for Washington on Sep- 
tember 16, 1901, and on the following day he called a meeting 
of the members of the Cabinet and asked them to remain in 
office which they consented to do. Hay with the others. He 
attended the funeral of President McKinley at Canton, 
Ohio, and on September 20, took up his residence in the 
White House. In accordance with an invitation which he 
had sent to me on his journey from Buffalo, I was his guest 
in the White House on the evening of that day, no one else 
being present, for his family had not arrived and no other 
guest had been asked. We had a long and intimate con- 
versation in which he talked freely of his policies and pur- 
poses as President. I said to him that no man had ever 
entered upon the office more absolutely free of all obliga- 
tion to any one than he had; that he owed his possession 
of it to no one, but that, on the contrary, he had acceded 
to it in spite of persistent efforts of his most zealous 
enemies to prevent him from ever reaching it ; and that he 
would enter upon his duties with the certainty of holding 
the office for seven years. He replied at once, and with 
great emphasis : 

'*I don't know anything about seven years. But this 
I do know — I am going to be President for three years, 
and I am going to do my utmost to give the country a good 
President during that period. I am going to be full Presi- 
dent, and I rather be full President for three years than 
half a President for seven years. Now, mind you, I am no 
second Grover Cleveland. I admire certain of his qualities, 
but I have no intention of doing with the Republican party 
what he did with the Democratic party. I intend to work 
with my party and to make it strong by making it worthy 
of popular support." 

He went on to say that he should not abandon a single 
one of the principles that had formed the basis of his public 
career, and that no matter how powerful might be the in- 
fluences brought to bear to induce him to waver on a single 
one of them, he should not yield a hair's breadth. When 



PRESIDENT— EARLY DECLARATIONS OF POLICY 151 

I dwelt upon the fact that influences which were certain 
to combine against him were far more powerful than any 
that he had encountered hitherto, he replied that he was f 
perfectly well aware of that but had no fear of ultimate 
victory since he was sure that the people would be on his 
side, and he should always let the people know what he was 
trying to accomplish. 

That he was deeply impressed with the great -responsi- 
bilities which had been placed upon him was apparent in all 
he said to me, and the same feeling found expression in the 
letters which he wrote at the time. To his friend, Senator 
Lodge, he wrote on September 23, 1901 : 

"It is a dreadful thing to come into the Presidency in 
this way; but it would be a far worse thing to be morbid 
about it. Here is the task, and I have got to do it to the 
best of my ability, and that is all there is about it." 

I 

To Richard Olney, who had been Secretary of State in 
President Cleveland's Cabinet, and who had sent him a 
letter of confidence and good wishes, he replied on the same 
date: 

''I know I need not tell you that I appreciate to the full 
the burdens placed upon me. All that in me lies to do will 
be done, to make my work a success. That I shall be able 
to solve with entire satisfaction to myself or any one else 
each of the many problems confronting me, I cannot of 
course hope for, but I shall do my best in each case, and in 
a reasonable number of cases I shall hope to meet with 
success. At any rate, I want you to know one thing. I can 
conscientiously say that my purpose is entirely single. I 
want to make a good President and to keep the administra- 
tion upright and efficient; to follow policies external and 
internal which shall be for the real and ultimate benefit of 
our people as a whole, and all party considerations will be 
absolutely secondary." 

There was general recognition, not only in Washington 
but throughout the country, that Roosevelt's accession to 



152 THEODORE ROOSEVELT AND HIS TIME 

the Presidency meant the opening of a new epoch in 
national history. The Republican party had been for many 
j years becoming more and more the party not merely of 
conservatives but of reactionaries. Its policy was con- 
trolled by the great industrial and commercial interests 
which had grown into enormous proportions during the 
preceding quarter of a centuiy. These, with the allied rail- 
way interests, constituted a veritable imperium in imperio, 
an invisible government more powerful than the govern- 
ment itself. The representatives of these interests argued, 
with all the sincerity of profound con\4ction, that since 
under their guidance and through their development the 
\ country had attained the greatest prosperity it had ever 
known, it was only just that the country should be given 
the kind of government most favorable to them. Their 
reasoning had never found more complete acceptance than 
was the case under President McKinley's administration. 

The first note of protest lifted by any Republican official 
and leader had come from Roosevelt while he was Governor 
of New York. The entire country had heard it, and the 
powerful interests whose dominion it threatened had com- 
bined in a determined eifort to render him powerless by 
''placing him on the shelf" of the Vice-Presidency, thus 
retiring him from public life. Knowing the man through 
his course in the Governorship they knew what confronted 
them when he became the Executive of the nation. The 
period of complacent acquiescence in things as they were 
had closed. 

A new period, of action in the field of the things that 
ought to be, was about to open. Henry Adams, who had 
known Roosevelt long and intimately, in his very remark- 
able book, ''The Education of Henry Adams," says of him 
as he entered upon the Presidency : 

"Power when wielded by abnormal energy is the most 
serious of facts, and all Roosevelt's friends knew that his 
restless and combative energy was more than normal. 
Roosevelt, more than any other living man within the range 
of notoriety, showed the singular primitive quality that 



PRESIDENT— EARLY DECLARATIONS OF POLICY 153 

belongs to ultimate matter — the quality that mediaeval 
theology assigned to God — he was pure act. ' ' 



The record of his first year in the Presidency amply 
confirms this view of Roosevelt's dominant quality, for it 
is crowded with action, most of it in directions hitherto 
carefully selected for inaction. 

From the very beginning, the new President left no room 
for doubt as to his unchanged attitude toward public office 
and public duty. He stood, as he had throughout his career, 
for honest, decent and efficient government in the interest 
of all the people, and whatever change was necessary to 
secure it, that change he should seek. Regarding his policy 
towards the new insular possessions, he announced on 
September 24, 1901, in reply to some inquiries by politicians 
on the subject, that ''absolutely no appointments in the 
insular possessions will be dictated or controlled by political 
considerations." On September 26, 1901, he wrote to 
William H. Hunt, Governor of Porto Rico : 

"In dealing with the Philippines, Cuba and Porto Rico 
my purpose is to give Taft and Wood and yourself the 
largest liberty of action possible, and the heartiest support 
on my part. In taking up the question of the lesser ap- 
pointments I want to consult especially you three men, for 
I have the utmost confidence in each of you. I shall certain- 
ly not appoint any man whom any one of you who has to 
be over or with that man disapproves of.** 

In accordance with his purpose of working with the 
leaders of his party whenever possible rather than against 
them, he wrote a cordial letter to Senator Marcus A. Hanna, 
of Ohio, requesting an early conference with him. Senator 
Hanna had been universally recognized as the ''power be- 
hind the throne ' ' in the McKinley administration and there 
was much speculation as to the maintenance of harmonious 
relations between him and the new President owing to sup- 
posed radical differences of opinion concerning the proper 



154 THEODORE ROOSEVELT AND HIS TIME 

use of public offices. Senator Hanna's response to the 
President's request, made from Cleveland, date of October 
12, 1901, is an interesting document : 

''I am in receipt of yours of the 8th inst. and reply that 
I will see you at the earliest time possible consistent with 
my duties here. Have had a full talk with Mr. Payne 
(Chairman of the Republican National Committee, and sub- 
sequently Postmaster General in Roosevelt's Cabinet) — 
there are many important matters to be considered from a 
political standpoint and I am sure we will agree upon a 
proper course to pursue. Meantime *go slow.' You will 
be besieged from all sides and I fear in some cases will get 
the wrong impression. Hear them all patiently but reserve 
your decision — unless in cases which may require imme- 
diate attention. Then if my advice is of importance Cor- 
telyou can reach me over the 'long distance.' '* 

The politicians of the Republican party had early infor- 
mation concerning the new President's ideas about the 
proper use of public office. On the first day that he held a 
reception for visitors, September 21, 1901, he said to three 
Southern Congressmen who asked about his policy in re- 
gard to appointments in the South : 

"I am going to be President of the United States and 
not of any section. I don't care that (snapping his fingers) 
for sections or sectional lines. When I was Governor of 
New York I was told I could make four appointments in 
the army. When I sent in the names three of the four men 
were from the South and the other was from New York. 
They were brave men who deserved recognition for services 
in the Spanish War and it did not matter to me what States 
they were from. 

"Half my blood is Southern and I have lived in the West, 
so that I feel that I can represent the whole countr>\ 

*'If I cannot find Republicans I am going to appoint 
Democrats. I intend to make such appointments as will 
induce every Southern man to respect the Republican 
party." 



PRESIDENT— EARLY DECLARATIOxNS OF POLICY 155 

In accordance with this declaration, he announced on 
October 7, 1901, that he should appoint as Judge of the 
United States District Court in Alabama, Thomas G. Jones, 
a liberal Democrat and an ex-Confederate. This selection 
was made without consulting Senator Hanna and in viola- 
tion of the established custom of consulting him about all 
Southern appointments. The Senator wrote asking why- 
there had been such haste in the matter, and the President, 
under date of October 8, 1901, replied : 

''The reason I wanted to decide about the judgeship in 
Alabama quickly was because my experience has taught 
me that in such a case a quick decision really prevents bit- 
terness." 

On the day following the appointment a letter was re- 
ceived by the President from Grover Cleveland commend- 
ing Mr. Jones for the position. Replying to this on October 
9, 1901, the President wrote: 

"I hardly know whether to say I am glad or sorry that 
I had appointed Mr. Jones Judge before I received your 
letter. But this I can say, that it was the greatest gratifica- 
tion to find that you would be glad of the appointment and 
thought so well of him." 

About this period, the President said to an Illinois Repre- 
sentative who was pressing the claims of a constituent to 
ofiice: 

"I want it thoroughly understood that no Presidential 
appointee has a prescriptive right to hold ofiice. I intend to 
consult only the public welfare in making appointments. 
As long as a man proves himself fit and efiicient his posi- 
tion is safe. When he shows himself unfit and inefficient he 
will be removed. ' * 

A few days later a Senator from Illinois who was urging 
the appointment of a constituent to a position said: ''He 

is backed, Mr. President, by the Illinois organization " 

but before he could get any farther, the President inter- 



156 THEODORE ROOSEVELT AND HIS TIME 

rupted him: "I wish to say, Senator, that I want to stand 
well with the organization, and all that, but I wish it dis- 
tinctly understood that I will appoint no man to office, even 
if recommended by the organization, unless he is wholly 
qualified for the position he seeks and is a man of in- 
tegrity." 

Another and very powerful Senator from a Western 
State approached the President with a request that a 
favorite army officer be advanced to the rank of Brigadier 
General. He seemed to think that the favor was to be 
granted merely for the asking but he found the President 
antagonistic. He was forced to argue the matter and had 
started on that line when the President, with a wave of the 
hand, motioned him to subside. **It is of no use, Senator, 
for you to talk any longer. I simply will not do it and that 
is ali there is about it. I have refused every Senator who 
called to see me on similar missions, and I must refuse you. 
It is not worth while to argue about the matter." 

Senator Bailey of Texas v.ent to the President with a 
similar request, saying that the promotion which he sought 
was favored by the entire Legislature of Texas. **But," 
said the President, **it is opposed by all the man's superior 
officers." *'I don't give a damn for his superior officers!" 
exclaimed the Senator. ''AVell, Senator," said the Presi- 
dent, "I don't give a damn for the Legislature of Texas." 
He refused to promote the Senator's man, and promoted 
an officer who hailed from Texas and who had performed 
excellent service in the war with Spain. 

In refusing to promote army officers on personal grounds, 
the President put an end to an abuse which had been grow- 
ing steadily for several years. As he said to the Senator 
above mentioned, he had denied similar requests from other 
Senators. One of these was a Senator from Maine, who 
was joined in the request by a Representative from the 
same State. To the latter Roosevelt wrote under date of 
November 9, 1901 : 

"General X. has been in several times to see me, more 
often than any other candidate for promotion. He has an 



PRESIDENT— EARLY DECLARATIONS OP POLICY 157 

excellent record but seems unable to understand the utter 
impropriety of doing what he asks, which is, not to pro- 
mote him to a vacancy but to punish some man now in the 
service by forcing him to retire in order to do a favor to 
General X. It is barely possible that some case would 
arise of so extreme a character as to justify such a pro- 
ceeding, but I can hardly imagine it. There is no warrant, 
whatever for doing it in General X. 's case as an exception, 
and it surely cannot be advocated as a general policy. It 
is not a question of giving General X. a promotion. It is a 
question of doing him a favor to which he has no more 
claim than hundreds of other officers, by doing a serious 
wrong and injustice to a man now in office." 

On the same day he sent a similar letter to the Maine 
Senator. 

Writing to a friend in Kansas, on October 9, 1901, he 
stated again his policy in regard to Southern appointments : 

*'I want to get hold of some man or men in Arkansas 
who will give me an absolutely square deal, when I ask for 
information about applicants for public office. Of course, 
where I can find a thoroughly fit and proper Republican to 
appoint I want to appoint him. If I cannot find one, then 
I want to take the best Democrat there is. Under no cir- 
cumstances do I intend to make an improper appointment 
or to put an inefficient or corrupt man into office. I want 
to have the same high standard in office in the South as in 
the North." 

Writing to Senator Lodge, on October 11, 1901, he out- 
lined briefly his general policy on economic subjects and ap- 
pointments : 

* ' On the general economic questions I shall do just about 
what I outlined in my letter of acceptance (as nominee for 
Vice-President) and in my speeches on the stump, unless 
some good reason can be shown why I should change at any 
point. In the appointments I shall go on exactly as I did 
while I was Governor of New York. The Senators and 



158 THEODORE ROOSEVELT AND HIS TIME 

Congressmen shall ordinarily name the men, but I shall 
name the standard, and the men have got to come up to it." 

A few weeks later, when the question of reappointing the 
occupant of an important Federal office in New York City 
was under consideration and the President was known to 
be in favor of a change, a volatile young politician who 
was acting as errand boy from Senator Piatt called upon 
the President in the interest of the incumbent. In the 
course of the conversation, the visitor threatened the Presi- 
dent with the vengeance of the party organization if he did 
not reappoint the official. The President sprang from his 
chair, saying that in the selection of officers for the public 
service he was guided only by the fitness of the applicants, 
and adding: **If you come here to threaten me, I will ask 
you to withdraw immediately and let me go on with my 
work." The visitor began to stammer an apology but be- 
fore he could find expression he found himself in the hall- 
way outside the President's office. 

One letter which the President wrote during the first 
weeks of his administration is worthy of record as showing 
his early desire to have Germany made fully aware of his 
attitude on the Monroe Doctrine, It was addressed, on 
October 11, 1901, to Baron H. S. von Sternburg, then Ger- 
man Consul at Calcutta, India, afterwards German Ambas- 
sador at Washington : 

' ' I most earnestly desire to have Germany and the United 
States work hand in hand. I regard the Monroe Doctrine 
as being equivalent to open door in South America. That 
is, I do not want the United States or any European power 
to get territorial possessions in South America but to let 
South America gradually develop on its own lines, with an 
open door to all outside nations, save as the individual 
countries enter into individual treaties with one another." 

Very soon after Roosevelt's accession to the Presidency, 
representatives of the powerful financial interests already 
alluded to called upon him and sought to persuade him to 



PRESIDENT— EARLY DECLARATIONS OF POLICY 159 

modify his views in regard to trusts and kindred matters. 
He told them frankly that he should not do so, and offered 
for their perusal those passages on such subjects that he 
had prepared for his first message to Congress in Decem- 
ber. Among others, these passages were submitted to Sen- 
ator Hanna, who wrote to him advising him not to give so 
much prominence as he had to them, advice that was dis- 
regarded. In a confidential letter to his brother-in-law, 
Douglas Robinson of New York City, on October 14, 1901, he 
gave an entertaining account of one valiant but fruitless 
effort to get him to go back on himself and his record : 

"I am very fond of X. He is one of the men whom I 
most respect. But, to be perfectly frank, he did not appear 
to advantage in the talk he had with me on the evening in 
question. This is no reflection on him. He was occupying 
exactly the same attitude that Y. occupies on this question. 
Both of them are men of the highest character, who are 
genuine forces for good as well as men of strength and 
weight. But on this particular occasion they were arguing 
like attorneys for a bad case, and at the bottom of their 
hearts each would know this if he were not personally in- 
terested; and especially if he were not the representative 
of a man of so strong and dominant a character as W. In 
plain English, what W. wanted me to do was to go back on 
my messages to the New York Legislature and on my letter 
of acceptance of the nomination for the Vice-Presidency, 
as well as on theMinneapolis speech, which was by no means 
as strong as either the messages or the letter. 

''Now if I felt convinced that I had been wrong in what 
I had hitherto said, or even if I were doubtful about it, 
I should not have the slightest hesitation in announcing 
that I have changed my mind ; but as a matter of fact I was 
right. I intend to be most conservative, but in the interests 
of the big corporations themselves and above all in the 
interest of the country, I intend to pursue, cautiously but 
steadily, the course to which I have been publicly committed 
again and again, and which I am certain is the right course. 
I may add that I happen to know that President McKinley 



160 THEODORE ROOSEVELT AND HIS TIME 

was uneasy about this so-called trust question and was re- 
flecting in his mind what he should do in the matter. 
X. wanted me to do nothing at all, and say nothing except 
platitudes ; accept the publication of what some particular 
company chooses to publish, as a favor, instead of demand- 
ing what we think ought to be published from all companies 
as a right." 

On the eve of the assembling of Congress the President 
invited me to the White House, saying that he would like 
to have me go over the message. After reaching Washing- 
ton I called upon John Hay, Secretary of State, who had 
been my honored and valued friend for many years. When 
I said to him that I was going to read the message, he re- 
marked: "You will be greatly interested. The President 
has written every word of it himself. Under McKinley, 
all of us in the Cabinet contributed portions relating to 
matters in our departments ; the message was thus a com- 
posite document. Roosevelt has written the whole of his 
himself; it is the most individual message since Lincoln." 

The message had been awaited with great interest, not 
only by the members of both houses of Congress, but by 
the general public as well, because of the universal recog- 
nition of the entry of a new force in national administra- 
tion. It was the first Presidential message sent to Con- 
gress in print rather than in script. This was a new de- 
parture, ordered by Roosevelt, as in keeping with the times. 
His action caused mild comment at the time, and was the 
forerunner of a much more radical departure five years 
later, which caused far more agitated comment, when he 
sent in a special message illustrated with photographic 
reproductions, giving the results of his trip to Panama to 
inspect the canal work which had just begun. 

The reception of the message by Congress revealed the 
deep interest with which it had been awaited. The account 
sent out to the country by the Associated Press read : 

"It was listened to with marked respect in the Senate. 
Not in many years have the members of the House listened 



PRESIDENT— EARLY DECLARATIONS OF POLICY 161 

with such rapt attention to the annual message of a Presi- 
dent of the United States as they did to-day to the reading 
of the first message of President Koosevelt. Every word 
was followed intently from the announcement of the tragic 
death of President McKinley in the opening sentence, to 
the expression of the plosing wish that the relations of the 
United States with the world should continue peaceful. The 
reading occupied two hours, but not over a dozen members 
left their seats until it was finished. Several times there 
was applause, and at the close there was an enthusiastic 
demonstration on the Republican side." 

The Washington correspondent of the Chicago Record- 
Herald wrote : 

'' President Roosevelt's message to Congress has one uni- 
versal and enthusiastic approval at the National Capital. 
Not for many years has a similar State paper aroused 
greater interest or met with warmer reception. The praise 
accorded it comes from men of both political parties. 

''Usually the annual message of a President is treated 
with scant courtesy by the commoners. They listen a while, 
then succumb to the allurement of the smoking-room or 
restaurant. To-day they sat still and when the end came 
there was applause loud and hearty. Democrats joined in 
it, which they had a right to do, for he is their President, 
too ; and in all the 20,000 words they had searched in vain 
for the party leader, the politician, the mere phrase-maker. 
They knew they had listened to a man who thinks, to a man 
who can write, to a man who writes well and clearly because 
he thinks well and clearly; and every word of it from the 
head of the Government, not a word from the head of a 
political organization." 

There was in the message an entirely unmodified re- 
affirmation of his previously expressed views about trusts. 
A few of the more important passages only are cited here, 
as the full text is available in the volumes of his public 
papers : 



162 THEODORE KOOSEVELT AND HIS TIME 

''There is a widespread conviction in the minds of the 
American people that the great corporations known as 
trusts are in certain of their features and tendencies hurt- 
ful to the general welfare. This springs from no spirit 
of envy or uncharitableness, nor lack of pride in the great 
industrial achievements that have placed this country at the 
head of the nations struggling for commercial supremacy. 
It does not rest upon a lack of intelligent appreciation of 
the necessity of meeting changing conditions of trade with 
new methods, nor upon ignorance of the fact that combina- 
tion of capital in the effort to accomplish great things is 
necessary when the world's progress demands that great 
things be done. It is based upon sincere conviction that 
combination and concentration should be, not prohibited, 
but supervised and within reasonable limits controlled ; and 
in my judgment this conviction is right." 

"Great corporations exist only because they are created 
and safeguarded by our institutions ; and it is therefore our 
right and duty to see that they work in harmony with these 
institutions." 

"The first essential in determining how to deal with the 
great industrial combinations is knowledge of the facts — 
publicity. In the interest of the public, the Government 
should have the right to inspect and examine the workings 
of the great corporations engaged in interstate business." 

* ' There is utter lack of uniformity in the State laws about 
them. Therefore, in the interest of the whole people, the 
Nation should, without interfering with the power of the 
States in the matter itself, also assume power of super- 
vision and regulation over all corporations doing an inter- 
state business." 

He recommended the creation of a new Cabinet officer, 
to be called the Secretary of Commerce and Industries, and 
suggested the adoption of a Constitutional Amendment 



PRESIDENT— EARLY DECLARATIONS OF POLICY 163 

giving powers of regulation and control of corporations in 
case such powers could not be exercised under authority of 
Congress. 

Soon after he became President the following amusing 
correspondence passed between him and his long-time and 
cherished friend, Owen Wister: 

Monday, September 23, 1901. 
Dear Theodore: I don't know the crime of yours which 
this earnest ass reveals. I shall not answer him because 
silence has a cumulative eloquence which I prefer. But 
make yourself gay over the solemn screed. 

Ever yours, 
0. W. 
(Enclosing the following letter) 

Boston, Mass., September 22, 1901. 
Oiven Wister, Esq., 
Dear Sir: 

I observe, at the end of an article bearing your signature, 
the following: 

''He (Theodore Roosevelt) has striven in his books to 
do honor to great Americans in the past." 

I am informed, on authority that seems conclusive, that 
Mr. Roosevelt, in one of his works, speaks of Thomas Paine 
as a "dirty little Atheist": that, on having it proven to 
him by a more careful, or more truthful historian, that in 
these three words he had made three mis-statements (or a 
triple mist-statement), and that Mr. Paine w^as neither 
''dirty," "little," or "Atheist," he has never made for 
them any apology, correction, or even withdrawal. 

For any other than an illiterate man to declare Paine to 
be an atheist, seems impossible ; for an educated historian 
to do so, when page after page of his best known work is 
devoted to argument in favor of the existence of a God, 
seems hardly compatible with honesty. 

Like Mr. Roosevelt, I have no agreement or even sym- 
pathy with Paine 's religious ideas; but, unlike him, I do 
not consider disagreement with them a legitimate excuse 



164 THEODORE ROOSEVELT AND HIS TIME 

for libelling and vilifying one of the greatest men of Ms 
time. 

In the opinion of thoughtful scholars, Mr. Roosevelt's 
ignorant and spiteful mis-statements about Thomas Paine 
effectually discredit him as a historian ; and they seem also 
to contradict the paragraph from your article, which I 
quote at the beginning of this letter. 

Yours truly, 

P. G. P . 

Personal. 

September 25, 1901. 
Dear Dan: 

This is delightful. I ought not to have used the exact 
word atheist. He admitted the existence of an unknown 
God, but denied there was a God of the Christians. As to 
whether he was dirty or not, it is a mere matter of private 
judgment. I was recording in the sentence the fact that he 
had stayed several weeks in bed without getting out for 
any purpose, and that as a consequence a swine in a sty 
was physically clean by comparison. 

Faithfully yours, 

Theodoee Roosevelt. 



CHAPTER XV 
THE BOOKER WASHINGTON INCIDENT 

No act of Roosevelt during his entire career in the Presi- 
dency was more thoroughly characteristic or created a 
greater commotion throughout the land than his having 
Booker T. "Washington, the negro educator and orator, as 
his guest at dinner in the White House on October 18, 1901. 
The news of it roused the South to fury, and even in the 
North there was a division of opinion in regard to the pro- 
priety of the act. That Roosevelt anticipated no such out- 
burst of disapproval when he invited Mr. Washington, I 
have personal knowledge. I had been spending a day and 
a night with him in the White House and on the morning 
of the 18th he asked me if I could not stay over another 
night, saying that Booker Washington was coming to dinner 
and he would like to have me meet him. I replied that I was 
extremely sorry I could not, for there was no man in the 
country whom I respected more highly or whom I would 
more gladly meet, but it was imperative that I return to 
New York. Neither one of us alluded to Washington's 
color, and it did not occur to me for a moment that there 
could be any objection to his presence at the White House 
table. No intimation of doubt on the point came from the 
President, but in a letter which I shall quote he says he 
felt a moment's qualm. When the storm burst I wrote him 
expressing my astonishment, and in reply he said: ''I 
really felt melancholy for the South at the way the 
Southerners behaved in the matter." 

A few weeks later, November 8, 1901, he wrote a letter on 
the subject to Albion W. Tourgee, who was the United 
States Consul at Bordeaux, France. Mr. Tourgee was an 

165 



166 THEODORE ROOSEVELT AND HIS TIME 

American lawyer and jurist and a veteran of the Civil War, 
who had acquired wide fame as the author of a book on the 
reconstruction of the South after the war, entitled 'A 
Fool's Errand.' He had written in remonstrance to the 
President because of his general policy toward the negro. 
Koosevelt's letter, aside from its reference to the Booker 
Washington incident, is of interest and value because of 
its impressive statement of his views upon the entire negro 
problem. I quote the f ollomng passages : 

''When I asked Booker T. Washington to dinner I did 
not devote very much thought to the matter one way or the 
other. I respect him greatly and believe in the work he has 
done. I have consulted so much with him it seemed to me 
that it Avas natural to ask him to dinner to talk over this 
work, and the very fact that I felt a moment's qualm on 
inviting him because of his color made me ashamed of my- 
self and made me hasten to send the invitation. I did not 
think of its bearing one way or the other, either on my own 
future or on anything else. As things have turned out, I 
am very glad that I asked him, for the clamor aroused by 
the act makes me feel as if the act was necessary. 
I ''I have not been able to think out any solution of the 
/terrible problem offered by the presence of the negro on 
I this continent, but of one thing I am sure, and that is that 
inasmuch as he is here and can neither be killed nor driven 
away, the only wise and honorable and Christian thing to 
do is to treat each black man and each white man strictly on 
his merits as a man, giving him no more and no less than 
he shows himself worthy to have. I say I am 'sure' that 
this is the right solution. Of course I know that we see 
through a glass dimly, and, after all, it may be that I am 
wrong; but if I am, then all my thoughts and beliefs are 
wrong, and my whole way of looking at life is^ wrong. At 
any rate, while I am in public life, however short a time 
that may be, I am in honor bound to act up to my beliefs 
and convictions. I do not intend to offend the prejudices 
of any one else, but neither do I intend to allow their preju- 
dices to make me false to my principles." 






THE BOOKER WASHINGTON INCIDENT 167 

I have said that there was a division of opinion in the 
North on the subject of the famous dinner. A striking 
illustration of this is afforded in the comment which the 
New York World, the foremost Democratic newspaper of 
the North, made editorially on October 20, 1901 : 

''An American named Washington, one of the most 
learned, most eloquent, most brilliant men of the day — the 
President of a college — is asked to dinner by President 
Eoosevelt. And because the pigment of his skin is some 
shades darker than that of others a large part of the United 
States is convulsed with shame and rage. 

' ' The man is a negro. Therefore in eating with him the 
President is charged with having insulted the South. This 
man may cast a ballot but he may not break bread. He may 
represent us in the Senate Chamber, but he may not 'join 
us at the breakfast table.' He may educate us, but not 
eat with us; preach our Gospel, but not be our guest; en- 
lighten our minds, but not entertain our bodies; die for us, 
but not dine with us. 

"Truly Liberty must smile at such broad-minded logic, 
such enlightened tolerance. Or should she weep?" 

An interesting corollary to this disturbing incident is 
afforded in a letter that Roosevelt wrote, two years later, 
on October 29, 1903, to Dr. Lyman Abbott: 

"Yesterday the Episcopal Bishops and clergymen called 
to see me. The Bishops of Kentucky, Mississippi, Ala- 
bama, Georgia, North Carolina, Virginia, etc., etc., were 
all there. Among them was an archdeacon from North Car- 
olina and a clergjTxian from Maryland, both of them ne- 
groes. They came into the White House in line among the 
rest of the bishops, deacons, and doctors of divinity. No- 
body shrank from them ; nobody seemed to think it unnat- 
ural that I should receive them in the White House. These 
high prelates of the Episcopal church brought their wives 
and daughters along in their company. They did not sit 
down at the table, but they all were received by Mrs. Roose- 
velt and myself on the same terms. If any of them took 



168 THEODORE ROOSEVELT AND HIS TIME 

any refreshment the colored men doubtless did so too. I 
wonder whether these same Southern bishops and clerg\^- 
men were shocked when, two years ago, Booker Washington 
sat down at my table with me? In South Carolina, at Flor- 
ence, I have just reappointed a negro postmaster with the 
approval of the entire community. Why South Carolina 
should go crazy over 'the appointment of an equally good 
negro as collector of the port of Charleston I do not know. 
Why the Southerners should be glad to visit the White 
House in company with a colored archdeacon, and yet feel 
furious because I received in only slightly more intimate 
fashion a great colored educator I am again at a loss to 
understand." 

Subsequently the President wrote two notable letters, 
from which I shall quote, defining fully his views in regard 
to the treatment of the colored race and the appointment 
of colored men to public office. The first was to Mr. E. G. 
Ehett, of Charleston, S. C, under date of November 10, 
1902: 

**How any one could have gained the idea that I had said 
I would not appoint reputable and upright colored men to 
office, when objection was made to them solely on account 
of their color, I confess I am wholly unable to understand. 

'*So far as I legitimately can I shall always endeavor to 
pay regard to the likes and dislikes of the people of each 
locality, but I cannot consent by my action to take the po- 
sition that the door of hope — the door of opportunity — is 
to be shut upon all men, no matter how worthy, purely 
upon the grounds of color. Such an attitude would accord- 
ing to my conviction be fundamentally wrong. The ques- 
tion of 'negro domination' does not enter into the matter at 
all. You yourself know that the enormous majority of my 
appointments in South Carolina have been of white men, 
and so far as I know, of white men whose good character 
and uprightness were not questioned. The question simply 
is whether it is to be declared that under no circumstances 
shall any man of color, no matter how good a citizen, no 



THE BOOKER WASHINGTON INCIDENT 169 

matter how upright and honest, no matter how fair in his 
dealings with all his fellows, be permitted to hold any office 
under our government. I certainly cannot assume such an 
attitude, and you must permit me to say that in my view it 
is an attitude no one should assume, whether he looks at it 
from the standpoint of the true interest of the white men of 
the South or of the colored men of the South — not to speak 
of any other section in the Union. It seems to me that it 
is a good thing from every standpoint to let the colored 
man know that if he shows in marked degree the qualities 
of good citizenship — the qualities which in a white man we 
feel are entitled to reward — then he himself will not be cut 
off from all hope of similar reward." 

The second letter was written under date of February 
23, 1903, to Mr. Clark Howell, editor of the Atlanta Consti- 
tution: 

**Now as to what you say concerning Federal appoint- 
ments in the South. Frankly, it seems to me that my ap- 
pointments speak for themselves and that my policy is self- 
explanatory. So far from feeling that they need the slight- 
est apology or justification, my position is that on the 
strength of what I have done I have the right to claim the 
support of all good citizens who wish not only a high 
standard of Federal service but fair and equitable dealing 
to the South as well as to the North, and a policy of con- 
sistent justice and good will toward all men. In making 
appointments I have sought to consider the feelings of the 
people of each locality so far as I could consistently do so 
without sacrificing principle. The prime tests I have ap- 
plied have been those of character, fitness and ability, and 
when I have been dissatisfied with what has been offered 
within my own party lines I have without hesitation gone 
to the opposite party — and you are of course aware that I 
have repeatedly done this in your own State of Georgia. 
I certainly cannot treat mere color as a permanent bar to 
holding office, any more than I could so treat creed or birth- 
place — always provided that in other respects the applicant 



170 THEODORE ROOSEVELT AND HIS TIME 

or incumbent is a worthy and well-behaved American citi- 
zen. Just as little will I treat it as conferring a right to 
hold office. I have scant sympathy with the mere doctri- 
naire, with the man of mere theory who refuses to face 
facts ; but do you not think that in the long run it is safer 
for everybody if we act on the motto, 'All men up,' rather 
than that of 'Some men down'l" 



CHAPTER XVI 
CONTROVERSIES WITH GENERAL MILES 

An incident which excited much attention and varying 
comment occurred in December, 1901, during the prolonged 
controversy between Admirals Sampson and Schley con- 
cerning the conduct of the latter in the naval battle of San- 
tiago during the war with Spain. The Naval Court of In- 
quiry, which investigated the case, made a report on De- 
cember 16, which was adverse to Schley. In a published 
interview on December 17, General Nelson A. Miles, who 
was then the Lieutenant-General of the army, its highest 
officer, condemned the finding of the Court and upheld 
Schley's side in the controversy. He was rebuked oflficially 
by the Secretary of War, Elihu Root, for this expression 
on the ground that it was in violation of the army regula- 
tions which forbid expression by military men of opinions 
of any kind, either of praise or censure, in matters of the 
kind. The President approved the order of rebuke. Gen- 
eral Miles went to the White House to protest to the Presi- 
dent, and was shown into the reception room, where he 
found the President in conversation with a number of per- 
sons. Striding up to the President, and interrupting the 
conversation, the General said: ''Mr. President, I have 
come here to protest against that order of Secretary Root." 
Before he could get any further, the President, noticing 
his excited condition, said quietly: "Step into the Cabinet 
room. General, and I will see you there presently." Instead 
of heeding this request, the General said again, loudly for 
all to hear: "Mr. President, I am here to protest, etc." 
Again the President said, this time impressively: "Gen- 
eral, I advise you to step into the Cabinet room!" Again 
the General declined to do so, repeating his previous utter- 

171 



172 THEODORE ROOSEVELT AND HIS TIME 

ances, whereupon the President, stepping closely to him and 
speaking with emphasis and distinctness, said, in substance : 
'* General Miles, you are a veteran with a distinguished 
record. I wish to show you courtesy, but if you insist upon 
my telling you what I am about to, I shall do so. Your con- 
duct has been not merely silly but insubordinate and un- 
military. You have done what you could to damage the 
navy and damage the army. Secretary Root is absolutely 
right, and you deserve a severe reprimand from the stand- 
point of the discipline absolutely essential to the army's 
welfare." 

No account of this interview was given out from the 
White House, but General Miles allowed a version of his 
own to reach the press in which it was made to appear that 
the President had turned upon him in anger when he en- 
tered the room and had subjected him to humiliation by ad- 
ministering a rebuke to him publicly. The President never 
took the trouble to contradict this inaccurate report. The 
version herewith given is authoritative and strictly truthful. 
To a Western editor who had written to the President in the 
interest of General Miles, Roosevelt replied, December 10, 
1901 : 

'*I take it for granted that you will cordially agree with 
me that such action as that of General Miles is to be repri- 
manded severely, from the standpoint of the discipline ab- 
solutely essential if the Army and Na\'y are to amount to 
anything; and this without regard to which side he takes. 

*'As for the Schley matter, most emphatically I shall en- 
deavor to do absolute justice. But you must let me say that 
in doing justice I should be ashamed to take into considera- 
tion whether what I did was popular or not. I hope I shall 
not have to take any part at all in a matter that purely re- 
fers to President McKinley's administration, and with 
which I have nothing whatever to do ; but if I do have to 
take it up I shall decide the case absolutely on its merits, 
and I shall no more consider whether a majority of the 
people are for or against a given man than I should con- 



CONTROVERSIES WITH GENERAL MILES 173 

sider it if I were a judge sitting upon the bench deciding 
the rights or wrongs of a particular case. ' ' 

The verdict of the Sampson-Schley court of inquiry, after 
having been approved by the Secretary of the Navy, was, 
at Schley's request, referred to the President for review 
on January 7, 1902, and on February 18 following the Pres- 
ident confirmed it on the ground that it decreed substantial 
justice. 

General Miles got himself into further trouble with the 
War Departmenta few weeks later. He made formal ap- 
plication on Feb^Mjv 17, 1902, to the Secretary of War to 
be sent to the Phili^B|J|U|ith ten men of his own selection 
from Cuba and Porto i||^fc^akefull control there from 
the military and civil auiiHiHBB^feiiduct a thorough in- 
quiry, and return with such a nuiirbjjMJjj^^e Filipinos 
as seemed desirable, and then enter int^flB^^ation with 
members of Congress as to a plan for thl^Hj^h^ntrol 

Secretary Root, in a memorandum dated MarcliWl902, 
which was approved by the President, denied the aPplica- 
tion, saying that to grant it would practically be to super- 
sede Governor Taft and General Chaffee, who were in 
charge of the Philippines, and would be a reflection on their 
successful conduct of affairs in the islands. To this Gen- 
eral Miles replied in a letter, March 24, 1902, reviewing the 
action of the President and Secretary, endeavoring to show 
it had been wrong, and assuming as evidence of his conten- 
tion that certain charges which had been made of official 
misconduct in the Philippines were true, although they were 
at the time under investigation and unproved. On this 
letter Secretary Root made a memorandum, on March 25, 
1902, reviewing the General's conduct in the matter and 
saying: 

'*In the interest of good discipline and effective service 
such a course is much to be regretted. Such charges ought 
not to be published against our countrymen, whom we have 
sent to labor and fight under our flag on the other side 



174 THEODORE ROOSEVELT AND HIS TIME 

of the world, before they can be heard in their own de- 
fense." 

On this memorandum the President wrote, March '27, 
1902: 

' ' The memorandum of the Secretary of War is approved 
as a whole and as to every part. Had there been any doubt 
before as to the wisdom of denying General Miles 's request, 
these papers would remove such doubt." 

General Miles brought it about that this correspondence 
was made known to members of Congress, and its publica- 
tion was called for and procured. He also was believed to 
have been instrumental in securing the publication in the 
press of a letter containing the charges alluded to in his 
second letter to the Secretary of War, charges which were 
withdrawn later by the writer of the letter because no evi- 
dence could be adduced to sustain them. 

While this episode in the career of General Miles was in 
progress, the President wrote a confidential letter to Sec- 
retary Root in which a very strong light is thrown on the 
mental peculiarities of the General. It is now published for 
the first time: 

Private and Confidential. 

March 7, 1902. 
My dear Mr. Secretary: 

It seems to me that, for your private use at the present 
time, and with a view to making a permanent record of 
certain facts, I ought to send this memorandum to you in 
connection with the request of General Miles which you 
have so properly disapproved. This is the request which 
General Miles first showed me in a far more offensive form; 
the request at that time being couched in language which 
amounted to an endorsement by the head of the army of 
some of the most offensive and most unfounded slanders 
which have been put forth on the stump and in Congress 
by the violent traducers of the army and of the nation. 
The course of General Miles in giving his endorsement to 



CONTROVERSIES WITH GENERAL MILES 175 

these utterly baseless slanders against the army of which 
he is himself the head was precisely on a parallel with his 
recent memorandum, in which he impliedly endorsed the 
statements of the least responsible demagogues, to the ef- 
fect that the army was gathered near great cities for the 
purpose of overawing workingmen. 

During the six months that I have been President, Gen- 
eral Miles has made it abundantly evident by his actions 
that he has not the slightest desire to improve or benefit 
the army, and to my mind his actions can bear only the 
construction that his desire is purely to gratify his selfish 
ambition, his vanity, or his spite. His conduct is certainly 
entirely incompatible, not merely with intelligent devotion 
to the interests of the country, but even with intelligent de- 
votion to the interests of the service. President McKinley 
and you yourself have repeatedly told me that such was 
the case during the period before I became President. 

To show the animus of General Miles in these matters and 
the. extreme unwisdom of trusting him in any position 
where he can imagine it to be for his interest to discredit 
the American Government or the American Army, I re- 
capitulate here what I have already told you and President 
McKinley as to something that occurred about three years 
ago. At that time I had testified or was about to testify 
as to certain shortcomings in the War Department during 
the Spanish War. General Miles seemingly construed this, 
not as a desire to tell the truth, whoever was affected, but 
as a championship of himself against Secretary Alger and 
President McKinley. I was Governor of New York, and 
had come on here to visit Senator Lodge. At the time, our 
army was engaged in the hard fighting which accompanied 
the outbreak of the Filipino insurrection. General Miles 
made repeated efforts to see me, and finally succeeded and 
had a long conversation with me, in Lodge's house, on the 
afternoon of Sunday, February 26, 1899. He proposed to 
me that we should join forces and that he should run for 
President while I ran for Vice-President. His estimate of 
the political situation was utterly fatuous, and the propo- 



176 THEODORE ROOSEVELT AND HIS TIME 

sition was interesting only because, in the first place, it 
showed the man's political folly, and, in the second place, 
it gave me a glimpse of a most unpleasant side of his char- 
acter as Major-General commanding the army. He based 
his main hope of being able to upset President McKinley 
and deprive him of a renomination or reelection upon 
what he regarded as the probable failure of our arms in 
the Philippines. He repeated again and again, obviously 
with the utmost satisfaction, that disaster would certainly 
befall our troops and that possibly they might be driven 
out of the islands, and that this would discredit the admin- 
istration of President McKinley and further the ambition 
of any one who was against him. 

After listening to him for some time, I remarked that of 
course every one was bound to work for the success of our 
arms in the Philippines and to hope for it. This called 
forth the most perfunctory acquiescence on his part; and 
after a minute 's pause he harped back to what he had been 
saying already and repeated two or three times, that dis- 
asters were certain to come ; that there would be disgrace 
to the nation and that then President McKinley would suf- 
fer ; and that the disgrace which befell our army would vin- 
dicate himself (Miles) and help the opponents of the Ad- 
ministration. 

His attitude was so foolish, and from a political stand- 
point he was so vague in his notions as to what should be 
done to achieve his ambition, and so ignorant of the fact 
that if the country did become hostile to McKinley the ad- 
vantage was bound to accrue to somebody other than him- 
self, that I should not have thought of the matter again had 
it not been for the very unpleasant impression which his 
conduct necessarily made upon me in view of his being 
the commanding general of the army. I told Senator Lodge 
of the matter at the time. The following July you came 
into your present office; and I was impressed more and 
more, as I thought over the matter, by the danger which 
might result from the fact that the general commanding the 
army, who was advising you in the most confidential man- 



CONTROVERSIES WITH GENERAL MILES 177 

ner as regards the course you were to follow in the Philip- 
pines, was really counting on the failure of that course as 
the stepping-stone to his own political ambition. I finally 
became convinced that, inasmuch as General Miles was in 
a frame of mind which caused him to take delight in disas- 
ters to the American arms unless success would redound 
to his own personal advantage, it would be well to caution 
President McKinley against him. I accordingly told the 
facts to the President. Later on the President told me that 
Miles had tried his best to persuade him (President McKin- 
ley) to accept Miles as a candidate for Vice-President on 
the same ticket with him. 

In view of these facts, I think that General Miles ought 
only to be employed when we are certain that whatever tal- 
ents he may possess will be used under conditions which 
make his own interests and the interests of the country 
identical. 

Faithfully yours, 

Theodoke Roosevelt. 

The closing episode in the public career of General Miles 
occurred in 1903. On August 8 of that year he was retired 
by limit of age, Secretary Root issuing the regulation 
formal order to that effect. A great clamor was at once 
raised in and out of the press because no letter or word of 
commendation of the General accompanied the order. The 
New York Times was especially vehement, saying the re- 
tirement of this ' ' splendid soldier ' ' without a word of praise 
was '*an amazing blunder which may even assume the pro- 
portions of a veritable calamity to the administration." 
Two letters which the President wrote at the time may be 
cited in explanation of his course. The first was to Clarke 
Davis, editor of the Public Ledger of Philadelphia, under 
date of August 24, 1903 : 

**I had no knowledge that any one would suggest my 
writing a letter to Miles any more than to any of the other 
Generals I had retired. The matter merely did not occur 
to me, and of course I did not speak about it to Mr. Root. 



178 THEODORE ROOSEVELT AND HIS TIME 

But if I had spoken about it to Mr. Root, I should most cer- 
tainly have backed him in refusing to give any special rec- 
ommendation to General Miles. It does not seem to me 
that the matter of General Miles 's disloyalty to the army 
is one the knowledge of which is confined to the Adminis- 
tration. Take his last report on the Philippines, which 
was made public with the findings upon it. Therein it ap- 
pears conclusively that this old soldier has devoted himself 
to a venomous slander of the army under his supposed con- 
trol. 

**As I told you in my last letter. General Miles asked me 
to go in with him, he as Presidential candidate and I as 
Vice-Presidential candidate, to upset McKinley for re- 
nomination. Of course he had a perfect right to make this 
proposition ; although I do not think it is advisable for the 
General commanding the army, who has just been commis- 
sioned Lieutenant-General by the President, to seek a nom- 
ination at the expense of that President. But assuming 
that his conduct was proper in this regard, the thing that I 
minded was the sinister pleasure he showed at the thought 
that McKinley would be hurt by disasters to the army in the 
Philippines, and his eager belief that these disasters were 
coming and would hurt McKinley so that he (Miles) might 
step into McKinley 's place. In other words, the General 
commanding the army was hoping for political preferment 
at the expense of the President, whose adviser he was sup- 
posed to be, through disaster to the army of which this 
same General was in titular command. 

''When I came in as President I was willing to forget 
all this; to remember only Miles 's gallant conduct forty 
years before in the Civil War and the fact that he had 
also done well in the Indian warfare — although not as well, 
for instance, as Crook, whose intriguing and underhanded 
enemy he ever showed himself to be. Accordingly I tried 
my best to keep on good terms with him. But it was ab- 
solutely impossible. ■ The man has not one feeling which 
should characterize an officer and a gentleman, save that 
only of physical courage. He is a foolish creature possess- 



CONTROVERSIES WITH GENERAL MILES 179 

ing only the power for intrigue and for demagogy, but not 
of military capacity. 

*'But what counts for a hundredfold more than this, I 
became convinced that there was no single recommendation 
he was making which had in view anything but his own 
advancement. He was anxious not to benefit the army, but 
to harm Secretary Root, and to gratify his spite on the va- 
rious officers of whom he disapproved. I have never met 
any officer of the army as wholly indifferent to its welfare 
as is Miles; and this, whether the matter at issue be the 
putting down of Filipino bandits, or the use and abuse of 
the canteen, or establishing a cavalry school, or anything 
else. I do not believe he is capable of considering anything 
but his own personal interest. In particular the course he 
has followed, again and again, seeking to discredit our 
troops in the Philippines and giving currency to reports of 
outrages by them which he well knew to be unfounded, has 
been such as to have warranted me in removing him 
from his position as Lieutenant-General. I am not sure 
that I did right in letting him serve out his term, but most 
certainly I should have been wrong and I should have in- 
flicted harm on the army if I had thanked him for his 
treachery and misconduct." 

The second letter was to Senator Lodge, who was then 
in London, serving as member of the Alaskan Boundary 
Commission. This was under date of September 3, 1903: 

' ' The public generally and the soldiers in particular have 
gone frantic because we did not single Miles out for special 
commendation when he retired from the service — a thing 
we have done in the case of none of the other generals 
with Civil War records who have retired. We are a queer, 
emotional, hysterical people on occasions, and in the Miles 
matter as in the Schley matter we have shown at our worst. 
Miles has for the two years of my Presidency, and of course 
for some years before that, shown himself the most dan- 
gerous foe and slanderer of the army which he was sup- 
posed to command. Nothing will hire me to praise him. 



180 THEODORE ROOSEVELT AND HIS TIME 

There has been really a great gust of popular anger against 
me ; I am not writing too strongly when I say popular anger. 
The feeling against me, especially in the Grand Army, is 
so bitter that certain of my friends in Illinois and Indiana 
have told me that they believe that if the election were held 
at present I should lose both those States! However, I 
cannot help thinking that such folly will burn itself out be- 
fore a year is over." 

A final demonstration of personal idiosyncrasy on the 
part of General Miles occurred a few weeks later and is re- 
corded in the following correspondence. On October 8, 
1903, the President wrote to Governor Franklin Murphy 
of New Jersey: 

"A few days ago General Miles went to one of the lead- 
ing men in New York and told him, as illustrating my 
attitude toward property, that you had recently said that I 
had informed you that I was certain I was going to win the 
Northern Securities suit and thereby ruin Pierpont Morgan 
and Jim Hill, or, to use his exact words, 'turn Morgan and 
Hill into the street.' My informant was somewhat upset 
over the matter and at first declined to allow me to see 
you about it. I told him that I should insist upon this, be- 
cause I was absolutely certain that the story was merely 
a lie of Miles and that you had never said one word such 
as you were represented as saying. Indeed, my memory is 
that we did not speak of the Northern Securities suit at all, 
and of course I never at any time used any such language as 
that imputed to me about Hill or Morgan, or expressed 
the slightest feeling of vindictiveness or personal hostility 
toward either. 

*'I am half ashamed to bring such an absurd falsehood 
to your notice. I wish you to understand that if I alone 
were cognizant of it, I should not bother you to deny it, 
for I should never think a second time of it ; but it is aston- 
ishing what some sensible men are capable of believing, and 
so I should like you to write me just a line on the matter." 



CONTROVERSIES WITH GENERAL MILES 181 

To this Governor Murphy replied immediately : ' * Thank 
you greatly for calling my attention to the report which 
has reached you. You are entirely correct in your opinion 
of it. It is a lie in its statement and in its inference." 

In response to this, the President wrote, on October 10, 
1903: '*I thank you for your letter. It is exactly the letter 
I supposed I would get from you. Perhaps the report orig- 
inated as you suggest — most likely General Miles simply 
made it up from the beginning." 



CHAPTER XVII 
THE NORTHERN SECURITIES SUIT 

When Roosevelt became President the vital question 
about the control of trusts or great corporations was 
whether the National Government had the power to exercise 
such control. A decision of the Supreme Court in 1895, 
in a suit brought under President Cleveland's administra- 
tion against the Sugar Trust, held in effect that under the 
Constitution the National Government had not such power. 
The suit had been brought under the Sherman anti-trust 
law of 1890, which was designed to destroy monopoly and 
curb industrial combinations like the Sugar and Tobacco 
Trusts. The decision of the Supreme Court, known as the 
Knight decision, was in effect that the National Govern- 
ment had no power over the corporations, and it was so 
interpreted by them, for under it, virtually all the trusts 
in the country were formed later. One of them, known as 
the Northern Securities Company, was formed shortly be- 
fore Roosevelt became President, and was a union or 
merger of practically the entire railway system of the 
Northwest, the chief lines being the Northern Pacific and 
Great Northern Roads. 

Early in 1902 the President took up with the Attorney 
General, Philander C. Knox, the question of testing the 
legality of this merger in the courts. The Attorney Gen- 
eral advised him that, in his judgment, an action would be 
sustained. Without consultation with other members of 
his Cabinet, the President directed the Attorney General 
to begin the suit. No intimation of his purpose had reached 
the public, and when, on the late afternoon of February 19, 
1902, Mr. Knox gave out through the press a brief an- 
nouncement that the President had so directed him, a tre- 

182 



THE NORTHERN SECURITIES SUIT 183 

mendous commotion followed. Mr. Knox simply said that 
some time previous the President had requested an opinion 
from him as to the legality of the merger and that he had 
recently given him one to the effect that, in his judgment, 
the merger violated the Sherman Act of 1890; whereupon, 
the President had directed him to have suitable action taken 
to have the question judicially determined ; a bill in equity 
was in preparation, and it w^as probable that proceedings 
would be instituted in a Federal Court in Minnesota. 

This announcement was published in the morning news- 
papers of February 20, 1902, its publication having been 
withheld till after the close of the stock market for obvious 
reasons. It fell upon the financial world literally like a bolt 
from the blue. The members of the President's Cabinet, 
with the single exception of the Attorney General, got their 
first intimation of the President's purpose from the news- 
papers. The chief personages in the merger were J. Pier- 
pont Morgan and James J. Hill, undisputed kings of the 
financial and railway worlds. They employed as legal ad- 
visers the ablest lawyers in the country, recognized leaders 
of the bar throughout the land. Not one of these advisers, 
it was shown subsequently, shared the view taken by Mr. 
Knox. Many of them were openly vocal in their indigna- 
tion and contempt, declaring that the President had been 
led into an act of folly on the advice of ''an unknown coun- 
try lawyer from Pennsylvania." Precisely this statement 
was made to me by one of them, and when I reported it to 
the President, he replied: "They will know this country 
lawyer before this suit is ended," a prophecy which was 
amply fulfilled. 

The effect of the news of the suit in Wall Street was thus 
recorded in the stock market report of the Tribune on 
February 21: 

"Not since the assassination of President McKinley has 
the stock market had such a sudden shock as was caused 
by the announcement on Wednesday night of President 
Boosevelt's purpose to proceed to test the legality of the 



184 THEODORE ROOSEVELT AND HIS TIME 

merger of the Northern Pacific and Great Northern Roads. 
Not the slightest intimation of the President's proposed 
move reached Wall Street in the course of the day on 
Wednesday." 

For the first time in many years the National Adminis- 
tration had acted in a matter of great financial importance 
without any advance news of its purpose reaching Wall 
Street. That in itself was a disturbing fact for it showed 
that all existing avenues of ''inside information" had been 
closed. 

The Attorney General filed a bill in equity in the United 
States Circuit Court at St. Paul on March 10. The defense 
was based expressly on the ground that the Supreme Court 
in the Knight case had explicitly sanctioned the formation 
of such a company as the Northern Securities Company. 
The representatives of privilege intimated, and sometimes 
asserted outright, that in directing the action to be brought 
the President had shown a lack of respect for the Supreme 
Court, which had already decided the question at issue by 
a vote of eight to one. 

J. Pierpont Morgan went to Washington and had an in- 
terview with the President, Attorney General Knox being 
present. Mr. Morgan protested against the President's 
conduct in acting without letting him know of his purpose 
in advance. The President replied: ''That is just what 
we did not want to do." "If we have done anything 
wrong," said Mr. Morgan, "send your man (meaning the 
Attorney General) to my man (naming one of his lawyers) 
and they can fix it up." "That can't be done," said the 
President. "We don't want to fix it up," added Mr. Knox, 
' ' we want to stop it. ' ' Then Mr. Morgan asked : ' ' Are you 
going to attack my other interests, the Steel Trust and the 
others?" "Certainly not," replied the President, "unless 
we find out that in any case they have done something that 
we regard as wrong." 

When Mr. Morgan retired, the President said to Mr. 
Knox: "That is a most illuminating illustration of the 



THE NORTHERN SECURITIES SUIT 185 

Wall Street point of view. Mr. Morgan could not help 
regarding me as a big rival operator, who either intended 
to ruin all his interests or else could be induced to come to 
an agreement to ruin none." 

I was informed later by one of Mr. Morgan's counsel that 
Mr. Morgan went to his hotel and wrote a very indignant 
and violent letter to the President which was never deliv- 
ered because it was stopped on the way by my informant, 
who persuaded the irate financial magnate of its unwisdom. 

The case was first tried in the United States Circuit Court 
at St. Paul and a decision in favor of the Government was 
rendered on April 9, 1903. It was appealed to the Supreme 
Court of the United States and was argued in behalf of the 
Northern Securities Company by the ablest corporation 
lawyers in the country. It was admitted that the conten- 
tion of these la^vyers that the merger had been sanctioned 
by the Knight decision was sound, and the question pre- 
sented to the Supreme Court was simply whether it would 
reverse itself by reversing that decision. This it decided 
to do, by a vote of 5 to 4, on March 14, 1904, when it ren- 
dered a majority decision that the merger had been formed 
in violation of the Sherman Law. The power of the Gov- 
ernment to exercise control over combinations was thereby 
permanently established, and the result was hailed as a 
notable triumph for the President and the Attorney Gen- 
eral. The New York Tribune said of it on March 15, 1904 : 

"The decision completely justifies the much denounced 
action of President Eoosevelt. It is not he who stops the 
merger, but the Supreme Court. The highest tribunal in 
the nation decides that the plan to control these competing 
railroads is illegal. Those who formed it may think that 
a hard saying and a wrong one, but they cannot blame the 
President as an irresponsible disorganizer for taking the 
same view of the law as the Supreme Court, nor complain 
because he requires them to obey the law, and when he 
thinks they are disobeying it submits the question to judi- 
cial decision." 



186 THEODORE ROOSEVELT AND HIS TIME 

The action of the President was subjected to sharp criti- 
cism until the final verdict was rendered but he was able 
to retain his equanimity under it, as his private corre- 
spondence shows. On May 6, 1902, he sent this letter of 
introduction to the Attorney General: 

''This is my good friend, Mr. Smalley, a correspondent 
of the London Times. I want him to have a talk with you, 
because in New York he lives at the Metropolitan Club and 
meets largely the gentlemen who since the merger suit 
have crossed themselves at the mention of our names." 



On June 3, 1902, he wrote to General James H. Wilson : 
"I am sorry that the fi'nancial men should be tempted to 
criticize me but I have never been more certain of anything 
than that I was right in taking the actions which they crit- 
icize. It is above all to the interests of the men of great 
wealth that the people at large should understand that they 
also have to obey the law." 

Following closely upon the decision in favor of the Gov- 
ernment by the St. Paul Circuit Court, the Attorney Gen- 
eral, on May 10, 1902, began proceedings against the Beef 
Trust, filing a petition to restrain it in the United States 
Circuit Court of the Northern District of Illinois. A deci- 
sion in favor of the Government was rendered by this court 
on May 26, 1903, and affirmed by the Supreme Court of the 
United States on January 31, 1905. Other similar suits 
of minor importance were instituted at this time and won 
by the Government. During the years following 1903, 
there were others of large importance instituted and won 
by the Government. 

When, in April, 1903, the Supreme Court of the United 
States rendered its decision upholding the New York Fran- 
chise Tax Law, the news of the court's action reached Pres- 
ident Roosevelt while he was on a speaking tour in the 
West. He expressed his natural gratification in a letter 
to Secretary Knox, which is notable also for its reference 



THE NORTHERN SECURITIES SUIT 187 

to educational influences which may affect the minds of 

judges as well as laymen : 

Ottumwa, Iowa, 
April 28, 1903. 

"I have just received a telegram to the effect that the 
Franchise Tax Law in New York has been declared consti- 
tutional by the Supreme Court. This was something very 
near my heart for I felt that the Franchise Tax Law was the 
most definite and important contribution to decent and in- 
telligent government made by me while I was Governor. 
I am, therefore, very much pleased with the news. I write 
you because I think that the reflex action of what you have 
done during the past year and a quarter is in no small de- 
gree responsible for the decision. The courts can be edu- 
cated just as the public can be educated, and the suits you 
have carried on and the decisions you have secured in the 
United States Courts have had, I am convinced, a very pro- 
found effect elsewhere. Unless I am greatly mistaken one 
of the places where this effect is visible is this Franchise 
Tax decision." 



CHAPTER XVIII 
INCIDENTS OF A BUSY YEAR 

The year 1902 was one of incessant activity for Roosevelt 
and was fairly crowded with events of far-reaching impor- 
tance. Next in importance to the beginning of proceedings 
against the trusts was the settlement of the great anthracite 
coal strike, which will be considered comprehensively in the 
next chapter. In the midst of these larger activities the 
President was able to find time for the consideration of 
many matters of scarcely less vital moment. He had recom- 
mended earnestly in his first annual message to Congress 
that reciprocal trade relations be established with Cuba. A 
bill granting reciprocity passed the House but was held up 
in the Senate through the influence of the powerful beet- 
sugar interests. While it was pending, ex-President Cleve- 
land wrote a letter, on January 21, 1902, which was pub- 
lished, in which he came to the support of the President 
very heartily, saying: 

''It seems to me that this subject involves considerations 
of morality and conscience higher and more commanding 
than all others. 

''The obligations arising from these considerations 
cannot be better or more forcibly defined than was done 
by President Roosevelt in his message to Congress, nor bet- 
ter emphasized than has been done by Secretary Root, and 
yet Congress waits, while we occasionally hear of conces- 
sions which rich sugar interests might approve in behalf of 
trembling Cuba.** 

The President sent a special message to the Senate in 
June, urging the passage of the bill on the ground of simple 
justice to Cuba, but the Senate refused to heed the request. 

188 



INCIDENTS OF A BUSY YEAR 189 

A year later, however, a treaty of reciprocity with Cuba, 
together with a treaty with Colombia in regard to an Isth- 
mian Canal, was negotiated and both were ratified by the 
Senate in February, 1903, after the President had sent an 
ultimatum to that body saying that if the treaties were not 
ratified by March 4 he should call an extra session for their 
consideration. 

On March 11, 1902, the President sent his first veto mes- 
sage to the Senate, refusing to sign a bill removing the 
charge of desertion from the naval record of a man who had 
deserted during the Civil War. Being his first deliverance 

f'lof the kind the President's words attracted wide attention 
and elicited general approval : 

* ' There can be no graver crime than the crime of deser- 
tion from the army and navy, especially during war; it is 
then high treason to the Nation, and justly punishable by 
death. No man should be relieved from such a crime, espe- 
cially when nearly forty years have passed since it oc- 
^curred, save on the clearest possible proof of his real inno- 

;Vcence. In this case the statement made by the affiant be- 
fore the committee does not in all points agree with his 
statement made to the Secretary of the Navy. In any event 
it is incomprehensible to me that he should not have made 
effective effort to get back into the Navy. He had served 
but little more than a month when he deserted, and the war 
lasted for over a year afterward. Yet he made no effort 
whatever to get back into the war. Under such circum- 
stances it seems to me that to remove the charge of deser- 

^tion from the Navy and give him an honorable discharge 

t would be to falsify the records and do an injustice to his 
gallant and worthy comrades who fought the war to a finish. 
The names of the veterans who fought in the Civil War 
make the honor list of the Republic, and I am not willing to 
put upon it the name of a man unworthy of the high posi- 
tion." 

The President did not permit the pressure of matters of 
really momentous importance to turn his attention from his 



190 THEODORE ROOSEVELT AND HIS TIME 

inflexible purpose to have appointments in the public ser- 
vice based on merit and fitness alone. One of his earliest 
acts after taking office was to write to Cardinal Gibbons, 
and to heads of the Protestant Church, asking their aid in 
securing for the army and navy as chaplains men of char- 
acter and special fitness for the position. On June 10, 1902, 
he wrote a letter to the Secretaries of War and the Navy, 
of like import, saying: 

"I want to see that hereafter no chaplain is appointed 
in the Army (and Navy) who is not a first-class man — a 
man who by education and training will be fitted to asso- 
ciate with his fellow-officers, and yet who has in him the 
zeal and the practical sense which will enable him to do 
genuine work for the enlisted men. Above all, I want chap- 
lains who will go in to do this work just as the best officers 
of the line or staff or the medical profession go in to do 
their work. I want to see that if possible we never appoint 
a man who desires the position as a soft job. How would 
it do to have the applicants of the different creeds pass 
some kind of examination before really high-grade clergy- 
men of their own creeds'? That is, to see that any Episco- 
pal chaplain has the backing of some such man as Bishop 
Potter, Bishop Satterlee, or Bishop Doane; that a Meth- 
odist was backed in the same way; and so on through the 
different creeds." 

Concerning a letter which the Postmaster General had 
referred to him for comment, he sent on March 20, 1902, this 
suggestion : 

**How would it do to answer this letter by pointing out 
the extreme difficulty of adopting a rule in reference to the 
Illinois Senators which we adopt in reference to no other 
Senators whatever? We do not remove any postmasters 
unless on charges, but when it comes to a new appointment 
we confine ourselves to asking whether the man recom- 
mended is a thoroughly fit and proper man, giving prefer- 
ence to the man who is in where we legitimately can.'' 



INCIDENTS OF A BUSY YEAR 191 

Conditions in the Philippine Islands, where the United 
States Government was engaged in suppressing a native 
insurrection, were attracting much attention in the spring 
of 1902, and reports of barbarous cruelties by American 
soldiers upon native prisoners were published in the press. 
An order was also published in April, 1902, which General 
J. H. Smith, nicknamed "Hell-Roaring Jake," had issued to 
his troops directing them to "kill and burn and make a 
howling wilderness of Samar." This naturally aroused 
much indignation throughout the country, and the anti- 
Imperialist faction that had vehemently opposed the tak- 
ing over of the Philippines instead of making them an in- 
dependent nation, raised a great clamor about it, demand- 
ing that the United States troops be withdrawn at once and 
the Filipinos be left to rule themselves. The President 
acted at once, sending this order to the Secretary of War: 

"Please instruct Governor Taft when he returns to the 
Islands to appoint a Commission, say, of three men of the 
highest integrity and capacity to report on the conduct of 
the military government at the present time toward the 
natives and as to whether or not any brutalities or indig- 
nities are inflicted by the army upon the natives." 

On May 9, 1902, he wrote to Bishop Lawrence of Massa- 
chusetts : 

"I hope it is unnecessary to say that no one in the coun- 
try can be more anxious than I am — save perhaps Secretary 
Root — to discover and punish every instance of barbarity 
by our troops in the Philippines. No provocation, however 
great, can be accepted as an excuse for misuse of the nec- 
essary severity of war, and above all not for torture of any 
kind or shape. Long before any statements had been made 
public, and before any action had been taken by Congress, 
\ the War Department had ordered a rigid investigation of 
certain of the charges ; the orders of investigation having 
gone out over three months ago. The investigation will be 
of the most thorough and sweeping character, and if neces- 



192 THEODORE ROOSEVELT AND HIS TIME 

sary, will be made by the ci\dl as well as by the military 
representatives of the Government in the Islands." 

When the clamor over the charges was at its height the 
President, on May 30, 1902, delivered the Memorial Day 
address in Arlington Cemetery, in which he said: 

''Determined and unswerving effort must be made, and 
has been and is being made, to find out every instance of 
barbarity on the part of our troops, to punish those guilty 
of it, and to take, if possible, even stronger measures than 
have already been taken to minimize or prevent the occur- 
rence of all such acts in the future. 

"Is it only in the army in the Philippines that Americans 
sometimes commit deeds that cause all other Americans to 
regret! No ! From time to time there occur in our country, 
to the deep and lasting shame of our people, lynchings car- 
ried on under circumstances of inhuman cruelty and bar- 
barity — cruelty infinitely worse than any that has ever been 
committed by our troops in the Philippines; worse to the 
victims, and far more brutalizing to those guilty of it. The 
men who fail to condemn these lynchings, and yet clamor 
about what has been done in the Philippines, are indeed 
guilty of neglecting the beam in their own eye while taunt- 
ing their brother about the mote in his. Understand me. 
These lynchings afford us no excuse for failure to stop 
cruelty in the Philippines. But keep in mind that these 
cruelties in the Philippines have been wholly exceptional, 
and have been shamelessly exaggerated. We deeply and 
bitterly regret that they should have been committed, no 
matter how rarely, no matter under what provocation, by 
American troops. But they afford far less ground for a 
general condemnation of our army than these lynchings 
afford for the condemnation of the communities in which 
they occur. In each case it is well to condemn the deed, 
and it is well also to refrain from including both guilty and 
innocent in the same sweeping condemnation." 

This denunciation of lynchings in the South was greeted 
with commendation in the North as a characteristically 



INCIDENTS OF A BUSY YEAR 193 

brave utterance of ideas whicli many entertained but few 
had the courage to express in public. In the South it was 
denounced bitterly as a sectional utterance, unjust and ill- 
timed, but the effect of it throughout the country, including 
the South, was to impress forcibly upon the minds of all 
thinking persons the real nature of the Southern lynchings 
and hence to arouse effective sentiment against them. 

As Secretary of War, Mr. Eoot was responsible for the 
administration of affairs in the Philippines, and his staunch 
defense of the military and civil authorities there subjected 
him to a large share of the hostile criticism. The President 
replying to one critic, a Boston clergyman, who had written 
to him on the subject, wrote as follows, on June 17, 1902: 

**Just at the moment Mr. Root has been savagely at- 
tacked. Now Mr. Root, by himself and through Governor 
Taft and General Wood and other military and civilian 
assistants, has done work which I regard as making the 
United States always his debtor. He gave up the position 
of leader of the New York bar, with a practise which 
brought him in over $100,000 a year, to come down here. If 
he serves through my term he will have made a pecuniary 
sacrifice of over half a million dollars in order to do the 
work he has undertaken. He has worked so as almost to 
wear himself out. I am obliged continually to try to make 
him ease up and to get him to go out riding with me. He 
has not one thought save how to benefit the public service, 
how to see that the Army is kept up to the highest standard, 
how to secure the faithful fulfilment of our obligations to 
Cuba, how to help bring peace and enlightenment and self- 
government in the Philippines. During these three years 
he has performed a mass of work such as has been per- 
formed by no other minister of any civilized nation during 
the same time, nor has any other minister in any govern- 
ment of any civilized nation had a task so important which 
at the same time he has fulfilled so well. Yet, in spite of 
this, he has been most cruelly attacked, usually without any 
basis at all, sometimes because an occasional subordinate 
has done wrong — or even, as with every other public man 



194 THEODORE ROOSEVELT AND HIS TIME 

from Washington and Lincoln down, because an occasional 
mistake has been made under him in the Department itself. 
* ' There is plenty to criticize in our public life, but I have 
never met in any occupation a higher standard of fidelity 
to the public good than I meet in many of the men with 
whom I have been brought into intimate contact — judges, 
Senators, Congressmen, executive officials." 

To another, a head of the Catholic Church in a Western 
State, he wrote on August 5, 1902 : 

"Most assuredly, my dear sir, all that I can do will be 
done to see that the Philippine Islands are administered in 
the interest, moral and spiritual no less than material and 
intellectual, of their inhabitants, and wherever possible, in 
accordance with the wishes of the Filipinos. As you doubt- 
less know, when we took over the Islands there was practi- 
cally no indication of system at all, so far as the bulk of the 
people were concerned. There was no foundation on which 
to build. We had to start absolutely new." 

When the flood of criticism was at its height, the Presi- 
dent declared in an address : ' ' The Republic has put up its 
flag in those Islands, and the flag will stay there. Where 
wrong has been done by any one the wrongdoer shall be 
punished, but we shall not halt in our great work because 
some man has happened to do wrong." 

As soon as the news of General Smith's order to "kill 
and burn" reached him, the President, on April 15, 1902, 
directed that a court of inquiry be instituted to investigate 
it, and when the court returned a verdict of guilty, the 
President, on June 16, 1902, ordered the General's retire- 
ment, saying that "while it is impossible to tell exactly how 
much influence the order had in inciting the commission of 
deeds which we all regret, his worse than injudicious pro- 
cedure has destroyed his further usefulness in the active 
service of the army." 

After the storm of criticism had subsided he received a 



i 



INCIDENTS OF A BUSY YEAR 195 

cordial letter of confidence and approval from Prof. Albert 
Bushnell Hart, of Harvard University, to which he replied 
on October 30, 1902 : 

**The President is not in a position to know how he is 
regarded, and moreover, if he has any sense at all he is 
entirely aware of the way in which public favor veers and 
changes. I have not the slightest idea how I am really 
regarded now and of course no human being can tell how 
I shall be regarded in a year or two hence. But this is not 
the important thing. If a man is worth his salt in such a 
position as mine he must appreciate the well-nigh terrible 
responsibilities upon him so deeply as to lose all uneasiness 
about his own personal fortunes. If I can keep the sincere 
good will of men like yourself I shall feel tolerably confi- 
dent that I have deserved it. In that case I shall be more 
than rewarded, no matter what comes in the future." 

In June, 1902, the President attended the Commence- 
ment exercises of Harvard University, his Alma Mater, and 
was given the honorary degree of LL.D. In conferring it 
President Eliot said: "President of the United States, 
from his youth a member of this society of scholars, now 
in his prime a true type of the sturdy gentleman and the 
high-minded public servant of a democracy." Speaking 
at the alumni dinner on June 25, 1902, President Roosevelt, 
after saying that it was "a liberal education in high- 
minded statesmanship to sit at the same council table with 
John Hay," devoted himself mainly to eulogizing the work 
of three men who were performing distinguished public 
service under his administration — Leonard Wood, Gov- 
ernor of Cuba ; Elihu Root, Secretary of War, and William 
H. Taft, Governor of the Philippines. 

In closing his address he said: "Those three men have 
rendered inestimable service to the American people. I can 
do nothing for them. I can show my appreciation of them 
in no way save the wholly insufficient one of standing up 
for them, and for their work; and that I will do as long 
as I have tongue to speak!" 



196 THEODORE ROOSEVELT AND HIS TIME 

Secretary Hay, who was present on the occasion, wrote 
to the President from Boston, on the following day : 

Hotel Touraine, 
June 26, 1902. 
Dear Theodore: 

I must congratulate you with all my heart on yesterday's 
triumph — it was nothing less. That great company was a 
corps d' elite, and you had them with you from start to 
finish. President Eliot, when you sat down, said, "What 
a man! Genius, force, and courage, and such evident 
honesty ! ' ' 

And another thought was in everybody's mind, also. 
"He is so young and he will be with us for many a day 
to come." We are all glad of that, even the old fellows, 
who are passing. 

I can never tell you how much I thank you for your kind 
reference to me. But your splendid defense of Root, Wood, 
and Taft touched me still more deeply. It was the speech 
of a great ruler, and a great gentleman — and will not be 
forgotten. 

I am feeling better this morning and expect a few days 
in Newbury, N. H., will set me up — for the end of the 
session. 

Yours affectionately, 

John Hay. 

On August 22 President Roosevelt left Oyster Bay for 
a speaking tour through New England, delivering ad- 
dresses in the principal cities and towns. In all of them 
he explained fully his views in regard to the chief ques- 
tions which he had been pressing upon Congress, laying 
special stress upon the necessity for legislation affecting 
trusts, Cuba and the Philippines and Porto Rico, and se- 
curing the building of the Isthmian Canal. ^Yliile near 
Pittsfield, Mass., on September 3, he escaped, literally by a 
hair's breadth, from instant death. A trolley car, going at 
a high rate of speed, collided squarely with the carriage in 
which he was riding, an open landau drawn by four horses. 



INCIDENTS OF A BUSY YEAR 197 

smashing the vehicle, killing instantly a secret service man 
who sat on the box with the driver, and throwing out with 
great violence the occupants of the carriage, the President, 
Governor W. Murray Crane, and Mr. Cortelyou, private 
secretary to the President. The President was thrown 
fully forty feet, falling on his right cheek, and escaped 
death almost by a miracle. Governor Crane and Mr. Cor- 
telyou were bruised but not seriously injured. The Presi- 
dent was on his feet at once, crying out : ''I am not hurt," 
and asking eagerly for the safety of his companions. He 
was deeply pained by the death of the secret service man, 
William Craig, who had been a most faithful attendant 
upon him in all his journeyings. He returned to Oyster 
Bay, arriving there in the evening, with the whole right side 
of his face swollen and colored a deep purple, and one leg 
badly bruised. In spite of his injuries, he started on the fol- 
lowing day, September 4, for a tour in the South and West, 
speaking first at Wheeling, West Va., on September 6. He 
visited during the ensuing three weeks, Virginia, Tennessee, 
Ohio, Michigan and Indiana, and ended his tour at Indian- 
apolis on September 24, when an abscess that had developed 
on his injured leg, and which threatened to atfect the bone, 
compelled him to return to Washington. His addresses 
during this tour were similar to those delivered in New 
England in their emphasis upon the leading questions of 
his administration. 



CHAPTER XIX 

COAL STRIKE SETTLEMENT 

In the fall of 1902 President Eoosevelt performed a service 
to the nation which ranks in history as one of the most 
patriotic and beneficent of his career, but which, when he 
entered upon it, was denounced with more bitterness than 
almost any other of his public acts. A universal strike of 
the miners in the anthracite coal regions of Pennsylvania, 
involving about 150,000 men, was instituted in the spring of 
that year and continued, with steadily increasing animosity 
between the mine operators and mine workers, through 
the summer and into the autumn, with no prospects of 
settlement. Its progress was marked with many acts of 
violence on the part of the strikers against the non-union 
laborers whom the operators were trying to employ. The 
Governor of Pennsylvania had been appealed to and had 
sent militia to the mines for the protection of life and 
property, but though there were in the later stages of the 
strike about 2,000 of these troops, they had shown them- 
selves unable to put a stop to violence. It was estimated 
that during the rioting twenty persons had been killed and 
about forty injured, and that much property had been de- 
stroyed. The Governor was subjected to sharp criticism 
for the inefficiency of the force and was accused of sym- 
pathy with the strikers. Although called upon repeatedly 
to confess the inadequacy of the State militia to restore 
and preserve order, and to appeal to the National Govern- 
ment to come to the aid of the State, he refused to do so. 
"With the jipproach of winter, a general feeling of alarm 
began to spread over the land, especially in the East, for 
in all States east of the Mississippi River anthracite coal 
was the almost exclusive fuel, and the supply had fallen so 

198 



COAL STRIKE SETTLEMENT 199 

low by September 1 that it was practically impossible to 
obtain any except in small quantities. Total failure of the 
supply seemed imminent, and this meant appalling distress 
in the entire East, with peril of rioting in all the large 
cities. All persons in authority were seeking anxiously for 
some powerful means by which to bring about a settlement. 
The operators of the mines, who had united in an associa- 
tion of their own, were deaf to all appeals, believing that 
if they held out a little longer the sufferings of the miners 
would compel them to yield — that they would be starved 
into submission. They persisted in declaring, in spite of 
indisputable evidence to the contrary, that there was no 
danger of a coal famine, that there was an existing supply 
ample for the winter's needs, and that thej^ were deter- 
mined to permit no outside interference with the manage- 
ment of their own business. 

President Roosevelt had been watching the situation with 
much solicitude for several weeks, and his anxiety had been 
increased by appeals which came to him when the advent 
of cold weather drew near, to take some action to avert the 
calamities which were threatening. The Governor of 
Massachusetts, the Mayors of New York and other large 
cities in the imperiled region, sent word to him that if the 
existing coal scarcity continued and became, as seemed 
likely, a famine, the misery throughout the East would be- 
come appalling and the consequent public disorder so great 
that frightful consequences might ensue. 

Writing to Senator Lodge, on September 27, 1902, the 
President gave this account of the difficulties in the way of 
action on his part and the political considerations which 
were hindering a settlement: 

**The real concrete trouble is in connection with the coal 
strike. There is literally nothing, so far as I have yet been 
able to find out, which the National Government has any 
power to do in the matter. I have been in consultation with 
Quay, on the one hand, and with Sargent on the other, as 
to what I can do, each of them having been in touch with 
both the representatives of the operators and with Mitchell. 



200 THEODORE ROOSEVELT AND HIS TIME 

One of the great troubles in dealing with the operators is 
that their avowed determination in connection with the 
present matter is to do away with what they regard as the 
damage done to them by submitting to interference for 
political reasons in 1900. From the outset they have said 
that they are never going to submit again to having their 
laborers given a triumph over them for political purposes, 
as Senator Hanna secured the triumph in 1900. They are 
now repeating with great bitterness that they do not intend 
to allow Quay to bully them into making any concession 
for his political ends, any more than they would to allow 
Hanna do it for his. 

''Unfortunately the strength of my public position be- 
fore the country is also its weakness. I am genuinely inde- 
pendent of the big moneyed men in all matters where I think 
the interests of the public are concerned, and probably I am 
the first President of recent times of whom this could be 
truthfully said. I think it right and desirable that this 
should be true of the President. But where I do not grant 
any favors to these big moneyed men which I do not think 
the country requires that they should have, it is out of the 
question for me to expect them to grant favors to me in 
return. I treat them precisely as I treat other citizens; 
that is, I consider their interests so far as my duty requires 
and so far as I think the needs of the country warrant. In 
return they will support me in so far as they are actuated 
purely by public spirit simply as accordingly they think 
I am or am not doing well ; and so far as they are actuated 
solely by their private interests they w^ll support me only 
on points where they think it is to their interest to do so. 
The sum of this is that I can make no private or special 
appeal to them, and I am at my wits ' end how to proceed. ' ' 

On September 27, 1902, he wrote also to Senator Hanna 
on the same subject : 

"What gives me the greatest concern at the moment is 
the coal famine. Of course, we have nothing whatever to 
do with this coal strike and no earthly responsibility for it. 



COAL STRIKE SETTLEMENT 201 

But the public at large will tend to visit upon our heads 
responsibility for the shortage in coal precisely as Kansas 
and Nebraska visited upon our heads their failure to raise 
good crops in the arid belt, eight, ten, or a dozen years ago. 
I do not see what I can do, and I know the coal operators 
are especially distrustful of anything which they regard 
as in the nature of political interference. But I do most 
earnestly feel that from every consideration of public 
policy and of good morals they should make some slight 
concession." 

To this Senator Hanna replied on September 28, 1902 : 
'*I am in receipt of yours of the 27th inst. and reply that 
I share with you the anxiety in regard to the coal situation. 
After leaving Oyster Bay I spent the balance of the week in 
New York raising money for the Congressional Committee, 
and trying to see what more could be done with the strike. 
Confidentially, I saw Mr. Mitchell (the public knows noth- 
ing about that). I got from Mr. Morgan a proposition as 
to what he would do in the matter. And I got Mitchell to 
agree to accept it if the operators would abide by the deci- 
sion. I really felt encouraged — to think I was about to 
accomplish a settlement. I went to Philadelphia and saw 
Mr. Baer (George F. Baer, President of the Reading Rail- 
road) and to my surprise he absolutely refused to enter- 
tain it. Yon can see how determined they are. It looks as 
if it was only to be settled when the miners are starved 
to it. And that may be weeks ahead as they are getting 
liberal supplies from their fellow workmen all over the 
country. 

* ' I am not unmindful of the importance of this coal situa- 
tion and will not miss an opportunity to help it if I can. But 
the position of the operators from the beginning has put 
all efforts of mine in a false light before the public so I am 
only able to hold the confidence of the men, and serve them 
if I can." 

From this point to its successful conclusion, the story of 
the President's efforts is best told in the letters that he 



202 THEODORE ROOSEVELT AND HIS TIME 

wrote and received during their progress. On September 
30, 1902, he wrote to Senator Lodge: 

*' After consultation with Root, Knox, Murray Crane and 
others on the one side, and after previous consultation with 
Senator Quay, Sargent and others from their standpoint, 
I have been inclined to think that there was a chance of my 
doing something anyhow. I have not yet worked the matter 
out perfectly clearly in my mind, but yesterday Root went 
to see Morgan and explained to him that in three or four 
days I should take some action, probably by inviting the 
operators to come to see me and requesting in good faith 
an ^ffort on their part to come to an agreement, by arbitra- 
tion or otherwise, with the miners. Thus I shall have a 
free hand to do what I deem best. I may be unable to do 
anything now, but I may tell them that I shall advise action 
along the lines I have explained in my speeches but of a 
much more radical type in reference to their business unless 
they wake up. I am also, however, to see the representa- 
tives of the coal miners. At any rate I am thoroughly 
awake and will do what I can." 

On October 1, he invited the operators and representa- 
tives of the mine workers to come to Washington on October 
3, for consultation with him for the purpose of endeavoring 
to reach a settlement. When this was announced, a storm of 
protest came from the newspapers which had been uphold- 
ing the cause of the operators in the strike. They declared 
that his course was without authority under the Constitu- 
tion, that its immediate effect would be to prolong the strike 
by encouraging the strikers to persist, and that for a Presi- 
dent to interfere in the affairs of private corporations was 
a proceeding so unconstitutional as to make him liable to 
impeachment. 

The invitation was accepted by both parties to the con- 
troversy, and in a brief address to them on assembling the 
President made it very clear that he did not for a moment 
assume that he had any authority whatever for his action : 

"I disclaim any right or duty to intervene in this way 



COAL STRIKE SETTLEMENT 203 

upon legal grounds or upon any official relation that I bear 
to the situation; but the urgency and the terrible nature 
of the catastrophe impending over a large portion of our 
people in the shape of a winter fuel famine impel me, after 
much anxious thought, to believe that my duty requires me 
to use whatever influence I personally can to bring to an 
end a situation which has become literally intolerable. 
With all the earnestness there is in me I ask that there be 
an immediate resumption of operations in the coal mines in 
some such way as will, without a day's unnecessary delay, 
meet the crying needs of the people. I do not invite a dis- 
cussion of your respective claims and positions. I appeal 
to your patriotism, to the spirit that sinks personal con- 
sideration and makes individual sacrifices for the general 
good." 

The operators showed very plainly that they resented 
the President's action and had come in a thoroughly bel- 
ligerent and uncompromising mood. Immediately after 
the close of the conference, the President wrote to Senator 
Hanna, October 3, 1902 : 

''Well, I have tried and failed. I feel downhearted over 
the result, both because of the great misery made for the 
mass of our people, and because the attitude of the opera- 
tors will beyond a doubt double the burden on us while 
standing between them and socialistic action. But I am 
glad I tried anyhow. I should have hated to feel that I had 
failed to make any effort. What my next move will be I 
cannot yet say. I feel most strongly that the attitude of 
the operators is one which accentuates the need of the 
Government having some power of supervision and regula- 
tion over such corporations. I should like to make a fairly 
radical experiment on the anthracite coal companies to 
start with! At the meeting to-day the operators assumed 
a fairly hopeless attitude. None of them appeared to such 
advantage as Mitchell, whom most of them denounced with 
such violence and rancor that I felt he did very well to 
keep his temper. Between times they insulted me for not 



204 THEODORE ROOSEVELT AND HIS TIME 

preserving order (and they evidently ignored such a tri- 
fling detail as the United States Constitution) and attacked 
Knox for not having brought suit against the Miners Union 
as violating the Sherman Anti-Trust Law.'* 

Keports of the conference were published in the news- 
papers of October 4, and on the following day the President 
received, what was undoubtedly one of the most welcome 
and gratifying letters of his life, the following from Grover 
Cleveland : 

Princeton, October 4, 1902. 
My dear Mr. President: 

I read in the paper this morning on my way home from 
Buzzard's Bay, the newspaper account of what took place 
yesterday between you and the parties directly concerned 
in the coal strike. 

I am so surprised and ''stirred up" by the position taken 
by the contestants that I cannot refrain from making a 
suggestion which perhaps I would not presume to make if 
I gave the subject more thought. I am especially disturbed 
and vexed by the tone and substance of the operators' de- 
liverances. 

It cannot be that either side, after your admonition to 
them, cares to stand in their present plight, if any sort of 
an avenue, even for temporary escape, is suggested to them. 

Has it ever been proposed to them that the indignation 
and dangerous condemnation now being launched against 
both their houses might be allayed by the production of 
coal in an amount, or for a length of time, sufficient to serve 
the necessities of consumers, leaving the parties to the 
quarrel, after such necessities are met, to take up the fight 
again where they left off "without prejudice" if they 
desire? 

This would eliminate the troublesome consumer and pub- 
lic; and perhaps both operators and miners would see 
enough advantage in that, to induce them to listen to such 
a proposition as I have suggested. 

I know there would be nothing philosophical or consis- 



COAL STRIKE SETTLEMENT 205 

tent in all this ; but my observation leads me to think that 
when quarreling parties are both in the wrong, and are 
assailed with blame so nearly universal, they will do strange 
things to save their faces. 

If you pardon my presumption in thus writing you, I 
promise never to do it again. At any rate it may serve 
as an indication of the anxiety felt by millions of our citi- 
zens on the subject. 

I have been quite impressed by a pamphlet I have lately 
read, by a Mr. Champlin of Boston, entitled, I believe, "The 
Coal Mines and the People." I suppose you have seen it. 

Very respectfully. 

Your obedient servant, 

Groveb Cleveland. 

To THE President. 

This letter was not given out to the public, of course; 
neither was any hint given of its existence. If it had been 
published, the effect upon the furious denouncers of the 
President's course would have been ludicrous in the ex- 
treme, for they were declaring that he was doing what no 
other President had ever done, or had ever thought of 
doing; and yet here was the only living Democratic ex- 
President upholding him in what they called his unconsti- 
tutional and revolutionary course! 

To Mr. Cleveland's letter, the President replied on Octo- 
ber 5, 1902, in a letter which gives what may be called the 
historic account of the proceedings at the conference. It is 
here published in full for the first time. 

October 5, 1902. 
My dear Mr. Cleveland: 

Your letter was a real help and comfort to me. Through- 
out this matter I have been thinking of what you and Mr. 
Olney did in the Pullman car strike, and have been going 
over with Carroll D. Wright what, from his inside knowl- 
edge, he believed were your views at that time ; and if ever 
the necessity arises for my interference to restore order 
in Pennsylvania on the call of the constituted authorities 



206 THEODORE ROOSEVELT AND HIS TIME 

or to protect government property by force of the United 
States reg-ular army, I shall try to use this force with the 
same firmness that you showed. But it has been rather 
exasperating to have our more foolish friends yelling that 
it was my business to send troops into Pennsylvania, when 
there is as yet no more warrant for doing so than there is 
for Mayor Low to send his New York police there. Of 
course, as a matter of fact, I cannot send them in at present, 
when no government property has been menaced and when 
there has been no appeal to me by the constituted authori- 
ties. I would have just as much right to send them to Troy 
when there was a railroad strike; or to have demanded 
them when I was Police Commissioner and there was a 
clothing cutters' strike. 

The attitude of the coal operators at the conference be- 
fore me was very exasperating. They used language 
toward Mitchell and his colleagues which was well calcu- 
lated to make them so angry that they would consent to 
nothing. They refused point blank to even consider what 
I regarded as Mitchell's entirely fair proposition. Some 
of them assailed me for not having put troops into Penn- 
sylvania — they might just as well have assailed you for 
not leading an independent body of coal and iron police 
thither — and one, Mr. Wilcox, made a long argument to 
show that the Attorney General was derelict in his duty 
in not bringing suit to dissolve the labor union on the 
ground that it was violating the Sherman Law. This last 
proposition, by the way, may be considered as an offset to 
the proposition contained in Mr. Champlin's pamphlet to 
which you refer. Under the Sherman Act Mr. Wilcox, on 
behalf of the operators, wishes me to bring suit against the 
miners, and Mr. Champlin that I should bring suit against 
the operators in the interest of the miners. Of course, if 
I brought suit against either I should probably have to 
bring suit against both, and under the decision in the sugar 
case it seems to me perfectly clear that neither the miners 
nor the operators, as such, could possibly be held to have 
violated the Sherman Law. 



COAL STRIKE SETTLEMENT 207 

I am very reluctant in view of the operators' attitude 
toward me to propose any plan to them at all. Curiously 
enough, if they had given me an opportunity I should have 
proposed just the plan you outlined, that is, that there 
should be a resumption of operations until April first, up 
to which time the two parties might seek to reach an agree- 
ment; and then, when the distress of the public would not 
be so terrible on account of the approach of warm weather, 
there would be less damage from their going on with their 
quarrel. 

By the way, you may have noticed that your old friend, 
The Sun, is now attacking me with the same infamous dis- 
regard of truth that it used in its assaults upon you. 

I think I shall now tell Mitchell that if the miners will 
go back to work I will appoint a commission to investigate 
the whole situation and will do whatever in my power lies 
to have the findings of such commission favorably acted 
upon. This seems to be the only step I can now take, or 
at least the best step at the moment to take. I feel the 
gravest apprehension concerning the misery pending over 
so many people this winter and the consequent rioting 
which may and probably will ensue. 

Now, my dear sir, let me thank you again for the real aid 
and comfort you have given me. You know what a pleasure 
it is to hear from you at any time. By the way, I was very 
glad to be able to make your friend O'Reilly Surgeon 
General. I know how well you think of him. 

"With warm regards to Mrs. Cleveland, 

Faithfully yours, 
(Signed) Theodore Roosevelt. 

Hon. GrROVER Cleveland, 
Princeton, N. J. 

P. S. Of course, if the Pennsylvania authorities would 
do their whole duty, there would be no need to appeal to 
me at all. 

Writing to Robert Bacon, on October 5, 1902, the Presi- 
dent said: 



208 THEODORE ROOSEVELT AND HIS TIME 

"The situation is bad, especially because it is possible 
it may grow infinitely worse. If when the severe weather 
comes on there is a coal famine I dread to think of the suf- 
fering, in parts of our great cities especially, and I fear 
there will be fuel riots of as bad a tj^e as any bread riots 
we have ever seen. Of course, once the rioting has hegim, 
once there is a resort to mob violence, the only thing to do 
is to maintain order. It is a dreadful thing to be brought 
face to face wdth the necessity of taking measures, how- 
ever unavoidable, which will mean the death of men who 
have been maddened by want and suffering." 

The radical nature of some of the appeals that reached 
him is shown in a letter to Senator Lodge on October 7, 
1902: 

**I am feeling my way step by step trying to get a solu- 
tion of the coal matter. Most of my correspondents wish 
me to try something violent or impossible. A minor but 
very influential part desire that I send troops at once with- 
out a shadow of warrant into the coal districts, or that I 
bring suit against the labor organization. The others de- 
mand that I bring suit against the operators, or that under 
the law of eminent domain, or for the purpose of protect- 
ing the public health, I seize their property, or appoint a 
receiver, or do something else that is wholly impossible. 
My great concern is, of course, to break the famine ; but I 
must not be drawn into any violent step which would bring 
reaction and disaster afterward." 

In a statement of his position which he wrote to me on 
October 13, 1902, he left no doubt as to his attitude toward 
violence : **Most emphatically I shall not compromise with 
lawlessness. I have been told, on excellent authority, that 
the disorder has been very great and of very evil kind. 
On equally good authority, I am told the exact contrary. 
I shall speedily find out for myself. I stand against social- 
ism; against anarchic disorder." 

The President wrote again to Mr. Cleveland on Octobe-r 



COAL STRIKE SETTLEMENT 209 

10, regretting that he could not, because of the injury to his 
leg, accept the latter 's invitation to be his guest at Prince- 
ton during the inauguration of Woodrow Wilson to the 
Presidency of Princeton University on the 25th of that 
month, and adding: 

"Now I am going to requite you ill for your hospitality 
by asking you to do a service which I know you will be 
most reluctant to undertake, and which I only ask because 
I feel we are in the midst of so serious a crisis and one so 
deeply affecting the welfare of our people. 

*'My efforts to get the operators and miners to agree 
failed, chiefly through the fault of the operators. I then 
asked the miners to go back to work so that the pressing 
necessities of the public might be met, promising at once 
to appoint such a commission as Mr. Mitchell had suggested 
and stating that I would do all in my power to have the 
recommendations of that commission adopted, of course 
meaning that I should do all in my power to have whatever 
legislation they advocated enacted, as well as making up 
their recommendations in all other ways. But Mitchell re- 
fused on behalf of the miners to entertain this proposition. 
In other words, both sides have resolutely persisted in 
regarding first their own interests and treating the inter- 
ests of the public as wholly secondary, and indeed as not 
tojbe considered at all. 

1 "I shall now direct Carroll D. Wright to make a full and 
careful investigation of the present conditions and of the 
causes that have led to these conditions, including the ques- 
tion whether there has been violence and if so to what ex- 
tent ; and what if any steps should be taken to prevent the 
recurrence of these conditions. I wish to join with him 
two eminent men — men of such character that save in a 
crisis like this I would not dream of appealing to them to 
render any Government service. In all the country there 
is no man whose name would add such weight to this in- 
quiry as would yours. I earnestly beg you to say that you 
will accept. I am well aware of the great strain I put 
upon you by making such a request. I would not make it 



210 THEODORE ROOSEVELT AND HIS TIME 

if I did not feel that the calamity now impending over our 
people may have consequences which without exaggeration 
are to be called terrible ; and I feel that your services may 
be invaluable to the nation at this time.'^^ 

Replying on October 12, 1902, Mr. Cleveland wrote : 

My dear Mr. President: 

Since the receipt of your letter yesterday I have given 
its subject matter serious consideration. 

You rightly appreciate my reluctance to assume any 
public service. I am also quite certain that if my advice 
was asked as to the expediency of naming me in the con- 
nection you mention, I should, as a matter of judgment, 
not favor it. 

I cannot, however, with proper deference to your opinion, 
consider this phase of the question as open to discussion. 
I have therefore felt that I had only to determine whether 
your request involved a duty which I ought not to avoid, 
and whether my engagements and the present demands 
upon my time would permit me to undertake it. 

So far as the latter are concerned this is my situation : 
I am to take part and say something at President Wilson 's 
inauguration on the 25th inst., and I have agreed to do the 
same at the opening of the new building of the Chamber 
of Commerce in New York on the 11th of November. My 
preparation for the inaugural exercises is complete ; but for 
the other occasion it is hardly begun. I am absurdly slow 
in such work. 

I have no idea of the time which would be exacted by a 
compliance with your request, nor how early you would 
expect a result from the Commission. 

I feel so deeply the gravity of the situation, and I so 
fully sympathize with you in your efforts to remedy pres- 
ent sad conditions, that I believe it is my duty to undertake 
the service if I can do so and keep the engagements I have 
already made. 

This I will leave for your decision — only suggesting that 



COAL STRIKE SETTLEMENT 211 

I ought to have the next week at least for preparation to 
keep my New York engagement. 

If after reading this you shall notify me that you still 
think I can undertake the duty you suggest, will you deem 
it amiss if I hint that I should be glad to know who the 
third member of the Commission will be? 

Your obedient servant, 

Grover Cleveland. 

This letter contains a reference to a plan which the Presi- 
dent had formed, but had not disclosed, when his efforts 
with the operators and mine workers had failed. He had 
decided that if they would not consent to the appointment 
of a commission, he would resort to drastic measures, as- 
sume powers which the Constitution did not specifically 
give him, and appoint an investigating or arbitrating com- 
mission without regard to whether or not the operators 
asked for it or agreed to abide by its decisions. He asked 
Mr. Cleveland, in the letter quoted above, to accept a place 
on such a commission, with Carroll D. Wright and one 
other person. Mr. Cleveland's reply, which is given above, 
shows that he was not troubled with doubts about the uncon- 
stitutionality of the President's proposal, for he gave his 
consent to serve. 

This commission was only part of the President's plan. 
The investigation which it was to conduct would take time. 
In order that mining operations might be resumed as 
speedily as possible, the President consulted with Senator 
Quay, who was all powerful in Pennsylvania politics, and 
was assured by him that whenever the President desired 
him to do so he would have the Governor of the State notify 
the President that he could not keep order in the coal re- 
gions and needed Federal interference. The President 
then informed Major-General John M. Schofield that in 
case of Federal interference he wished to send him to the 
coal regions with the regular army troops with instruc- 
tions to act as receiver of the mines, take full charge, put 
down all violence, and disregard any orders from the 



212 THEODORE ROOSEVELT AND HIS TIME 

operators. The President asked the General if, in case 
the operators went to court and had a writ ser\^ed on him, 
he would do as was done under Lincohi, simply send the writ 
on to the President. After a little thought the General re- 
plied that he would. Roosevelt said : ''All right, I will send 
you." 

No one except Senator Quay, General Schotield and two 
members of Roosevelt's Cabinet had knowledge of this 
part of the President's plan. He had arranged with Sena- 
tor Quay, who was in Pennsylvania, to telegraph to him 
when the moment arrived at which he (Roosevelt) wished 
the Governor to notify him of his need of Federal inter- 
ference; the message was to be: "The time for the re- 
quest has come." The President had all preparations 
made for starting the troops within half an hour. 

Whether knowledge of the President's purpose leaked 
out or not cannot be stated, but something acted as a 
powerful incentive upon the operators, producing a sud- 
den change of front. It may have been a hint of Mr. Cleve- 
land's willingness to stand openly with the President. 

After receipt of Mr. Cleveland's letter of consent. Secre- 
tary Root, at the President's request, went to New York 
on a private mission. In a letter, written to the President 
on June 23, 1903, to contradict some erroneous assertions 
about the coal strike settlement that had been made in a 
newspaper. Secretary Root described this mission and its 
results as follows, showing that the operators refused to 
accept Mr. Cleveland as a member of the commission, 
being naturally unwilling to have such convincing evidence 
as would thereby be given to the public of the wisdom and 
justice of the President's course: 

"I went to New York and spent the better part of a day 
with Mr. J. P. Morgan on his yacht Corsair, and during 
this interview we drafted an agreement of arbitration for 
a commission to be appointed by you. Mr. Morgan got the 
signature of the operators to this paper with a single modi- 
fication. The modification required that the arbitrators 
appointed by you should belong to certain specified 



COAL STRIKE SETTLEMENT 213 

classes — an army engineer, a business man familiar with 
the coal business, a Judge of the locality, a sociologist, etc., 
etc. When this paper was presented to the miners they in 
turn wished for some modification of the proposal, and it 
appeared that they would be satisfied to enter into the 
agreement if Bishop Spalding could be added to the list of 
arbitrators, and Mr. Clark could be appointed to the place 
which called for a sociologist. As the operators' signa- 
tures had been obtained by Mr. Morgan, in order to ascer- 
tain whether the operators would assent to these appoint- 
ments I telegraphed for some member of Mr. Morgan's 
firm to come to Washington, and Mr. Bacon and Mr. Perkins 
came, and upon learning the situation they opened tele- 
phonic communication with the representatives of the oper- 
ators in New York, and secured their assent to the appoint- 
ment of Bishop Spalding and Mr. Clark. When that had 
been done you asked Mr. Bacon and Mr. Perkins if the oper- 
ators would not consent to have Mr. Cleveland appointed in 
lieu of an appointment of an army engineer, saying that you 
had already asked him to act on a committee of investiga- 
tion and had secured his assent, and that you would like to 
appoint him as one of the arbitrators. They went away, and 
after a short time came back and said they had communi- 
cated with the operators by telephone, and the operators 
would not assent to the appointment of Mr. Cleveland in 
lieu of an army engineer, or to any further change in their 
proposal.'* 

When the refusal of the operators to accept Mr. Cleve- 
land was communicated to the President, he sent the follow- 
ing telegram and letter to him on October 16, 1902 : 

The White House, 

WASHiNeTQisr, October 16, 1902. 
Hon. Grover Cleveland, Princeton, N. J. 

Deeply grateful for your letter. Propositions that have 
been made since have totally changed situation so that I 
will not have to make the demand upon you which three 



214 THEODORE ROOSEVELT AND HIS TIME 

days ago it seemed I would have to for the interest of the 
nation. I thank you most deeply and shall write you at 
length. 

Theodore Roosevelt. 

My dear Mr. Cleveland: 

I appreciated so deeply your being willing to accept that 
it was very hard for me to forego the chance of putting you 
on the commission. But in order to get the vitally neces- 
sary agreement between the operators and miners I found 
I had to consult their wishes as to the types of men. Of 
course I knew that it was the greatest relief to you not to 
be obliged to serve, but I did wish to have you on, in the 
first place, because of the weight your name would have 
lent the commission, and in the next place, because of the 
effect upon our people, and especially upon our young men, 
of such an example of genuine self-denying patriotism — 
for, my dear sir, your service would have meant all this. 
I do not know whether you understand how heartily I thank 
you and appreciate what you have done. 

Faithfully yours, 

Theodore Roosevelt. 

An entertaining account of the final agreement is given 
by the President in this letter to Senator Lodge under date 
of October 17, 1902 : 

''The crisis came at the last moment. Between the hours 
of 10 p. M. and 1 a. m., I had Bacon and Perkins on here, on 
behalf of Morgan but really representing the operators. 
Neither Morgan nor any one else had been able to do much 
with those wooden-headed gentry, and Bacon and Perkins 
were literally almost crazy. Bacon in particular had be- 
come so excited that I was quite concerned over his condi- 
tion. The operators had limited me down by a full proviso, 
to five different types of men, including 'an eminent sociolo- 
gist.' This was a ridiculous proviso because I could have 
appointed bad men in every case and yet be kept to its 
letter; and they ought to have given me a free hand. The 



COAL STRIKE SETTLEMENT 215 

miners, on the other hand, wanted me to appoint at least 
two extra members myself, or in some fashion to get Bishop 
Spalding (whom I myself wanted), and the labor union man 
on the commission. I regarded their contention as per- 
fectly reasonable, and so informed Bacon and Perkins and 
the operators. The operators refused point blank to have 
another man added, and Bacon and Perkins came on nearly 
wild to say that they had full power to treat on behalf 
of the operators, but that no extra man should be added. 
Finally it developed that what they meant was that no extra 
man should be added if he was a representative of organ- 
ized labor ; and argue as I could, nothing would make them 
change ; although they grew more and more hysterical, and 
not merely admitted, but insisted, that the failure to agree 
meant probable violence and possible social war. 

"It took me about two hours before I at last grasped the 
fact that the mighty brains of these captains of industry 
had formulated the theory that they would rather have 
anarchy than tweedledum, but if I would use the word 
tweedledee they would hail it as meaning peace. In other 
words, that they had not the slightest objection to my ap- 
pointing a labor man as an 'eminent sociologist,' and add- 
ing Bishop Spalding on my own account, but they preferred 
to see the Red Commune come rather than to have me make 
Bishop Spalding or any one else 'the eminent sociologist' 
and add the labor man. I instantly told them that I had 
not the slightest objection whatever to doing an absurd 
thing when it was necessary to meet the objection of an 
absurd mind on some vital point, and that I would cheer- 
fully appoint my labor man as the 'eminent sociologist.' 
It was almost impossible for me to appreciate the instant 
and tremendous relief this gave them. They saw nothing 
offensive in my language and nothing ridiculous in the 
proposition, and Pierpont Morgan and Baer, when called 
up by telephone, eagerly ratified the absurdity; and ac- 
cordingly, at this utterly unimportant price, we bid fair to 
come out of as dangerous a situation as I ever dealt with. ' ' 



216 THEODORE ROOSEVELT AND HIS TIME 

Writing to Finley Peter Dunne ("Mr. Dooley") a few 
days after agreement was reached, October 20, 1902, the 
President revealed his thorough enjoyment of the final 
scene : 

"I have not had the heart to write to you until this coal 
strike was out of the way. Now I feel like throwing up my 
hands and going to the circus ; but as that is not possible I 
think I shall try a turkey shoot or bear hunt or something 
of the kind instead. Nothing that you have ever written 
can begin to approach in screaming comedy the inside of 
the last few conferences before I appointed the strike com- 
mission, and especially the complicated maneuvers by 
which, weaving in and out among the tender susceptibilities 
of the operators and the miners, I finally succeeded in 
reconciling both to the appointment of the president of the 
labor union as an 'eminent sociologist.' " 

The appointment of the commission was hailed with 
universal relief and approval, for pending the investiga- 
tion work in the mines was to be resumed at once. From 
one end of the country to the other the President was 
praised for his efforts, and there was not a dissenting voice 
anywhere, even the most zealous guardians of the Con- 
stitution joining in it. Foreign newspapers also joined in 
the chorus of approval, the London Times saying: 

*'In a most quiet and unobtrusive manner the President 
has done a very big and entirely new thing. We are wit- 
nessing not merely the ending of the coal strike, but the 
definite entry of a powerful Government upon a novel 
sphere of operation. President Roosevelt did not assume 
his task as the amateur mediator; he did not enter upon 
it without counting the cost, or without the support of con- 
victions and ideas far outrunning the ostensible subject- 
matter of his action. His personal prestige and reputation 
are enormously enhanced by the immediate public service 
he has rendered, and they will be immeasurably enhanced 
when the American people grasp, as they rapidly will, the 



COAL STRIKE SETTLEMENT 217 

far larger issues involved in his striking departure from 
precedent. 

''Let the Americans stick to their President and 
strengthen his hands. If there is any living man who can 
show them the way out of the dangers threatening them, 
that man is Mr. Roosevelt." 

Writing to me on October 18, 1902, he said : 
"I am being very much overpraised by everybody, and 
although I suppose I like it, it makes me feel uncomfortable 
too. Mind you, I speak the literal truth when I say I know 
perfectly well I do not deserve what is said of me. It 
really seems to me that any man of average courage and 
common-sense, who felt as deeply as I did the terrible 
calamity impending over our people, would have done just 
what I did." 

The Commission was announced on October 15, as fol- 
lows: 

Brigadier General John M. Wilson, retired, formerly 
Chief of Engineers, U.S.A.; E. W. Parker, expert mining 
engineer, chief statistician of the coal division of the U. S. 
Geological Survey and editor of The Engineering and 
Mining Journal; George Gray, Judge of the United States 
Circuit Court, Delaware ; E. E. Clark, Chief of the Order of 
Railway Conductors, sociologist; Thomas H. Watkins, 
practically connected with the mining and selling of coal; 
Bishop John L. Spalding, of Illinois; Carroll D. Wright, 
U. S. Commissioner of Labor, Recorder of the Commission. 

The Commission, which was accepted by the operators, 
and by the mine workers in convention, came together at 
the White House on October 24, 1902, for organization and 
for instructions from the President. Judge Gray was 
chosen Chairman. In a brief address, the President said : 

''By the action you recommend, which the parties in 
interest have in advance consented to abide by, you will 
endeavor to establish the relations between the employers 
and the wage workers in the anthracite fields on a just and 
permanent basis, and as far as possible to do away with any 



218 THEODORE ROOSEVELT AND HIS TIME 

causes for the recurrence of such difficulties as those which 
you have been called to settle." 

The Commission began its labors at once and continued 
them for nearly four months, hearing a great mass of testi- 
mony and thoroughly investigating all phases of the prob- 
lem. Its report was completed in March, 1903, presented 
to the President on the 21st of the month, and published 
in the newspapers on the following day. As both parties 
to the Commission's inquiry had pledged themselves in 
advance to abide by its decisions, there was no question of 
acceptance, but both parties expressed themselves publicly 
as fully satisfied with the findings, each claiming a victory 
over the other. 

The verdict by press and public was one of unanimous 
approval. That uttered by the Tribune, on March 22, 1903, 
may be cited as a fairly accurate sample of the whole : 

" *A sweeping victory for the miners!' exclaims one 
commentator upon the report of the President's Commis- 
sion on the anthracite coal strike. 'A bomb in labor circles !' 
declares another with equal assurance. Both are wrong. 
The report gives victory to one of the parties to the con- 
troversy. But it is not the miners, nor is it the operators. 
It is rather that third party whose interests are permanent, 
though too often overlooked by both the others and their 
hot champions — the public. So far as the two parties first 
named are concerned, each has partly won and partly lost, 
as was to be expected. The public, whose demands were 
simply that justice should prevail, seems to have won on 
every point. 

''It was a generous and patriotic act of the President to 
intervene in the strike, appoint this Commission, set the 
mines in operation again, and thus fill the empty coal bins 
throughout the land. It has also been a generous and patri- 
otic act of the Commissioners to investigate the matter be- 
fore them in so impartial and painstaking a manner, to 
make at the end so wise and just a report. To the President 
and to them the sincere gratitude of the nation is due." 



COAL STRIKE SETTLEMENT 219 

The main points of the Commission's findings were that 
the miners should have a ten per cent increase in wages ; 
that non-union labor and union labor should be treated on 
equal terms ; that all disputes between operators and min- 
ers should be referred to a Board of Conciliation of six 
members, three chosen by the operators and three by the 
organizations of mine workers; in case of failure by the 
Board to agree, the question in dispute should be referred 
to a United States Circuit Judge of the District as umpire, 
and his decision should be final. The findings of the Com- 
mission were to be obligatory upon operators and workers 
for three years. 

Time has completely justified the President's course. 
Not only did the findings of the Commission secure peace 
In the anthracite mines during the three stipulated years, 
but permanently, for since 1902 there has been no strike 
there and no serious labor trouble. The system of settling 
disputes has worked smoothly and with entire success. 
Among other direful predictions that were made anent the 
President's course w^s one that in interfering in a labor 
dispute he had established a precedent that would lead to 
constant interference of the same sort in future and would 
encourage all labor agitators to promote strikes in the con- 
fident belief that the President of the United States would 
intervene and settle them. Not a single instance of the 
kind has occurred which can be traced to President Roose- 
velt's action as the inspiring cause. The great lesson of 
the settlement which the President had secured and which 
impressed the people of the land was that the labor prob- 
lem had entered upon a new phase, was no longer only an 
economic problem, but a moral and human one. The work- 
ers had been compelled to unite to secure not merely their 
economic but their simple human rights, and a body of 
men who commanded the respect and confidence of the 
country had decreed that those human rights should be 
recognized and protected. 

When the report of the Commission was received by the 
President, he wrote as follows to Judge Gray : 



220 THEODORE ROOSEVELT AND HIS TIME 

White House, Washington, 

March 24, 1903. 
My dear Judge Gray: 

Pray permit me through you to thank the members of 
the Anthracite Coal Strike Commission for as important 
a piece of public service as any equal number of men have 
in our time rendered the country. When you were ap- 
pointed, we were within measurable distance of a great 
national calamity. By your acceptance of the position, and 
the wisdom, fearlessness and absolute fairness of your 
course since, you not only averted that calamity but per- 
formed great and lasting service to the nation. This service 
was rendered at a heavy personal cost to each of you, and 
to those of your body who were in public service it was 
simply an additional burden. But such service as you gave 
could not be bought, and perhaps it is as well for the coun- 
try that it should be given at a personal sacrifice, as was 
true in this case. Thanking you again most heartily, I am 

Sincerely yours, 
(Signed) Theodore Roosevelt. 



CHAPTER XX 
THE KAISER AND VENEZUELA 

Early in December, 1902, an opportunity came for the 
President to assert the position he had held for many years 
in regard to the Monroe Doctrine, and he was quick to seize 
it. No publicity was given at the time, nor for many years 
afterward, to the manner in which he compelled the German 
Kaiser to execute a complete backdown. Details of the in- 
cident were published for the first time in 1915, in William 
Roscoe Thayer's "Life of John Hay." The publication 
would have attracted wide attention in ordinary times, and 
coming as it did in the first year of Germany's great war 
with the rest of the world, it aroused especial and very deep 
interest. There was some question raised as to the authen- 
ticity of the author's story, and to corroborate its truth 
and prevent all future denial, Roosevelt wrote a letter 
to Mr. Thayer in which he gave his personal version 
of the incident, and supplemented Mr. Thayer's version 
with some corroborative evidence which had recently come 
into his possession and which established its accuracy be- 
yond dispute. This letter was published later as an ap- 
pendix in a second edition of Mr. Thayer's book. In ac- 
cordance with the expressed wish of Roosevelt it is repro- 
duced here as the final and authoritative account of the 
incident : 

Sagamore Hill, August 21, 1916. 
My dear Mr. Thayer: 

There is now no reason why I should not speak of the 
facts connected with the disagreement between the United 
States and Germany over the Venezuela matter, in the 
early part of my administration as President, and of the 
final amicable settlement of the disagreement. 

221 



222 THEODORE ROOSEVELT AND HIS TIME 

At that time the Venezuelan Dictator— President Castro 
—had committed various offenses against different Euro- 
pean nations, including Germany and England. The Eng- 
lish Government was then endeavoring to keep on good 
terms with Germany, and on this occasion acted jointly with 
her. Germany sent a squadron of war vessels to the Vene- 
zuelan coast, and they were accompanied by some English 
war vessels. There was no objection whatever to Castro's 
being punished, as long as the punishment did not take the 
form of seizure of territory and its more or less permanent 
occupation by some Old-World power. At this particular 
point, such seizure of territory would have been a direct 
menace to the United States, because it would have threat- 
ened or partially controlled the approach to the projected 
Istlmiian Canal. 

I speedily became convinced that Germany was the 
leader, and the really formidable party in the transaction ; 
and that England was merely following Germany's lead 
in rather half-hearted fashion. I became convinced that 
England would not back Germany in the event of a clash 
over the matter between Germany and the United States, 
but would remain neutral ; I did not desire that she should 
do more than remain neutral. I also became convinced that 
Germany intended to seize some Venezuelan harbor and 
turn it into a strongly fortified place of arms, on the modell 
of Kiauchau, with a view to exercising some degree of con- 
trol over the future Isthmian Canal, and over South Ameri- 
can affairs generally. 

For some time the usual methods of diplomatic inter- 
course were tried. Germany declined to agree to arbitrate 
the question at issue between her and Venezuela, and de- 
clined to say that she would not take possession of Vene- 
zuelan territory, merely saying that such possession would 
be ''temporary" — which might mean anything. I finally 
decided that no useful purpose would be served by further 
delay, and I took action accordingly. I assembled our 
battle fleet, under Admiral Dewey, near Porto Eico, for 
"maneuvers," with instructions that the fleet should be 



THE KAISER AND VENEZUELA 223 

kept in hand and in fighting trim, and should be ready to 
sail at an hour's notice. The fact that the fleet was in West 
Indian waters was of course generally known; but I be- 
lieve that the Secretaiy of the Navy, and Admiral Dewey, 
and perhaps his Chief of Staff, and the Secretary of State, 
John Hay, were the only persons who knew about the order 
for the fleet to be ready to sail at an hour's notice. I told 
John Hay that I would now see the German Ambassador, 
Herr von Holleben, myself, and that I intended to bring 
matters to an early conclusion. Our navy was in very ef- 
ficient condition, being superior to the German navy. 

I saw the Ambassador, and explained that in view of the 
presence of the German Squadron on the Venezuelan coast 
I could not permit longer delay in answering my request 
for an arbitration, and that I could not acquiesce in any 
seizure of Venezuelan territory. The Ambassador re- 
sponded that his government could not agree to arbitrate, 
and that there was no intention to take ''permanent" pos- 
session of Venezuelan territory. I answered that Kiauchau 
was not a "permanent" possession of Germany — that I 
understood that it was merely held by a 99 years' lease; 
and that I did not intend to have another Kiauchau, held 
by similar tenure, on the approach to the Isthmian Canal. 
The Ambassador repeated that his government would not 
agree to arbitrate. I then asked him to inform his govern- 
ment that if no notification for arbitration came within a 
certain specified number of days I should be obliged to 
order Dewey to take his fleet to the Venezuelan coast and 
see that the German forces did not take possession of any 
territory. He expressed very grave concern, and asked me 
if I realized the serious consequences that would follow 
such action ; consequences so serious to both countries that 
he dreaded to give them a name. I answered that I had 
thoroughly counted the cost before I decided on the step, 
and asked him to look at the map, as a glance would show 
him that there was no spot in the world where Germany in 
the event of a conflict with the United States would be at a 
greater disadvantage than in the Caribbean Sea. 



224 THEODORE ROOSEVELT AND HIS TIME 

A few days later the Ambassador came to see me, talked 
pleasantly on several subjects, and rose to go. I asked him 
if he had any answer to make from his government to my 
request, and when he said no, I informed him that in such 
event it was useless to wait as long as I had intended, and 
that Dewey would be ordered to sail twenty-four hours in 
advance of the time I had set. He expressed deep appre- 
hension, and said that his government would not arbitrate. 
However, less than twenty-four hours before the time I 
had appointed for cabling the order to Dewey, the Em- 
bassy notified me that his Imperial Majesty the German 
Emperor had directed him to request me to undertake the 
arbitration myself. I felt, and publicly expressed, great 
gratification at this outcome, and great appreciation of the 
course the German Government had finally agreed to take. 
Later I received the consent of the German Government 
to have the arbitration undertaken by The Hague Tribunal, 
and not by me. 

At that time there was in New York as German Consul- 
General a very able and agreeable man, Dr. Buenz, a na- 
tive of Holstein. He was intimate with a friend and then 
neighbor of mine, Mr. A. W. Callisen, whose father was 
born in Schleswig, and who, incidentally, was and is exact- 
ly as straight an American as I am. Mr. Callisen intro- 
duced Dr. Buenz to me; and I found the doctor an excep- 
tionally well informed man about American matters and 
indeed about world affairs generally. He was at my house 
on several occasions, and I discussed many things with him, 
including the German and American navies. I had, how- 
ever, no idea that he had any knowledge whatever of this 
phase of the Venezuelan affair until after your book ap- 
peared. Mr. Callisen happened to read it, was much inter- 
ested in the part referring to Venezuela, and wrote to a 
friend of his, Mr. Ambrose C. Richardson, of Buffalo, a 
letter running in part as follows : 

" 'A Chapter of Diplomacy' (Mr. Thayer's account) in- 
terested me greatly, all the more as I knew Dr. Holleben 



THE KAISER AND VENEZUELA 225 

personally, and, what is still more to the purpose, his 
most intimate friend, Dr. Buenz, at that time German 
Consul-General at New York. The story is absolutely true, 
and here is the sequel. 

''The German and British Governments firmly counted 
on our well established jellyfish squashiness and felt sure 
they had a free hand. The Kaiser and Junker party espe- 
cially had everything cut and dried, and counted the affair 
as accomplished. The first time Holleben informed his 
government that probably Eoosevelt's attitude was a bluff; 
but on second thought went to his friend Buenz for advice 
as B. knew the American people better than any German 
living, and was a close friend of Eoosevelt's (I introduced 
him) and hence a good judge of the situation. Buenz at 
once assured him that Roosevelt was not bluffing, and that 
he could count on his doing as threatened; and that in a 
conversation Roosevelt had shown that he had an intimate 
knowledge of the strength and condition of the German 
fleet which was . . . (then) no match for ours. 

''Holleben was obliged to eat his own words and tele- 
graph in hot haste to Berlin, where his message fell like a 
bomb shell. You know the rest. This resulted in Holleben 's 
being recalled and dismissed from the diplomatic ser- 
vice. . . . When he sailed from Hoboken not a single mem- 
ber of the diplomatic corps or German official dared to see 
him off. Only Buenz (and I) dared to brave official dis- 
approval, and went on board to bid him farewell. I went 
at Buenz 's request." 

A copy of this letter came into my possession and I 
showed it to Mr. Callisen when he was here, at my house, 
on May 7 last. He wrote alongside the part I have quoted : 
"The above is absolutely accurate. (Signed) A. W. Calli- 
sen." Mr. Callisen informed me that he had not intended 
the letter for publication, but that as the copy had been 
shown to several people I was at liberty to make whatever 
use of it I desired. 

After your book appeared some person wrote a letter 



226 THEODORE ROOSEVELT AND HIS TIME 

to the press stating that at the time of the Venezuela inci- 
dent the American fleet was not mobilized under Admiral 
Dewey in the West Indies. The letter was sent to Mr. 
Henry A. Wise Wood, of the National Security League, 
who thereupon wrote to Admiral Dewey for inforaiation 
on the subject. Admiral Dewey answered as follows: 

Office of 

The Admiral of the Navy 

Washington 

May 23, 1916. 
Me. Henry A. Wise Wood, 
25 Madison Avenue, 
New York City. 
My dear Mr. Wood: 

I beg to acknowledge the receipt of your letter of May 22, 
asking me to set you right respecting certain facts regard- 
ing Colonel Roosevelt's action over Venezuela. 

I was at Culebra, Porto Rico, at the time, in command 
of a fleet consisting of over fifty ships, including every 
battle ship and every torpedo boat that we had, with orders 
from Washington to hold the fleet in hand and be ready 
to move at a moment's notice. Fortunately, however, the 
whole matter was amicably adjusted, and there was no need 
for action. 

Hoping the above statement is exactly what you want, 
and thanking you for the compliments you pay me, I am. 

Very truly yours, 

George Dewey. 

This letter was published in the press; and Mr. Wood 
then sent me copies of the correspondence. 

Sincerely yours, 

Theodore Roosevelt. 

It was on December 8, 1902, that Germany and England 
severed diplomatic relations with Venezuela. President 
Roosevelt soon afterwards had with the German Ambas- 



THE KAISER AND VENEZUELA 227 

sador the first interview in which the Ambassador had 
claimed that Germany was establishing a ''pacific block- 
ade" and that its occupation of territory was only "tem- 
porary." That the President was correct in his estimate 
of England's attitude was shown ten days later, December 
18, 1902, when Mr. Balfour, then Prime Minister, said in 
the House of Commons: 

''I think it quite likely that the United States will think 
that there cannot be such a thing as a 'pacific blockade,' 
and I personally take the same view. Evidently the block- 
ade involves a state of war." 

This declaration was received with general approval, 
showing that English opinion was in accord with it. It was 
published prominently in American newspapers and the 
German Ambassador undoubtedly saw it. On December 18, 
there also appeared in the newspapers a despatch from 
Washington saying that the fighting ships of Dewey's fleet 
had been ordered to rendezvous at the Island of Trinidad, 
directly off the coast of Venezuela. The German Ambas- 
sador doubtless saw this also. On the morning of December 
19, 1902, the following, obviously inspired. Associated Press 
despatch from Berlin was published: 

"The answer of Germany to the arbitration proposal in 
behalf of Venezuela, received through the United States, 
is its acceptance. The delivery of this reply to the United 
States for transmission to Minister Bowen (American 
Minister to Venezuela) is delayed for a day or two for tac- 
tical reasons. Four days ago the German Gevomment was 
in favor of rejecting arbitration, and that is understood 
to have been the temper of the British Foreign Office, also. 
While it is impossible to trace the steps which led to the 
reversal of this view, it appears that it was caused by the 
state of public opinion in the United States, so far as Ger- 
many is concerned, as it is understood here." 

Three days later, December 22, 1902, the Kaiser formally 
requested President Roosevelt to act as arbiter, but after 



228 THEODORE ROOSEVELT AND HIS TIME 

careful deliberation he declined, on December 26, and the 
case was referred to The Hague Tribunal. There was no 
publicity given to the President's conversation with Dr. von 
Holleben. Even Admiral Dewey knew nothing except that 
he was instructed to hold his fleet in readiness for orders. 
In his annual message to Congress, December 7, 1903, the 
President thus stated the facts in the case, giving no hint of 
his personal diplomatic proceedings in bringing about a 
peaceful solution: 

"It will be remembered that during the second session 
of the last Congress Great Britain, Germany, and Italy 
formed an alliance for the purpose of blockading the ports 
of Venezuela and using such other means of pressure as 
would secure a settlement of claims due, as they alleged, 
to certain of their subjects. 

*' Their employment of force for the collection of these 
claims was terminated by an agreement brought about 
through the offices of the diplomatic representatives of the 
United States at Caracas and the Government at Wash- 
ington, thereby ending a situation which was bound to cause 
increasing friction and which jeopardized the peace of the 
continent. Under this agreement Venezuela agreed to 'set 
apart a certain percentage of the customs receipts of two 
of her ports to be applied to the payment of whatever obli- 
gations might be ascertai.ied by mixed commissions ap- 
pointed for that purpose to be due from her, not only to 
the three powers already mentioned, whose proceedings 
against her had resulted in a state of war, but also to the 
United States, France, Spain, Belgium, the Netherlands, 
Sweden and Norway, and Mexico, who had not employed 
force for the collection of the claims alleged to be due to 
certain of their citizens. 

"A demand was then made by the so-called blockading 
powers that the sums ascertained to be due to their citizens 
by such mixed commissions should be accorded payment in 
full before anything was paid upon the claims of any of 
the so-called peace powers. Venezuela, on the other hand, 
insisted that all her creditors should be paid upon a basis 



THE KAISER AND VENEZUELA , 229 

of exact equality. During the efforts to adjust this dispute 
it was suggested by the powers in interest that it should be 
referred to me for decision, but I was clearly of the opinion 
that a far wiser course would be to submit the question to 
the Permanent Court of Arbitration at The Hague. It 
seemed to me to offer an admirable opportunity to advance 
the practise of the peaceful settlement of disputes between 
nations and to secure for The Hague Tribunal a mem- 
orable increase of its practical importance. The nations 
interested in the controversy were so numerous, and in 
many instances so powerful, as to make it evident that 
beneficent results would follow from their appearance at 
the same time before the bar of that august tribunal of 
peace. 

"Our hopes in that regard have been realized. Russia 
and Austria are represented in the persons of the learned 
and distinguished jurists who compose the Tribunal, while 
Great Britain, Germany, France, Spain, Italy, Belgium, the 
Netherlands, Sweden and Norway, Mexico, the United 
States, and Venezuela are represented by their respec- 
tive agents and counsel. Such an imposing concourse of 
nations presenting their arguments and invoking the deci- 
sion of that high court of international justice and inter- 
national peace can hardly fail to secure a like submission 
of many future controversies. The nations now appearing 
there will find it far easier to appear there a second time, 
while no nation can imagine its just pride will be lessened 
by following the example now presented. This triumph of 
the principle of international arbitration is a subject of 
warm congratulation and offers a happy augury for the 
peace of the world." 



CHAPTER XXI 
POPULAR APPROVAL— VIEWS ON VARIOUS SUBJECTS 

The elections of November, 1902, showed unmistakably 
that the President had the hearty support of the people of 
the country in his course during the first year of his ad- 
ministration. The chief issues were his treatment of trusts 
and the settlement of the coal strike, and on these he won a 
signal triumph. Not only had all the Republican State con- 
ventions of the year strongly approved his policies but had 
declared in favor of his election to the Presidency in 1904. 
The Republicans elected the largest majority of members 
of the House of Representatives that their party had se- 
cured in a midway election during Republican administra- 
tion for thirty-four years. A few days after election, on 
November 11, 1902, the President went to New York to par- 
ticipate in the dedication of a building which had been 
erected by the Chamber of Commerce of that city as its 
permanent home. At a banquet in the evening the Pres- 
ident delivered the principal address. Fifteen years later, 
when the European war was in progress, the closing pass- 
ages of this address were recalled as evidence of far-sighted 
wisdom on the part of Roosevelt. It was : 

**We are glad indeed that we are on good terms with all 
the other peoples of mankind, and no effort on our part 
shall be spared to secure a continuance of these relations. 
And remember, gentlemen, that we shall be a potent factor 
for peace largely in proportion to the way in which we make 
it evident that our attitude is due, not to weakness, not to 
inability to defend ourselves, but to a genuine repugnance 
to wrongdoing, a genuine desire for self-respecting friend- 
ship with our neighbors. The voice of the weakling or the 
craven counts for nothing when he clamors for peace ; but 

230 



VIEWS ON VARIOUS SUBJECTS 231 

the voice of the just man armed is potent. We need to 
keep in a condition of preparedness, especially as regards 
our navy, not because we want war, but because we desire 
to stand with those whose plea for peace is listened to with 
respectful attention." 

This was not the first utterance of the kind that Koose- 
velt had made, but was in fact a repetition of what he had 
said twenty years earlier in the preface to his ** History of 
the War of 1812, ' ' which he wrote in 1882, quoted in Chap- 
ter VI, and in his address before the Naval War College in 
1897, quoted in Chapter IX. 

In his Chamber of Commerce speech the President gave 
an outline of his ideas on the subject of social and indus- 
trial reform — a question that was steadily growing to 
larger importance in his mind : 

"No patent remedy can be devised for the solution of 
these grave problems in the industrial world; but we may 
rest assured that they can be solved at all only if we bring 
to the solution certain old-time virtues, and if we strive to 
keep out of the solution some of the most familiar and most 
undesirable of the traits to which mankind has owed un- 
told degradation and suffering throughout the ages. Arro- 
gance, suspicion, brutal envy of the well-to-do, brutal indif- 
ference toward those who are not well-to-do, the hard re- 
fusal to consider the rights of others, the foolish refusal 
to consider the limits of beneficent action, the base appeal 
to the spirit of selfish greed, whether it take the form of 
plunder of the fortunate or of oppression of the unfortu- 
nate — from these and from all kindred vices this Nation 
must be kept free if it is to remain in its present position 
in the forefront of the peoples of mankind. On the other 
hand, good will come, even out of the present evils, if we 
face them armed with the old homely virtues ; if we show 
that we are fearless of soul, cool of head, and kindly of 
heart; if, without betraying the weakness that cringes be- 
fore wrongdoing, we yet show by deeds and words our 



232 THEODORE ROOSEVELT AND HIS TIME 

knowledge that in such a government as ours each of us 
must be in very truth his brother's keeper." 

He went to Tennessee in November, speaking at Mem- 
phis on the 19th of that month, when he dwelt upon the 
Government's w^ork in the Philippines, saying: 

''There is no question as to our not having gone far 
enough and fast enough in granting self-government to the 
Filipinos ; the only possible danger has been lest we should 
go faster and further than was in the interest of the Fili- 
pinos themselves. Each Filipino at the present day is guar- 
anteed his life, his liberty and the chance to pursue hap- 
piness as he wishes, so long as he does not harm his fellows, 
in a way which the Islands have never known before during 
all their recorded history." 

Speaking at a banquet of the Union League Club in Phil- 
adelphia on November 22, 1902, he paid high tribute to the 
ability and services of Attorney General Knox, adding: 

"The question of the so-called trusts is but one of the 
questions we must meet in connection with our industrial 
system. There are many of them and they are serious; 
but they can and will be met. Time may be needed for 
making the solution perfect ; but it is idle to tell this people 
that we have not the power to solve such a problem as that 
of exercising adequate supervision over the great indus- 
trial combinations of to-day. We have the power and we 
shall find out the way. We shall not act hastily or reck- 
lessly, and a right solution shall be found, and found it 
will be." 

In his annual message to Congress, December 2, 1902, 
the President said that the views which he had expressed 
in his message of 1901, in regard to the desirability of 
national control and regulation of trusts and corporations, 
had, in his opinion, been emphasized by experience, and he 
defined his general attitude on the subject as follows: 

"Our aim is not to do away with corporations; on the 



VIEWS ON VARIOUS SUBJECTS 233 

contrary, these big aggregations are an inevitable develop- 
ment of modern industrialism, and the effort to destroy 
them would be futile unless accomplished in ways that 
would work the utmost mischief to the entire body politic. 
We can do nothing of good in the way of regulating and 
supervising these corporations until we fix clearly in our 
minds that we are not attacking the corporations, but en- 
deavoring to do away with any evil in them. We are not 
hostile to them; we are merely determined that they shall 
be so handled as to subserve the public good. We draw the 
line against misconduct, not against wealth. Publicity can 
do no harm to the honest corporation; and we need not be 
over-tender about sparing the dishonest corporation." 

To the Rev. Dr. W. S. Eainsford, of New York, who wrote 
him a letter criticizing the trust portions of his message 
as lacking in specific remedies, he replied, December 27, 
1902: 

"I thank you for your letter. You say it is difficult for 
the politicians in Washington to understand what is needed 
and not to be timid. I agree with you. But one of my 
main difficulties arises from the fact that thoroughly good 
outsiders do not understand what is possible to do or indeed 
what is done. I am glad you wrote frankly about my mes- 
sage. I know you expect me to write with equal frankness 
in return. Your letter was a genuine disappointment to 
me, because it showed you had misunderstood what most 
emphatically no man has a right to misunderstand. My 
message was absolutely clear. I spoke of the need of 
publicity. But are you aware that to make publicity an 
issue is mere nonsense unless I frame legislation which will 
give us a chance to get it? Are you aware also of the ex- 
treme unwisdom of my irritating Congress by fixing the 
details of a bill, concerning which they are very sensitive, 
instead of laying down a general policy? I said in my mes- 
sage just what I had said in my speeches, only I used the 
phraseology appropriate to the occasion. I went over 
every word with Attorney General Knox and went just as 



234 THEODORE ROOSEVELT AND HIS TIME 

far as I thought we could with safety go. He and I are 
now in close consultation with the Congressional commit- 
tees having the legislation in charge. 

''Don't you think that you will get a better idea of what 
I am after if you remember that I am seeking to secure 
action by Congress rather than to establish a reputation 
as a stump exhorter?" 

The President's sense of humor, for which he was accus- 
tomed to give devout thanks as a genuine "very present 
help in time of trouble," is revealed constantly in his let- 
ters. I append two samples. The first was to Secretary 
Hay on May 19, 1902: 

Dear John: 

The enclosed papers of A B in point of fervor 

and number would quite justify his appointment as Secre- 
tary of State; but I understand he only wants the consul- 
ship at Fort Erie. Senator Piatt and Congressman Alex- 
ander have nearly burst into tears at the thought of its 
going elsewhere — Congressman Alexander is listening to 
me as I pen this. If Hitt's man can be put elsewhere, can 
we not continue Erie as a feudal appanage of Buffalo? 

Faithfully yours, 

T. R. 

The second was to Secretary Root on February 21, 1903, 
enclosing a letter of complaint : 

To the Secretary of War: 

This is austerely called to your attention by the Presi- 
dent, who would like a full and detailed explanation, if pos- 
sible with interjectional musical accompaniment, about the 
iniquity of making a promotion for the senior Senator from 
Maine and refusing to make one for the junior Senator. 
Your special attention is directed to the pathos of the con- 
cluding sentence of the junior Senator's letter. An early 
and inaccurate report is requested. 

T. R. 



VIEWS ON VARIOUS SUBJECTS 235 

A correspondence which took place early in 1903 between 
the President and Senator Piatt, of New York, is of interest 
as defining the attitude which the President habitually took 
with all the Senators of his party in the matter of appoint- 
ments. He consulted them, and when they proposed to him 
men who met his test of character and fitness, he appointed 
them gladly, but as he said, in a letter already quoted in 
these pages: ''They may ordinarily name the men but I 
shall name the standard and the men have got to come up 
to it." He habitually exercised great care in the selec- 
tion of nominees for the bench, making inquiries in all 
directions from which trustworthy information could be 
derived, and reaching a decision only when he thought the 
best man had been found. He pursued this course in regard 
to a vacancy in the United States District Court in New 
York in 1903. When he had decided upon the man he in- 
formed Senator Piatt of his selection. The Senator, who 
was then broken in health and broken also in political 
power, and who had presented a candidate of his own choice 
for the place, wrote a querulous, even peevish letter to 
the President, to which the latter replied at length on 
February 22, 1903, saying among other things: 

"You say that you 'cannot with any degree of equanimity 
consent to the appointment of a man whose chief claim to 
recognition is his social standing and whose unfitness for 
appointment is known to nearly every member of the bar 
in New York — i. e., to every member of the bar who is active 
and potential in the practise of the law.' I do not see how 
you can feel thus in view of the endorsements I have re- 
ceived. (The names of a large number of eminent lawyers 
in New York are then given.) 

"You say that 'if Mr. H.'s appointment follows this pro- 
test, I shall view it with absolute disgust. I shall, more- 
over, experience a diminution of that interest in public 
affairs that has been for so many years a vital element of 
my life.' 

"This, my dear Senator, seems hardly worthy of you. 
I cannot believe that you seriously mean that if I should, 



236 THEODORE ROOSEVELT AND HIS TIME 

after careful and conscientious thought, conclude to nomi- 
nate a man recommended as Mr. H. is recommended, and 
standing as high as I know him to stand, you would feel 
like losing interest in public affairs. My life has been much 
shorter than yours, yet I have seen a good many appoint- 
ments made to Federal position, during the last twenty 
years, of which I by no means approve. But it never oc- 
curred to me, on account of any or all of those appoint- 
ments, to refuse longer to take an interest in public affairs. 
It is, I trust, needless to say that I fully appreciate the 
right and duty of the Senate to reject or to confirm any 
appointment according to what its members conscientiously 
deem their duty to be; just as it is my business to make 
an appointment which I conscientiously think is a good one. 

"Finally, my dear Senator, you say: 'If you cherish the 
belief that Mr. H. will be able to accomplish the political 
results that you have in mind, I simply wish to express the 
opinion that he cannot, and, moreover, will not, meet your 
expectations.' 

"I am wholly at a loss to know what you mean by this 
sentence. The political results I shall have in mind if I 
appoint Mr. H. are those that I hope will follow the ap- 
pointment of a first class man whom the community in 
general and the bar in particular will accept as a first class 
man in point of character and ability, and whose appoint- 
ment they will feel reflects credit upon the bench. I do not 
see how bad political results can follow such action, and I 
should hope that on the whole the political results will be 
good. But I must frankly say that I feel, when the matter 
is one of the appointment of a judge, that the wisest and 
best politics is to appoint a thoroughly high grade man — if 
possible the best man obtainable. It is a matter of very 
keen regret to me that we seem unable to agree in this 
matter. ' ' 

Three days later, February 28, 1903, he wrote again to 
the Senator, giving notice of his final decision : 

'*I have been going over and over that judgeship situa- 



VIEWS ON VARIOUS SUBJECTS 237 

tion. I am convinced that the bar and the people generally 
who are best competent to judge feel that H. is by all 
means the better man, and I do not see how I can avoid 
sending in his name. Many of your strongest friends wish 
him. It is a matter of the greatest regret to me that our 
judgments on this point do not seem to agree. I would not 
for one moment act against your wishes if it was a matter 
of personal preference, but here my conception of duty 
seems to me to require that I should nominate him." 

Writing at this period to William H. Taft, then Civil 
Governor of the Philippines, he gave, under date of March 
13, 1903, this judicial estimate of the character and ser- 
vices of the Republican leaders in both houses of Congress : 

*'My experience for the last year and a half, including 
the two sessions of the last Congress and the special session 
of the Senate which has just closed, has made me feel re- 
spect and regard for Aldrich as one of that group of Sen- 
ators, including Allison, Hanna, Spooner, Piatt, of Connec- 
ticut, Lodge and one or two others, who, together with 
men like the next Speaker of the House, Joe Cannon, are 
the most powerful factors in Congress. With every one 
of these men I at times differ radically on important ques- 
tions ; but they are the leaders, and their great intelligence 
and power and their desire in the last resort to do what is 
best for the government, make them not only essential to 
work with, but desirable to work with. Several of the lead- 
ers have special friends whom they desire to favor, or spe- 
cial interests with which they are connected and which they 
hope to serve. But, taken as a body, they are broadminded 
and patriotic, as well as sagacious, skilful and resolute. 
Each of them is set in his ways on certain points. Thus, 
with both Hanna and Aldrich I had to have a regular 
stand-up fight before I could get them to accept any trust 
legislation; but when I once got them to say they would 
give in, they kept their promise in good faith, and it was 
far more satisfactory to work with them than to try to 
work with the alleged radical reformers. Aldrich, for in- 



238 THEODORE ROOSEVELT AND HIS TIME 

stance, has shied off from a number of propositions in 
which I was interested, but if I thought the matter vital 
and brought it before him fair and square, I have always 
found him a reasonable man, open to conviction and a tower 
of strength when thus convinced." 

A letter which the President wrote to Secretary Hay, on 
March 13, 1903, reveals his consistent devotion to the Mon- 
roe doctrine and especially his determination to keep the 
German Government fully informed as to his position in 
regard to it : 

''Speck (von Sternburg, German Ambassador) was in 
to-day, evidently inspired from Berlin to propose for our 
consideration in the future the advisability of having the 
great Powers collectively stand back of some syndicate 
which should take possession of the finances of Venezuela. 
His statement was that he believed such action would put 
a stop to the motive for revolution in Venezuela, would 
make the country peaceful and therefore more or less pros- 
perous, and would do away with the chance for a repetition 
of punitive expeditions by European powders to collect 
debts. He said he hoped America would take the initiative 
in such a movement, so that it could be begun with her in 
the lead. I told him I would not answer offliand but that 
at first blush my judgment was very strongly that our 
people would view with the utmost displeasure any such 
proposal, because it seemed to me that it would not only 
tend to produce complication among the guaranteeing 
powers but would pave the way for reducing Venezuela to 
a condition like that of Egypt, and that the American people 
interpreted the Monroe Doctrine as meaning of course that 
no European power should gain control of any American 
republics. ' ' 

At the end of March, 1903, the President left Washing- 
ton for a tour in the Western States, and on the eve of de- 
parture he sent these letters of advice and caution to two 
admirals of the navy : 



VIEWS ON VARIOUS SUBJECTS 239 

March 28, 1903. 
To Admiral Henry C. Taylor: 

* ' I am going away and I want you and everybody around 
the Department to help me in seeing that no chance is given 
ignorant, foolish or reckless newspaper men to make state- 
ments which tend to embroil us with foreign nations. The 
last thing I want to see done is an impression conveyed that 
we are boasting, or saying anything that will hurt the feel- 
ings of powers with which we are at peace, and with which 
I hope we will continue on terms of friendship. I want to 
see every step possible taken to make us the most formi- 
dable of foes in the event of war, and at the same time to 
make it equally evident that no one need fear a war with 
us unless from his own fault.'* 

March 30, 1903. 
i To Admiral George Dewey: 

I '*Good-by and good luck to you while I am gone! Now, 
I my dear Admiral, do let me beg of you to remember how 
i great your reputation is — how widely whatever you say 
goes over the whole world. I know that you did not expect 
the interview you had to be printed, but do let me entreat 
you to say nothing which can be taken hold of by those 
anxious to foment trouble between ourselves and any 
foreign power or who delight in giving the impression that 
as a nation we are walking about with a chip on our 
shoulder. We are too big a people to be able to be careless 
in what we say.'* 

Speaking to a great audience in Chicago on April 2, 1903, 
the President said: 

"I believe in the Monroe Doctrine with all my heart and 
soul; I am convinced that the immense majority of our fel- 
low-countrymen so believe in it ; but I would infinitely prefer 
to see us abandon it than to see us put it forward and bluster 
about it, and yet fail to build up the efficient fighting 
strength which in the last resort can alone make it re- 
spected by any strong foreign power whose interest it may 
ever happen to be to violate it. 



240 THEODORE ROOSEVELT AND HIS TIME 

' ' There is a homely old adage which runs : ' Speak softly 
and carry a big stick; you will go far.' If the American 
nation will speak softly and yet build and keep at a pitch 
of the highest training a thoroughly efficient navy the Mon- 
roe Doctrine will go far." 

The first mention of the ''big stick" adage that I find in 
his correspondence is in a letter that he wrote while he 
was Governor of New York. During his Presidency the 
cartoonists of the daily press seized upon a part of it only 
and pictured him invariably with an immense club in his 
hand, oftentimes with spikes protruding from the sides 
of it. He was thus represented as the champion of the 
"Big Stick" policy in governmental administration, and in 
that^f orceful aspect he was placed continuously before the 

world. 

During his Presidency I made collections of the press car- 
toons about him and took them to the White House with me 
on my occasional visits. Usually they were inspected by 
him in the presence of such members of the family as hap- 
pened to be there and they were the cause of much merri- 
ment, he himself enjojang them as much as any one else. 
On one occasion, after a particularly large batch had been 
examined, he said,— I give his words from memory: "It is 
very curious. Ever since I have been in the Presidency 
I have been pictured constantly as a huge creature with 
enormous clenched teeth, a big spiked club, and a belt full 
of pistols— a blustering, roaring swashbuckler type of ruf- 
fian, and yet all the time I have been growing in popularity. 
I don't understand it at all." 

The explanation seemed to me to be simple enough. All 
the cartoonists at heart liked him, and there was seldom or 
never anything bitter or really unfriendly in their por- 
trayals of him; they were uniformly good-natured. He, 
as I have said, genuinely enjoyed their productions and 
had many of the original drawings framed and placed on 
the bookcases in his library, both in the White House and 
at Oyster Bay. 



VIEWS ON VARIOUS SUBJECTS 241 

Writing from the Far West to Senator Lodge, he gave an 
interesting glimpse of the movement which was on foot at 
the time to make Grover Cleveland the Democratic Presi- 
dential candidate for a third term : 

May 4, 1903. — **I enjoyed meeting Cleveland for I like the 
old fellow. It is evident he has the Presidential bee in his 
bonnet, and it is equally evident that a large number of 
people are desirous of running him again. Bryan would 
bolt him, but in spite of this I think he would be a very 
formidable candidate. In North Dakota, for instance, they 
told me they thought he would run better than any other 
Democrat. So they did in Missouri and Iowa. 

''I have been well received, indeed, I might say, enthusi- 
astically received. But, frankly, I have been too long in 
public life to be taken in by a good reception, and I have 
not the slightest idea how things really stand." 

May 23, 1903. — ''Most of the people out here believe that 
Cleveland will be nominated on the Democratic ticket, and 
that he will be a very formidable man to beat — probably 
the most formidable Democrat. If nominated he will drive 
certain Democrats away. For instance, the Governor of 
Nevada and the Mayor of Carson, both Democrats, told me 
that they should vote for me if Cleveland were nominated ; 
but I find that Pierpont Morgan and other Wall Street 
men have been announcing openly within the past fortnight 
that they should support Mr. Cleveland against me with all 
their power. They would draw a great many votes both 
from the honest rich and the fool respectable classes." 

The President had appointed as District Attorney for 
the State of Delaware, Mr. William M. Byrne, concerning 
whom there had been a heated partisan controversy be- 
cause of his relations with political factional quarrels in 
the State. In a letter to him, on March 23, 1903, the Presi- 
dent said: 

''I have named you as District Attorney. Now there is 
one thing, and one thing only, that I demand. That is, that 
you keep clear of factional politics, and indeed do just as 



242 THEODORE ROOSEVELT AND HIS TIME 

little political work as possible, and confine your attention 
to making the best record as district attorney that has been 
made by any district attorney of Delaware. There must 
not be a single legitimate or well-founded complaint against 
you. You will of course show neither fear nor favor in 
anything you do. Any offender of any kind whose case 
may be brought to your attention, or whom you can reach, 
is to be prosecuted with absolute indifference as to whether 
he is Republican or Democrat, Addicks man or anti-Addicks 
man. I have liked you and I think well of you, but under 
the circumstances of your appointment and the way in 
which it was fought, I have a right to demand that you 
walk even more guardedly than the ordinary public official 
walks, and that you show yourself a model officer in point 
of fearlessness and integrity, industry and ability. 

''The question of your confirmation will come up when 
the Senate reconvenes. You can help yourself in it more 
than any other man can possibly help you; and you can 
help yourself only by making a record which will be a just 
source of pride to you and to me. ' ' 

In accordance with the recommendation of the President 
in his first message to Congress, repeated in subsequent 
messages. Congress passed in February, 1903, an act cre- 
ating a Department of Commerce and Labor, including a 
Bureau of Corporations, and the act was approved on 
February 19. The first head of it, George B. Cortelyou, 
who had been Secretary to the President, was appointed 
two days later. 



CHAPTER XXII 

FOR PRESIDENT IN 1904r— FUTILE OPPOSITION— HIS 
OWN ATTITUDE 

The Republican State conventions of 1902 had quite gen- 
erally commended Roosevelt as the party's candidate for 
the Presidency in 1904, and it became evident early in 1903 
that he was so clearly the first choice of his party that 
his nomination was a foregone conclusion. Only one very 
short-lived effort was made to prevent it. 

It was while the President was in the Far West in May, 
1903, that the first surface indication of this effort, whicn 
originated in Wall Street, made its appearance. All the 
Republican State conventions that had been held had 
adopted resolutions declaring in favor of his nomination 
in 1904. The Ohio convention was to meet on June 3, 1903. 
A week or more before that date two prominent Ohio Re- 
publican leaders. Senator Foraker and Congressman Gros- 
venor, had said in published interviews that the convention 
would endorse Roosevelt. Senator Hanna, whose relations 
with the New York opponents of Roosevelt were known to 
be intimate, and who had been spoken of in the press as 
their candidate for the Presidential nomination, declared in 
an interview that he was opposed to the endorsement of 
Roosevelt because the convention of 1903 had no right to 
assume the responsibilities of the convention of 1904, whose 
delegates would be chosen for the express purpose of choos- 
ing delegates to the National Convention, and that there 
was no precedent for such action except in the case of a 
** favorite son." As soon as the interview was published 
he sent this telegram to President Roosevelt: 

243 



244 THEODORE ROOSEVELT AND HIS TIME 

Cleveland, Ohio, May 23, 1903. 
The President, 

Seattle, Wash. 
The issue which has been forced upon me in the matter 
of our State Convention this year endorsing you for the 
Eepublican nomination next year has come in a way which 
makes it necessary for me to oppose such a resolution. 
When you know all the facts I am sure you will approve 
my course. 

M. A. Hanna. 

To this telegram the President replied as follows: 

Seattle, Wash., May 25, 1903 
Eon. M. A. Hanna, 

Cleveland, Ohio. 
Your telegram received. I have not asked any man for 
his support. I have had nothing whatever to do with rais- 
ing this issue. Inasmuch as it has been raised of course 
those who favor my administration and my nomination will 
favor endorsing both and those who do not will oppose. 

Theodore Roosevelt. 

Senator Hanna had no difficulty in comprehending what 
this message meant, and he responded immediately as fol- 
lows: 

Cleveland, Ohio, May 26, 1903. 
The President: 

Your telegram of the 25th. In view of the sentiment ex- 
pressed I shall not oppose the endorsement of your admin- 
istration and candidacy by our State Convention. I have 
given the substance of this to the Associated Press. 

M. A. Hanna. 

Writing confidentially to Senator Lodge, on May 27, 1903, 
the President thus explains his reasons for the action he 
took: 

''After the receipt of the first telegram I thought over the 



FOR PRESIDENT IN 1904— FUTILE OPPOSITION 245 

matter a full twenty-four hours, consulting with Mellen, 
Byrnes and Moody and decided that the time had come to 
stop shilly-shallying, and let Hanna know definitely that I 
did not intend to assume the position, at least passively, 
of a suppliant to whom he might give the nomination as a 
boon. I accordingly sent him my answer, and as you doubt- 
less saw, made a similar statement for the public press, 
of course not alluding to the fact that Hanna had sent me 
the telegram, my statement simply going as one made nec- 
essary by Hanna 's long interview in which he announced 
that he would oppose my endorsement by the Ohio Con- 
vention. I rather expected Hanna to fight, but made up 
my mind that it was better to have a fight in the open at 
once than to run the risk of being knifed secretly. Mellen 
and also Loeb were confident that he would not fight. The 
result proved that they were right, as his last telegram 
shows. 

'*I am pleased at the outcome as it simplifies things all 
I around, for in my judgment Hanna was my only formidable 
I opponent so far as the nomination is concerned." 

The accuracy of the President's prediction was verified 
by subsequent events. All opposition to his nomination dis- 
appeared the moment that his reply to Hanna was known. 
As casting full light upon the incident, the following cor- 
respondence between the President and Senator Hanna is 
appended : 

SENATOR HANNA 'S LETTER 

Cleveland, Ohio, May 25, 1903. 
' * I wired you Saturday about the question which is com- 
ing up before our State Convention in regard to a resolu- 
tion endorsing your candidacy. I was not consulted and 
heard nothing about it until Grosvenor's and Foraker's 
interviews came out in the papers. When asked about it I 
at once expressed my disapproval for the following rea- 
sons — that this State Convention had no right to assume 
the responsibilities of the Convention of 1904, whose dele- 



246 THEODORE ROOSEVELT AND HIS TIME 

gates would be chosen for the express purpose of choosing 
delegates to the National Convention; that it is without 
precedent in our State (except in regard to a favorite 
son); that it places me in an embarrassing position as 
Chairman of the National Committee; and last but not 
least it is meant to be unfriendly toward me. You know 
the past history of several things of kindred nature so I 
will not dwell on the motives which are the real incentive 
to this action, only that I shall oppose the resolution and 
you may feel sure without anything but the best of motives 
and in what I consider your best interests. I am hearing 
from all over the country and where the source is most 
worthy of consideration. There is but one opinion that this 
is an attempt to put me in a false position and to your 
injury. 

"I almost committed an 'impulsive' act myself by stating 
in my interview to the Associated Press (copy enclosed) 
that I felt sure you would not approve— (under the circum- 
stances). It is not necessary to hesitate between good and 
bad judgment when the motives are known. I spent a few 
days in New York last week and remembered your sugges- 
tion to me. There is need of missionary work there. But 
with this embarrassment thrust upon me will make me a 
useless article. Our convention comes the 2nd and 3rd of 
June, and promises to be a hot time." 

THE president's REPLY 

^ Ogden, Utah, May 29, 1903. 

I thank you for your letter, which gave me the first 
gleam of light on the situation. I do not think you appre- 
ciated the exact effect that your interview and announced 
position had in the country at large. It was everywhere 
accepted as the first open attack upon me, and it gave heart, 
curiously enough, not only to my opponents, but to all the 
curious men who lumped you and me together as improp- 
erly friendly to organized labor and to the workingmen 
generally. The mischievous effect was instantly visible 



FOR PRESIDENT IN 1904— FUTILE OPPOSITION 247 

The general belief was that this was not your move, save 
indirectly ; that it was really an attack by the so-called Wall 
Street forces on me, to which you had been led to give a 
reluctant acquiescence. I might not have said anything 
for publication at all had it not been for the statement that 
I approved your course. In the way the movement was 
interpreted this looked as if I was approving having my 
throat slit. My view was that you of course had an abso- 
lute right to be a candidate yourself, but that if you were 
not one you would be doing me and the Republican party 
serious harm by fighting and very probably beating the 
proposition to endorse me by the Ohio Convention. 

** After thinking the matter carefully over I became sure 
that I had to take a definite stand myself. I hated to do it 
because you have sho-svn such broad generosity and straight- 
forwardness in all your dealings with me that it was pe- 
culiarly painful to me to be put, even temporarily, in a 
position of seeming antagonism to you. No one but a really 
big man — a man above all petty considerations — could have 
treated me as you have treated me during the year and a 
half since President McKinley's death. I have consulted 
you and relied on your judgment more than has been the 
case with any other man." 

The fact that he was on the verge of a campaign for his 
own election to the Presidency, did not prevent Roosevelt 
from taking action which might harm him politically and 
possibly cause his defeat at the polls. All appeals to him 
to lower his standard of appointments in the interest of his 
own nomination and election were rejected with vigor and 
finality. To a member of the National Republican Com- 
mittee who was especially interested in the election of del- 
egates from the South to the National Convention, he wrote 
on March 13, 1903 : 

*'The most damaging thing to me any one can do is to 
give the impression that in what I have been trying to do 
for the negro I have been actuated by political motives. 
That is why I have been so insistent that neither you nor 



248 THEODORE ROOSEVELT AND HIS TIME 

any one else shall take any step to secure a negro or any 
other delegation from the South. I do not want the nomina- 
tion unless it comes freely from the people of the Republi- 
can States, because they believe in me, and because they 
believe I can carry their States. And in the South I want 
to make it as clear as a bell that I have acted in the way 
I have on the negro question simply because I hold myself 
the heir of the policies of Abraham Lincoln and would be 
incapable of abandoning them to serve political or per- 
sonal ends." 

To the Governor of a leading Northern State he wrote 
on March 23, 1903 ; 

''I do not quite understand the serious tone in which 
you speak of the possibility of my appointments returning 
to cause trouble in the future. Do you mean as regards 
my nomination as President? I have followed your advice 
and given no thought whatever to that, agreeing with what 
you said, that the way for me to do was to make a first- 
class President and let the nomination take care of itself." 

A notable incident had arisen in Oregon. There had been 
a good deal of fraud and lax work in certain land offices 
in that State, and the President had informed the two 
United States Senators from Oregon that he would not re- 
appoint a certain land official but would appoint in his place 
any fit man whom they might name. The two Senators de- 
clined to select a successor, believing that by so doing the 
President would permit the incumbent to remain in office. 
On August 25, 1903, the President considerably astonished 
the two Senators by sending to each of them a letter in 
which he said: 

'*! cannot permit the incumbent to retain his position 
because there is a deadlock about his successor. He will 
be removed at once. In appointing his successor, and in 
appointing all other officers to these places, I must keep 
in mind that it is I who am primarily responsible for the 
appointment, not the Senators. If I appoint a man who is 



FOR PRESIDENT IN 1904— FUTILE OPPOSITION 249 

unfit, then of course you must refuse to confirm him; and 
as a matter of fact, if you will give me a man of whom I 
can approve, I will gladly appoint him. There is no one of 
whom I am personally desirous of putting in any of these 
positions. But I do not merely desire, but am firmly de- 
termined to have, a thoroughly good type of man in the 
position; and I cannot surrender to any one the right to 
decide for me whether or not I believe the man to be a 
good one. I cannot permit any one to say to me that such 
and such a man shall be appointed and no one else ; nor if I 
believe a man to be unfit can I accept any one else's judg- 
ment that he is fit. In return, I have of course no right to 
insist that the Senate shall accept my judgment as to a 
man's fitness. They can reject any nominee of mine; and 
if they do so I will try to find some thoroughly good man 
whom they will accept. ' ' 

The President also informed the Senators that, in de- 
fault of their naming a successor he had chosen a man whom 
he hoped they would accept. Furthermore, as additional 
information concerning his attitude on land office affairs, 
he said it was reported to him that two other positions in 
the service were in a disgraceful condition, and added: 
"The incumbents must be removed forthwith. Will yoij 
kindly join with your colleague in recommending to me 
at once first-class men to put in their places? All I ask is 
that these men shall be first-class in every way?" 

This open warfare upon the two Senators, an unprece- 
dented proceeding a few months in advance of a campaign, 
did not prevent the State of Oregon from giving its elec- 
toral vote to Roosevelt in the election of the following year. 
Subsequently, Roosevelt's relentless pursuit of the land 
office thieves resulted in sending one of the Senators to the 
penitentiary. 

Another incident of like character occurred in September, 
1903. On May 18 of that year William A. Miller, Assistant 
Foreman of the Government Printing Office, was removed 
from his position by the Public Printer, the reason given 
for removal being that Miller had been expelled from a 



250 THEODORE ROOSEVELT AND HIS TIME 

labor union. Miller filed a complaint with tlie Civil Ser- 
vice Commission, alleging that his removal was in violation 
of the Civil Service Law. The Commission investigated the 
case and decided that his removal was a violation of the 
law and requested his reassignment to his position. Pres- 
ident Roosevelt ordered the Public Printer to reinstate 
Miller, saying in his letter to him: ''There is no objection 
to the employees of the Government Printing Office consti- 
tuting themselves into a union if they so desire; but no 
rules or resolutions of that union can be permitted to over- 
ride the laws of the United States which it is my sworn 
duty to enforce." 

The Washington Central Labor Bureau took up the case 
on the side of the union and, with the approval of the 
American Federation of Labor, sent circulars to more than 
500 central labor unions throughout the United States, 
claiming a membership of two and a half millions of work- 
ingmen, in which was embodied the following: 

"Whereas, The President of the United States has seen 
fit to reinstate W. A. Miller, who is an expelled member of a 
trades organization, notwithstanding the overwhelming ev- 
idence of his moral turpitude, and has also committed him- 
self to the policy of the open shop, as shown by his let- 
ters, 

"Resolved, That the order of the President cannot be re- 
garded in any but an unfriendly light." 

The President, in pursuance of a request by Samuel Gom- 
pers. President of the American Federation of Labor, 
granted an interview on September 29, 1903, to the mem- 
bers of the executive council of that body, during which the 
Miller case was brought up for consideration. The Presi- 
dent made a statement in which he said: 

"As regards the Miller case, I have little to add to what 
I have already said. In dealing with it, I ask you to re- 
member that I am dealing purely with the relation of the 
Government to its employees. I must govern my action 
by the laws of the land, which I am sworn to administer, 



FOR PRESIDENT IN 1904— FUTILE OPPOSITION 251 

and which differentiate any case in which the Government 
of the United States is a party from all other cases what- 
soever. These laws are enacted for the benefit of the whole 
people and cannot and must not be construed as permitting 
discrimination against some of the people. I am President 
of all the people of the United States, without regard to 
creed, color, birthplace, occupation, or social conditions. 
My aim is to do equal and exact justice as among them all. 
In the emplojTuent and dismissal of men in the Government 
service I can no more recognize the fact that a man does or 
does not belong to a union as being for or against him than 
I can recognize the fact that he is a Protestant or a Catho- 
lic, a Jew or a Gentile, as being for or against him. This is 
the only question now before me for decision; and as to 
this my decision is final." 

Writing to his friend, L. Clarke Davis, of the Phila- 
delphia Public Ledger, on September 21, 1903, a few days 
before the interview with the labor union representatives, 
he said: 

*'It is a sheer waste of time for these people, through 
such resolutions as those of the unions yon quote, to 
threaten me with defeat for the Presidency next year. 
Nothing would hire me even to accept the Presidency if I 
had to take it on terms which would mean a forfeiting of 
self-respect. Just as I should refuse to accept it at the cost 
of abandoning the Northern Securities suit, or of repealing 
the trust regulatory legislation of last year, or of undoing 
what I did in the anthracite coal strike, so I should refuse 
to take it at the cost of undoing what I did in this matter 
of Miller and the Labor Union. The labor unions and the 
trust magnates may perhaps unite against me. If so, I 
shall do my level best to make the fight an open one and 
beat them— and I think I run a good chance of winning; and 
if I fail, I shall not regret the policy I have pursued." 

In a letter to Baron d'Estournelles de Constant, in France, 
on September 1, 1903, the President gave a fuller outline of 
his attitude toward an election to the Presidency: 



252 THEODORE ROOSEVELT AND HIS TIME 

"Of course I should like to be reelected President, and 
I shall be disappointed, although not very greatly disap- 
pointed, if I am not ; and so far as I legitimately can I pay 
heed to considerations of political expediency — in fact I 
should be unfit for my position, or for any position of po- 
litical leadership, if I did not do so. But when questions 
involve deep and far-reaching principles, then I believe 
that the real expediency is to be found in straightforward 
and unflinching adherence to principle, and this without 
regard to what may be the temporary effect. When the 
matter is one of elementary justice and decency, then there 
can be no compromise. Murder is murder, and theft is 
theft, and there should be no halfway measure with crimi- 
nality. There are good and bad men of all nationalities, 
creeds and colors; and if this world of ours is ever to be- 
come what we hope some day it may become, it must be by 
the general recognition that the man's heart and soul, the 
man's worth and action, determine his standing. I should 
be sorry to lose the Presidency, but I should be a hundred- 
fold more sorry to gain it by failing in every way in my 
power to try to put a stop to lynching and to brutality and 
wrong of any kind ; or by failing on the one hand to make 
the very wealthiest and most powerful men in the country 
obey the law and handle their property (so far as it is in 
my power to make them) in the public interest; or, on the 
other hand, to fail to make the laboring men in their turn 
obey the law, and realize that envy is as evil a thing as ar- 
rogance, and that crimes of violence and riot shall be as 
sternly punished as crimes of greed and cunning." 

For several months an investigation had been in progress, 
in 1903, in the Post Ofifice Department in regard to frauds 
of various kinds which had been committed during the 
McKinley administration. President Roosevelt ordered a 
vigorous and unrelenting inquiry, and appointed special 
counsel, in the person of two lawyers of high character and 
standing, to take charge of it. Writing from Oyster Bay, 



FOR PRESIDENT IN 1904— FUTILE OPPOSITION 253 

on September 4, 1903, to the Postmaster General, Henry C. 
Payne, he said: 

**I would far rather incur the hostility of a Congressman 
or a Senator than do something we ought, not to do. The 
Post Office Department is now under fire and there is much 
baseless distrust of it in the popular mind. Really, you 
and I are not responsible for the misconduct. It happened 
before either of us came into office; but as long as this 
feeling exists we can a hundredfold better afford to incur 
the hostility of any politician than to give the slightest 
ground for belief that we are managing the Department 
primarily as a political machine. If the real or fancied need 
of any politician comes in conflict with what you regard as 
the good of the service or as equity to any individuals, 
disregard that politician utterly and if he complains send 
him to me. I shall take up any such case myself." 

In many letters written at this time he expressed him- 
self frankly concerning his political prospects, sounding in 
all the same note of inflexible devotion to his guiding prin- 
ciples of official conduct. 

To W. W. Sewell, in Maine, he wrote on September 23, 
1903: 

''Sometimes I feel a little melancholy because it is so 
hard to persuade people to accept equal justice. The very 
rich corporation people are sore and angry because I re- 
fuse to allow a case like that of the Northern Securities 
Company to go unchallenged by the law; and in the same 
way the turbulent and extreme labor union people are sore 
and angry because I insist that every man, whether he be- 
long to a labor union or not, shall be given a square deal 
in Government employment. Now, I believe in rich people 
who act squarely, and in labor unions which are managed 
with wisdom and justice; but when either employee or 
employer, laboring man or capitalist, goes wrong, I have to 
cinch him, and that is all there is to it. ' ' 

To his sister, Mrs. Douglas Robinson, he wrote from 
Oyster Bay on September 23, 1903 : 



254 THEODORE ROOSEVELT AND HIS TIME 

**Next Monday I go back to Washington. And for the 
thirteen months following there will be mighty little let up 
to the strain. But I enjoy it to the full. What the outcome 
will be, so far as I am personally concerned, I do not know. 
It looks as if I will be nominated. Whether I shall be re- 
elected, I have not the slightest idea. I know there is bitter 
opposition to me from many different sources. Whether I 
shall have enough support to overcome this opposition, I 
cannot tell. I suppose few Presidents can form the slightest 
idea whether their policies have met with approval or not — 
certainly I cannot. But as far as I can see those policies 
have been right, and I hope that time will justify them. If 
it does not, why, I must abide the fall of the dice, and that 
ig all there is about it." 

One phase of his pursuit of persons involved in the frauds 
of the Post Office Department is described in a letter to Sen- 
ator Lodge, under date of September 30, 1903 : 

"I had a very ugly time over the indictment of a State 
Senator of New York. He is a close personal, political and 
business friend of the Eepublican State Chairman, and of 
the State Comptroller. The Chainnan is a hea\y stock- 
holder in the concern on behalf of w^hich the crookedness 
was done, and he is very naturally bitter against me. 
Wliether he himself was cognizant of the wrong-doing or 
not, I cannot say. It is greatly to be regretted that he is 
Chairman of the State Committee. The Comptroller came 
dowTi to see me to explain that if the Senator were indicted 
it w^as his judgment that we should certainly lose the State 
next fall. I was as polite as possible, answering that of 
course I was more interested in carrying the State than 
any one else was, but that in the first place I should cer- 
tainly not let up on any grafter, no matter what the politi- 
cal effect might be ; and that in the second place, my judg- 
ment w^as that whereas we might lose the State if we did 
make it evident that we intended to prosecute every guilty 
man, we should certainly lose it if we did not." 



FOR PRESIDENT IN 1904— FUTILE OPPOSITION 255 

One of the most characteristic of all the letters written at 
this time was the following to L. Clarke Davis, of Phila- 
delphia : 

' ' There is one small point that I should like to speak to 
you about. The other day in a very kindly editorial you 
spoke of me as saying that I would do anything in the 
world not dishonorable or improper or in violation of my 
conscience to be reelected as President. I forget the exact 
word, but this was the sense. It seems to me that this is 
calculated to convey a somewhat wrong impression of what 
I said. I do not believe in playing the hypocrite. Any 
strong man fit to be President would desire a renomination 
and reelection after his first term. Lincoln was President 
in so great a crisis that perhaps he neither could nor did 
feel any personal interest in his own reelection. I trust 
and believe that if the crisis were a serious one I should be 
incapable of considering my own well-being for a moment in 
such a contingency. I should like to be elected President 
just precisely as John Quincy Adams, or McKinley, or 
Cleveland, or John Adams, or "Washington himself, desired 
to be elected. It is pleasant tp think that one 's countrymen 
thought well of one. But I shall not do anything whatever 
to secure my nomination or election save to try to carry on 
the public business in such shape that decent citizens will 
believe I have shown wisdom, integrity and courage. If 
they believe this with sufficient emphasis to secure my nom- 
ination and election — and on no other terms can I, or would 
I, be willing to secure either — why I shall be glad. If they 
do not I shall be sorry, but I shall not be very much cast 
down because I shall feel that I have done the best that was 
in me, and that there is nothing I have yet done of which 
I have cause to be ashamed, or which I have cause to re- 
gret ; and that I can go out of office with the profound sat- 
isfaction of having accomplished a certain amount of work 
that w^as both beneficial and honorable for the country." 



CHAPTER XXIII 

NOTABLE SENTIMENTS IN SPEECHEb AND LETTERS— J 
ALASKA BOUNDARY— WIDE RANGE OF READING 

During 1903 the President made several speeches on oc-- 
casions of special moment, in which he uttered sentiments s 
which attracted wide approval, and are as self-revelatory 
as his letters. Speaking at the grave of Lincoln, Spring- - 
field, Illinois, on June 4, he said : 

"It seems to me eminently fitting that the guard around 
the tomb of Lincoln should be composed of colored soldiers. 
It was my own good fortune at Santiago to serve beside 
colored troops. A man who is good enough to shed his^ 
blood for his country is good enough to get a square deal 
afterwards. More than that no man is entitled to, and lesS' 
than that no man shall have." 

This declaration called forth the publication of a letterr 
from Lincoln which was said to have been written in 1864, 
to General James S. Wadsworth, of New York, and which 
contained the following passage: 

"How to better the condition of the colored race has longi 
been a study which has attracted my serious and carefull 
attention ; hence I think I am clear and decided as to whatl 
course I shall pursue in the premises, regarding it as a re- 
ligious duty, as the nation's guardian of these people who 
have so heroically vindicated their manhood on the battle- 
field, where, in assisting to save the life of the Republic, 
they have demonstrated their right to the ballot, which is 
but the humane protection of the Flag they have so fear- 
lessly defended." 

In a speech on Labor Day, September 7, 1903, at Syra- 
cuse, N. Y., the President said: 

256 



NOTABLE SENTIMENTS IN SPEECHES AND LETTERS 257 

''There is no worse enemy of the wage-worker than the 
man who condones moh violence in any shape or who 
preaches class hatred; and surely the slightest acquaint- 
ance with our industrial history should teach even the most 
short-sighted that the times of most suffering for our people 
.as a whole, the times when business is stagnant, and capital 
suffers from shrinkage and gets no return from its invest- 
ments, are exactly the times of hardship, and want, and 
grim disaster among the poor. If all the existing instru- 
mentalities of wealth could be abolished, the first and se- 
verest suffering would come among those of us who are 
least well off at present. The wage-worker is well off 
only when the rest of the country is well off; and he can 
best contribute to this general well-being by showing san- 
ity and a firm purpose to do justice to others." 

Speaking at the unveiling of a statue of General W. T. 
Sherman, in Washington, on October 15, 1903, he said: 

''The greatest leaders, whether in war or in peace, must 
of course show a peculiar quality of genius; but the most 
redoubtable armies that have ever existed have been re- 
doubtable because the average soldier, the average officer, 
possessed to a high degree such comparatively simple qual- 
ities as loyalty, courage, and hardihood. And so the most 
successful governments are those in which the average pub- 
lic servant possesses that variant of loyalty which we call 
patriotism, together with common sense and honesty. We 
can as little afford to tolerate a dishonest man in the public 
service as a coward in the army. The murderer takes a 
single life ; the corruptionist in public life, whether he be 
bribe-giver or bribe-taker, strikes at the heart of the com- 
monwealth. ' ' 

On November 10, 1903, the President convened Congress 
in advance of its regular date of meeting in order that it 
might consider the legislation necessary to put into opera- 
tion the commercial treaty with Cuba which had been rati- 
fied at the previous session. This legislation was passed 



258 THEODORE ROOSEVELT AND HIS TIME 

subsequently by both houses of Congress. In his message 
at the opening of the regular session, dated December 7, 
1903, he took occasion to reassert, without modification, his 
policy in regard to the Tegulation of trusts and the en- 
forcement of law with equal justice to all : 

''The legislation (in regard to trusts) was moderate. It 
was characterized throughout by the idea that we were not 
attacking corporations, but endeavoring to provide for 
doing away with any evil in them; that we drew the line 
against misconduct, not against wealth; gladly recognizing 
the great good done by the capitalist who alone, or in con- 
junction with his fellows, does his work along proper and I 
legitimate lines. 

' ' Every man must be guaranteed his liberty and his right 
to do as he likes with his property or his labor, so long as 
he does not infringe the rights of others. No man is above 
the law and no man is below it; nor do we ask any man's 
permission when we require him to obey it. Obedience toi 
the law is demanded as a right; not asked as a favor." 

One of the problems that Roosevelt inherited from the 
McKinley administration was the Alaska boundaiy dis- 
pute between the United States and Canada. An effort 
to settle it through a Joint High Commission had failed, 
and in the last days of the McKinley administration a pro- 
posal was made by the British Government that the matter' 
be submitted to arbitration. This was under discussion 
when Roosevelt acceded to the Presidency. He at once 
took control of the question, flatly declined arbitration, and 
secured in January, 1903, through the British Minister at 
Washington the negotiation of a treaty with Great Britain 
which provided for a mixed tribunal of six members, three 
Americans and three representatives of Great Britain, to 
consider the matter. The American members of the tri- 
bunal were Senator H. C. Lodge, Elihu Root, Secretary of 
War, and George Turner, formerly U. S. Senator from the 
State of Washington. The British members were Lord 
Alverston, Lord Chief Justice of England, and Sir L. A. 



NOTABLE SENTIMENTS IN SPEECHES AND LETTERS 259 

Jette and A. B. Aylesworth of Canada. Roosevelt's atti- 
tude toward this tribunal and its possible outcome was 
frankly set forth in a letter that he wrote to Justice Oliver 
Wendell Holmes, who at the time was in England and had 
sent to Roosevelt an account of a conversation that he had 
had on the subject with the Rt. Hon. Joseph Chamberlain 
of the British Cabinet. As Roosevelt's letter is of histori- 
cal value in showing the direct methods which he habitually 
employed in diplomatic matters, it is here reproduced in 
full: 

Personal. 

Oyster Bay, N. Y., 
July 25, 190? 
My dear Judge Holmes: 

I thank you very much for your letter, which I thorough- 
ly enjoyed. There is one point on which I think I ought to 
give you full information, in view of Chamberlain's remark 
to you. This is about the Alaska boundary matter, and if 
you happen to meet Chamberlain again you are entirely at 
liberty to tell him what I say, although of course it must 
be privately and unofficially. Nothing but my very earnest 
desire to get on well with England and my reluctance to 
come to a break made me consent to this appointment of a 
Joint Commission in this case ; for I regard the attitude of 
Canada, which England has backed, as having the scantest 
possible warrant in justice. However, there were but two 
alternatives. Either I could appoint a commission and 
give a chance for agreement; or I could do as I shall of 
course do in case this commission fails, and request Con- 
gress to make an appropriation which will enable me to 
run the boundary on my own hook. As regards most of 
Great Britain's claim, there is not, in my judgment, enough 
to warrant so much as a consideration by the United States ; 
and if it were not that there are two or three lesser points 
on which there is doubt, I could not, even for the object I 
have mentioned, have consented to appoint a commission. 
The claim of the Canadians for access to deep water along 
any part of the Canadian coast is just exactly as inde- 



260 THEODORE ROOSEVELT AND HIS TIME 

fensible as if they should now suddenly claim the island of 
Nantucket. There is not a man j5t to go on the conunission 
in all the United States who would treat this claim any 
more respectfully than he would treat a claim to Nantucket. 
In the same way the preposterous claim once advanced, but 
I think now abandoned by the Canadians, that the Portland 
Chaimel was not the Portland Channel but something else 
unknown, is no more worth discussing than the claim that 
the 49th Parallel meant the 50th Parallel or else the 48th. 
But there are points which the commission can genuinely 
consider. There is room for argument about the islands 
in the mouth of the Portland Channel. I think on this the 
American case much the stronger of the two ; still, the Brit- 
ish have a case. Again, it may well be that there are places 
in which there is room for doubt as to whether there ac- 
tually is a chain of mountains parallel to the coast within 
the ten-league limit. Here again there is a chance for 
honest ditference and honest final agreement. I believ^e 
that no three men in the United States could be found who 
would be more anxious than our own delegates to do jus- 
tice to the British claim on all points where there is even a 
color of right on the British side. But the objection raised 
by certain Canadian authorities to Lodge, Root and Turner, 
and especially to Lodge and Root, was that they had com- 
mitted themselves on the general proposition. No man in 
public life in any position of prominence could have pos- 
sibly avoided committing himself on the proposition, any 
more than Mr. Chamberlain could avoid committing him- 
self on the question of the ownership of the Orkneys if some 
Scandinavian country suddenly claimed them. If this claim 
embodied other points as to w^hich there was legitimate 
doubt, I believe Mr. Chamberlain would act fairly and 
squarely in deciding the matter ; but if he appointed a com- 
mission to settle up all those questions, I certainly should 
not expect liim to appoint three men, if he could find them, 
who believed that as to the Orkneys the question was an 
open one. Similarly I wish to repeat that no three men fit 
for the position could be found in all the United States who 



NOTABLE SENTIMENTS IN SPEECHES AND LETTERS 261 

would not already have come to some conclusion as to cer- 
tain features of the Canadian claim — not as to all of them. 

Let me add that I earnestly hope that the English under- 
stand my purpose. I wish to make one last effort to bring 
about an agreement through the commission, which will 
enable the people of both countries to say that the result 
represents the feeling of the representatives of both coun- 
tries. But if there is a disagreement I wish it distinctly 
understood, not only that there will be no arbitration of the 
matter, but that in my message to Congress I shall take a 
position which will prevent any possibility of arbitration 
hereafter ; a position, I am inclined to believe, which will 
render it necessary for Congress to give me the authority 
to run the line as we claim it, by our o^vn people, without 
any further regard to the attitude of England and Canada. 
If I paid attention to mere abstract right, that is the posi- 
tion I ought to take anyhow. I have not taken it because 
I wish to exhaust ever^' effort to have the affair settled 
peacefully and with due regard to England's dignity. 

Faithfully yours, 

Theodobe Roosevelt. 

Hon. 0. AV. Holmes, 

Care J. S. Morgan & Co., 
London, England. 

It was knowni at the time that Roosevelt had sent troops 
to Alaska, and though the primary object in sending them 
was to maintain law and order among the great horde of 
gold-seekers in the Klondike, still it was believed that he 
would not hesitate to use them in support of his resolve to 
ask Congress for the power to *'run the line as we claim 
it" in case the tribunal failed to reach an agreement. The 
tribunal met in London and reached an agreement on Octo- 
ber 20, 1903. In his message to Congress on December 3, 
following, Roosevelt said of the settlement: 

"The result is satisfactory^ in every way. It is of great 
material advantage to our people in the Far Northwest. 
It has removed from the field of discussion and possible 



262 THEODORE ROOSEVELT AND HIS TIME 

danger a question liable to become more acutely accen- 
tuated with each passing year. Finally, it has furnished I 
signal proof of the fairness and good-will with which twoi 
friendly nations can approach and determine issues involv-- 
ing national sovereignty to a third power for adiudica-- 
tion.'» 

Another notable diplomatic triumph of the year was also 
recorded in the same message : 

''Early in July, having received intelligence, which hap- 
pily turned out to be erroneous, of the assassination of our 
vice-consul at Beirut, I despatched a small squadron to 
that port for such service as might be found necessary on 
arrival. Although the attempt on the life of our vice-consul 
had not been successful, yet the outrage was symptomatic 
of a state of excitement and disorder which demanded im- 
mediate attention. The arrival of the vessels had the hap- 
piest result. A feeling of security at once took the place 
of the former alarm and disquiet; our officers were cor- 
dially welcomed by the Consular body and the leading mer- 
chants, and ordinary business resumed its activity. The 
government of the Sultan gave a considerate hearing to 
the representations of our minister; the official who was 
regarded as responsible for the disturbed condition of af- 
fairs was removed. Our relations with the Turkish Gov- 
ernment remain friendly; our claims founded on inequit- 
able treatment of some of our schools and missions appear 
to be in process of amicable adjustment." 

The cordial and mutually helpful relations that existed 
between the President and members of his Cabinet are re- 
vealed in correspondence which passed between him and 
them at various times. On July 11, 1903, he wrote from 
Oyster Bay, to Secretary Hay, who was in Washington : 

''By this time it is absolutely needless for me to tell you 
not merely what an immense help you are to me, but what 
a perpetual delight and comfort. Of course, do not ever 
give a thought to the newspaper and other swine who de- 



NOTABLE SENTIMENTS IN SPEECHES AND LETTERS 263 

light to invent tales about our relation. Literally I never 
see them. When I came in I thought you a great Secre- 
tary of State, but now I have had a chance to know far 
more fully what a really great Secretary of State you are. 
As for those who first of all portray a wholly imaginary 
difference between us and then attack me because of that 
difference — for Heaven's sake, let them go on!" 

To this Secretary Hay responded on July 13, 1903 : 

**Dear Theodore: 

'*! thank you a thousand times for your kind and gen- 
erous letter of the 11th. It is a comfort to work for a 
President who besides being a lot of other things, happened 
to be born a gentleman. 



>) 



A letter to Secretary Hay on November 7, 1903, shows 
how careful Roosevelt was not to offend the susceptibilities 
of Congress in reference to its prerogatives concerning the 
conduct of foreign affairs : 

''Uncle Joe Cannon was in this afternoon and was very 
nice indeed, but evidently slightly nervous lest the preroga- 
tives of Congress in foreign affairs should be overlooked 
by us. I told him I should ask you to keep in close touch 
with Congressman Hitt (Chairman of the Committee on 
Foreign Relations) and consult with him on any point 
where there would be a chance of Congress feeling that it 
had power of action. Will you mind getting in touch with 
Hitt and advising with him on any point where such a pos- 
sibility could arise? I find that Congress is evidently pre- 
pared to be a little sensitive on the subject, and we might 
as well forestall possible criticism." 

To Secretary Root, who resigned the war portfolio, his 
resignation taking effect in February, 1904, when he was 
succeeded by William H. Taft, the President wrote on 
August 24, 1903 : 

**It is hard indeed for me to accept your resignation ; and 



264 HEODORE ROOSEVELT AND HIS TIME 

I do so not only with keen personal regret, but with a lively- 
understanding of the gap your withdrawal will create in 
public life. My sense of personal loss is very great; and 
yet my sense of the loss to the Nation as a whole is even 
greater. You have been over four years Secretary of War. 
I wonder if you yourself realize how much you have ac- 
complished during that period. If you will turn to your 
first reports and will read therein the recommendations 
you made in order that the army might be put on an effec- 
tive basis, you cannot but be pleased at the way in which 
these recommendations have now been adopted by Con- 
gress as well as by the administration, and have become 
enacted into law or crystallized into custom. We have 
never had a public servant of the government who has 
worked harder than you have worked during these four 
years and a half, and this not merely in point of time, but 
above all in point of intensity; and your success has been 
equal to your labor. The only reward you have had, or 
can have, is the knowledge of successful achievement, of the 
performance in fullest fashion of a great public duty, the 
doing of which was of vital importance to the nation's 
welfare. 

"Your duties have included more than merely the admin- 
istration of the Department and the reorganization of the 
army on an effective basis. You have also been the head 
of the Department which dealt with the vast and delicate 
problems involved in our possession of the Philippine 
Islands, and your success in dealing with this part of your 
work had been as signal as your success in dealing with the 
purely military problem. To very few statesmen indeed 
in any country is it given at one and the same time to 
achieve signal and striking triumph in the administration 
and reform of the military branch of the government and 
in the administration of what was in effect a department 
of insular dependencies, where the problems were new to 
our people and were in themselves of great difficulty. 

"Moreover, aside from your work in these two divisions 
of the government service, I appreciate most keenly the 



NOTABLE SENTIMENTS IN SPEECHES AND LETTERS 265 

invaluable advice and assistance you have rendered me in 
innumerable matters of weight not coming directly in your 
departmental province, but in which I sought your aid wdth 
the certainty of not being disappointed. Your position on 
the Alaska Boundary Commission at the present moment 
is an illustration of these services. 

'•May all good fortune attend you wherever you are; 
the American people wish you well and appreciate to the 
full the debt due you for all that you have done on their 
behalf." 

Incessant and exacting as were the official activities of 
the President during the first two years of his service, he 
still was able to find time for a really extraordinary amount 
of miscellaneous reading as the following letter, under date 
of November 4, 1903, to Dr. Nicholas Murray Butler, Presi- 
dent of Columbia University, shows: 

*'You remember speaking to me about reading and espe- 
cially about the kind of books one ought to read. On my 
way back from Oyster Bay on election day I tried to jot 
down the books I have been reading for the past two years, 
and they run as follows. Of course, I have forgotten a 
great many, especially ephemeral novels which I have hap- 
pened to take up ; and I have also read much in the maga- 
zines. Moreover, more than half of the books are books 
which I have read before. These I did not read through, 
but simply took out the parts I liked. Thus, in ' Waverley,' 
I omitted all the opening part; in 'Pickwick' I skipped 
about ; going through all my favorite scenes. In Macaulay 
I read simply the essays that appealed to me, while in Keats 
and Browning, although I read again and again many of the 
poems, I think there must be at least eighty or ninety per 
cent of the poetry of each, as far as the bulk is concerned, 
which I have never succeeded in reading at all. The old 
books I read were not necessarily my favorites; it was 
largely a matter of chance. All the reading, of course, was 
purely for enjoyment, and of most desultory character. 
With this preliminary explanation, here goes! 



266 THEODORE ROOSEVELT AND HIS TIME 

''Parts of Herodotus; the first and seventh books of 
Thucydides ; all of Polybius ; a little of Plutarch ; ^schy- 
lus's 'Orestean Trilogy/ and the 'Seven against Thebes'; 
Euripides' 'Hippolytus and Bacchae,' and Aristophanes' 
'Frogs'; parts of the 'Politics' of Aristotle; (all of these 
were in translation); Kidgeway's 'Early Age of Greece'; 
Wheeler's 'Life of Alexander'; some six volumes of Ma- 
haffey's 'Studies of the Greek World'— of which I only 
read chapters here and there; two of Maspero's volumes 
on the Early Syrian, Chaldean and Egyptian civilizations — 
these I read superficially; several chapters of Froissart; 
the 'Memoirs' of Marbot; Bain's 'Life of Charles the 
Twelfth'; Mahan's 'Types of Naval Officers'; some of 
Macaulay's Essays; three or four volumes of Gibbon; three 
or four chapters of Motley; the 'Life of Prince Eugene,' 
of Admiral de Ruyter, of Turenne, and of Sobieski (all 
in French) ; the Battles in Carlyle's 'Frederick the Great'; 
Hay and Nicolay's 'Lincoln,' and the two volumes of Lin- 
coln's 'Speeches and Writings' — these I have not only read 
through, but have read parts of them again and again; 
Bacon's 'Essays' — curiously enough, I had really never 
read these until this year; Mrs, Roosevelt has a volume 
which belonged to her grandfather, which she always car- 
ries around with her, and I got started reading this; 'Mac- 
beth'; 'Twelfth Night'; 'Henry IV'; 'Henry V; 'Richard 
II'; the first two cantos of 'Paradise Lost'; some of Michael 
Drayton 's poems — there are only three or four I care for ; 
portions of ' Nibelungenlied ' ; portions of Carlyle's trans- 
lation of Dante's 'Inferno'; Church's 'Beowulf; Morris' 
translation of the 'Heimskringla,' and Dasent's transla- 
tion of the 'Sagas of Gisli and Burnt Njal'; Lady Greg- 
ory's and Miss Hull's 'Cuchulain Saga,' together with the 
'Children of Lir,' the 'Children of Tuirenn,' the 'Tale of 
Deirdre,' etc.; the 'Precieuses Ridicules,' 'Le Barbier de 
Seville'; most of Jusserand's books — of which I was most 
interested in his studies of the 'King's Quhair'; Holmes' 
'Over the Teacups'; Lounsbury's 'Shakespeare and Vol- 
taire'; various numbers of the Edinburgh Review from 



NOTABLE SENTIMENTS IN SPEECHES AND LETTERS 267 

1803 to 1850; Tolstoi's 'Sebastopol and the Cossacks'; 
Sinkiewicz's 'Fire and Sword' and parts of his other vol- 
umes; 'Guy Mannering'; the 'Antiquary'; 'Rob Roy'; 
'Waverley'; 'Quentin Durward'; parts of 'Marmion' and 
the 'Lay of the Last Minstrel'; Cooper's 'Pilot'; some of 
the earlier stories and some of the poems of Bret Harte; 
Mark Twain's 'Tom Sawyer'; 'Pickwick Pai>ers'; 'Nich- 
olas Nickleby'; 'Vanity Fair'; 'Pendennis'; 'The New- 
comes'; 'The Adventures of Philip'; Conan Doyle's 'White 
Company'; Lever's 'Charles O'Malley'; 'Romances of 
Brockden Brown' I read when I was confined to my room 
with a game leg; for motives of curiosity and no real en- 
joyment; an occasional half hour's reading in Keats, 
Browning, Poe, Tennyson, Longfellow, Kipling, Bliss Car- 
man; also in Poe's 'Tales' and Lowell's 'Essays'; some of 
Stevenson's stories, and of AUingham's 'British Ballads'; 
Wagner's 'Simple Life.' 

"I have read aloud to the children, and often finished 
afterwards to myself, 'The Rose and the Ring'; Hans An- 
dersen; some of Grimm; some of 'Norse Folk Tales'; 
stories by Howard Pyle; 'Uncle Remus' and the rest of 
Joel Chandler Harris' stories (incidentally I would be 
willing to rest all that I have done in the South as regards 
the negro in his story 'Free Joe'). Two or three books by 
Jacob Riis; also Mrs. Van Vorst's 'Woman Who Toils,* 
and one or two similar volumes; the 'Nonsense Verses' of 
Carolyn Wells, first to the children and afterward to Mrs. 
Roosevelt and myself; Kenneth Grahame's 'Golden Age'; 
those two delightful books by Somerville and Ross, 'All 
on the Irish Shore,' and 'Experiences of an Irish M. P.'; 
Townsend's 'Europe and Asia'; Conrad's 'Youth'; 'Phoe- 
nixiana'; 'Artemus Ward'; Octave Thanet's stories, which 
I always like when they deal with labor problems ; various 
books on the Boer War, of which I like best Viljoen's, 
Stevens', and 'Studies' by the writer signing himself 
Linesman; Pike's 'Through the Sun-Arctic Forest,' and 
Peer's 'Cross Country with Horse and Hound'; together 
with a number of books on big game hunting, mostly in 



268 THEODORE ROOSEVELT AND HIS TIME 

Africa; several volumes on American outdoor life and 
natural history, including the reading of much of John 
Burroughs; Swettenham's 'Real Malay'; David Gray's 
'Gallops'; Miss Stewart's 'Napoleon Jackson'; Janvier's 
'Passing of Thomas and Other Stories' ; 'The Benefactors'; 
'People of the Whirlpool'; London's 'Call of the Wild'; 
Fox's 'Little Shepherd of Kingdom Come'; Hamlin Gar- 
land's 'Captain of the Gray Horse Troop'; Tarkington's 
'Gentleman from Indiana'; Churchill's 'Crisis'; Reming- 
ton's 'John Ermine of the Yellowstone'; Wister's 'Vir- 
ginian,' 'Red Men and White,' 'Philosophy Four,' and 
'Lin McLean'; White's 'Blazed Trail,' 'Conjurer's House,' 
and 'Claim Jumpers'; Trevelyan's 'American Revolution.' 
Often I would read one book by chance and it would sug- 
gest another. 

"There! That is the catalogue; about as interesting as 
Homer's catalogue of the Ships, and with about as much 
method in it as there seems in a superficial glance to be in 
an Irish Stew." 

A scarcely less notable letter, as disclosing the dimen- 
sions of the President's omnivorous reading, is the follow- 
ing to the Rt. Hon., afterwards Lord, John Morley, under 
date of January 17, 1904 : 

"It is a temptation to me to write you at inordinate 
length about your 'Life of Gladstone.' Incidentally, you 
started me to rereading Lucretius and Finlay. Lucretius 
was an astounding man for pagan Rome to have produced 
just before the empire. I should not myself have thought 
of comparing him with Virgil one way or the other. It 
would be too much like comparing, say, Herbert Spencer 
with Milton, excepting that part dealing with death, in the 
end of the third book (if I remember right), I am less 
struck with the work because of its own quality (as a fin- 
ished product, so to speak) than I am with the fact that 
it was opening up a totally new trail — a trail which for 
very many centuries, indeed down to modern times, was 
not followed much farther. He had as truly a scientific 



NOTABLE SENTIMENTS IN SPEECHES AND LETTERS 269 

mind as Darwin or Huxley, and the boldness of his truth- 
telling was astonishing. As for Finlay, I have always been 
fond of him. But I would not like to be understood as de- 
preciating Gibbon. Personally I feel that with all their 
faults Gibbon and Macaulay are the two great English his- 
torians, and there could be no better testimonial to their 
greatness than the fact that scores of authors have each 
made a comfortable life reputation by refuting some single 
statement of one or the other. 

*'0f course, in reading the Gladstone, I was especially 
interested because of the ceaseless unconscious compari- 
sons I was making with events in our own history, and 
with difficulties I myself every day encounter. A man who 
has grappled, or is grappling, with Cuba, Panama and the 
Philippines, has a lively appreciation of the difficulties 
inevitably attendant upon getting into Egypt in the first 
place, and then upon the impossibility of getting out of it, 
in the second. Perhaps I was interested most of all in your 
account of the closing years of Gladstone's career, in which 
'Home Rule' was the most important question he had to 
face. I suppose I am one of a large multitude to whom 
your book for the first time gave a clear idea of what Glad- 
stone's actual position was in the matter, and of the gross 
injustice of the assaults upon him. You make it clear, for 
instance, that from the standpoint of Gladstone's assail- 
ants, even, there was far more to be said against the con- 
sistency and frankness of the leaders who opposed him 
and the leaders who deserted him than against his. To my 
mind you prove your case completely, — and I have always 
been inclined to criticize Gladstone on this point, although 
I have personally been a Home-Euler ever since reading 
Lecky's account of Ireland in the eighteenth century. On 
no position do I feel more cordial sympathy with Glad- 
stone's attitude than as regards Turkey and the subjugated 
peoples of the Balkan peninsula." 



CHAPTER XXIV 
SECURING THE PANAMA CANAL 

The year 1903 marks what Theodore Roosevelt always con- 
sidered the most notable and widely beneficent achievement 
of his Presidential career — the possession of the Isthmus 
of Panama and the consequent construction of an inter- 
oceanic canal across it. His interest in the project began 
long before he became President. While he was Governor 
of New York, he entered an emphatic protest against a 
treaty which Secretary Hay had negotiated with the 
British Government and which was presented to the 
United States Senate for ratification on February 5, 
1900. This is known as the first Hay-Pauncefote 
treaty, designed to abrogate the Clayton-Bulwer treaty of 
1850 and make possible the construction of an Isthmian 
Canal. Under the provisions of this first treaty the canal 
was not to be fortified and its neutrality was to be guar- 
anteed by all nations using it. As soon as the text of the 
treaty was published. Governor Roosevelt wrote a friendly 
but most earnest letter to Secretary Hay in opposition to 
it, pointing out what he regarded as very serious defects 
in it. This letter is published in full in Chapter XIII of 
this volume. It outlined with clearness and force the course 
which Roosevelt as President was to carry to success a 
few years later when he secured a canal built with Ameri- 
can money and operated and fortified by Americans with- 
out the cooperation or interference of any foreign nation. 
The Senate refused to ratify the first treaty in the form 
submitted, and added amendments which did away 
with the neutrality provision and authorized specifically 
the fortifying of the canal. These amendments the British 
Government declined to accept, and the treaty failed. Sec- 

270 



SECURING THE PANAMA CANAL 271 

retary Hay was greatly chagrined at the failure and sub- 
mitted his resignation to President McKinley, who refused 
to accept it. Negotiations were resumed and on November 
18, 1901, the second Hay-Pauncefote treaty was completed. 
Roosevelt had in the meantime acceded to the Presidency 
and in laying the treaty before the Senate he said of it 
in his first annual message to Congress on December 3, 1901 : 
"In this treaty, the old Clayton-Bulwer treaty, so long 
recognized as inadequate to supply the base for the con- 
struction and maintenance of a necessarily American ship 
canal, is abrogated. It specifically provides that the United 
States alone shall do the work of building and assume the 
responsibility of safeguarding the canal and shall regulate 
its neutral use by all nations on terms of equality without 
the guaranty or interference of any outside nation from 
any quarter." 

The treaty was ratified by the Senate on December 16, 
1901. While it did not in terms authorize the fortifying of 
the canal, the British Government consented to the omission 
of a clause in the first treaty forbidding fortification, and 
subsequently acquiesced in the assumption by the American 
Government that it was entitled to fortify under the provi- 
sion which declared that the United States ''shall be at 
liberty to maintain such military police along the canal as 
may be necessary to protect it against lawlessness and dis- 
order." 

As soon as the treaty was ratified, attention became con- 
centrated upon the question of routes for an Isthmian 
Canal. A Commission, with Rear Admiral A. G. Walker 
at its head, which had been appointed by President McKin- 
ley in March, 1899, for the purpose of ascertaining and re- 
porting as to the ''most feasible and practicable route," 
reported in December, 1901, to the effect that the cost of 
constructing a canal at Nicaragua was $189,864,062, and of 
one at Panama, $144,233,000; that the new reorganized 
Panama Canal Company offered to sell its rights, property 
and franchises for $109,141,500, which would bring the cost 



272 THEODORE ROOSEVELT AND HIS TIME 

of a canal by the Panama route up to $253,374,858; that 
the Commission estimated the value of the new Panama 
Canal Company's property at $40,000,000; and that in view 
of the terms offered by that company, the Commission was 
of the opinion that the "most practicable and feasible 
route ' ' was by way of Nicaragua. 

This report was transmitted to Congress by President 
Roosevelt on December 4, 1901. On January 4, 1902, the 
president of the new Panama Canal Company sent word by 
cable from Paris to Rear Admiral Walker that the company 
was willing to sell its properties and concessions to the 
United States Government for $40,000,000. On January 
18 the Walker commission rendered to President Roosevelt 
a supplementary report, transmitting the offer of the 
French company to sell for $40,000,000, and declaring it 
to be the commission's opinion, in view of the changed con- 
ditions, that the "most practicable and feasible route" for 
a canal was that by way of Panama. 

In the meantime, while these negotiations with the 
French company were in progress, the House of Repre- 
sentatives, on January 8, 1902, passed by a vote of 225 to 
25 a bill authorizing the President to proceed with the con- 
struction of a canal by way of Nicaragua, at a cost of 
$180,000,000, and appropriating $10,000,000 on account for 
immediate use. When the bill reached the Senate it en- 
countered vigorous opposition. The supplementary report 
of the Walker commission was sent to Congress on January 
20, and proved to be the doom of the Nicaraguan project. 
An amendment to the House bill was offered by Senator 
Spooner which converted it virtually into a new measure. 

After a long debate, marked at times by some animosity, 
the Spooner bill passed the Senate on June 19, 1902, by a 
vote of 67 to 6, and passed the House of Representatives on 
June 26 by a vote of 259 to 8. It was signed by President 
Roosevelt on June 28. In substance it authorized the Presi- 
dent to acquire for and in behalf of the United States, at a 
cost not exceeding $40,000,000, all the rights, privileges, 
franchises, concessions, and property on the Isthmus of 



SECURING THE PANAMA CANAL 273 

Panama owned by the new Panama Canal Company; to 
acquire from the Republic of Colombia, on such terms as 
he might deem reasonable, control of a strip of land, not 
less than six miles in width, between the two oceans, in 
which to construct and operate a canal; to acquire such 
additional territory and rights from Colombia as in his 
judgment would facilitate the general purpose; and, when 
a satisfactory title had been secured from the new Panama 
Canal Company, to proceed to construct a canal of sufficient 
capacity and depth to afford ''convenient passage for ves- 
sels of the largest tonnage and greatest draft now in use, 
and such as may be reasonably anticipated." In case satis- 
factory title could not be obtained from the French com- 
pany, the act authorized the President to take the neces- 
sary steps to permit of the construction of a canal at 
Nicaragua. 

Immediately following the enactment of the Spooner law 
Secretary Hay opened negotiations with Dr. Tomas Her- 
ran, Charge d'affaires of the Colombian Government at 
Washington, for the conclusion of a treaty between the 
United States and Colombia in accordance with the terms 
of that law. The negotiations resulted in what is known 
as the Hay-Herran convention, which was signed on Janu- 
ary 22, 1903, Dr. Herran signing with the authority of the 
Colombian Government. The treaty was sent to the Senate 
on January 23. Writing to Secretary Hay, who was absent 
from Washington, on March 12, 1903, the President said: 

**I am now sweating blood in the effort to get the two 
treaties (Cuban Reciprocity and Colombian) confirmed. 
Senator Blank, of course, had been filled with distrust at 
the last moment and wanted to propose one or two amend- 
ments to the Panama treaty. He is an admirable man of 
great intellect; but I wish that every tom-cat in the path 
did not strike him as an unusually large and ferocious lion. 
The Democrats are doing their best to get into shape to 
vote solidly against both treaties. They cannot possibly 
do this against the Panama treaty, and I think they will 
find it difficult to do so against the Cuban treaty, although 



274 THEODORE ROOSEVELT AND HIS TIME 

the latter is as yet by no means out of the woods. Gorman 
is a very smooth article, and though he will exercise some 
control over the yahoos, he will have to do much as they 
desire, and unfortunately, the addition of his ability to their 
loose-lipped abhorrence of decency, does not make a really 
attractive combination." 

The President's prediction as to the fate of the Panama 
treaty was verilSed, for it was ratified without change on 
March 17, 1903. It authorized the new Panama Canal Com- 
pany to sell and transfer to the United States all its rights, 
privileges, properties and concessions, as well as the Pan- 
ama Railroad ; ceded to the United States for the purpose 
of canal construction a strip of land thirty miles in width 
between the two oceans, over which the United States 
should have administrative control for police and sanita- 
tion purposes, but of which the sovereignty should remain 
vested in Colombia; stipulated that upon the exchange of 
ratifications, the United States should pay to Colombia 
$10,000,000 in gold, and in addition, beginning nine years 
after the date of ratification, should pay annually, $250,000 
in gold. It was pointed out by Secretary Hay, after the 
rejection of the treaty by Colombia, that the bonus of $10,- 
000,000 was a sum equivalent to two-thirds of what was 
reputed to be the Colombian public debt, and that the an- 
nual payment of $250,000 was equivalent to the interest on 
$15,000,000 at the rate at which loans could be obtained by 
the American Government. 

The Colombian Congi^ess met in extra session, convened 
for the purpose of considering the treaty, on June 20, 1903. 
It was known that a large majority of its members were op- 
posed to ratification, and that the Colombian Government 
controlled it absolutely. The treaty itself was withheld 
on a pretext that it must be signed by the Vice President 
before being sent to the Congress. In the meantime a 
general clamor was raised for more favorable terms for 
Colombia and for amendments that should grant them. 

On June 10, 1903, the agent of the new Panama Canal 



' SECURING THE PANAMA CANAL 275 

Company at Bogota received from the Colombian Govern- 
ment an oflficial note saying that it did not think the conven- 
tion would be ratified, because of the opinion that the com- 
pensation was insufficient, but that, if the new Panama 
Canal Company would pay to Colombia $10,000,000, ratifi- 
cation could be secured. 

On July 9, 1903, General Rafael Reyes, spokesman of the 
government, requested the American Minister at Bogota 
to say to Secretary Hay, as the Minister did at once by 
cable, that he (Reyes) did not think the treaty could be 
ratified without two amendments — one stipulating the pay- 
ment of $10,000^ -'gold by the new Panama Canal Com- 
pany for the right to transfer its isthmus property to the 
United States, and the other increasing the bonus which 
the United States was to pay to Colombia from $10,000,000 
to $15,000,000. These direct attempts to extort more money 
as the price of ratification were unsuccessful. Secretary 
Hay replied, on July 13, 1903, that neither of the proposed 
amendments would stand any chance of acceptance by the 
Senate, while any amendment whatever or unnecessary de- 
lay in ratification of the treaty would greatly imperil its 
consummation. 

Two days later, July 15, 1903, the treaty was submitted 
to a special committee of nine in the Colombian Senate. 
It was reported to the Senate on August 4, 1903, with a 
series of amendments which completely changed the char- 
acter of the treaty. On July 31, 1903, Secretary Hay sent 
the following cable message to the American Minister at 
Bogota: 

''Instructions heretofore sent to you show the great dan- 
ger of amending the treaty. This government has no right 
or competence to covenant with Colombia to impose new 
financial obligations upon canal company and the President 
would not submit to our Senate any amendment in that 
sense, but would treat it as voiding the negotiation and 
bringing about a failure to conclude a satisfactory treaty 
with Colombia. No additional payment by the United 
States can hope for approval by the United States Senate, 



276 THEODORE ROOSEVELT AND HIS TIME 

while any amendment whatever requiring reconsideration 
by that body would most certainly imperil its consumma- 
tion." 

The substance of this message was communicated at once 
to the Colombian Government. On August 12, 1903, the 
Colombian Senate rejected the treaty in its entirety by 
unanimous vote. On the same date General Reyes called 
upon the American Minister and informed him that the 
treaty had been rejected by the Colombian Government and 
leading senators in the belief that there would be a reaction 
in public sentiment in its favor, when it would be possible 
to reconsider and ratify it without amendment. He re- 
quested the American Minister to ask the American Gov- 
ernment to grant two more weeks for the consummation of 
this plan. 

This message was communicated to President Roosevelt 
at Oyster Bay, and on August 19, 1903, he wrote to Secre- 
tary Hay: 

"On your way back cannot you stop here, and we will 
go over the canal situation? The one thing evident is to 
do nothing at present. If under the treaty of 1846 we have 
a color of right to start in and build a canal, my off-hand 
judgment would favor such proceeding. It seems that the 
great bulk of the best engineers are agreed that that route 
is the best; and I do not think that the Bogota lot of ob- 
structionists should be allowed permanently to bar one of 
the future highways of civilization. Of course, under the 
terms of the Act we could now go ahead with Nicaragua, 
and perhaps would technically be required to do so. But 
what we do now will be of consequence, not merely decades, 
but centuries hence, and we must be sure that we are tak- 
ing the right step before we act." 

After consultation with the President, Secretary Hay 
cabled to the American Minister at Bogota, on August 24, 
1903: ''The President will make no engagement on the 
canal matter, but I regard it as improbable that any definite 



SECURING THE PANAMA CANAL 277 

action will be taken within two weeks. ' ' Again, on August 
29, 1903, he cabled more fully to the American Minister : 

"The President is bound by the Isthmian Canal statute, 
commonly called the Spooner law. By its provisions he is 
given a reasonable time to arrange a satisfactory treaty 
with Colombia. When, in his judgment, the reasonable time 
has expired, and he has not been able to make a satisfac- 
tory arrangement as to the Panama route, he will then 
proceed to carry into effect the alternative of the statute. 
Meantime the President will enter into no engagement re- 
straining his freedom of action under the statute." 

The special committee of the Colombia Senate, on Sep- 
tember 5, 1903, reported a bill approving the rejection of the 
treaty and authorizing the President of Colombia to con- 
clude treaties for the construction of a Panama canal under 
certain conditions, and on terms most generous to Colom- 
bia, but the measure never came to a vote. It was referred 
to a committee that made a report on October 14, 1903, 
which was read in the Senate and which presented, without 
approval or dissent, a contention that the last extension 
of the Wyse concession for a canal at Panama, granted by 
Colombia in 1900, and purchased by the French Canal Com- 
pany, fixing October 31, 1910, as the date for completion of 
the canal, was not valid, and that if this was the case, the 
previous extension would expire at the end of 1904 and all 
canal properties, rights and franchises would revert to 
Colombia. Colombia would then be in position to receive 
the $40,000,000 which the treaty proposed the United States 
should pay to the new Panama Canal Company, as well as 
the $10,000,000 bonus, and also be in more advantageous 
position for demanding terms from the United States. This 
plan found great favor, and it was even contended that 
the Colombia Congress had full power to annul the exten- 
sion in case it saw fit to do so. No action was taken on the 
report, and on October 31, 1903, the Congress adjourned. 

The President was keeping a close watch upon the pro- 
ceedings at Bogota, studiously making up his mind as to the 



278 THEODORE ROOSEVELT AND HIS TIME 

best course to pursue. On September 15, 1903, he wrote to 
Secretary Hay: 

''Let us do nothing in the Colombia matter at present. 
I shall be back in Washington by the 28th instant, and you 
a week or two afterward. Then we will go over the matter 
very carefully and decide what to do. At present I feel 
that there are two alternatives. First, to take up Nica- 
ragua; second, in some shape or way to interfere when it 
becomes necessary so as to secure the Panama route with- 
out further dealing with the foolish and homicidal corrup- 
tionists in Bogota. I am not inclined to have any further 
dealings whatever with those Bogota people." 

He was still considering the subject on October 5, 1903, 
when he wrote to Senator Hanna : 

* ' You may have noticed that I have not said a word about 
the canal. I shall have to allude to it in my message, but 
I shall go over this part of my message with you before 
putting it in its final form. I am not as sure as you are 
that the only virtue we need exercise is patience. I think 
it is well worth considering whether we had not better warn 
these Bogota politicians that great though our patience 
has been, it can be exhausted. This does not mean that we 
must necessarily go to Nicaragua. I feel we are certainly 
justified in morals, and therefore justified in law, under 
the treaty of 1846, in interfering summarily and saying 
that the canal is to be built and that they must not stop it. ' ' 

A letter which the President wrote at this time to Dr. 
Albert Shaw, editor of The Revieiv of Reviews, is of first 
importance historically, showing as it does that Roosevelt 
refused to give encouragement, even by suggestion, to the 
secession of Panama, an event which his most venomous 
critics subsequently charged him with bringing about in 
guilty and secret connivance with Secretary Hay — an out- 
rageous slander which persists in some quarters even to 
the present day: 



SECURING THE PANAMA CANAL 279 

Personal. 

"White House, "Washington, 

October 10, 1903. 
My dear Dr. Shaw: 

I enclose you, purely for your own information, a copy 
of a letter of September Sth from our Minister to Colom- 
bia. I think it might interest you to see that there was 
absolutely not the slightest chance of securing by treaty 
any more than we endeavored to secure. The alternatives 
were to go to Nicaragua, against the advice of the great 
majority of competent engineers — some of the most com- 
petent saying that we had better have no canal at this time 
than go there — or else to take the territory by force without 
any attempt at getting a treaty. I cast aside the proposi- 
tion made at this time to foment the secession of Panama. 
Whatever other governments can do, the United States can 
not go into the securing by such underhand means, the 
cession. Privately, I freely say to you that I should be 
delighted if Panama were an independent State, or if it 
made itself so at this moment ; but for me to say so publicly 
would amount to an instigation of a revolt, and therefore 
I can not say it. 

With great regard. 

Sincerely yours, 

Theodore Eoosevelt. 

President Roosevelt's poor opinion of the Colombian 
politicians was shared by Secretary Hay. I was talking 
with the Secretary one day during the period in which the 
rival negotiations were in progress, in regard to the con- 
flicting claims of the Nicaraguan and Panama routes. He 
was describing with much humor the diplomatic antics of 
the representatives of the two governments, when he paused, 
and with that inviting twinkle in his eye which always pro- 
claimed the coming of a happy idea, he said: *' Talking 
with those fellows from down there. Bishop, is like holding 
a squirrel in your lap and trying to keep up the conversa- 
tion. ' ' 



280 THEODORE ROOSEVELT AND HIS TIME 

The Colombian Congress rejected the treaty with full 
knowledge that a revolution was impending in the depart- 
ment or state of Panama. Like knowledge was possessed 
by the American Government. On June 9, 1903, Secretary 
Hay sent a cable message to the American Minister at Bo- 
gota, in which he said, in reference to Colombian proposals - 
to amend the treaty, that the Colombian Government *'ap-- 
parently does not appreciate the gravity of the situation, ' ' 
that the treaty embodied the propositions presented by 
Colombia with slight modifications, and that if Colombia i 
should now reject it the ** friendly understanding between i 
the two countries would be so seriously compromised thatt 
action might be taken by the Congress next winter which 
every friend of Colombia would regret." The substance of 
this message was communicated at once to the Colombian 
Government. On July 5, 1903, the American Minister senti 
the f ollomng cable message to Secretary Hay : 

"Confidential. Have received information privately thatt' 
a paraphrase of your cipher telegram of June 9 was read 
in the Senate secret session. Created sensation. Construed 
by many as threat of direct retaliation against Colombia 
in case the treaty is not ratified. This, and the statement 
of jttst arrived members of Congress from Panama that 
this department would revolt if the treaty is not ratified, 
caused alarm, and the effect is favorable." 

Three days after the treaty had been rejected by the 
Colombian Senate, the American Minister, writing to Sec- 
retary Hay under date of August 15, 1903, said: ''The 
Panama representatives have lately become so thoroughly 
imbued with the idea of an independent republic that they 
have been more or less indifferent to the fate of the treaty." 
Cabling on August 31, to Secretary Hay, the American Min- 
ister said that Senator Jose Domingo de Obaldia, who had 
been appointed governor of Panama, had informed him 
that in accepting the position he had told the Colombian 
President that ''in case the department found it necessary 
to revolt to secure canal he would stand by Panama." In 



SECURING THE PANAMA CANAL 281 

mother message, on September 10, 1903, the American 
ninister said: "The appointment of Obaldia is regarded 
IS the forerunner of separation," and in a letter on the 
'ollowing day he wrote: ''Senator Obaldia 's separatist 
;endencies are well known, and he is reported to have said 
;hat, should the canal treaty not pass, the department of 
Panama would declare its independence, and would be right 
n doing so. That these are his opinions there is, of course, 
10 doubt." 

Again, on October 21, 1903, the American Minister wrote 
o Secretary Hay: "I have the honor to inform you that 
here is no disguising the alarm existing as to the possible 
action of the government of the United States should the 
'eeling of dissatisfaction undoubtedly existing in the de- 
partment of Panama find expression in overt acts." 
I The Colombian Congress adjourned on October 31, 1903, 
lind on the same day the American Minister cabled to Secre- 
tary Hay: "The people here in great anxiety over con- 
iicting reports of secession movements in the Cauca and 
Panama." 

In the United States the possibility of a revolution in 
tPanama, in case of the rejection of the treaty, was a mat- 
ter of public knowledge in August, 1903. Toward the end 
>'3f that month the newspapers began to publish informa- 
);ion in various forms from the Isthmus and Bogota similar 
to that quoted above from the files of the State Depart- 
-.ment. Toward the end of October it was announced in the 
[American press that the Colombian Government had al- 
jready begun the movement of troops to the Isthmus. On 
'October 15, 1903, the President was informed by Com- 
Imander John Hubbard, of the navy, that a revolution had 
jbroken out in the department of Cauca, and on the follow- 
jing day, at the request of Lieutenant-General Young, of 
!the United States army, the President received two officers 
iof the army who had just returned by way of Panama from 
'a four months' trip in Venezuela and Colombia. They in- 
formed him that a revolutionary party was organizing in 
Panama with the object of separation from Colombia, and 



282 THEODORE ROOSEVELT AND HIS TIME j 

was collecting arms and ammunition, and that it was the 
general belief on the Isthmus that the revolution might 
occur at any moment, and that their own opinion was thai 
failure on the part of Colombia to ratify the treaty would 
lead to immediate revolution. 

In view of this condition of affairs. President Roosevelt, 
acting in accordance with the unbroken policy of the gov- 
ernment since the ratification of the treaty of 1846 witl 
New Granada, directed the Navy Department to issue such 
instructions as would insure having American naval vessel- ' 
within easy reach of the Isthmus in the event of disorder , 
there. Orders were issued on October 19, 1903, for one 
ship, the Boston, to proceed to San Juan del Sur, Nican 
ragua; to another, the Atlanta, to proceed to- Guantanamo, 
Cuba; and to a third, the Dixie, to prepare to sail fromi 
League Island. On October 30, 1903, a fourth, the Nash- 
ville, Commander Hubbard, was ordered to proceed to 
Colon. On November 2, 1903, when it was evident that an 
outbreak was imminent, instructions were sent to the Nash- 
ville, Boston and Dixie as follows : 

*' Maintain free and uninterrupted transit. If interrup-i 
tion is threatened by armed force, occupy the line of rail-l 
road. Prevent landing of any armed force, either govern-^ 
ment or insurgent, at any point within 50 miles of Panama.i 
Government force reported approaching Isthmus in vessels. 
Prevent their landing if, in your judgment, the landing, 
would precipitate a conflict." 

Instractions similar to these had been issued repeatedly 
during previous disorders of various kinds on the Isthmus, 
the latest instance being in September, 1902, when, as ini 
1856, 1860, 1861, 1873, 1885, and in 1901, sailors and ma- 
rines from United States war-ships were landed to patrol 
the Isthmus to protect life and property and keep transit 
free and open. In most of these instances the troops had 
been landed at the request of the Colombian Government. 

The Nashville arrived at Colon at 5.30 p. m. on November 
2, 1903. At daylight on the following morning Commander 



SECURING THE PANAMA CANAL 283 

Hubbard learned that a Colombian gun-boat, Cartagena, 
had come in during the night with four hundred or five 
(hundred troops on board. He had her boarded and learned 
that the troops were for the garrison at Panama. As he 
had not yet received instructions, he did not feel justified 
in preventing their landing, and they were disembarked at 
8.30 A. M. Their commanding ofiScers, Generals Amaya and 
Tovar, with four others, took the train to Panama, leaving 
Colonel Torres in command. At 10.30 Commander Hub- 
bard received the cable message with the instructions cited 
above, and at once went ashore. Late in the afternoon he 
learned that there had been a revolution in Panama; that 
Generals Amaya and Tovar and the other four Colombian 
ofiicers had been seized and were held as prisoners ; that a 
provisional government had been established and a military 
force of one thousand five hundred men had been organized; 
and that the provisional government wished the Colombian 
'troops at Colon to be sent to Panama. 
' The general superintendent of the Panama Eailroad had 
agreed to transport the Colombian troops, but Commander 
Hubbard, on the morning of November 4, 1903, prohibited 
the transportation of troops in either direction in order to 
preserve the neutrality of the Isthmus and free and unin- 
terrupted transit. During the forenoon of November 4, 
1903, Commander Hubbard was informed that Colonel 
'Torres had sent word to the United States consul at Colon 
that if Generals Amaya and Tovar and the other Colombian 
officers who had been seized at Panama were not released 
by 2 p. M. he, Torres, would open fire on the town of Colon 
and kill every United States citizen in the place. Com- 
mander Hubbard had all the Ajnerican citizens of Colon 
assembled in the stone building of the Panama Railroad 
Company, quickly fortified it as much as possible, and at 
1.30 p. M. landed forty-two men from the Nashville to pro- 
tect the building, with orders not to fire unless fired upon. 
The American women and children were placed aboard a 
Panama Railroad Company steamer and a German steamer 
which were lying at the wharf. 



284 THEODORE ROOSEVELT AND HIS TIME 

The Colombians surrounded the railroad building soon 
after the Americans had taken possession of it, and tried i 
to provoke attack from the American troops, but the latter 
were cool and steady and the effort failed. 

At about 3.15 p. m. Colonel Torres entered the building 
for an interview, declaring that the whole affair was a mis- 
apprehension, that he was most friendly to Americans, andi 
saying that he should like to send the alcalde of Colon to 
Panama to see General Tovar and have him direct a dis- 
continuance of a show of force. This request was granted 
and a special train over the Panama Railroad was supplied 
by the general superintendent for the alcalde's journey. 
At about 5.30 Colonel Torres stated to Commander Hub- 
bard that he would withdraw his Colombian troops to 
Monkey Hill, about two miles outside of Colon, on condition 
that the American troops should be withdrawn to the 
Nashville. This proposition was accepted and faithfully 
complied with by Commander Hubbard. On the morning 
of November 5, 1903, Commander Hubbard discovered that 
Colonel Torres had not withdrawn his troops to Monkey 
Hill, but only to some buildings near the outskirts of the 
town, giving a trivial excuse for failure to keep his word. 
Learning that it was the purpose of Colonel Torres, in cases; 
he did not receive orders from General Tovar to withdraw,; 
to bring in his troops and occupy Colon, Commander Hub- 
bard again landed an armed force, reoccupied the railroad 
building, brought ashore two one-pounder guns, and ' 
mounted them in position of defense near the building, r 
In company with the United States consul he then sought ' 
and obtained an interview with Colonel Torres, in which ' 
he told him that he had re-landed his troops because of his, 
Torres, failure to keep his agreement; that his sole pur- 
pose in landing them was to preserve the lives and prop-v 
erty of American citizens; that his attitude was one of 
strict neutrality ; that the troops of neither side should be 
transported; and that free and uninterrupted transit 
should be maintained, if necessary by force. 

He tried to induce Colonel Torres to withdraw to Monkey 



SECURING THE PANAMA CANAL 285 

Hill, but the latter replied that it was unhealthy out there. 
Later in the forenoon of November 5, 1903, the alcalde re- 
turned from Panama without orders, and Colonel Torres 
marched his Colombian troops again into Colon, but they 
made no threatening demonstrations. During the after- 
noon representatives of the new Panama Government suc- 
ceeded in persuading Colonel Torres to embark with his 
troops on a Royal Mail steamer, Orinoco, and sail to Carta- 
gena. The gun-boat Cartagena, on which he had come to 
Colon, had left port immediately after the threat against 
Americans had been made, on November 4, 1903. 

In the meantime, while the American naval officer was 
preventing bloodshed at Colon, the new Panama Republic 
was becoming established on the other side of the Isthmus. 
As early as August, 1903, a junta of six men had been 
named by advocates of separation in Panama to take the 
leadership in plans for securing independence. It had been 
decided first to have the revolution on September 22, 1903, 
the date set for the adjournment of the Colombian Con- 
gress. When adjournment was delayed till October 31, 
1903, preparations were made to have the revolution take 
place on November 4, 1903. The arrival of the Colombian 
troops at Colon on November 3 forced the event forward 
twenty-four hours. 

The Colombian generals arrived in Panama about 11 
o'clock on the morning of November 4, 1903, and were re- 
ceived with courtesy by the authorities and the populace. 
Later, when they had got wind of the impending revolution, 
they started for the government barracks on the sea-wall 
to call out the troops and signal to three Colombian gun- 
boats that were lying in the bay, in the hope of frustrating 
the plans of the revolutionists. On their arrival they were 
met by General Esteban Huertas, in command of the garri- 
son, who was in league with the revolutionists, who ordered 
out a company of soldiers and arrested them as prisoners 
of war. Governor Obaldia, the Colombian head of the de- 
partment of Panama, was also arrested, as a mere formal 
act of deposition, but was released immediately. The three 



286 THEODORE ROOSEVELT AND HIS TIME I 

Colombian gun-boats were informed by signal that the revo- 
lution had been effected, it being supposed that they would 
acquiesce in it. Two of them did, but the commanding 
officer of the third sent official word to the chief of police 
that unless the imprisoned Colombian officers were set at 
liberty within two hours he would shell the city. At the 
expiration of that time he fired two shells, one of which 
killed a Chinaman on the street near the barracks, but when 
fire was opened upon the vessel from the fortifications she 
steamed away, never to return. 

On the following morning the two remaining gun-boats 
ran up the flag of the new Panama Republic. With the ex- 
ception of the Chinaman's death the revolution was blood- 
less. 

The formal declaration of independence was made on 
November 4, 1903. The municipal council of the city of 
Panama met and after a free discussion voted unanimously 
in favor of separation from Colombia and the creation of 
the free and independent Republic of Panama. Pending the 
formation of the new republic, the direction of affairs was 
placed in the hands of three men, who later, with eleven 
others, constituted the Committee of Provisional Govern 
ment. At 3 p. m. on the same day a formal declaration of 
independence was read at a mass-meeting in Cathedral 
Plaza. 

Generals Amaya and Tovar, with their associates, were 
released on November 5, 1903, on pledge of leaving the Isth 
mus as soon as possible. They were given a military escort 
to Colon, but arrived there too late to sail with Colonel 
Torres and the Colombian troops on board the Royal Mail 
steamer Orinoco, but they took passage for Cartagena oil 
November 12, 1903. 

The Dixie, with a force of about four hundred men, en 
tered the harbor of Colon at 7 p. m. in the evening of No 
vember 5, just as the Orinoco was sailing away. On the fol- 
lowing morning the Atlcmta arrived, bringing the combinec 
American force at Colon up to about one thousand men, 
The Maine arrived a few days later. The Boston arrived 



SECURING THE PANAMA CANAL 287 

at Panama on November 7, and was joined there later by 
three other naval vessels. 

On November 7, the American Minister at Bogota sent a 
cable message to Secretary Hay, saying that General Reyes 
was about to start for Panama with full powers, and wished 
to be informed by the Secretary before starting if the Amer- 
ican commander at Panama would be ordered to cooperate 
with him with the new Panama Government to arrange 
peace and approval of the treaty, which would be accepted 
on condition that the integrity of Colombia be preserved. 
On the same day the Colombian Government asked to be 
informed through the American minister whether it would 
be allowed to land troops at Colon and Panama to fight 
there along the line of the railway. 

These messages were received at Washington on Novem- 
ber 10, 1903, and on the following day Secretary Hay re- 
plied that it "is not thought desirable to permit landing 
of Colombian troops on Isthmus, as such a course would 
precipitate civil war and disturb for an indefinite period 
the free transit we are pledged to protect." 

The Republic of Panama was formally recognized by the 
United States on November 6, 1903, in the foUomng mes- 
sage from Secretary Hay to the consulate-general at 
Panama : 

"The people of Panama having by an apparently unani- 
mous movement dissolved their political connection with 
the Republic of Colombia and resumed their independence, 
and having adopted a government of their own, republican 
in form, with which the Government of the United States 
of America has entered into relations, the President of the 
United States, in accordance with the ties of friendship 
which have so long and so happily existed between the re- 
spective nations, most earnestly commends to the govern- 
ments of Colombia and of Panama the peaceful and equit- 
able settlement of all questions at issue between them. He 
holds that he is bound, not merely by treaty obligations, but 
by the interests of civilization, to see that the peaceable 
trafl&c of the world across the Isthmus of Panama shall not 



288 THEODORE ROOSEVELT AND HIS TIME 

longer be disturbed by a constant succession of unnecessary 
and wasteful wars." 

The same message was sent to the American minister at 
Bogota on November 6, 1903. Within a few weeks all the 
so-called *' great powers" of the earth, following the lead 
of the United States, formally recognized the independence 
of the Republic of Panama, and by the 1st of March fol- 
lowing practically all the governments of the world except 
Colombia had recognized it. 

The news of the revolution had scarcely reached Colombia 
before its government began to confess judgment on its 
conduct toward the Hay-Herran treaty. On November 6, 
1903, the American Minister at Bogota sent a cable mes- 
sage to Secretary Hay containing an offer from General 
Reyes to reassemble the Colombian Congress and ratify the 
treaty as signed, or to approve it by government decree, 
provided the United States Government would uphold Co- 
lombia by declaring martial law and suppressing the rev- 
olution on the Isthmus. 

The charge of *' conspiracy" between the American Gov- 
ernment and the revolutionists in Panama was made as 
soon as the news of the revolution was published. Writ- 
ing to Dr. Albert Shaw on November 6, 1903, the President 
said in regard to it : 

*'I did not foment the revolution on the Isthmus, as you 
know from my previous correspondence with you. It is 
idle folly to speak of there having been a conspiracy with 
us. The people of the Isthmus are a unit for the canal, 
and in favor of separation from the Colombians. The lat- 
ter signed their death warrant when they acted in such 
infamous manner about the signing of the treaty. Unless 
Congress overrides me, which I do not think probable, 
Colombia's grip on Panama is gone forever." 

Writing to Lawrence Abbott on November 12, 1903, the 
President adduced positive proof that he was not even an- 
ticipating a revolt: 



SECURING THE PANAMA CANAL 289 

"I wish, by the way, I had shown you when you were 
here my Message on the Panama subject. I had written it 
out and had the rough draft with Hay's marginal correc- 
tions. It was written the very end of October — that is, less 
than a week before the outbreak occurred — and by it you 
would have seen that at that time neither Hay nor I was 
preparing for the outbreak, and that the message was drawn 
up on the supposition that there would be no outbreak, and 
that I should have to face the problem of digging the canal 
anyhow. ' ' 

In the draft of the message, alluded to in the above letter, 
the President had recommended to Congress that the Amer- 
ican Government take possession of the Isthmus, without 
regard to Colombia's wishes in the matter, and proceed to 
build the canal. He had written: 

''The refusal of Colombia properly to respond to our 
sincere and earnest efforts to come to an agreement, or 
to pay heed to the many concessions we have made, ren- 
ders it in my judgment necessary that the United States 
should take immediate action on one of two lines; either 
we should drop the Panama canal project and immediately 
begin work on the Nicaraguan canal, or else we should pur- 
chase all the rights of the French company, and, without 
any further parley with Colombia, enter upon the comple- 
tion of the canal which the French company has begun. 
I feel that the latter course is the one demanded by the 
interests of this Nation, and I therefore bring the matter 
to your attention for such action in the premises as you 
may deem wise. If in your judgment it is better not to 
take such action, then I shall proceed at once with the 
Nicaraguan canal." 

One of the first acts of the provisional government of the 
Republic of Panama was to appoint, on November 6, 1903, 
Philippe Bunau-Varilla envoy extraordinary and minister 
plenipotentiary to the United States, with full powers to 
conduct diplomatic and financial negotiations. Bunau- 



290 THEODORE ROOSEVELT AND HIS TIME 

Varilla was in Washington at the time, and on November 
13 he was received formally by President Roosevelt at the 
White House. On the following day the Secretary of State 
sent a cable message to all the diplomatic representatives 
of the United States in foreign countries as follows : 

''The President yesterday fully recognized the Republic 
of Panama and formally received its Minister Plenipoten- 
tiary. You will promptly communicate this to the govern- 
ment to which you are accredited." 

Writing to his son, Theodore, on November 15, 1903, 
the President thus described the situation at the moment : 

'*I have had a most interesting time about Panama and 
Colombia. My experiences in all these matters give me 
an idea of the fearful times Lincoln must have had in 
dealing with the great crisis he had to face. When I see 
how panic-struck Senators, business men and everybody 
else become from my little flurry of trouble, and the wild 
clamor they all raise for foolish or cowardly action, I get 
an idea of what he had to stand after Bull Run and again 
after McClellan's failures in '62 and the party defeat in 
the elections of that year, and again after Fredericksburg 
and Chancellorsville. Why, even in this Panama business 
the Evening Post and the entire fool Mug^\Tlmp crowd have 
fairly suffered from hysterics ; and a goodly number of the 
Senators even of my own party have shown about as much 
backbone as so many angle worms. However, I have kept 
things moving just right so far." 



CHAPTER XXV 

SECURING THE PANAMA CANAL— CONCLUDED 

The negotiation of a treaty between the United States 
and the Republic of Panama was begun at once by Secre- 
tary Hay and Bunau-Varilla, and was completed and signed 
by them at Washington on November 18, 1903. It was rati- 
fied by Panama on December 2, 1903. 

In his annual message to Congress, December 7, 1903, 
and in a special message, January 4, 1904, President Roose- 
velt gave a detailed account of the revolution at Panama 
and of his conduct in recognizing the Republic. In the two 
messages he set forth the facts which have been stated in 
the present narrative, showing that in 53 years there had 
been 53 revolutions on the Isthmus, and giving the full text 
of Commander Hubbard's official report. He accompanied 
his annual message with the treaty which Secretary Hay 
and Bunau-Varilla had drawn. After describing the events 
which led up to the recognition of the Republic, he said in 
the message of December 7: 

''Under such circumstances, the Government of the 
United States would have been guilty of folly and weakness, 
amounting in their sum to a crime against the Nation, had 
it acted otherwise than it did when the revolution of No- 
vember 3 last took place in Panama. This great enterprise 
of building the interoceanic canal can not be held up to 
gratify the whims, or out of respect to the governmental 
impotence, or to the even more sinister and evil political 
peculiarities, of people who, though they dwell afar off, 
yet, against the wish of the actual dwellers on the Isthmus, 
assert an unreal supremacy over the territory. The pos- 
session of a territory fraught with such peculiar capacities 
as the Isthmus in question carries with it obligations to 

291 



292 THEODORE ROOSEVELT AND HIS TIME 

mankind. The course of events has shown that this canal 
can not be built by private enterprise, or by any other nation 
than our own; therefore it must be built by the United 
States." 

In the same message, he said of the treaty: 
*'By it our interests are better safeguarded than in the 
treaty with Colombia which was ratified by the Senate at its 
last session. It is better in its terms than the treaties of- 
fered to us by the Republics of Nicaragua and Costa Rica. 
At last the right to begin this great undertaking is made 
available. Panama has done her part. All that remains is 
for the American Congress to do its part and forthwith this 
Republic will enter upon the execution of a project colossal 
in its size and of well-nigh incalculable possibilities for the 
good of this country and the nations of mankind." 

In the special message of January 4, 1904, he said of the 
offer of General Reyes, already quoted, to have the treaty 
ratified by the Colombian Congress provided the President 
would uphold Colombia in declaring martial law and sup- 
pressing the Panama revolution: 

"I pass by the question as to what assurance we have 
that they would now keep their pledge and not again refuse 
to ratify the treaty if they had the power; for, of course, 
I will not for one moment discuss the possibility of the 
United States committing an act of such baseness as to 
abandon the new Republic of Panama." 

In the same message he thus referred to the "conspiracy" 
slanders : 

''I hesitate to refer to the injurious insinuations which 
have been made of complicity by this government in the 
revolutionary movement in Panama. They are as desti- 
tute of foundation as of propriety. The only excuse for 
my mentioning them is the fear lest unthinking persons 
might mistake for acquiescence the silence of mere self- 
respect. I think proper to say, therefore, that no one con- 
nected with this Government had any part in preparing, 



SECURING THE PANAMA CANAL 293 

inciting, or encouraging the late revolution on the Isthmus 
of Panama, and that save from the reports of our military 
and naval officers, given above, no one connected with this 
Government had any previous knowledge of the revolution 
except such as was accessible to any person of ordinary 
intelligence who read the newspapers and kept up a current 
acquaintance with public affairs." 

Between the writing of the two messages to Congress the 
President, in several private letters, set forth his convic- 
tions in regard to the course he had pursued. Writing to 
Charles S. Osborn, of Michigan, on December 9, 1903, he 
said: 

*' Just at the moment I am more concerned about Panama 
than anything else. Of course, to me, the situation is sim- 
ple. In its essence it is exactly as if a road agent had tried 
to hold up a man, and the man was quick enough to take his 
gun away. Under such circumstances I would regard it 
as the wildest sentimental folly for outsiders to claim that 
the road agent did not intend to shoot, and that it was his 
gun and ought to be given back to him. By every consider- 
ation of equity, and of legitimate national and international 
interest, what we have done was right. And it will be a 
lamentable thing if a twisted party feeling should join with 
mere hysteria to prevent at this time the fulfilling of what 
has been accomplished." 

To the Eev. Dr. David D. Thompson, editor of The North- 
western Christian Advocate, he entered upon a more elab- 
orate justification of his conduct, on December 22, 1903 : 

* ' You of course remember that during the Civil War the 
leaders of the Confederates in the South, and their allies 
both in England and in the North, insisted that the move- 
ment for the independence of the slave States against the 
Union was identical with the movement for the indepen- 
dence of the original thirteen States as against Great 
Britain, and that Jefferson Davis stood exactly as George 
Washington did. It is difficult to believe now that such 



294 THEODORE ROOSEVELT AND HIS TIME 

arrant nonsense was ever seriously advanced. But it is 
not one whit more absurd than to say that the secession 
of Panama from Colombia has anything in common with 
the secession of the eleven slave-holding States from the 
Union in 1861. 

*'A revolutionary movement can only be justified by 
showing that it has ample cause, and that good will follow 
from its success. In other words, each revolutionary move- 
ment must be judged on its own merits. Under Washing- 
ton, the American Colonies revolted because the Crown and 
Parliament of England strove to keep them in subjection. 
Their revolutionary movement was right, and it was a good 
thing for the whole world that it succeeded. Under Jeffer- 
son Davis, the Southern States revolted in order to estab- 
lish a slave-holding republic, and to break up the greatest 
experiment at successful democratic republican government 
which the world had ever seen. There was no adequate 
cause— indeed no cause whatever,— for the attempted se- 
cession ; and if successful, the movement would have been 
fraught with incalculable damage to all mankind. There- 
fore the two movements, though superficially alike, are in 
points of morality at opposite poles from each other, judged 
at the bar of history. 

''The revolution in Panama, or secession of Panama, is 
just like the secession of Greece from Turkey at the begin- 
ning of the last century, and of the other Christian States 
from Turkey later on in the century. Panama has suffered 
oppression for years. Not only was its secession justifi- 
able but if it had had the power it would not have been war- 
ranted m standing such oppression for twenty-four hours 
No body of men of courage and power, trained as you and 
1 and our fellow-citizens have been trained in self-govern- 
ment, m liberty, and in law-abiding habits, would submit 
tor one day to the oppression habitual under Colombian rule 
m Panama. 

''Finally, when Colombia, which had plundered Panama, 
and misgoverned and misruled her, declined to ratify the 
treaty tor the canal-which meant giving up Panama's last 



SECURING THE PANAMA CANAL 295 

hope — the people of Panama rose literally as one man. 
When once this rising had occurred our Government was 
bound by every consideration of honor and humanity, and 
of national and international interest, to take exactly the 
steps that it took.'* 

Several other letters, written at this time, testify to the 
sincerity of the President in the matter: 

To Samuel W. Small, Georgia: 

December 29, 1903. — "To my mind this building of the ca- 
nal through Panama will rank in kind, though not of course 
in degree, with the Louisiana Purchase and the acquisition 
of Texas. I can say with entire conscientiousness that if in 
order to get the treaty through and start building the canal 
it were necessary for me forthwith to retire definitely from 
politics, I should be only too glad to make the arrangement 
accordingly; for it is the amount done in office, and not 
length of time in office, that makes office worth having." 

To Charles F. Lummis, Los Angeles, Calif.: 

January 4, 1904. — '^No more cruel despotism outside of 
Turkey exists than that of the so-called Colombia Republic, 
under present political and ecclesiastical management. 
Turkey is worse, but I know of no other power that is as 
bad. To the worst characteristics of seventeenth century 
Spain, and of Spain at its worst under Philip II, Colombia 
has added a squalid savagery of its own, and has combined 
with exquisite nicety the worst forms of despotism and of 
anarchy, of violence and of fatuous weakness, of dismal 
ignorance, cruelty, treachery, greed, and utter vanity. I 
cannot feel much respect for such a country. 

" If I can do anything to make it better I shall try to, and 
try to in good faith. If there is any way I can help them 
build railways, even by an act of Congress granting money, 
I shall be glad to do it." 

To John Bigelow, New York: 

January 6, 1904. — ' ' Of course I have no idea what Bunau- 
Varilla advised the revolutionists, or what he said in any tel- 



296 



THEODORE ROOSEVELT AND HIS TIME \ 



egrams to them as to either Hay or myself; but I do know, of 
course, that he had no assurances in any way, either from 
Hay or myself, or from any one authorized to speak for us. 
He is a very able fellow, and it was his business to find out 
what he thought our Government would do. I have no doubt 
that he was able to make a very accurate guess, and to advise 
his people accordingly. In fact, he would have been a very 
dull man had he been unable to make such a guess." 

To Senator Lodge: 
January 6, 1904. — ''I was interested in one point Senator 
^ Morgan made. That is where he quoted Bunau-Varilla's 
article in Le Matin, September 2, and stated that it so fore- 
shadowed the course I actually took that undoubtedly either 
Hay or I must have inspired it — this was the substance of 
what he said. Now I am much pleased that he should have 
done this. MacVeagh and others have been threatening for 
some time to produce telegrams from Bunau-Varilla which 
would show such an exact knowledge of our movements, and 
even our intentions as regards sending ships to the Isthmus, 
keeping order upon it, and recognizing any revolutionary 
government, as to make it evident that he had received some 
assurances from us. Indeed, they have been saying that 
he had asserted in some telegram that he had received such 
assurances. Of course as I have said once for all, neither 
John Hay nor I, nor any one speaking for us, either directly 
or indirectly, gave such assurances or such information in 
any shape or way. But it is impossible for me to be sure 
what Bunau-Varilla has said or not said, and therefore I 
am particularly pleased that Morgan should have brought 
out this article in Le Matin. It really is a remarkable fore- 
cast of what we actually did, and yet on its face it shows 
that this forecast was prepared six weeks before Bunau- 
Varilla saw either Hay or me ; and, as a matter of fact, it 
appeared about a week before I called John Bassett Moore 
out to Oyster Bay and for the first time began definitely 
to formulate my policy even in my own mind. You see they 
have proved too much. They have proved that Bunau- 



SECURING THE PANAMA CANAL 297 

Varilla knew what we were going to do six weeks before he 
ever saw any of us and some little time before I had even 
begun myself to make up my mind what I should do." 

To Cecil Arthur Spring-Rice, British Foreign Office, 
London: 
January 18, 1904. — "I have been having most interesting 
times. I have succeeded in accomplishing a certain amount 
which I think will stand'. I believe I shall put through the 
Panama treaty (my worst foes being those in the Senate 
and not those outside of the borders of the United States) 
and begin to dig the canal. It is always difficult for me to 
reason with those solemn creatures of imperfect aspirations 
after righteousness, who never take the trouble to go below 
names. These people scream about the injustice done Co- 
lombia when Panama was released from its domination, 
which is precisely like bemoaning the wrong done to Turkey 
when Herzegovina was handed over to Austria. It was a 
good thing for Egypt and the Soudan, and for the world, 
when England took Egypt and the Soudan. It is a good 
thing for India that England should control it. And so it 
is a good thing, a very good thing, for Cuba and for Pan- 
ama and for the world that the United States has acted as 
it has actually done during the last six years. The people 
of the United States and the people of the Isthmus and the 
rest of mankind will all be the better because we dig the 
Panama Canal and keep order in its neighborhood. And 
the politicians and revolutionists at Bogota are entitled 
to precisely the amount of sympathy we extend to other 
inefficient bandits." 

Speaking at Dallas, Texas, on April 5, 1905, President 
Koosevelt said of his action : 

''Especially as regards what was done in Panama, I 
want to say that while I was most anxious to deserve the 
approval of my countrymen, and while I was very glad to 
be elected President, I would without one moment's hesita- 
tion have given up the second term in the Presidency rather 
than not to have begun the Panama Canal." 



298 THEODORE ROOSEVELT AND HIS TIME 

Secretary Hay was in hearty accord with every step of 
the President's course and joined with him in resenting and 
refuting the charge of ''conspiracy." Writing to James 
Ford Khodes, the historian, on December 8, 1903, the Sec- 
retary said: 

''It is hard for me to understand how any one can crit- 
icize our action in Panama on the grounds upon Avhich it 
is ordinarily attacked. The matter came to us with amaz- 
ing celerity. We had to decide on the instant whether we 
would take possession of the ends of the railroad and keep 
the traffic clear, or whether we would stand back and let 
those gentlemen cut each other's throats for an indefinite 
time, and destroy whatever remnant of our property and in- 
terests we had there. I had no hesitation as to the proper 
course to take, and have had no doubt of the propriety of 
it since." 

To General Reyes, the accredited representative of the 
Colombian Government, who, in a statement of grievances 
that he had sent to Secretary Hay, had spoken of "gross 
imputations upon the conduct and motives of the American 
Government" as having "appeared in reputable American 
newspapers," the Secretary replied: 

"The press in this country is entirely free, and as a nec- 
essary consequence represents substantially every phase of 
human activity, interest and disposition. Not only is the 
course of the Government in all matters subject to daily 
comment, but the motives of public men are as freely dis- 
cussed as their acts; and if, as sometimes happens, criti- 
cism proceeds to the point of calumny, the evil is left to 
work its own cure. Diplomatic representatives, however, 
are not supposed to seek in such sources material for ar- 
guments, much less for grave accusations. Any charge 
that this Government, or any responsible member of it, 
held intercourse, whether official or unofficial, with agents 
of revolution in Colombia, is utterly without justification. 

"Equally so is the insinuation that any action of this 
Government, prior to the revolution in Panama, was the 



SECURING THE PANAMA CANAL 299 

result of complicity with the plans of the revolutionists. 
The Department sees fit to make these denials and makes 
;hem finally. ' ' 



In the same reply, the Secretary also wrote : 
*'The Isthmus was threatened with desolation by another 
sivil war, nor were the rights and interests of the United 
States alone at stake, the interests of the whole civilized 
fw^orld were involved. The Republic of Panama stood for 
those interests ; the Government of Colombia opposed them. 
Compelled to choose between these two alternatives, the 
jGrovernment of the United States, in no wise responsible 
for the situation that had arisen, did not hesitate. It rec- 
jognized the independence of the Republic of Panama, and 
upon its judgment and action in the emergency the Powers 
of the world have set the seal of their approval. ' ' 

One especially insidious bit of ' * evidence ' ' which was cir- 
culated industriously for the purpose of showing that Sec- 
retary Hay had been a conspirator, was thus disposed of 
in a letter from the Secretary to Senator George F. Hoar 
on January 11, 1904 : 

''The President tells me that in a letter to him you refer 
to a newspaper publication to the effect that in discussing 
the subject of the coming revolution in Panama with a 
Mr. Duque, on his informing me that the revolution was to 
take place on the 23rd of September, I had said to him that 
that was too early, and it ought to be deferred. I now find 
the same statement copied from the Evening Post in a 
speech by Senator Morgan in the Senate. 

"It seems rather humiliating to be obliged to refer to 
such a story, but since you mentioned it to the President 
and since it seems to have made some impression upon 
your mind, I venture to say to you, confidentially, that I 
never saw Mr. Duque but once, thst I never saw him alone, 
and that nothing in the remotest degree resembling this 
printed conversation was ever said by either of us." 



300 THEODORE ROOSEVELT AND HIS TIME 

Writing to Professor George W. Fisher, of Yale Uni- 
versity, on January 30, Secretary Hay said: 

**I am sure that if the President had acted differently 
when, the 3rd of November, he was confronted by a critical I 
situation w^hich might easily have turned to disaster, the' 
attacks which are now made on him would have been ten 
times more virulent and more effective. He must have 
done exactly as he did, or the only alternative would have' 
been an indefinite duration of bloodshed and devastation! 
through the whole extent of the Isthmus. It was a time 
to act and not to theorize, and my judgment at least is clear 
that he acted rightly. ' * 

Finally, in an address, on July 6, 1904, which he made at' 
Jackson, Michigan, at a celebration of the Fiftieth Anni- 
versary of the Republican Party, Secretary Hay summed 
up the case as follows : 

''There has been more noise made over his (President' 
Roosevelt's) suddenness on the Isthmus of Panama than 
elsewhere. It is difficult to treat this charge with serious- 
ness. The President has made a treaty with Colombia at 
her own solicitation, which was infinitely to her advantage, 
to inaugurate an enterprise which was to be for the benefit 
of the world. He waited with endless patience while Bo- 
gota delayed and trifled with the matter, and finally re- 
jected it, and suggested new negotiations for a larger sum. 
Panama, outraged by this climax of the wrongs she had 
already suffered, declared and established her indepen- 
dence. The President, following an unbroken line of pre- 
cedents, entered into relations with the new Republic, and, 
obeying his duty to protect the transit of the Isthmus as 
all other Presidents had done before him, gave orders that 
there should be no bloodshed on the line of the railway. 
He said, like Grant, 'Let us have peace!' and we had it. 
It will seem incredible to posterity that any American could 
have objected to this. He acted wisely and beneficently, and 
all some people can find to criticize in his action is that he 
was too brisk about it. If a thing is right and proper to 



SECURING THE PANAMA CANAL 301 

do, it does not make it criminal to do it promptly. No, 
gentlemen! That was a time when the hour and the man 
arrived together. He struck while the iron was white hot 
on the anvil of opportunity, and forged as perfect a bit of 
honest statecraft as this generation has seen." 

A complete justification of the course pursued by the 
President was afforded by Elihu Root in an address which 
he delivered before the Union League Club of Chicago on 
February 22, 1904. In this address Mr. Root showed that 
under the Constitution of the United States of Colombia, 
adopted in 1863, the State of Panama had been vested with 
'' absolute and unqualified sovereignty"; that she had never 
legally lost this sovereignty but had been deprived of it by 
force in 1886 by Rafael Nunez, President of Colombia, who 
had declared that the "Constitution of 1863 no longer ex- 
ists." What Nunez did was thus described by Mr. Root; 

^ ' He put Panama under martial law, not during the civil 
war, but after its close, and appointed a governor of the 
state. He also appointed governors for the other states 
in the Confederation. He then directed these governors 
to appoint delegates to a constitutional convention ; and the 
delegates thus appointed framed what is known as the 
Constitution of 1886. The two delegates appointed to rep- 
resent Panama in this convention were residents of Bogota. 
Neither of them ever resided in Panama, and one of them 
never had set foot in Panama. The pretended constitution 
thus framed by the appointees of Nunez was declared to be 
adopted without compliance with a single one of the requi- 
sites prescribed by the Constitution of 1863 for its amend- 
ment. It robbed the people of Panama of every vestige of 
self-government. It gave them a governor to be appointed 
by the president at Bogota, and he, in turn, appointed all 
the administrative officers of the department. It left to 
the other states their legislatures, but it took away from 
Panama its legislature and subjected the Isthmus directly in 
all things to the legislative authority of the Congress at Bo- 
gota. It provided that the president might at any time, in 



302 THEODORE ROOSEVELT AND HIS TIME 

case of civil commotion, declare the public order to be dis- 
turbed, and that he should thereupon have authority to 
issue decrees having the force of legislative enactments. 
It gave him absolute power over the press and power to 
imprison or expatriate any citizen at will. It took away 
the property, the powers, the corporate existence, the civil 
organization of the state, and placed the property and the 
lives of its people absolutely under the authority and power 
of a single dictator in a distant capital with which there 
was no communication by land, and which it required longer 
to reach than it did to reach the city of Washington. This 
pretended constitution was never submitted to the people 
of Panama for their approval or rejection. It was never 
consented to by them.'* 

Concerning the efforts of the people of Panama to regain 
their lost sovereignty, Mr. Root said: 

''The people of Panama fought to exhaifstion in 1885 
to prevent the loss of their liberty and they were defeated 
through the action of the naval forces of the United States 
Three times since then they have risen in rebellion against 
their oppressors. 

*'In 1895 they arose and were suppressed by force; in 
1899 they arose again and for three years maintained a war 
for liberation, which ended in 1902 through the interposi 
tion of the United States by armed force. The rising of 
November, 1902, was the fourth attempt of this people to 
regain the rights of which they had been deprived by the 
usurpation of Nunez. The rejection of the canal treaty by 
the Bogota Congress was the final and overwhelming injury 
to the interests of Panama; the conclusive evidence of in- 
difference to her welfare and disregard of her wishes ; and 
it also created the opportunity for success in her persistent 
purpose to regain civil liberty; for it was plain that under 
the strained relations created by that rejection, the United 
States naturally would not exercise her authority again 
upon the Isthmus, as she had exercised it before, to aid the 
troops of Colombia. She was under no obligation to do so, 



SECURING THE PANAMA CANAL 303 

and she could not do so without aiding in the denial of her 
own rights and the destruction of her own interests. Upon 
that the people of Panama relied in their last attempt, and 
they relied upon it with reason.'* 

A most interesting and valuable part of Mr. Root's expo- 
sition is the following concerning the fraudulent character 
of the dictator who was ruling Colombia when the Hay- 
Bunau-Varilla treaty was rejected : 

*'In the meantime there had been a curious grafting of 
usurpation upon usurpation at Bogota. In 1898 M. A. San- 
clamente was elected president, and J. M. Maroquin, vice- 
president, of the republic of Colombia. It is true that there 
was no freedom of election. Our minister had reported of 
a preceding election : ' None but the soldiers, police, an(^ 
employees of the Government voted, thus making the vic- 
tory of the Government complete'; but there was a form of 
election, and Sanclamente became the only president there 
was, and Maroquin the vice-president. Article twenty-four 
of the Constitution of 1886 provided: 

** 'The vice-president of the republic shall perform the 
duties of the executive office during the temporary absence 
of the president. In case of the permanent absence of the 
president, the vice-president shall occupy the office of the 
president during the balance of the time for which he was 
elected. ' 

''On July 31, 1900, the vice-president, Maroquin, executed 
a coup d'etat, by seizing the person of the president, San- 
clamente, and imprisoning him at a place a few miles out- 
side of Bogota. Maroquin thereupon declared himself pos- 
sessed of the executive power because of the absence of the 
president. He then issued a decree that public order was 
disturbed, and, upon that ground, assumed to himself legis- 
lative power under another provision of the constitution, 
which I have already cited. Thenceforth, Maroquin, with- 
out the aid of any legislative body, ruled as the supreme 
executive, legislative, civil, and military authority in the 
so-called republic of Colombia. The absence of Sancla- 



304 THEODORE ROOSEVELT AND HIS TIME 

mente from the capital became permanent by his death in 
prison in the year 1902. When the people of Panama de- 
clared their independence in November last, no Congress 
had sat in Colombia since the year 1898, except the special 
Congress called by Maroquin to reject the canal treaty, and 
which did reject it by a unanimous vote, and adjourned 
without legislating on any other subject. The constitu- 
tion of 1886 had taken away from Panama the power of 
self-government and vested it in Colombia. The coup d'etat 
of Maroquin took away from Colombia herself the power of 
government and vested it in an irresponsible dictator." 

Summing up the whole matter, Mr. Boot said : 
*'The people of Panama were the real owners of the 
canal route ; it was because their fathers dwelt in the land, 
because they won their independence from Spain, because 
they organized a civil society there, that it was not to be 
treated as one of the waste places of the earth. They 
owned that part of the earth's surface just as much as the 
State of New York owns the Erie Canal. When the sover- 
eign state of Panama confederated itself with the other 
states of Colombia under the constitution of 18G3, it did 
not part with its title or its substantial rights, but consti- 
tuted the Federal Government its trustee for the represen- 
tation of its rights in all foreign relations, and imposed 
upon that Government the duty of protecting them. The 
trustee was faithless to its trust; it repudiated its obliga- 
tions without the consent of the true owner; it seized by 
the strong hand of military power the rights which it was 
bound to protect; Colombia herself broke the bonds ofi 
union and destroyed the compact upon which alone de- 
pended her right to represent the owner of the soil. The 
question for the United States was: Shall we take this 
treaty from the true owner or shall we take it from the 
faithless trustee, and for that purpose a third time put 
back the yoke of foreign domination upon the neck of Pan- 
ama, by the request of that Government which has tried to 
play toward us the part of the highwayman? There was 



SECURING THE PANAMA CANAL 305 

no provision of our treaty with Colombia which required 
us to answer to her call, for our guaranty of her sovereignty 
in that treaty relates solely to foreign aggression. There 
was no rule of international law which required us to recog- 
nize the wrongs of Panama or the justice of her cause, for 
international law does not concern itself with the internal 
affairs of states. But I put it to the conscience of the 
American people who are passing judgment upon the action 
of their Government, whether the decision of our President 
and Secretary of State and the Senate was not a righteous 
decision. 

**By all the principles of justice among men and among 
nations that we have learned from our fathers, and that all 
peoples and all governments should maintain, the revolu- 
tionists in Panama were right, the people of Panama were 
entitled to be free again, the Isthmus was theirs and they 
were entitled to govern it ; and it would have been a shame- 
ful thing for the Government of the United States to re- 
turn them again to servitude.*' 

It should be borne in mind that Mr. Root was not in the 
Cabinet at the time of the Panama incident and that his 
treatment of it was that of an impartial outside observer. 

After the Bunau-Varilla treaty had been sent to the Sen- 
ate, the President invited the leading Republican Senators 
to come to the White House for a consultation with him- 
self and Secretary Hay concerning it. When the Senators 
came they were found, almost to a man, to be in a hostile 
frame of mind, but after several hours of earnest discus- 
sion, they one by one came to the view of the President and 
Secretary and promised to support the treaty. As they 
were leaving, an eminent Senator from a Western State, 
noted for ability as an expert political balancer, said in a 
low tone to Hay: '*Do it, but be as gentle as you can with 
Colombia." ''Which," said Hay, in reporting the incident 
to me, ' ' reminded me of the instruction of the Western out- 
law chief : * Kill him, but kill him easy ! ' " 

The treaty was ratified by Panama on December 2, 1903. 



306 THEODORE ROOSEVELT AND HIS TIME 

It was sent to the United States Senate on December 7, and 
ratified by that body on February 23, 1904. It was ap- 
proved by President Eoosevelt on February 25, and pro- 
claimed on the following day. 

Closely following the ratification of the treaty by the 
Senate, the President appointed a Commission to take 
charge of the construction of the canal. The full history of 
his action in connection with the work is recorded in sub- 
sequent chapters. 

One of the President's final official utterances before 
leaving office was a special message to Congress on Decem- 
ber 16, 1908, in reference to certain newspaper assertions 
to the effect that there had been some corrupt action by or 
on behalf of the United States Government in connection 
with the acquisition of the title and property of the French 
Canal Company at Panama. It was charged that an Amer- 
ican syndicate had acquired the French Canal Company's 
property and had sold it to the United States Government 
at a ''huge profit" to the members of the syndicate, who 
included the President's brother-in-law, Douglas Robinson, 
and the President-elect's brother, Charles P. Taft. All the 
charges were shown subsequently to be absolutely without 
foundation. The President used vigorous language in his 
message, while setting forth in full all the established facts 
in the case, with citations from official records to support 
them. The charges had been published originally in the 
New York World, and in denouncing them the President 
said: 

''These stories as a matter of fact need no investigation 
whatever. No shadow of proof has been, or can be, pro- 
duced in behalf of any of them. They consist simply of a 
string of infamous libels. In form, they are in part libels 
upon individuals, upon Mr. Taft and Mr. Robinson, for in- 
stance. But they are, in fact, wholly, and in form partly, 
a libel upon the United States Government. I do not be- 
lieve we should concern ourselves with the particular indi- 
viduals who wrote the lying and libelous editorials, articles 
from correspondents, or articles in the news columns. 



SECURING THE PANAMA CANAL 307 

**The real offender is Mr. Joseph Pulitzer, editor and 
proprietor of the World. While the criminal offense of 
which Mr. Pulitzer has been guilty is in form a libel upon 
individuals, the great injury done is in blackening the good 
name of the American people. 

**It should not be left to a private citizen to sue Mr. Pu- 
litzer for libel. He should be prosecuted for libel by the 
governmental authorities. In point of encouragement of 
iniquity, in point of infamy, or wrongdoing, there is nothing 
to choose between a public servant who betrays his trust, 
a public servant who is guilty of blackmail, or theft, or 
financial dishonesty of any kind, and a man guilty as Mr. 
Joseph Pulitzer has been guilty in this instance. 

**It is therefore a high national duty to bring to justice 
this vilifier of the American people, this man who wantonly 
and wickedly and without one shadow of justification seeks 
to blacken the character of reputable private citizens and 
to convict the government of his own country in the eyes 
of the civilized world of wrongdoing of the basest and 
foulest kind, when he has not one shadow of justification of 
any sort or description for the charge he has made.'* 

Under the President's direction, Henry L. Stimson, 
United States District Attorney for the Southern District 
of New York, on March 4, 1909, filed an indictment in the 
Federal Court against the New York World for publish- 
ing the charges. The case was carried on by Henry A. 
Wise, Mr. Stimson 's successor, and a great deal of testi- 
mony was taken. The indictment was quashed, on February 
25, 1910, on the ground that the Federal Court did not have 
jurisdiction. In the course of the preparation for the trial 
the World sent a commission to Panama, accompanied by 
its lawyers, to try to discover evidence there that President 
Koosevelt and the Government were guilty of complicity in 
setting up the revolution. They failed utterly. No such 
evidence could be found. A memorandum of the testimony 
adduced, mainly by the defendants, which was prepared by 
the Assistant District Attorney who had conducted the 



308 THEODORE ROOSEVELT AND HIS TIME 

deposition and filed in the official records, concluded as fol- 
lows: 

* ' Not a word of testimony was introduced to show that ' 
any act by the United States Navy or Army which could be 
deemed interference or anything more than the carrying 
out of the policy which the Government has always pursued 
of keeping transit across the Isthmus free from disorder." 

In later years, after he had retired from the Presidency, 
Eoosevelt made several references to his course in secur- 
ing the canal at Panama which showed complete confidence 
in the justice of his acts. Speaking at Berkeley, California, 
on March 23, 1911, he said: *'I am interested in the Pan- 
ama Canal because I started it. If I had followed tradi- 
tional, conservative methods I should have submitted a dig- 
nified state paper of probably two hundred pages to Con- 
gress, and the debate on it would be going on yet; but I 
took the Canal Zone and let Congress debate and while the 
debate goes on the canal does too." The expression *'I 
took the Canal Zone ' ' aroused much comment and was con- 
strued by his critics as an admission that he had used arbi- 
trary and unjustifiable methods. That this criticism did 
not trouble him at all was shown in the following passage 
from an address that he delivered before the National Press 
Club in Washington on January 24, 1918 : 

''Panama declared itself independent and wanted to com- 
plete the Panama Canal, and opened negotiations with us. 
I had two courses open. I might have taken the matter 
under advisement and put it before the Senate, in which 
case we should have had a number of most able speeches 
on the subject. We would have had a number of very pro- 
found arguments, and they would have been going on now, 
and the Panama Canal would be in the dim future yet. We 
would have had a half century of discussion, and perhaps 
the Panama Canal. I preferred we should have the Pan- 
ama Canal first and the half century of discussion after- 
ward. And now instead of discussing the canal before it 
was built, which would have been harmful, they merely dis- 



SECURING THE PANAMA CANAL 309 

cuss me — a discussion whioli I regard with benign in- 
terest." 

While the criticism was irritating because of the natural 
unwillingness on the part of reputable men to give the dig- 
nity of denial to such base accusations, it was at no time 
seriously annoying to the President. Usually it was the 
subject of mirth with him and his official advisers for the 
Cabinet was a unit in support of his policy. A glimpse of 
the prevailing good-fellowship between the President and 
his associates is revealed in the following note to the Pres- 
ident from Secretary Hay on December 4, 1906 : 

''Can you receive Keyes to-morrow, Saturday? If so, at 
what hour 1 Permit me to observe, the sooner you see him, 
the sooner you can bid him good-by. 

"I have a complaint to make of Root. I told him I was 
going to see Reyes. He replied, 'Better look out I Ex- 
Reyes are dangerous.' 

"Do you think that, on my salary, I can afford to bear 
such things?*' 

A partial reopening of the controversy was caused by 
General Reyes in 1905, when he had become President of 
Colombia. He wrote a letter to President Roosevelt con- 
taining an assertion to which the latter replied as follows 
on February 20, 1905 : 

"I thank you for your confidential letter. Your quota- 
tion of me is substantially correct when you say that I ad- 
dressed you as follows on the occasion of your visit to me 
as Colombia's agent in the Panama matter: 

" 'If you had been President of Colombia you would have 
saved Panama, because you would have known how to safe- 
guard its rights and the interests of all and would have 
avoided the revolution which caused its secession from Co- 
lombia. In that case my Government could have helped 
Colombia to be one of the richest and most prosperous 
countries in South America.' 

"Like you, I desire to draw a veil over the past, but my 



310 THEODORE ROOSEVELT AND HIS TIME 

dear Mr. President, as you speak of your country as being 
deeply injured by my country do let me point out to you 
that in the words of my own quoted above I was endeavor- 
ing to show why I thought you would have saved Colombia 
from the trouble that befell her had you been President. 
This country, so far from wronging Colombia, made every 
possible effort to persuade Colombia to allow herself to be 
benefited, I cannot seem by remaining quiet to counte- 
nance for one moment the idea that this country did any- 
thing but show a spirit not merely of justice but of gener- 
osity in its dealings with Colombia. Had you been Presi- 
dent, I firmly believe that this spirit would have been met 
with a like spirit from Colombia, and that therefore Co- 
lombia, by the mere fact of ratifying the treaty agreed 
upon with the United States, would have prevented the rev- 
olution in Panama and would have itself become rich and 
prosperous. 

"You say you are lacking at present the means of ar- 
ranging in a decorous manner the pending questions be- 
tween Colombia, the United States, and Panama, and you 
ask me to do justice and thereby help you. Of course if I 
can help you in any way I will ; but, my dear Mr. President, 
I do not quite understand what it is expected we shall do. 
If the people of Panama desire to take a plebiscite as to 
whether or not they shall resume connection with Colombia, 
most emphatically I have no objections and will be delighted 
so to inform them; but I cannot press them unless they 
desire to do it. So about their assumption of a portion of 
Colombia's debt. We have stated that in our judgment 
this should be done by Panama and we are informed by 
their Minister here, Mr. Bunau-Varilla, that they intended 
to do so; but we cannot force them to do it. As for the 
purchase of the Islands, which I understand Colombia 
would like to sell to us, our Navy Department does not 
deem it to our interest to procure them, and I am very 
much afraid that a treaty for their purchase would not be 
approved by the Senate of the United States. 



SECURING THE PANAMA CANAL 311 



**I have shown your letter to Mr. Hay. I wish I could 
write you in a manner that would be more agreeable. 



>) 



"When, during the administration of President Wilson, a 
treaty was drawn up under which a payment of $25,000,000 
was to be made to Colombia, Mr. Roosevelt published an 
article denouncing it as a ''Blackmail Treaty" and travers- 
ing in detail the history of his proceedings in getting pos- 
session of the Isthmus of Panama. He made the same rev- 
elations in regard to the character and conduct of the fraud- 
ulent government of Columbia as are quoted in preceding 
pages from the address of Mr. Root. In closing he said: 
''The proposed treaty is a crime against the United States. 
It is an attack upon the honor of the United States which, 
if justified, would convict the United States of infamy. ' ' 

This article is published in full in the volume of Roose- 
velt's writings entitled "Fear God and Take Your Own 
Part." (George H. Doran Company, 1915.) 



CHAPTER XXVI 
NATIONAL CONVENTION AND CAMPAIGN OF 1904 

Although opposition to the President's nomination ceased 
with the elimination of Senator Hanna as a candidate at the 
time of the Ohio State Convention in June, 1903, a series of 
efforts was begun early in 1904 and continued for several 
months to induce him to give pledges or assurances of va- 
rious kinds in regard to the course he should pursue after 
election. Representatives of various interests that had 
been opposing his nomination visited him, assuring him 
that these interests had not objected to him as a man but 
had been uneasy lest he pursue to extremes certain policies 
which they regarded as disturbing and harmful. A\Tiat 
these representatives desired was the authority to say to 
the interests that, when reelected, he would consult them 
about all important matters and be guided by their counsel. 
They were afraid that if they could not give this assurance 
it would be difficult if not impossible to raise a campaign 
fund. 

The President listened to all of them and to all made the 
same reply. He could only promise to proceed in the future 
as he had acted in the past; that he should always consult 
the leaders of his party and others whose opinion it was 
desirable to have, but when the time for action came, he 
must follow his own judgment and conscience ; that so far 
as a campaign fund was concerned, if one could not be 
raised, the campaign must be conducted without it. 

Later, when the campaign opened a curious mental con- 
dition was revealed. The managers of the campaign made 
no request for contributions from people who had been 

312 



NATIONAL CONVENTION AND CAMPAIGN OF 1904 313 

most bitter in their denunciation of the President's poli- 
cies. These at once complained because they had not been 
called upon, asking if failure to do so meant that they were 
to be proceeded against after election. One quite promi- 
nent financial magnate, who had been especially vehement 
in denunciation, called upon the managers, and asked: 
''What does this mean? Why have I not been asked to 
contribute! Have I not just as much right to contribute 
as anybody else? Am I to be discriminated against after 
election?" 

These inquiries revealed in a striking manner the concep- 
tion as to the real nature of campaign contributions which 
had prevailed previous to the advent of Theodore Roose- 
velt in public office. Such contributions were regarded as 
purchasing favors of various kinds after election. Roose- 
velt had encountered and combated this view when he was 
Governor of New York, and he was about to encounter and 
combat it in his approaching Presidential campaign. Be- 
fore that campaign ended, it was made clear to all men that 
the old view of contributions had passed away and, so far 
as Roosevelt was concerned, a new one had taken its place. 

While the efforts to extort concessions of one kind or 
another were in progress in the winter of 1904, the Pres- 
ident, on January 27, wrote to a friend who had knowledge 
of what was going on : 

"To use the vernacular of our adopted West, you can bet 
your bedrock dollar that if I go down it will be with colors 
flying and drums beating, and that I would neither truckle 
nor trade with any of the opposition if to do so guaranteed 
me the nomination and election. In the first place, I be- 
lieve I shall win. In the next place, and what is infinitely 
more important, — I am going to fight it out on the line I 
have chosen without deviating a hair's breadth from it, win 
or lose ; for I am sure that the policies for which I stand are 
those in accordance with which this country must be gov- 
erned, and up to which we must all of us live in public or 
private life, under penalty of grave disaster to the Nation. ' ' 



314 THEODORE ROOSEVELT AND HIS TIME 

That he felt reasonably assured of the nomination at 
this time is shown in a letter to Dr. Albert Shaw, on Jan- 
uary 30, 1904: 

''In confidence, I can tell you that outside all the South- 
ern States I am now as certain as I well can be that if 
Hanna made the fight (for the nomination), and with all 
the money of Wall Street behind him, he would get the ma- 
jority of the delegation from no State excepting Ohio ; and 
from the South I should have from a third to a half of the 
delegates, and most of the remainder would have been 
pledged to me and would have to be purchased outright 
against me. I believe that the best advisers among my op- 
ponents themselves see this and have very nearly made up 
their minds to give up the contest. In a few weeks I think 
that most of the Wall Street Republicans will have con- 
cluded that they have to, however grudgingly, support me. 
So much do I believe this that I am a little uneasy lest our 
opponents may raise the cry that I have made terms with 
them. Fortunately, my nomination has become assured, 
in my judgment, before they give up the contest. Besides, 
I do not think even such rather thick-headed people as my 
opponents would venture to try to make terms with me 
now, although there was a tentative effort in that direction 
in October and November last. I shall treat them with 
scrupulous fairness, anyhow, and in no event would I have 
done either more or less." 

There was much speculation at this period about prob- 
able Democratic candidates in opposition to Eoosevelt, and 
considerable sentiment in favor of Judge Gray, of Dela- 
ware, whom Roosevelt had placed at the head of the An- 
thracite Coal Strike Commission. Writing to me on the 
subject on February 8, 1904, the President made what 
proved later to be genuine prophecy : " I do not think the 
Democrats will nominate Gray. In the first place he is 
too good a fellow, and in the next place it would be an 
absurdity to run him against the Republican party when 



NATIONAL CONVENTION AND CAMPAIGN OF 1904 315 

he owes his position to one Republican President and his 
prominence to another one." 

In February, 1904, Senator Hanna, who had been in fail- 
ing health for some time, died quite suddenly. "Writing to 
Elihu Root, on February 16, 1904, the President gave this 
sympathetic estimate of his character: 

'' Hanna 's death has been very sad. Did I tell you the 
last letter he wrote was one to me I As soon as he was seri- 
ously sick I called at the hotel, as a matter of course. For 
some inexplicable reason this affected him very much, and 
appealed to the generous and large-hearted side of his na- 
ture, and he at once sent me a pencil note, running as fol- 
lows: 

My dear Mr. President: 

You touched a tender spot, old man, when you called 
personally to inquire after me this a. m. I may be worse 
before I can be better, but all the same such ''drops" of 
kindness are good for a fellow. 

Sincerely yours, 

M. A. Hanna. 
Friday, p. m. 

*'No man had larger traits than Hanna. He was a big 
man in every way and as forceful a personality as we have 
seen in public life in our generation. I think that not merely 
for myself, but the whole party and the whole country have 
reason to be very grateful to him for the way in which, 
after I came into office, under circumstances which were 
very hard for him, he resolutely declined to be drawn into 
the position which a smaller man of meaner cast would 
inevitably have taken ; that is, the position of antagonizing 
public policies if I was identified with them. He could have 
caused the widest disaster to the country and the public 
if he had attacked and opposed the policies referring to 
Panama, the Philippines, Cuban reciprocity. Army reform, 
the Navy, and the legislation for regulating corporations. 



316 THEODORE ROOSEVELT AND HIS TIME 

But he stood by them just as loyally as if I had been 
McKinley." 

In accordance with his invariable habit when a candidate 
for oflfice, the President studiously avoided taking a too 
sanguine view of his prospects. "Writing on April 4, 1904, 
to Henry White in London, he said : 

''Nobody can tell how this fight will come out. I have 
been astonishingly successful in getting through the policies 
in which I believe, and in achieving results ; but often the 
mere fact of having a good deal of record is more against 
a man than for him, when the question is as to how people 
will vote ; for my experience is that usually people are more 
apt to let their dislikes than their likings cause them to 
break away from their party ties in matters of voting. In 
other words, the people of the opposite party who like what 
I have done are less apt for that reason to leave their can- 
didate than the people of my o\sti party who dislike what 
I have done are apt to leave me. Politicians proverbially 
like a colorless candidate, and the very success of what I 
have done, the number of things I have accomplished, and 
the extent of my record, may prove to be against me. How- 
ever, be that as it may, we now have a big sum of achieve- 
ment to our credit," 

Senator Hanna's death had left the National Republican 
Committee without a chairman, and an animated contest 
was begun almost immediately over the choice of a succes- 
sor. The extreme partisan elements of the party were 
eager to have one of their own number selected for the posi- 
tion and urged their wishes upon the President with great 
persistency. He, on his part, was determined that no man 
should be selected who would be likely to give pledges dur- 
ing the campaign which he would be called upon to carry 
out after election. According to his custom he sought advice 
and suggestion from men of all shades of opinion. I was 
on one occasion in Washington when a number of per- 



NATIONAL CONVENTION AND CAMPAIGN OF 1904 317 

sons of diverse political views were present. Don Cam- 
eron, the veteran Republican politician and leader of Penn- 
sylvania, was one of the number and was earnestly advo- 
cating the selection of an astute and experienced politician 
from his own State. He took me aside, and standing very 
close to me said with really solemn intensity: ''I like and 
admire the President. He is a very remarkable man, but 
he does some extraordinary things. Now, Mr. Bishop, I am 
71 years old ; I have been in politics 70 years ; and the Presi- 
dent asks me to confer, on the question of a chairman of the 
Republican National Committee, with Nicholas Murray 
Butler, the President of Columbia University! Now what 
do you think of that?" Mr. Cameron's feeling toward 
amateur politicians was shared by all other professionals 
of his kind, but the President was merely doing what he 
had done many times before, conferring with persons of all 
varieties of opinion, and the professionals should have been 
used to it, though as a matter of fact they were never able to 
comprehend it, or to contemplate it with equanimity. In 
the end, the President made his own choice and selected a 
man in whom he was sure he could plaoe absolute confi- 
dence — George B. Cortelyou, his former secretary and, at 
the time, Secretary of Commerce and Labor. The selec- 
tion was opposed vehemently by Senator Piatt of New 
York and others of the most powerful bosses of the party, 
but in vain. They could not budge the President from his 
choice, or even disturb him a particle. Writing to Senator 
Lodge, on May 28, 1904, he said : 

'*I am not in the least worried about the discontent on 
the part of some of the political leaders with Cortelyou. 
As Murray Crane and Root could not take it, Cortelyou was 
the man of all others to have it, and these people will in 
the end find out that this is so. He will manage the can- 
vass on a capable and also on an absolutely clean basis, and 
my canvass cannot be managed on any other lines either 
with propriety or with advantage. If I win at all this year 
it will be because the bulk of the people believe I am a 
straightforward, decent and efficient man, upon whose cour- 



318 THEODORE ROOSEVELT AND HIS TIME 

age and common sense no less than upon whose honesty and 
energy they can depend." 

The appointment of Mr. Cortelyou to the chairmanship 
of the Republican National Committee was followed by his 
resignation as head of the Department of Commerce and 
Labor, and the resignation of Attorney General Knox, who 
had been elected United States Senator by Pennsylvania, 
led to several changes in the Cabinet in June. Mr. Cortel- 
you was succeeded by Victor L. Metcalf ; William H. Moody, 
who was Secretary of the Xavy, succeeded Mr. Knox as 
Attorney General, and Paul Morton succeeded Mr. Moody 
as Secretary of the NTavy. 

In accepting Mr. Knox's resignation, the President wrote 
on June 23, 1904: 

''I accept your resignation not only with keen personal 
regret, but with a very real feeling of the loss the country 
thereby sustains. . . . There is nothing that I can say 
which will in any way add to the reputation which you 
have won, and no tribute I can pay you will approach in 
value that already paid you by the hearty admiration and 
respect of your fellow citizens. . . . Many great and able 
men have preceded you in the office you hold ; but there is 
none among them whose administration has left so deep 
a mark for good upon the country's development. Under 
you it has been literally true that the mightiest and the 
humblest in the land have alike had it brought home to 
them, that each was sure of the law's protection while he 
did right, and that neither could hope to defy the law if 
he did wrong. ' ' 

In March, 1904, the President aroused a great storm of 
criticism and denunciation from the chronic opponents of 
his policies by establishing, through executive order, a ser- 
vice pension of six dollars a month for all veterans of the 
Civil War between the ages of 62 and 70 years. It was 
claimed by his critics that in doing this by executive order 
he was guilty of a ''flagrant usurpation" of the legislative 



NATIONAL CONVENTION AND CAMPAIGN OF 1904 319 

powers of Congress. In explanation and justification of 
\ his act, the President, on May 28, 1904, wrote a long letter 
I to his friend, Frederick W. Whitridge, of New York, in 
I which he said : 

'*I shall write you so that you may know exactly the facts 
about the pension order. There were two sides to the 
matter. The first was the situation I had to face as re- 
gards the party in Congress. The second was the moral 
t justification of what was actually done. When Congress 
; met I found that the feeling was overwhelmingly for a full 
i service pension — that is, $12 a month, beginning at the age 
of 62. This was the pension granted by President Cleve- 
' land and a Democratic House to the Mexican War veterans 
thirty-nine years after the close of the Mexican War, and 
! the argument by analogy seemed very strong, namely, that 
I if men, many of whom afterwards served against the Union, 
: were entitled to $12 a month at the age of sixty-two, thirty- 
nine years after the close of the Mexican War, then thirty- 
i nine years after the close of an infinitely greater and more 
righteous war the Union veterans were entitled to the same 
privilege. Moreover, I soon found that Congi-ess was 
nearly a unit for the Service Pension bill. If allowed to 
get under way unchecked the bill would undoubtedly have 
passed both houses with substantial unanimity, and if I 
had vetoed it I could not have rallied more than a tenth 
of the House nor more than a fifth of the members of the 
Senate to my support ; and I should have hated to veto it. 
I should have preferred to let them pass a bill authorizing 
me to do exactly what I did by executive order. But with- 
! out exception the responsible leaders of both houses as- 
sured me that it was out of the question to prevent any 
such bill from being so amended as to carry some fifty mil- 
lions a year instead of the five million which will actually 
be carried by what was done. 

"I found that President Cleveland had established the 
rule that a man who was seventy-five years old should be 
treated as by that fact having reached the stage of complete 
disability, and being therefore entitled to $12 a month pen- 



320 THEODORE ROOSEVELT AND HIS TIME 

sion. I found that Pension Commissioner H. Clay Evans, 
under President McKinley, had established the age of sixty- 
five as similarly entitling a veteran to six dollars a month, 
on the ground that he was similarly disabled to the extent 
of one-half from earning his living. What I did was to take 
these two rates and make the limit sixty-two and seventy 
years respectively, instead of sixty-five and seventy-five, 
which they actually were — treating the age as an evidential 
fact — as a rebuttable presumption of half and complete 
physical disability. Inasmuch as nearly eighty per cent of 
the veterans are already pensioned, and as I was establish- 
ing not $12 but $6, this meant an increase of but one-tenth, 
of what the proposed Service Pension bill would have cost. 
'*So much for the technical argument. I do not, how- 
ever, rest the case on this. I hold that the ruling was abso- 
lutely right and proper. Most of our friends who live 
softly do not understand that the great majority of people 
who live by hard manual labor have begun to find their 
wage-earning capacity seriously impaired by the time they 
are sixty. The man of sixty-two has on the average great 
diflBculty in getting a new job anywhere if he is dependent 
upon the labor of his hands. . . . Now the average wage 
worker does not lay by enough money to lieep him in his 
old age, and when he has fought in the Civil War I am en- 
tirely willing that he shall be cared for to the extent indi- 
cated in my order. '^ 

The Eepublican National Convention assembled in Chi- 
cago on June 21, 1904, and on the following day the country 
was given an inspiring illustration of the Roosevelt method 
of diplomacy in the protection of American citizens in for- 
eign lands. An American citizen. Ion H. Perdicaris, had 
been seized by a Moroccan bandit named Eaizuli, and held 
for ransom. To all demands from the American consul for 
the release of the prisoner Raizuli replied that unless the 
money demanded was speedily paid he would kill him. On 
June 22, Secretary Hay, after consultation with the Presi- 
dent, cabled to j;he American consul, Mr. Gummere: ''We 



NATIONAL CONVENTION AND CAMPAIGN OF 1904 321 

want Perdicaris alive or Raizuli dead," adding that Gum- 
mere was not to commit the American Government about 
landing marines or seizing the custom house at Tangier. 
This cable message was published during the session of the 
convention on June 22, and the effect produced was thus 
described by the correspondent of the New York Tribune: 

*' Perdicaris alive or Raizuli dead" went through the 
Convention like an electric thrill, and it was more talked 
about at night than any feature of the day's work. The pre- 
vailing impression was that if Secretary Hay had sent the 
telegram it was after consultation with the President, and 
that there must have been ample justification. 

*'It is pithy, pungent and peremptory. I like it, and so 
do the people," said Senator McComas, of Maryland. 

**It is the kind of a telegram," said Senator Spooner, of 
Wisconsin, *Hhat touches a popular chord. This Govern- 
ment is bound to protect its citizens abroad as well as at 
home. ' ' 

"The American people will not back down on a mes- 
sage of that kind," said Representative Grosvenor, of 
Ohio. ' ' It may not be exactly in diplomatic words, but its 
meaning is unmistakable. The people are quick to respond 
when their patriotism is appealed to. The Morocco bandit 
will find that there is a united sentiment supporting the 
President and Secretary in the stand they have taken." 

**It was good, hot stuff, and echoed my sentiments," said 
Congressman Dwight, of New York. ' * The people want an 
administration that will stand by its citizens, even if it 
takes a fleet to do it." 

''It was magnificent — ^magnificent!" said Senator Depew. 
*' Every right-minded American will heartily indorse Mr. 
Hay's strong stand." 

''Do I like it?" exclaimed W. A. Elstun, of Kansas, one 
of the delegates. "Bet your bottom dollar I like it. Roose- 
velt is behind that cable message to that fine old body- 
snatcher Raizuli. Out in Kansas we believe in keeping the 
peace but in fighting against wrong. Roosevelt and Hay 



322 THEODORE ROOSEVELT AND HIS TIME 

know what tliey are doing. Our people like courage. We'll ; 
stand for anything those two men do." 

Three entries in the diary of Secretary Hay, made at the 
time, reveal the result of the peremptory cable message : 

June 23. My telegram to Gummere had an uncalled-for 
success. It is curious how a concise impropriety hits the 
public. 

June 24. Gummere telegraphs that he expects Perdi- 
caris to-night. 

June 27. Perdicaris wires his thanks. 

On the following day Eoosevelt, who was the only candi- 
date before the Convention, was nominated by acclamation, 
being the only man in our history, who had acceded to the 
Presidency through the death of the incumbent, to be so 
honored. 

Writing to Roosevelt from Clinton, N. Y., under date of 
July 12, 1904, Elihu Root, who as Secretary of War during 
the three years that Roosevelt had been President had inti- 
mate personal knowledge of his conduct of the office, said : 

**I haven't congratulated you on your nomination. I felt 
as if it would be a foolish formality. There are, however, 
some features of it that are very gratifying. 

*'l. This is the first time that any party has nominated 
to succeed himself a Vice President who had become Presi- 
dent. 

* ' 2. This is the first time that the Republican party ever 
nominated for President a citizen of the State of New 
York. 

''3. It was a People's nomination and not a managers'. 
Every attempt at bargain or deal or combination was the 
other way and failed. 

"4. The opposition has passed over every man who has 
made a record against your policy or action and has nomi- 
nated a man who never opened his mouth on any national 
question. 

**No one who has antagonized or criticized your admin- 



NATIONAL CONVENTION AND CAMPAIGN OF 1904 323 

istration has made sufficient effect on the public mind to 
establish any claim to the Democratic nomination. 

''I have no doubt about the election, but however that 
results you have made a success and it cannot be Tv^iped 
off the book. And you have done it yourself. Others have 
helped you, but your personality has been the Adminis- 
tration. ' ' 

From the moment of his nomination till election day in 
November the Republican canvass was conducted on Roose- 
velt's acts in office and on the principles upon which those 
acts were based. He was formally notified of his nomina- 
tion on July 27, 1904, and in a brief speech of acceptance 
he reviewed the most conspicuous acts of his administra- 
tion, giving this emphatic and uncompromising statement 
of his position on the questions of corporations and labor: 

''We recognize the organization of capital and the organ- 
ization of labor as natural outcomes of our industrial sys- 
tem. Each kind of organization is to be favored so long 
as it acts in a spirit of justice and of regard for the rights 
of others. Each is to be granted the full protection of the 
law, and each in turn is to be held to a strict obedience to 
the law ; for no man is above it and no man below it. The 
humblest individual is to have his rights safeguarded as 
scrupulously as those of the strongest organization, for 
each is to receive justice, no more and no less. The prob- 
lems with which we have to deal in our modern industrial 
and social life are manifold; but the spirit in which it is 
necessary to approach their solution is simply the spirit of 
honesty, of courage, and of common-sense." 

His formal letter of acceptance was published on Septem- 
ber 12, 1904, and became at once the text book and chief 
source of inspiration of his party in the canvass. In it he 
passed in review all the acts of his administration which 
had been most severely criticized, including the Northern 
Securities suit, the Anthracite Coal Strike settlement, and 
the possession of the Isthmus for the Panama Canal, and 



324 THEODORE ROOSEVELT AND HIS TIME 

cliallenged the Democrats to join issue on them before the 
people. The challenge was never met. Although it had 
been the expectation of the Republican managers that these 
three acts would be the chief issues of the campaign, the 
Democratic managers sedulously avoided them, thereby 
making confession that popular support had been won for 
them by the President. 

Early in the campaign, a few weeks after Judge Alton 
B. Parker had been nominated as the Democratic candidate 
and had set forth his views and principles, a temporary 
alarm was caused in the Republican camp by the sudden and 
entirely unexpected declaration of the New York Sim on 
August 11, 1904, that it was in favor of Roosevelt in pref- 
erence to Parker. As that journal had been the most ven- 
omous of all the President's critics in condemning his 
course toward corporations and trusts, the Republican 
managers were alarmed lest its sudden ''flop" might give 
the impression that a compromise of some sort had been 
arranged through which the support of the ''Wall-Street 
crowd" had been secured for Roosevelt. The manner of 
the Sun's declaration gave a semblance of color to this 
possible view, for it read : 

"As the case is now made up, we prefer the impulsive 
candidate of the party of conservatism to the mildly con- 
servative, temporizing opportunist representative of the 
Hun vote in the background. We have more faith in the 
distinct promises of the Chicago platform, not ignoring the 
many serious defects of that document, than we have in 
the miserable hell broth of disaster and djTiamite concocted 
at St. Louis a month ago by a party afraid to renounce its 
criminal follies, and tasted yesterday at Esopus by a re- 
spectable candidate, who declares with gusto that its flavor 
is admirable." 

On the date on which the Swn article appeared the Presi- 
dent wrote to Mr. Cortelyou, chairman of the Republican 
National Committee : 

"I know the stress you are under, but as regards this 



NATIONAL CONVENTION AND CAMPAIGN OF 1904 325 

Northern Securities business no stress must make us go 
one hand's breadth out of our path. I should hate to be 
beaten in this contest; but I should not merely hate, I should 
not be able to bear being beaten under circumstances which 
implied ignominy. To give any color for misrepresentation 
to the effect that we were now weakening in the Northern 
Securities matter would be ruinous. The Northern Secur- 
ities suit is one of the great achievements of my adminis- 
tration. I look back upon it with great pride, for through 
it we emphasize in signal fashion, as in no other way could 
be emphasized, the fact that the most powerful men in this 
country were held to accountability before the law. Now 
we must not spoil the effect of this lesson." 

To this letter Mr. Gortelyou replied at once in a letter 
in which he said : 

**I have your letter of August 11 about the Northern 
Securities matter. If I did not know you as well as I do 
I should resent your sending me such a communication. 
Whatever may be my shortcomings — and they are many — 
I think I have a fair degree of moral fiber, certainly enough 
to measure up' to the requirements of this Northern Se- 
curities case. I am conducting this campaign for your re- 
election on as high a plane as you have conducted the af- 
fairs of your great office. It is not likely that one who has 
been so intimately associated with you, or who has so much 
at heart your welfare and success, would permit any con- 
sideration whatever to weaken the force and effect of the 
splendid achievements of your administration." 

As I have mentioned, Roosevelt's formal letter of accep- 
tance was published on September 12, 1904, and on the same 
date the election in Maine resulted in favor of the Republi- 
cans. Secretary Hay expressed his keen pleasure in regard 
to the two events in a joyful letter from his summer resi- 
dence in Newbury, N. H., on September 13, 1904 : 

"Well, my dear Theodore, you had two glorious victories 
yesterday. Your letter had been getting better and better 



326 THEODORE ROOSEVELT AND HIS TIME 

since I saw it, and~it is now what they call a whirlwind 
campaign in itself. It is magnificent — not only in sub- 
stance but in tone and temper. It has the unmistakable 
air of a winner, — the force as well as the reserve authority. 
^'And Maine^ — we have heard how she went. 

She went, by gob, 
For Governor Cobb, 
And Roosevelt and 
Fairbanks too. 

'*! judge from the tone of our friends the enemy that 
they are losing all heart and hope. I am getting sorry for 
Parker ; they will turn and rend him before long. I do not 
doubt he already wishes that comfortable judgeship back 
again. 

"Everything they do is ridiculous. But their rally in 
defense of the Constitution is most absurd of all. One of 
these days they will be saying it is unconstitutional to read 
the Constitution." 



Roosevelt's views on the art of painting were set forth 
in a letter to P. Marcius Simons, an American artist whose 
works he greatly admired, three specimens of which hang in 
prominent positions in his Trophy Room at Oyster Bay. 
Writing to Mr. Simons, on March 19, 1904, he said : 

''Your letter pleased and interested me much. The first 
work I saw of yours was the 'Seats of the Mighty,' and it 
impressed me so powerfully that I have ever since eagerly 
sought out any of your pictures of which I heard. When 
I became President, Mrs. Roosevelt and I made up our 
minds that while I was President we would indulge our- 
selves in the purchase of one really first-class piece of 
American art — for we are people whom the respective sizes 
of our family and our income have never warranted in 
making such a purchase while I was in private life! As 
soon as we saw 'When Light and Shadow Meet' we made 
up our minds at once and without speaking to one another 
that at last we had seen the very thing we wanted. 



NATIONAL CONVENTION AND CAMPAIGN OF 1904 327 

''Mrs. Roosevelt and I feel that in your letter you have 
expressed much which we have felt but not formulated. I 
agree absolutely with you that art, or at least the art for 
which I care, must present the ideal through the tempera- 
ment and the interpretation of the painter. I do not greatly 
care for the reproduction of landscapes which, in effect, I 
see whenever I ride or walk. I wish 'the light that never 
was on land or sea' in the pictures that I am to live with — 
and this light your paintings have. When I look at them 
I feel a lift in my soul ; I feel my imagination stirred. And 
so, dear Mr. Simons, I believe in you as an artist and I am 
proud of you as an American." 



CHAPTER XXVII 

ATTITUDE TOWARD CAMPAIGN CONTRIBUTIONS- 
JUDGE PARKER'S CHARGES 

A LETTEB which throws interesting light upon the attitude 
of the President and Mr. Cortelyou toward campaign con- 
tributions was the following from the President to Dr. 
Lyman Abbott on October 7, 1904: 

"A week ago this Monday Cortelyou was on here, and 
he then said to me that if I was elected I would be elected 
without a promise or pledge of any kind, express or im- 
plied, to any corporation or indiyidual. He told me of two 
or three amusing instances of efforts to get some kind of 
assurance from him, to which his invariable answer was 
that they could count upon just treatment — upon my doing 
nothing that I did not regard as fair and right; but that 
there must be no misapprehension as to my purpose to go 
steadily forward along the lines which had marked our 
course for the last three years. Then a concrete instance 
came up of the way in which he was handling things. You 
may have noticed that I had to decide the Customs Stamp 
Cigar question. After careful consideration I found that 
my decision had to be against the so-called Tobacco Trust, 
and in favor of the Independent Tobacco Manufacturers. 

'* Cortelyou had hoped that I would not have to make the 
decision, as from the political standpoint at this stage of 
the campaign, it was sure to cause irritation whichever way 
it went. I told him, however, that I had looked into the 
matter very carefully, and had gone over it with Taft and 
Moody, and we had come to the conclusion that there was 
but one way we could decide and that was in favor of the 
Independent Tobacco men. He said very well; that he 
wished to know at once, because under such circumstances 

328 



ATTITUDE TOWARD CAMPAIGN CONTRIBUTIONS 329 

he could not accept any contribution from the Independent 
' Tobacco men, for we must not be put in a position where 
it could be falsely alleged that we got any qmd pro quo for 
such a decision. 

*'It seemed to me that this action of his emphasized the 
distinction between the campaign he was running and the 
campaign most others had run in like circumstances.'* 

Most illuminating of all are these two letters from the 
President to Mr. Cortelyou, written near the close of the 
campaign : 

"I have just been informed that the Standard Oil people 
have contributed $100,000 to our campaign fund. This may 
be entirely untrue. But if true I must ask you to direct 

' that the money be returned to them forthwith. I appre- 
ciate to the full the need of funds to pay the legitimate and 

. necessarily great expenses of the campaign. I appreciate 
to the full the fact that under no circumstances will we re- 

I ceive half as much as was received by the National Com- 

I mittee in 1900 and 1896. Moreover, it is entirely legitimate 
to accept contributions, no matter how large they are, from 
individuals and corporations on the terms on which I hap- 
pen to know that you have accepted them, that is, with the 
explicit understanding that they were given and received 
with no thought of any more obligation on the part of the 
National Committee or of the national administration than 
is implied in the statement that every man shall receive a 
square deal, no more and no less, and that this I shall guar- 
antee him in any event to the best of my ability. 

i "The big business corporations have a tremendous stake 
in the welfare of this country. They know that this wel- 
fare can only be secured through the continuance in power 
of the Republican party ; and if they subscribe for the pur- 
pose of securing such national welfare, and with no thought 
of personal favors to them, why they are acting as is en- 
tirely proper; but we cannot under any circumstances af- 
ford to take a contribution which can be even improperly 
construed as putting us under an improper obligation, and 



330 THEODORE ROOSEVELT AND HIS TIME 

in view of my past relations with tlie Standard Oil Com- 
pany I fear that such a construction will be put upon re- 
, ceiving any aid from them. In returning the money to them 
I wish it made clear to them that there is not the slightest 
personal feeling against them, and that they can count upon 
being treated exactly as well by the administration, exactly 
as fairly, as if we had accepted the contribution. They 
shall not suffer in any way because we refused it, just as 
they would not have gained in any way if we had accepted 
it. But I am not willing that it should be accepted, and 
must ask that you tell Mr. Bliss to return it." 

October 27, 1904. 

**As supplemental to my letter of yesterday, containing 
my request that any contribution which the Standard Oil 
people may have made to the campaign be immediately re- 
turned, I wish to add that my judgment as to the propriety 
of this action is confirmed because of the fact brought into 
especial prominence by the Standard Oil Company's publi- 
cation in the newspapers (which I saw after my letter was 
written and sent) that much importance seems to be at- 
tached to the political attitude of this company. Further- 
more, in view of the open and pronounced opposition of the 
Standard Oil Company to the establishment of the Bureau 
of Corporations, one of the most important accomplish- 
ments of my administration, I do not feel willing to accept 
its aid. I request, therefore, that the contribution be re- 
turned without further delay. 

*'0f course I do not wish any public statement made 
about this matter, nor to take any step that will seem as if 
I were casting any reflection upon the Standard Oil people 
or their motives in making the contribution. ' ' 

Eoosevelt supposed that his wishes in regard to any 
contribution which the Standard Oil Company might have 
made had been complied with by the National Committee, 
and it was not until four years later (September, 1908) 
that he learned the truth about the matter. It was then 
made known to him that no contribution had been made 



ATTITUDE TOWARD CAMPAIGN CONTRIBUTIONS 331 

by the company or in its behalf but that H. H. Rogers had 
contributed $100,000, and had made it as his personal con- 
tribution ; that the treasurer of the Committee, not wishing 
to offend him by refusing it, had not sent it back, and had 
not informed Mr. Roosevelt of his action in regard to it. 
(See Chapter IX, Vol. II.) 

A glimpse at the humorous aspects of the campaign is 
given in this letter from the President to Secretary Hay 
on August 12, 1904: 

''Some of the developments of this campaign are too 
deliciously funny for anything. A couple of deliciously 
unconscious portrayals of this state of things were recent- 
ly furnished me, one by B., an ex- Congressman, a Gold 
Democrat of Indiana, and the other by D., the Republican 
sub-boss from Brooklyn. B. came to me out of the kindness 
of his heart, to reassure me, and said in entire good faith: 
'Mr. President, Taggart is not nearly so formidable as 
these men think ; for aside from the money he has obtained 
from his gambling houses, most of his fortune has come 
from moneys he has received f-or running campaigns, which 
he has kept for his own purposes. He is a very expensive 
campaign manager, and always keeps for himself a large 
proportion of the funds placed in his hands. I think this 
will offset the fact that he will probably get much more 
money this year than the Democrats have obtained for a 
long time.' 

"D. called me aside, and in great secrecy told me as fol- 
lows: 'On Monday night Tim Sullivan (Dry Dollar Sulli- 
van, a Tammany leader who has always been fond of me, 
partly because of kindred tastes in the matter of prize 
fights) came to my house and said that I was to tell you, 
when I came to Washington, from him, that you need not 
be at all alarmed about New York because he was going 
to do his best to see to it that Tammany men were instructed 
none of them to commit any offense which would expose 
them to being put in the penitentiary in the interest of 
Parker's success.' Not only Sullivan but D. regarded this 
as being symptomatic of a great breakdown in the Tam- 



332 THEODORE ROOSEVELT AND HIS TIME 

many vote, and as being equivalent on the part of Sullivan 
to practically bolting Tammany in my interest." 

Throughout the campaign the President had studiously 
refrained from making up his mind as to what the outcome 
was to be. In July he wrote to Henry White in London: 
"As to what the r.esult will be, I have not the slightest idea. 
I have long given up prophesying about the outcome of a 
political contest, especially one in which one sees almost 
exclusively the people who are friendly and zealous parti- 
sans; and accordingly all that is heard is favorable." 

To Eudyard Kipling he wrote on November 1, 1904 : 
**We are now closing the campaign, and the Lord only 
knows how it will go. I have done a good many things in 
the past three years, and the fact that I did them is doubt- 
less due partly to accident and partly to temperament. 
Naturally, I think I was right in doing them, for otherwise 
I would not have done them. It is equally natural that 
some people should have been alienated by each thing I did, 
and the aggregate of all that have been alienated may be 
more than sufficient to overthrow me. Thus, in dealing 
with the Philippines, I have first the jack fools who seri- 
ously think that any group of pirates and head-hunters 
needs nothing but independence in order that it may be 
turned forthwith into a dark-hued New England town meet- 
ing; and then the entirely practical creatures who join with 
these extremists because I do not intend that the Islands 
shall be exploited for corrupt purposes. 

' ' So in Panama, I have to encounter the opposition of the 
vague individuals of serious minds and limited imagina- 
tions who think that a corrupt pithecoid community in 
which the President has obtained his position by the simple 
process of clapping the former President into a wooden 
cage and sending him on an ox-cart over the mountains 
(this is literally what was done at Bogota) — is entitled to 
just the treatment that I would give, say, to Denmark or 
Switzerland. Then, in addition, I have the representatives 
of the transcontinental railways, who are under no delu- 



ATTITUDE TOWARD CAMPAIGN CONTRIBUTIONS 333 

sion, but who do not want a competing canal. In the same 
way I have alienated some of the big representatives of 
what we call the trusts, and have had a muss with the 
trades unions on the other side. 

* * So only a merciful Providence can tell what the outcome 
will be. If elected I shall be very glad. If beaten I shall 
be sorry ; but in any event I have had a first class run for 
my money, and I have accomplished certain definite things. 
I would consider myself a hundred times over repaid if I 
had nothing more to my credit than Panama and the coal- 
ing stations in Cuba. So you see that my frame of mind 
is a good deal like that of your old Viceroy when he ad- 
dressed the new Viceroy." 

In the closing days of the campaign Alton B. Parker, the 
Democratic candidate for President, made several speeches 
in which he charged that Mr. Cortelyou had been using the 
knowledge that he had gained as Secretary of Commerce , 
and Labor to extort money from the corporations as con- 
tributions to the Republican campaign fund. The charges, 
uttered cautiously at first by Judge Parker, were gradually 
made more direct by him until they amounted to assertions 
that a conspiracy had been formed by the President and 
Mr. Cortelyou, the President having made him chairman 
for the purpose, to levy this blackmail, promising in return 
certain immunities or favors to the contributors after elec- 
tion. The President waited till the charges assumed the 
form of direct assertions, when, ''lest the silence of self- 
respect be misunderstood," he spoke and in no -uncertain 
tones, his declaration appearing in the press of the country 
on the morning of November 5, 1904, three days before 
election. In it, characterizing the charges as "slanderous 
accusations," he said: 

*'Mr. Parker's accusations against Mr. Cortelyou and 
me are monstrous. If true they would brand both of us 
forever with infamy ; and inasmuch as they are false, heavy 
must be the condemnation of the man making them. 

**The assertion that Mr. Cortelyou had any knowledge, 



334 THEODORE ROOSEVELT AND HIS TIME 

gained while in an official position, whereby he was enabled! 
to secure and did secure any contributions from any corpo- 
ration, is a falsehood. The assertion that there has been 
any blackmail, direct or indirect, by Mr. Cortelyou or by 
me, is a falsehood. The assertion that there has been made 
in my behalf and by my authority, by Mr. Cortelyou or by 
any one else, any pledge or promise, or that there has been 
any understanding as to future immunities or benefits, in 
recognition of any contributions from any source, is ai 
wicked falsehood. 

''The statements made by Mr. Parker are unqualifiedly 
and atrociously false. As Mr. Cortelyou has said to me 
more than once during the campaign, if elected I shall go 
into the Presidency unhampered by any pledge, promise or 
understanding of any kind, sort or description, save my 
promise, made openly to the American people, that so far 
as in my power lies I shall see to it that every man has- 
a square deal, no less and no more." 

The President's vigorous utterance met with general andi 
hearty approval, for Judge Parker's astounding conduct in 
virtually calling the President of the United States a con- 
spirator and blackmailer had aroused the indignation of 
decent men of all parties. It was an act of incredible politi- 
cal folly, reflecting not only upon its author's ideas of pro- 
priety, but upon his intelligence. No man who rightly un- 
derstood the character of the American people would be 
capable of such a blunder. The election returns showed 
unmistakably the faith that the people had in Theodore 
Roosevelt, for they gave him the largest vote in the elec- 
toral college and the largest popular majority that any can- 
didate had received. 

On the night of election, as soon as the result was known, 
he wrote and gave out for publication the following: 

"A wise custom which limits the President to two terms 
regards the substance and not the form, and under no cir- 
cumstances will I be a candidate for or accept another 
nomination.*' 



ATTITUDE TOWARD CAMPAIGN CONTRIBUTIONS 335 

Writing, on November 10, 1904, to his son, Kermit, who 
was in school at Groton, Mass., he gave tliis interesting ac- 
count of the scene in the White House on election night : 

**I am stunned by the overwhelming victory we have 
won. I had no conception that such a thing was possible. 
I thought it probable we should win, but was quite pre- 
pared to be defeated, and of course had not the slightest 
idea that there was such a tidal wave. We carried not only 
all the States I put down in my letter to you as probably 
Republican, but all those that I put down as doubtful, and 
all but one of those that I put down as probably Demo- 
cratic. The only States that went against me were those 
in which no free discussion is allowed and in which fraud 
and violence have rendered the voting a farce. I have the 
greatest popular majority and the greatest electoral ma- 
jority ever given to a candidate for President. 

*'0n the evening of the election I got back from Oyster 
Bay, where I had voted, soon after half-past six. At that 
time I knew nothing of the returns and did not expect to 
find out anything definite for two or three hours, and had 
been endeavoring not to think of the result, but to school 
myself to accept it as a man ought to, whichever way it 
went. But as soon as I got in the White House Ted met 
me with the news that Buffalo and Rochester had sent in 
their returns already and that they showed enormous gains 
for me. Within the next twenty minutes enough returns 
were received from precincts and districts in Chicago, Con- 
necticut, New York and Massachusetts to make it evident 
that there was a tremendous drift my way, and by the time 
we sat down to dinner at half-past seven my election was 
assured. Mrs. Cortelyou was with us for dinner, just as 
interested and excited as we were. 

' ' Right after dinner members of the Cabinet and friends 
began to come in, and we had a celebration that would have 
been perfect if only you had been present. Archie, fairly 
plastered with badges, was acting as messenger between 
the telegraph operators and me, and bringing me continual- 
ly telegram after telegram, which I read aloud. I longed 



336 THEODORE EOOSEVELT AND HIS TIME 

for you very much, as all of us did, for of course this was 
the day of greatest triumph I ever had had or ever could 
have, and I was very proud and happy. But I tell you, 
Kermit, it was a great comfort to feel, all during the last 
days when affairs looked doubtful, that no matter how 
things came out the really important thing was the lovely 
life I have with Mother and with you children, and that 
compared to this home life everything else was of very 
small importance from the standpoint of happiness." 



CHAPTEE XXVIII 
VISIT OF JOHN MORLEY AT THE WHITE HOUSE 

Two days after the election in 1904, John Morley, now Lord 
Morley, the distinguished English essayist and author, paid 
a visit of several days to President Roosevelt in the White 
House. When Mr. Morley 's 'Life of Gladstone' appeared 
about a year earlier, the President had written to him the 
letter of warm appreciation quoted in Chapter XXIII, and 
a cordial correspondence had ensued. When the date of 
the visit had been fixed, the President did me the very great 
and agreeable honor of inviting me as a fellow guest. Sub- 
sequently I put in writing an account of some of the inci- 
dents of this most interesting and memorable visit, which 
I submitted to the President and obtained from him per- 
mission to include in my record of his life. I may, there- 
fore, without impropriety, reproduce portions of it here, 
especially since they are of value in throwing light upon 
his personality in much the same way that his letters do. 

Mr. Morley and I arrived together on the afternoon of 
Thursday, November 10, and found the President in the 
highest health and spirits, fairly overflowing with joy be- 
cause of his great triumph. 

From the first the President greatly interested Mr. Mor- 
ley. The two men had much in common intellectually. Both 
had been wide readers and writers of history, and close 
students of men and affairs. Each had written a life of 
Cromwell. The President's talk, frank, vigorous, and mar- 
velous in its range over human history, ancient, modern, 
and contemporaneous, as it always was when he had a sym- 
pathetic and understanding listener, was a revelation to 
Mr. Morley, who said to me later that he had never heard 
anything like it. He spoke of it frequently when we were 

337 



338 THEODORE ROOSEVELT AND HIS TIME 

alone together, saying repeatedly: "He is a most extraor- 
dinary man ! ' ' 

On the morning of the second day of our visit, when the 
President left us to go to his office, Mr. Morley asked me 
to show him the rooms on the first floor of the White House. 
I took him through the Red Room, the Green Room, and 
the Blue Room into the large East Room. As we stood in 
the center of it and I had given a brief history of it, he 
turned to me and, putting his hand on my shoulder, said : 
''My dear fellow, do you know the two most extraordinary 
things I have seen in your country? Niagara Falls and the 
President of the United States — both great wonders of 
nature!" Later in the day I repeated this remark to the 
President, and also to Secretary Hay and Secretary Taft, 
all of whom, the President no less than his two associates, 
enjoyed it greatly. Secretary Hay recorded it in his diary 
in incomplete form, and it is so published in Mr. W. R. 
Thayer's life of him. 

Each day, after the President had left us to attend to his 
duties, Mr. Morley and I went to the library in the White 
House, where, in frank and intimate conversation, Mr. 
Morley asked me to explain such of the allusions to Ameri- 
can political methods made by the President as he had not 
fully understood. There were many such allusions. I re- 
call one in particular. In describing the elements in poli- 
tics that had from time to time antagonized him, the Presi- 
dent said: "By all odds the most contemptible creature 
we have encountered in our politics is the Goo Goo." Mr. 
Morley, in obvious perplexity, exclaimed: "The Goo Goo? 
Really, Mr. President, I don't understand you." He was 
much amused on learning that the species referred to was 
human and living and not extinct like the Dodo. 

I turned the conversation on one occasion to French his- 
tory and politics, on which I knew Mr. Morley to be a high 
authority, and we spoke at some length of Napoleon. In 
the course of our talk Mr. Morley said: "This man whose 
guests we are has many of Napoleon's qualities— indom- 
itable courage, tireless perseverance, great capacity for 



VISIT OF JOHN MORLEY AT THE WHITE HOUSE 339 

leadership — and one thing that Napoleon never had — high 
moral purpose ! And think what it would have meant for / 
the world if he had had that ! " I quote from memory and / 
am not sure of the exact phraseology, but the sense is as I 
have expressed it. Taken with the first remark about 
Roosevelt, this second one is essential to give accurately 
the estimate which Mr. Morley made of Roosevelt's char- 
acter. 

The physical vigor of the President impressed Mr. Mor- 
ley no less than his intellectual activity, being himself a 
frail man in rather delicate health. At dinner one evening 
the President had a number of prominent labor leaders to 
meet Mr. Morley, who was desirous of obtaining informa- 
tion as to labor problems and conditions in the United 
States. There was much animated conversation both during 
the dinner and afterwards. When the guests were depart- 
ing the President followed them into the hall, talking and 
gesticulating in his usual emphatic manner. Mr. Morley 
touched me on the arm, pointed to him and said: ''Look 
at him! And he has been doing that all day long!" As 
he said this he sank into a chair as if completely exhausted 
by the mere sight of such tireless energy. 

One subject upon which Mr. Morley talked much with 
the President was the announcement which the latter had 
made on the night of election declaring his intention not to 
take a nomination for another term. He expressed himself 
as quite unable to comprehend it, saying that the act seemed 
to him as inexplicable as it would have been if Mr. Glad- 
stone, at the height of his career, had declared after a tri- 
umph at the polls, that he would never consent to go before 
the people of Great Britain again as candidate for Prime 
Minister. 

In explanation of his action the President said that since 
the time of Washington the American people had, wisely as 
he thought, established a custom against allowing any one 
to hold the office of President for more than two consecu- 
tive terms. Their reason had been that the Presidency 
being a great office, the power of the President, especially 



340 THEODORE KOOSEVELT AXD HIS TIME 

if he had the support of great political and financial inter- 
ests, could be used effectively to secure his renomination. 
There had been much said by his opponents in the cam- 
paign about his supposed personal ambition and intention 
to use the office to perpetuate himself in power. He had not 
said anything on the subject prior to election because he 
did not T\-ish to say anything that could be construed into 
a promise made as a consideration for securing votes. In 
making the announcement after election he had chosen 
the exact phraseology- he used for two reasons: First, 
many of his supporters were insisting that as his first term 
had consisted of only three years and a half, becoming 
President through the death of the incumbent, he would, 
at the end of seven years and a half, have really served for 
only one elective term so that the third-term custom would 
not apply to him. He wished to repudiate this suggestion. 
Believing the third-term custom to be wholesome, he was 
determined to regard its substance, refusing to quibble 
about the form of words usually employed to express it. 
Second, he did not wish simply and specifically to say that 
he would not be a candidate for the nomination in' 1908, 
for to specify any year in which he would not be a candi- 
date would have been widely accepted as meaning that he 
would be a candidate in some other year, and he had no 
such intention and no idea that he would ever be a candi- 
date again. He had been asked bv newspaper men if his 
renunciation applied to 1912, and'he had replied that he 
was not thinking of 1912, or 1920, or 1940, and declined to 
add anything whatever to what appeared in his statement. 
So far as the third-term custom was concerned, he added 
that It had no application whatever to anvthing except two 
consecutive terms, since every shred of power which a 
President exercises while in office vanishes absolutely when 
he creases to hold it, and an ex-President stands preciselv 
m the position of any other private citizen, and has no 
more power to secure a nomination or election than he 
would ha^^ if he had never held the office, indeed, he prob- 
ably would have less from the very fact that he had held it 



VISIT OF JOHN MORLEY AT THE WHITE HOUSE 341 

The subject was in Mr. Morley's mind when, soon after 
his White House visit, he said in a speech which he made at 
the annual banquet of the Chamber of Commerce in New 
York, on November 15, 1904: 

*'It would be most unbecoming of me to say a word as to 
the personality of your new President. I will say this in 
passing, that it is very gratifying to me to find that a man 
may write a book about Oliver Cromwell and yet be thought 
a very good man to whom to trust the destinies of a nation, 
because, for no better reason, that I have written about 
Oliver Cromwell also. One of his memorable performances 
was, as you all know, his self-denying ordinance — a thing 
for which Oliver Cromwell himself was solely responsible — 
to withdraw himself from active military and public life 
at a certain moment. There appears to be something like 
a self-denying ordinance announced for the public the day 
after election. Whether that was an imitation of Cromwell 
or not I do not inquire, but this I do say, without, I hope, 
being impertinent, that in your new President you have got 
a man. All sorts of events within the four years may break 
out upon the world — events in the oldest parts of Europe — 
there are lives in the old parts of Europe upon which re- 
sults may hang; you have in the Pacific enormous risks, 
possibilities, open questions, and all I can say is that it will 
be a great thing for diplomatists to know that in dealing 
with the government that will come into power and office 
here on the fourth of March next year, they are dealing 
with a man who has behind him, unless I am mistaken, the 
American people." 

After he returned to England Lord Morley summed up 
his estimate of the President in a neat epigram. Writing to 
Eoosevelt on September 15, 1905, Senator Lodge said : 

''Lady Harcourt (widow of Sir Vernon Harcourt) told 
me that Morley came to see her when he returned from the 
United States. She asked him to tell her about you. He 
said : ' He is not an American, you know. He is America. ' '* 



342 THEODORE ROOSEVELT AND HIS TIME 

To this Roosevelt replied on the same date : 
''That was a very nice thing of Morley to say, so long as 
it is confined to one or two of my intimate friends who won't 
misunderstand it ! Just at the moment people are speaking 
altogether too well of me, which is enough to make any man 
feel uncomfortable ; for if he has any sense he knows that 
the reaction is perfectly certain to come under such circum- 
stances, and that then people will revenge themselves for 
feeling humiliated for having said too much on one side 
by saying too much on the other. ' ' 



CHAPTER XXIX 

ILLUMINATING LETTERS ON VARIOUS SUBJECTS, IN- 
CLUDING QUESTIONS OF POLICY 

A GREAT flood of congratulatory letters poured in upon 
the President after his election. His replies to those that 
came from personal friends, written as they were in the 
full flush of his great triumph, are among the most com- 
pletely self -revealing that he ever penned. They disclose 
the fundamental principles upon which he based his pol- 
icies, and the profound and matured convictions which ani- 
mated his public conduct. They show also that his head 
was not in the least turned by the victory, that he regarded 
it as a vote of confidence by the nation, and that the su- 
preme joy which he derived from it was the assurance it 
gave of overwhelming popular support of the issues for 
which he stood and which were dearest to his heart. 

Writing to George Haven Putnam, of New York, on 
November 15, 1904, he made a vigorous defense of a much 
criticized method of procedure that he had followed in ad- 
vancing his policies: 

''I shall do all I can to deserve the confidence the Nation 
has reposed in me. But there is one point [in your letter] 
which I should like to correct and which I fear is a misap- 
prehension of yours. You speak of 'men like Quay and 
Addicks having no claim under existing conditions to 
having any essential part in making me President for the 
four years beginning with March 4, ' and this seems to im- 
ply that you think that in the past three and a half years I 
have dealt with them because they had such claim. I liave 
never dealt with Addicks at all. With Quay and all the 
other Senators I have dealt continually, and during the 
next four years I shall deal with all the men of this kind 

343 



344 THEODORE KOOSEVELT AND HIS TIME 

just exactly as I have dealt with them for the last three. 
"I have dealt with Quay and with all similar men, not 
because I regarded them as making me President, not be- 
cause I had anything selfish to expect from them, but be- 
cause, not being a fool, and having certain policies for the 
welfare of the Eepublic at heart, I realized that I could 
succeed in these policies only by working with the men of 
prominence in the Republican party. That ridiculous 
Parker Constitution Club, for instance, numbers among 
its members and backers people who at the same time 
falsely attack me for imaginarj^ violations of the Consti- 
tution and then argue that I should try to violate the Con- 1 
stitution by disregarding Quay and the other Senators who, 
under the first article of that Constitution, are the official 
advisers whom I must consult, and without whose acqui- 
escence I can not make a single appointment. I did not 
make these men Senators. They are in the Senate; and I 
should be derelict in my duty if I did not try to get along 
with them. I should be heartily ashamed of myself if this 
election made any real change in my attitude towards them. 
This attitude has not been due in the past to any desire 
for self-advancement on my part, and therefore there is no 
need to change it simply because it is no longer possible 
for these men to do anything for my advancement." jj 

In somewhat similar vein he wrote to Owen Wister on 
November 19, 1904: 

*'I have been most abundantly rewarded, far beyond my 
deserts, by the American people ; and I say this with all sin- 
cerity and not in any spirit of mock humility. The stars in 
their courses fought for me. I was forced to try a dozen 
pieces of doubtful and difficult work in which it was possi- 
ble to deserve success, but in which it would not have been 
possible even for Lincoln or Washington to be sure of com- 
manding success. I mean the Panama business, the anthra- 
cite coal strike, the Northern Securities suit, the Philippine 
Church question, the whole Cuban business, the Alaska 
boundary, the Government open shop matter, irrigation 



ILLUMINATING LETTERS ON VARIOUS SUBJECTS 345 

and forestry work, etc., etc. In each case, partly by hard 
and intelligent work and partly by good fortune, we won 
ont. . . . 

**It is a peculiar gratification to me to have owed my 
election not to the politicians primarily, although of course 
I have done my best to get on with them ; not to the finan- 
ciers, although I have staunchly upheld the rights of prop- 
erty; but above all to Abraham Lincoln's 'plain people'; 
to the folk who worked hard on farm, in shop, or on the rail- 
roads, or who owned little stores, little businesses which 
they managed themselves. I would literally, not figura- 
jtively, rather cut off my right hand than forfeit by any 
i improper act of mine the trust and regard of these people. 
jl may have to do something of which they will disapprove, 
'because I deem it absolutely right and necessary; but most 
i assuredly I shall endeavor not to merit their disapproval 
by any act inconsistent with the ideal they have formed 
with me. 

\ *'But the gentle folk, the people whom you and I meet 
at the houses of our friends and at our clubs; the people 
who went to Harvard as we did, or to other colleges more 
or less like Harvard, these people have contained many of 
those who have been most bitter in their opposition to me, 
and their support on the whole has been much more luke- 
warm than the support of those whom I have called the 
plain people. . . . 

' ' But the New York Evening Post crowd are hypocritical 
and insincere when they oppose me. They have loudly pro- 
fessed to demand just exactly the kind of government I 
have given, and yet they have done their futile best to de- 
feat me. They have not been able to do me personally any 
harm; but they continually do the cause of good govern- 
ment a certain amount of harm by diverting into foolish 
channels of snarling and critical impotence the energies of 
fine young fellows who ought to be a power for good. Take 
Carl Schurz's attack upon me for acting as any gentleman 
would act with Hanna and Quay when they were on their 
death-beds ; or take his statement that because I had seen 



346 THEODORE ROOSEVELT AND HIS TIME ' 

Addicks and Lou Payn I was to be repudiated, as Uhe 
friendship of the wicked has its price.' In the first place, 
I have seen Lou Payn just once, at his request. I have 
seen Addicks perhaps three times, at his request, of course. 
I have never since I have been President done for either 
Addicks or Payn one single act; never made an appoint- (I 
ment for either of them or done anything else for either 
of them; in the next place, I shall continue to see both of 
them whenever they choose to call, and to see everybody |; 
else who chooses to call — unless it be some creature who 
renders it impossible for me to see him. For instance, if 
Hearst, while Congressman, calls upon me I shall see him 
as a matter of course. I continually see 'Dry Dollar' 
Sullivan. If my virtue ever becomes so frail that it will 
not stand meeting men of whom I thoroughly disapprove, 
but who are in active official life and whom I must encoun- 
ter, why I shall go out of politics and become an anchorite. 
Whether I see these men or do not see them, if I do for them 
anything improper then I am legitimately subject to criti- 
cism; but only a fool will criticize me because I see them." 

Between the President and Fiiiley Peter Dunne ("Mr. 
Dooley") a cordial and thoroughly congenial friendship ex- 
isted, undisturbed by the latter 's manj^ humorous accounts 
of notable events in Eoosevelt's career. Mr. Dooley pub- 
lished an article describing the election as an ''Anglo-Saxon 
triumph," which aroused the President to a lively protest 
in which he said: 

"Now, oh laughing philosopher (because you are not only 
one who laughs, but also a genuine philosopher and because i 
your philosophy has a real effect upon this country), I : 
want to enter a strong protest against your very amusing i 
and very wrong-headed article on the 'Anglo-Saxon Tri- 
umph. ' In this article, as in everything else you have writ- 
ten about me, you are as nice as possible as to me person- 
ally, and the fun about the feeling abroad, including 
England, is perfectly legitimate. If you have ever hap- ,[ 
pened to see what I have written on the matter of the ' 



ILLUMINATING LETTERS ON VARIOUS SUBJECTS 347 

Anglo-Saxon business you may have noticed that I have 
always insisted that we are not Anglo-Saxon at all — even 
admitting for the sake of argument, which I do not, that 
there are any Anglo-Saxons — but a new and mixed race — 
a race drawing its blood from many different sources. . . . 

**My own view is, that if a man is good enough for me to 
profit by his services before election, he is good enough 
for me to do what I can for him after election ; and I do not 
give a damn whether his name happens to be Casey, or 
Schwartzmeister, or Van Eensselaer, or Peabody. I think 
my whole public life has been an emphatic protest against 
the Peabodys and Van Rensselaers arrogating to them- 
selves any superiorities over the Caseys and Schwartzmeis- 
ters. But in return I will not, where I have anything to. say 
about it, tolerate for one moment any assumption of supe- 
riority by the Caseys and Schwartzmeisters over the Pea- 
bodys and Van Rensselaers. I did not notice any difference 
between them as they fought in my regiment ; and I had lots 
of representatives of all of them in it. If you will look at 
the nomenclature of the Yale, Harvard and Princeton 
teams this year, or any other year, and then at the feats 
performed by the men bearing the names, you will come to 
the conclusion. Friend Dooley, that Peabody and Van 
Rensselaer and Saltonstall and Witherspoon are pretty 
tough citizens to handle in a mixup and that they will be 
found quite as often at the top of the heap as at the bot- 
tom. 

"There is nothing against which I protest more strongly, 
socially and politically, than any proscription of or looking 
down upon decent Americans because they are of Irish 
or German ancestry ; but I protest just exactly as strongly 
against any similar discrimination against or sneering at 
men because they happen to be descended from people who 
came over here some three centuries ago, whether they 
landed at Plymouth, or at the mouth of the Hudson. I 
have fought beside and against Americans of Irish, of 
German, and of old Colonial stock in every political contest 
in which I have engaged ; I have been a fairly good rough- 

I 



348 THEODORE ROOSEVELT AND HIS TIME j 

and-tumble man myself ; I have never asked any odds ; and 
I have generally held my own. 

''I am sure you will agree with me that in our political 
life, very unlike what is the case in our social life, the 
temptation is toward Anglophobia, not toward Anglomania. 
The cheapest thing for any politician to do, the easiest, and 
too often politically one of the most remunerative, is to 
make some yell about England. One of the things I am 
most pleased with in the recent election is that while I got, 
I think, a greater proportion of the Americans of Irish 
birth or parentage and of the Catholic religion than any 
previous Republican candidate, I got this proportion purely 
because they knew I felt in sympathy with them and in 
touch with them, and that they and I had the same ideals 
and principles, and not by any demagogic appeals about 
creed or race, or by any demagogic attack upon England. 
I feel a sincere friendliness for England; but you may 
notice that I do not slop over about it, and that I do not 
in the least misunderstand England's attitude, or, for the 
matter of that, the attitude of any European nation as re- 
gards us. We shall keep the respect of each of them just 
as long as we are thoroughly able to hold our own, and no 
longer. If we got into trouble, there is not one of them 
upon whose friendship we could count to get us out ; whatt 
we shall need to count upon is the efficiency of our fighting: 
men and particularly of our neighbor. 

*' There is one thing to which I should like to call your 
attention. If an Anglomaniac in social life goes into po- 
litical life he usually becomes politically an Anglophobiac, 
and the occasional political Anglophobiac whose curious 
ambition it is to associate socially with 'vacuity trimmed 
with lace ' is equally sure to become an Anglomaniac in his 
new surroundings." 

Several letters which the President wrote at this period 
are of interest and value both as displaying his indefati- 
gable reading habit and disclosing his views upon national 



ILLUMINATING LETTERS ON VARIOUS SUBJECTS 349 

questions connected with and growing out of the Civil War. 
To James Ford Ehodes he wrote on November 29, 1904 : 

*'I have just finished your fifth volume and am delighted 
with it. I do not know whether I told you that during the 
campaign I reread your first four. At the same time I read 
Macaulay's 'History' and many of Lincoln's letters and 
speeches, and I got real help from all of them. It seems 
to me, that allowing for ditf erence of epoch and nationality, 
you and Macaulay approach the great subject of self-gov- 
ernment by a free people in much the same spirit and from 
the same philosophical standpoint. 

''In the last volume I was immensely pleased with every- 
thing. Perhaps I should bar one sentence — that in which 
you say that in no quarrel is the right all on one side, and 
the wrong all on the other. As regards the actual act of 
secession, the actual opening of the Civil War, I think the 
right was exclusively with the Union people and the wrong 
3xclusively with the Secessionists; and indeed I do not 
[enow of another struggle in history in which this sharp 
iivision between right and wrong can be made in quite 
10 clear-cut a manner. I am half Southern. My mother's 
dnsfolk fought on the Confederate side, and I am proud 
3f them. I fully believe in and appreciate not only the 
7alor of the South, but its lofty devotion to the right as it 
saw the right ; and yet I think that on every ground — that 
is, on the question of the Union, on the question of slavery, 
3n the question of State rights — it was wrong with a folly 
that amounted to madness, and with a perversity that 
imounted to wickedness. 

"I am much interested in what you say as to Grant's 
superiority over Lee in the fortnight's operations ending 
it Appomattox, which brought the Civil War to a close. 
For the previous year, it seems to me, that Lee had shown 
aimself the superior, but during this fortnight Grant rose 
to his Vicksburg level. A mighty pair of Generals they 
w^ere! 

*' Reading your history brings out the essential greatness 
of Lincoln ever more and more. Perhaps, as you say, he 



350 THEODORE ROOSEVELT AND HIS TIME 

and Washington do not come in the very limited class of 
men which include Casar, Alexander and Napoleon, but 
they are far better men for a nation to develop than any 
of these three giants; and, excepting only these three, I 
hardly see any greater figures loom up in the history of;' 
civilized nations. There have been other men as good — 
men like Timoleon and John Hampden; but no other good I 
men have been as great. 

"The trouble I am having with the Southern question — 
which, my dear sir, I beg you to beheve I am painfully 
striving to meet, so far as in me lies, in the spirit of[ 
Abraham Lincoln — emphasizes the infinite damage done in 
reconstruction days by the unregenerate arrogance and 
short-sightedness of the Southerners and the doctrinaire 
folly of radicals like Sumner and Thaddeus Stevens. The 
more I study the Civil War and the time following it, the 
more I feel (as of course every one feels) the towering 
greatness of Lincoln which puts him before all other men of 
our time." 

More specifically about the Southern question, he wrote 
to Henry S. Pritchett, President of the Massachusetts In- 
stitute of Technology, on December 14, 1904 : 

"I have always felt that the passage of the Fifteenth 
Amendment at the time it was passed was a mistake; but' 
to admit this is very different from admitting that it is 
wise, even if it were practicable, now to repeal that amend- 
ment. . . . But it is out of the question that there can be 
permanent acquiescence on the part of the North in an ar- 
rangement under which Mr. John Sharp Williams, the 
leader of the minority in the House, as compared with Mr 
Cannon, the Speaker, elected by the majority, has just four 
times the political weight to which he is entitled. Mr. 
Williams represents a district in which there are three 
blacks to one white. It is an outrage that this one white 
man should first be allowed to suppress the votes of the 
three black men, and then to cast them by himself in orden 



ILLUMINATING LETTERS ON VARIOUS SUBJECTS 351 

to make his own vote equal to that of four men in Mr. 
Cannon's district. If tliis result came about as a natural 
effect of a genuine and honest effort to enforce an illiteracy 
test, or something of the sort, I believe there would be little 
or no objection to it in the North, in spite of the damage 
done the North thereby; for I believe that the North has 
hearty sympathy with the trials of the South and is gen- 
erously glad to assist the South whenever the South does 
not render it impossible by 'superfluity of naughtiness.' 

"The trouble is that there is no such genuine law, and 
that there is no white man from a Southern district in 
which blacks are numerous who does not tell you, either 
defiantly or as a joke, that any white man is allowed to 
vote, no matter how ignorant and degraded, and that the 
negro vote is practically suppressed because it is the negro 
;vote. To acquiesce in this state of things because it is not 
; possible at the time to attempt to change it without doing 
damage is one thing. It's quite another thing to do any- 
' thing which will seem formally to approve it. . . . 

'*My own view of this Southern question is, as I have 
said, fundamentally yours and Rhodes'. What I am now 
puzzling over is whether it is best simply to go on as I have 
gone, saying nothing, or to try to say something. I have 
been interested at the great number of requests I am now 
receiving from Southern cities to visit them and address 
their citizens. I do not know whether it means that they 
begin to understand that I am not their enemy, or whether 
it is simply the same kind of a feeling that would make 
them interested in a circus coming to town. I do not want 
to crowd things, or in any way to seem to truckle to the 
I South, and my present thought is that I shall simply go 
through San Antonio, where there is reason for my going, 
and defer most of my other visits to the South until a little 
later. If I can hammer out just the kind of speech I want 
to make, I may make it on Lincoln's birthday; but if I am 
not fairly sure that I am saying the right thing I shall 
not say anything on the subject." 



352 THEODORE ROOSEVELT AND HIS TIME 

In this letter to Mr. Pritchett, the President gives utter- 
ance to a sentiment about Lincohi and the White House' 
which all his intimates knew rested upon him like a spell:: 

**It is curious that you should give utterance to exactly 
my thought when you say: 

**. *I never go into the White House and through the; 
corridors and up the stairs where you pass every day with-- 
out thinking of old Lincoln, with his shambling figure, com-- 
ing down the steps in the early morning, in his clothi 
slippers, on his way to the War Department to read the; 
night's dispatches.' 

**I think of Lincoln, shambling, homely, with his strong,, 
sad, deeply-furrowed face, all the time. I see him in the' 
different rooms and in the halls. For some reason or other 
he is to me infinitely the most real of the dead Presidents.. 
So far as one who is not a great man can model himself! 
upon one who was, I try to follow out the general lines oft 
policy which Lincoln laid down. I do not like to say this- 
in public, for I suppose it would seem as if I were presum- 
ing, but I know you will understand the spirit in which li 
am saying it. I wish to Heaven I had his invariable equa- j 
nimity. I try my best not to give expression to irritation,, 
but sometimes I do get deeply irritated." 

Shortly after election in 1904, Justice Oliver Wendell 
Holmes, of the Supreme Court, sent to Roosevelt a little 
book by President Eliot, of Harvard, entitled 'The Dur- 
able Satisfactions of Life.' Two sentences in it, — "Not 
one human being in ten million is really long remembered. 
For the mass of mankind oblivion, like death, is sure" — 
especially attracted the President's attention, and on De- 
cember 5, he wrote to the Justice this quite remarkable 
letter : 

"I was rather struck at what President Eliot said about; 
oblivion so speedily overtaking almost every one. But after 
all, what does the fact amount to that here and there a man 



ILLUMINATING LETTEES ON VARIOUS SUBJECTS 353 

escapes oblivion longer than his fellows'? Ozymandias in 
the desert — when a like interval has gone by, who will 
know more of any man of the present day than Shelley 
knew of him? I suppose it's only about ten thousand years 
since the last glacial epoch (at least, that is, I understand, 
the newest uncertain guess of the geologists) ; and this 
covers more than the period in which there is anything that 
we can even regard as civilization. Of course when we 
go back even half that time we get past the period when 
any man's memory, no matter how great the man, is more 
than a flickering shadow to us ; yet this distance is too small 
to be measured when we look at the ages, even at rather 
short range — not astronomically but geometrically. That 
queer creature Ware, my pension commissioner, who al- 
ways uses the terminology of his Kansas environment, but 
who has much philosophy of his own, once wrote the follow- 
ing verses on this very question: 

History. 

Over the infinite prairie of level eternity, 
Flying as flies the deer, 

Time is pursued by a pitiless, cruel oblivion, 
Following fast and near. 

Ever and ever the famished coyote is following 
Patiently in the rear; 

Trifling the interval, yet we are calling it "History " 

Distance from wolf to deer. 

''Whether the distance between the wolf and the deer is 
a couple of inches or a quarter of a mile is not really of 
much consequence in the end. It is passed over mighty 
quickly in either event, and it makes small odds to any of 
us after we are dead whether the next generation forgets 
us, or whether a number of generations pass before our 
memory, steadily growing more and more dim, at last fades 
into nothing. On this point it seems to me that the only 
important thing is to be able to feel, when our time comes 
to go out into the blackness, that those sui^vivors who care 
for us and to whom it will be a pleasure to think well of us 
when we are gone shall have that pleasure. Save in a few 



354 THEODORE ROOSEVELT AND HIS TIME 

wholly exceptional cases, cases of men such as are not alive ^ 
at this particular time, it is only possible in any event thatt 
a comparatively few people can have this feeling for any 
length of time. But it is a good thing if as many as possible > 
feel it even for a short time, and it is surely a good thing; 
that those whom we love should feel it as long as they too 
live. 

"I should be quite unable to tell you why I think it would I 
be pleasant to feel that one has lived manfully and honor- 
ably when the time comes after which all things are the 
same to ever}^ man ; yet I am very sure that it is well so to 
feel, that it is well to have lived so that at the end it may 
be possible to know that on the whole one's duties had not 
been shirked, that there has been no flinching from foes, no 
lack of gentleness and loyalty to friends, and a reasonable 
measure of success in the effort to do the task allotted. 
This is just the kind of feeling that President Eliot's heroi 
had the right to have ; and a Justice of the Supreme Court 
or a President or a General or an Admiral, may be mighty 
thankful if at the end he has earned a similar right!" 

No President, and no other public man anywhere, was 
ever more photographed than Roosevelt, and it is interest- 
ing to see from a letter, written on November 18, 1904, to < 
R. W. Gilder, editor of the Century Magazine, what his 
feelings on the subject really were : 

^'I do not want to begin to have new photographs taken. 
If I do it in one case, I must do it in others. In the first 
place, it is an intolerable nuisance ; and in the next place it 
creates a false impression. People do not realize that I do 
not like to sit for photographs and that it is only a good- 
natured acquiescence on my part when I do. Nqw there is 
not the slightest need of a new photograph. Dozens of 
excellent ones have been taken. Take any one of these. 
It will do just exactly as well." 

When Joseph H. Choate resigned the ambassadorship to 
England, the President, on December 24, 1904, wrote to 
him this cordially appreciative letter: 



i 



ILLUMINATING LETTERS ON VARIOUS SUBJECTS 355 

''I have just received your letter of resignation coupled 
with your private letter in which you ask that it be accepted 
and give reasons therefor which would seem to be con- 
trolling. It is with genuine reluctance that I accept it. You 
have rendered not merely loyal but distinguished service. 
Not since Mr. Adams has any of our ambassadors to Eng- 
land served as long as you have served ; and not since Mr. 
Adams has any Ambassador in your position rendered 
more devoted and more efficient service to the country. I 
thank you with all my heart, not only as President, but as 
an American citizen, for what you have done; and your 
countrymen, you may rest assured, appreciate it to the full, 
and when you return will show you by their affectionate 
welcome that the great place you already had in their re- 
gard and esteem has grown even greater. Distinguished 
though your career has been, no part of it has been more 
distinguished than that which has fallen within the last six 
years. 

"You ask as to the time when you can take your depar- 
ture ; but you mention that you had hoped to complete and 
dedicate while yet in England your memorial window to 
John Harvard in St. Saviour's Church. You say that you 
still hope to accomplish this before your recall reaches you. 
If the delay will not inconvenience you I should like to have 
you arrange to stay until you can dedicate this window per- 
sonally. Accordingly, subject as I say to your convenience, 
I shall ask you to let me know the date when you expect to 
dedicate it, and I shall then notify you, accepting the resig- 
nation at a time shortly subsequent thereto." 

Two letters which the President wrote at this period set 
forth in engaging language his views about the duties of 
ambassadors and ministers at foreign courts. The first 
was addressed, on December 26, 1904, to George von L. 
Meyer, who at the time was serving as Ambassador at 
Rome: 

*'I desire to send you as Ambassador to St. Petersburg. 
St. Petersburg is at this moment and bids fair to continue 



356 THEODORE ROOSEVELT AND HIS TIME 

to be for at least a year, the most important post in the 
diplomatic service, from the standpoint of work to be done, 
and you come in the category of public sei'\^ants who desire 
to do public work, as distinguished from those whose de- 
sire is merely to occupy public place — a class for whom I 
have no particular respect. I wish in St. Petersburg a man 
who, while able to do all the social work, able to entertain 
and meet the Russians and his fellow diplomats on equal 
terms, able to do all the necessary plush business — business 
which is indispensable — can do in addition, the really vital 
and important thing. . . . The trouble with our ambassa- 
dors in stations of real importance is that they totally fail 
to give us real help and real information, and seem to think 
that the life work of an ambassador is a kind of glorified 
pink tea party." 

The second was to Richard Harding Davis, under date 
of January 3, 1905, in response to a letter from him giving 
his views and estimates of various American diplomats 
whom he had encountered in foreign lands : 

"There are a large number of well-meaning ambassadors 
and ministers, and even consuls and secretaries, who belong 
to what I call the pink tea type, w^ho merely reside in the 
service instead of working in the ser\'ice, and these I intend 

to change whenever the need arises. The Minister to 

is a nice man with an even nicer wife. He has been eight 
years in the service. He is polite to people, gives nice little 
dinners, etc., etc. During all that time it has never made 
one atom of real difference to the country whether he was 
in or out. He is in the service for his own advantage, not 
for the good of the service, although he does all the secon- 
darily important w^ork well; and in all probability I shall 
change him and promote some man who during all that time 
has done really hard work in a place where there is no pink 
tea possibility. . . . 

* ' I shall not make a fetish of keeping a man in, but if a 
man is a realli/ good man he will be kept in. A pink tea 
man shall stay in or go out, just as I find convenient. Of 



ILLUMINATING LETTERS ON VARIOUS SUBJECTS 357 

course, most places at embassies and legations are pink tea 
places. A few are not, and in these we need real men, and 
these real men shall be rewarded." 

In November, 1904, Frederick MacMonnies, the sculptor, 
wrote from France to the President expressing a wish to 
make a statuette of him. Replying, on November 19, the 
President wrote : 

* ' I have just received your very kind note, and of course 
I shall be delighted to have you make the little statue or 
statuette that you desire, for, my dear sir, I think that any 
American President would be glad to have an American 
sculptor like you or St. Gaudens do such a piece of work. 
But before sending you over the things you would like I 
want to point out something. You say that you like that 
photograph of me jumping a fence, and apparently intend 
to use that as a model ; but you ask me for my soldier suit. 
Now, of course, I do not jump fences in my khaki and with 
sword and revolver in my belt — as a matter of fact I rarely 
wore my sword at all in the war — and if you want to make 
me jumping a fence I must send you my ordinary riding 
things. It seems to me it would be better to put me in 
khaki and not to have me jumping the fence. Horses I 
jump fences with have short tails. The horses I rode in 
the war had long tails ; and, by the way, as soon as I got 
down to active work they looked much more like Reming- 
ton's cavalry horses than like the traditional war steed of 
the story books. Now, which way do you want to make that 
statuette? It seems to me it would be better in uniform." 

I 

t 

The statuette was made and reached the White House in 
June following. In acknowledging it, the President wrote 
on June 5 : 

* ' Mrs. Roosevelt and I are delighted with the statuette ; 
and, my dear fellow, to have a bronze of me by MacMonnies 
really makes me feel as if I were a pretty considerable per- 
sonage ! I have always been grateful to you and St. Gau- 



358 THEODORE ROOSEVELT AND HIS TIME 

dens for just existing, for it is a big asset on the Nation 's^ 
credit side that it should have produced you both. ' ' 

When the statuette was presented to the President, he 
said: 

''I now feel myself a really great man. The distinction 
of 'being done' by either St. Gaudens or MacMonnies might 
flatter anybody. I had always hoped to have something in 
my possession by MacMonnies, but it never occurred to me 
that I should have something by MacMonnies of me. The 
statuette is exactly as I should like to have it — a cavalry 
horse, the rough rider clothes and the emblematic support 
to the whole." 

For several years President Roosevelt, with the cordial I 
and enthusiastic cooperation of Augustus Saint-Gaudens, 
made persistent efforts to have the artistic quality of our 
coinage improved. While he was unable to accomplish all 
that he wished, some notable results were achieved. He 
greatly admired the sculptor's work, especially the eques- 
trian statue of General Sherman which stands at the Fifth 
Avenue entrance to Central Park in New York City. Writ- 
ing of this to Saint-Gaudens, under date of August 3, 1903, 
he said : 

'*To my mind your Sherman is the greatest statue of a 
commander in existence. But I can say with all sincerity 
that I know of no man — of course of no one living — who 
could have done it. To take grim, homely, old Sherman, 
the type and ideal of a democratic general, and put with him 
an allegorical figure such as you did, could result in but one 
of two ways — a ludicrous failure or striking the very highest 
note of the sculptor's art. Thrice over for the good fortune 
of your countrymen, it was given you to strike this highest 
note." 

For making the usual Inauguration Medal which is struck 
for every new President, Saint-Gaudens was selected, and 
when the medal was received the President, on July 8, 1905, 
wrote to him ; 



ILLUMINATING LETTERS ON VARIOUS SUBJECTS 359 

*' Really I do not know whether to thank most Frank 
Millet, who first put it into my rather dense head that we 
ought to have a great artist to design these medals, or to 
thank you for consenting to undertake the work. My dear 
fellow, I am very grateful to you, and I am very proud to 
have been able to associate you in some way with my ad- 
ministration. I like the medals immensely ; but that goes 
without saying, for the work is eminently characteristic of 
you. I thank heaven, we have at last some artistic work 
of permanent worth, done for the Government. 

"I don't want to slop over; but I feel just as if we had 
suddenly imported a little of Greece of the fifth or fourth 
centuries B. C. into America ; and am very proud and very 
grateful that I personally happened to be the beneficiary. 
I like the special bronze medal particularly." 

The success of Saint-Gaudens with the Inauguration 
Medal led to a conversation between the sculptor and the 
President in regard to the improvement of the coinage in 
which the sculptor expressed the belief that the Greek coins 
offered the best models. The President took up the subject 
with the Secretary of the Treasury and obtained from him 
an agreement to employ Saint-Gaudens to submit designs 
for the gold coins, which was done. Writing to Saint- 
Gaudens on November 6, 1905, the President said in regard 
to these designs : 

*'I want to make a suggestion. It seems to me worth 
while to try for a really good coinage; though I suppose 
there will be a revolt about it! I was looking at some gold 
coins of Alexander the Great today, and I was struck by 
their high relief. Would it not be well to have our coins in 
high relief, and also to have the rims raised? The point of 
having the rims raised would be, of course, to protect the 
figure on the coin ; and if we have the figures in high relief, 
like the figures on the old Greek coins, they will surely last 
longer. What do you think of this ? ' ' 

Writing again to Saint-Gaudens on November 14, 1905, 
the President said : 



360 THEODORE ROOSEVELT AND HIS TIME 

**I have summoned all the Mint people, and I am going to 
see if I cannot persuade them that coins of the Grecian type 
but with the raised rim will meet the commercial needs of 
the day. Of course I want to avoid too heavy an outbreak 
of the mercantile classes, because after all it is they who do 
use the gold. If we can have an eagle like that on the 
Inauguration Medal, only raised, I should feel that we would 
be awfully fortunate. Don't you think that we might accom- 
plish something by raising the figures more than at present 
but not as much as in the Greek coins'? Probably the Greek 
coins would be so thick that modern banking houses, where 
they have to pile up gold, would simply be unable to do so. 
How would it do to have a design struck off in a tentative 
fashion — that is, to have a model made? I think your 
Liberty idea is all right. Is it possible to make a Liberty 
with that Indian feather head-dress? Would people refuse 
to regard it as a Liberty? The figure of Liberty as you 
suggest would be beautiful. If we get down to bed-rock 
facts, would the feather head-dress be any more out of 
keeping with the rest of Liberty than the canonical Phry- 
gian cap which never is worn and never has been worn by 
any free people in the world ? ' ' 

To this Saint-Gaudens replied on November 22, 1905, say- 
ing: **I can perfectly well use the Indian head-dress on the 
figure of Liberty. It should be very handsome. ' ' 

From the outset of the President's efforts the authorities 
of the United States Mint displayed strenuous opposition, 
raising objection after objection to the designs submitted 
by Saint-Gaudens. In a letter to him, on January 6, 1906, 
the President referred to this obstructive attitude : 

*'I have seen Shaw about that coinage and told him that 
it was my pet baby. We will try it anyway, so you go ahead. 
Shaw was really very nice about it. Of course he thinks I 
am a mere crack-brained lunatic on the subject, but he said 
with great kindness that there was always a certain number 
of gold coins that had to be stored up in vaults, and that 
there was no earthly objection to having those coins as 





INAUGURATION MEDAL, 1905 
Wade directly from the medal designed by Augustus Saint-Gaudens 





Obverse of the ten-dollar fjold piece, in high relief, 
and before the addition of the head-dress, on 
President Roosevelt's suggestion 



Obverse of the ten-dollar gold piece w ith the Roose- 
velt feather head-dress Before the relief was 
radicallv lowered for minting 




The high relief form •>{ ili<- il\ing eagle for the 
twenty-dollar gold piece ultimately used, but in 
much lower relief. Reverse of coin 



The standing eagle design for the twenty-dollar 
gold piece, but ultimately used only for the ten- 
dollar gold piece and in much lower relief 



COINAGE DESIGNS BY AUGUSTUS SAINT-GAUDENS, 1906 
Collected by Homer Saint-Gaudens. Photographs by DeW. C. Ward 



ILLUMINATING LETTERS ON VARIOUS SUBJECTS 361 

artistic as the Greeks could desire. (I am paraphrasing his 
words, of course.) I think it will seriously increase the 
mortality among the employes of the mint at seeing such a 
desecration, but they will perish in a good cause!" 

When Saint-Gaudens sent his models for the twenty- 
dollar gold coin the President wrote to him on December 20, 
1906: 

''Those models are simply immense — if such a slang 
way of talking is permissible in reference to giving a mod- 
ern nation one coinage at least which shall be as good as 
that of the ancient Greeks. I have instructed the Director 
of the Mint that these dies are to be reproduced just as 
quickly as possible and just as they are. It is simply splen- 
did. I suppose I shall be impeached for it in Congress, 
but I shall regard that as a very cheap payment!" 

The President succeeded in getting the Indian feather 
head-dress adopted and expressed his joy thereat in a letter 
to Saint-Gaudens on March 14, 1907 : 

"Many thanks for your letter of the 12th instant. Good! 
I have directed that be done at once. I am so glad you like 
the head of Liberty with the feather head-dress. Really, 
the feather head-dress can be treated as being the conven- 
tional cap of Liberty quite as much as if it was the Phrygian 
cap ; and, after all, it is our Liberty — not what the ancient 
Greeks and Romans miscalled by that title — and we are 
entitled to a typically American head-dress for the lady." 

Saint-Gaudens died in August, 1907, and the last stages 
of the work were supervised by his assistant, Henry Hering. 
The coins as finally struck were far inferior to those de- 
signed by Saint-Gaudens, because of their lowered relief, 
changes in the lettering and numerals, and careless repro- 
duction, but none the less they marked a distinct artistic 
progress in the national coinage. 



CHAPTER XXX 

INAUGURATED PRESIDENT— DEATH OF JOHN HAY 

The attendance at the Inauguration exercises in March, 
1905, exceeded all previous records. It was estimated that 
fully 500,000 people were in the city. The weather was ex- 
ceptionally fine for the season, and thus favorable for the 
parade which numbered 35,000 men and was three and a 
half hours passing the reviewing stand upon which the 
President stood. Roosevelt's correspondence contains 
much interesting matter relating to the exercises. On the 
night before the exercises he received this memorable letter ; 

Department op State, 

Washington, March 3, 1905. 
Dear Theodore: 

The hair in this ring is from the head of Abraham Lin- 
coln. Dr. Taft cut it off the night of the assassination, and 
I got it from his son — a brief pedigree. 

Please wear it to-morrow; you are one of the men who 
most thoroughly understand and appreciate Lincoln. 

I have had your monogram and Lincoln's engraved on 
the ring. 

Longas, utinam, bone dux, ferias, 
Praestes Hesperiae.* 

Yours affectionately, 

John Hay. 

To a telegram of congratulation from Elihu Root, he 
replied on March 6, 1905 : 

Dear Elihu: 

I appreciate the telegram. No one did more than you 

* Horace, Odes, IV, V : " Mayest thou, Good Captain, give long holiday 
to Hesperia ! ' ' 

362 



INAUGURATED PRESIDENT— JOHN HAY'S DEATH 363 

have done to make my first term a success and I thank you 
now from the bottom of my heart, my dear fellow. 
With love to you and yours, 

Your friend, 
(Signed) Theodore Koosevelt. 
P. S. The night before the inauguration John Hay did 
such a characteristically nice thing. He sent me a ring 
containing some of Abraham Lincoln's hair, cut from his 
head after he was assassinated, and with my initials and his 
engraved on the ring ; saying he wished me to wear it when 
I took the oath. Naturally no present could have pleased 
me more. 

On the same date he wrote to R. B. Roosevelt, in New 
York: 

Dear Uncle Rob: 

It was peculiarly pleasant having you here. How I wish 
Father could have lived to see it too ! You stood to me for 
him and for all that generation, and so you may imagine 
how proud I was to have you here. 

Ever yours, 
(Signed) Theodore Roosevelt. 

In his Inaugural Address, which was one of the briefest 
he ever delivered, President Roosevelt laid most stress 
upon the two subjects which occupied first place in his 
mind — national preparedness and social and industrial jus- 
tice. ''We wish peace," he said, "but we wish the peace 
of justice, the peace of righteousness. We wish it because 
we think it is right and not because we are afraid. No weak 
nation that acts manfully and justly shall ever have cause 
to fear us, and no strong power should ever be able to single 
us out as a subject for insolent aggression." The growth 
in wealth and population of the country during a century 
and a half, had produced perils the very existence of which 
it was impossible that our forefathers should foresee. ' ' The 
conditions which have told for our marvelous material well- 
being, which have developed to a very high degree our 



364 THEODOEE ROOSEVELT AND HIS TIME 

energy, self-reliance and individual initiative, have also 
brought the care and anxiety inseparable from the accumu- 
lation of great wealth in industrial centers. . . . There is 
no good reason why we should fear the future, but there is 
every reason why we should face it seriously, neither hid- 
ing from ourselves the gravity of the problems before us 
nor fearing to approach those problems wdth the unbending, 
unflinching purpose to solve them aright." 

A long letter to Sir George Otto Trevelyan, in England, 
March 9, 1905, with whom he maintained an intimate corre- 
spondence for many years, contains an account of the 
Inauguration which is interesting as revealing the Presi- 
dent's personal impressions of the event: 

** Well, I have just been inaugurated and begun my second 
term. Of course, I greatly enjoyed inauguration day, and 
indeed I have thoroughly enjoyed being President. But I 
believe I can also say that I am thoroughly alive to the 
tremendous responsibilities of my position. Life is a long 
campaign where every victory merely leaves the ground 
free for another battle, and sooner or later defeat comes to 
every man, unless death forestalls it. But the final defeat 
does not and should not cancel the triumphs, if the latter 
have been substantial and for a cause worth championing. 

''It has been peculiarly pleasant to me to find that my 
supporters are to be found in the overwhelming majority 
among those whom Abraham Lincoln called the plain 
people. As I suppose you know, Lincoln is my hero. He 
was a man of the people who always felt with and for the 
people, but who had not the slightest touch of the dema- 
gogue in him. It is probably difficult for his countrymen 
to get him exactly in the right perspective as compared 
with the great men of other lands. But to me he does seem 
to be one of the great figures, who will loom ever larger as 
the centuries go by. His unfaltering resolution, his quiet, 
unyielding courage, his infinite patience and gentleness, 
and the heights of disinterestedness which he attained 
whenever the crisis called for putting aside self, together 



INAUGURATED PRESIDENT— JOHN HAY'S DEATH 365 

with his far-sighted, hard-headed common sense, point him 
out as just the kind of chief who can do most good in a 
democratic republic like ours. 

** Having such an admiration for the great rail-splitter, 
it has been a matter of keen pride to me that I have ap- 
pealed peculiarly to the very men to whom he most ap- 
pealed and who gave him their heartiest support. I am a 
college bred man, belonging to a well-to-do family, so that, 
as I was more than contented to live simply, and was for- 
tunate to marry a wife with the same tastes, I have not 
had to make my own livelihood ; though I have always had 
to add to my private income by work of some kind. But 
the farmers, lumbermen, mechanics, ranchmen, miners, of 
the North, East, and West have felt that I was just as much 
in sympathy with them, just as devoted to their interests, 
and as proud of them and as representative of them, as if 
I had sprung from among their own ranks ; and I certainly 
feel that I do understand them and believe in them and feel 
for them and try to represent them just as much as if I had 
from earliest childhood made each day's toil pay for that 
day's existence or achievement. How long this feeling 
toward me will last I cannot say. It was overwhelming at 
the time of the election last November, and I judge by the 
extraordinary turnout for the Inauguration it is over- 
whelming now. Inasmuch as the crest of the wave is in- 
variably succeeded by the hollow, this means that there will 
be a reaction. But meanwhile I shall have accomplished 
something worth accomplishing, I hope. 

'*I wish you could have been here on Inauguration Day, 
for I should think the ceremonies, if such they can be called, 
would have interested you. The Secretary of State, John 
Hay, was Lincoln 's private secretary, and the night before 
the Inauguration he gave me a ring containing some of 
Lincoln's hair, cut from his head just after he was assassi- 
nated nearly forty years ago ; and I wore the ring when I 
took my oath of office next day. I had thirty members of 
my old regiment as my special guard of honor, riding to 
and from the Capitol. And in the parade itself, besides the 



366 THEODORE ROOSEVELT AND HIS TIME 

regular Army and Navy and the National Guard, there 
was every variety of civic organization, including a dele- 
gation of coal miners with a banner recalling that I had 
settled the anthracite coal strike ; Porto Ricans and Philip- 
pine scouts ; old style Indians, in their war paint and with 
horses painted green and blue and red and yellow, with 
their war bonnets of eagles ' feathers and their spears and 
tomahawks, followed by the new Indians, the students of 
Hampton and Carlisle ; sixty or seventy cowboys, farmers ' 
clubs ; mechanics ' clubs — everybody and everything. Many 
of my old friends with whom I had lived on the ranches and 
worked in the round-ups in the early days came to see me 
inaugurated. ' ' 

Writing on March 9, 1905, to Gen. Leonard Wood, who 
was at Manila, he said : 

"Well, the inauguration went off splendidly and I am 
getting along with no more than the usual and normal 
amount of worry which every President must have. Con- 
gress does from a third to a half of what I think is the 
minimum that it ought to do, and I am profoundly grateful 
that I get as much. Next year I believe we shall get im- 
proved tariff arrangements for the Philippines. Thank 
Heaven, we can now make a start in the railroad matters ! 
But of course, it is one long fight and worry. However, I 
am not complaining. Taking it on the whole I have gotten 
an astonishing proportion of what I set out to get. When 
I became President three years ago I made up my mind that 
I should try for a fleet with a minimum strength of forty 
armor-clads ; and though the difficulty of getting what I 
wished has increased from year to year I have now reached 
my mark and we have built or provided for twenty-eight 
battle-ships and twelve armored cruisers. This navy puts 
us a good second to France and about on a par with Ger- 
many; and ahead of any other power in point of material, 
except, of course, England. For some years now we can 
afford to rest and merely replace the ships that are worn 
out or become obsolete, while we bring up the personnel. ' ' 



INAUGURATED PRESIDENT— JOHN HAY'S DEATH 367 

An example of Eoosevelt's sympathetic aid to authors 
appears in the following correspondence with Booth Tar- 
kington. Writing to him on March 9, 1905, the President 
said: 

*'I like 'In the Arena' so much that I must write to tell 
you so. I particularly like the philosophy of the Preface 
and the first story. But I like all the stories. Mrs. Pro- 
thero does not come within the ken of my own experiences, 
but the other comedies and pitiful tragedies are just such 
as I myself have seen. 

**Do let me know when you get to Washington again." 

In replying Mr. Tarkington wrote : 

''It is a tremendous pleasure to know that you read and 
liked my political stories. The Preface was almost directly 
your suggestion. When, in last December, I had the honor 
of lunching with you, you spoke of the danger that my pur- 
pose in these stories might be misunderstood, and that 
exhibiting too much of the uglier side might have no good 
effect. So I prefixed the Preface, hoping that if you hap- 
pened to see it you would believe that the Professor was at 
least trying to do his best." 

The death of John Hay, on July 1, 1905, was a cause of 
keen grief to Roosevelt which found expression in many 
of his letters. They had been personal friends for many 
years before he became President, and their intimate offi- 
cial association developed their friendship into a deep and 
tender affection. Differing widely in many of their char- 
acteristics, each had a full appreciation of the other's qual- 
ities, and each supplemented the other, the two working 
always harmoniously, even joyously, together. Socially, 
they met constantly. Every Sunday morning, on his re- 
turn from church, the President dropped in at Secretary 
Hay's house for an hour's chat. Sometimes it was with 
Hay alone; at other times Secretary Taft, or Secretary 
Root, or both would be present. He was a fortunate man 



368 THEODORE ROOSEVELT AND HIS TIME 

who was honored with an invitation to be present at these 
gatherings, for he was then permitted to behold the work- 
ings of the National Government from its innermost side. 
Usually it w^as the comic aspect which predominated in the 
revelation, for the President's prevailing sense of humor 
was shared by his colleagues. I was thus honored on sev- 
eral occasions, and invariably Hay contributed something 
that was especially apt and worth repeating. I may, I think, 
without indiscretion, introduce here an instance. Secretary 
Taft was present on this occasion, and the subject under 
consideration was the Philippine Islands. "I see," said 
Taft, "that the anti-imperialists are changing their ground 
about the Islands. They have been saying heretofore that 
we should not have stayed there after the battle of Manila ; 
that we should get out of them and leave them to their fate ; 
and that they are doing infinite harm to us and to our insti- 
tutions, because in ruling them against their will we are 
violating the Declaration of Independence and destroying 
our own love of liberty. Now they say that we ought to 
give them away, or sell them to Germany or Japan or any 
nation that will take them off our hands." ''That," said 
Hay, ''reminds me of the young woman who had got re- 
ligion and was telling her experience in conference meet- 
ing. Wishing to give proof of the thoroughness of her con- 
version, she said: 'Allien I found that my jewelry was 
dragging me do^vn to hell, I gave it all to my sister.' " 

With Hay's sickness and absence from the country these 
gatherings were interrupted and they ceased, of course, 
with his death. It was natural that his colleagues in the 
Cabinet, as well as the President, should feel his loss keen- 
ly. On the day following his death the President gave out 
for publication this statement: "My sense of deep per- 
sonal loss, great though it is, is lost in my sense of the be- 
reavement to the whole country in Mr. Hay's death. I was 
inexpressibly shocked, as every one was, for all of us, in- 
cluding Mr. Hay's immediate family, had supposed that all 
immediate danger was over, and I had been hoping that 
the rest during the summer would put him again in good 



INAUGURATED PRESIDENT— JOHN HAY'S DEATH 369 

health by the fall. The American people have never had 
a greater Secretary of State than John Hay, and his loss 
is a national calamity." 



Writing to the President, from New York, Mr. Eoot said: 
''I am completely broken up by Hay's death. Dear old 
boy, he was right about himself after all. 

*'I must send you a word of sympathy and condolence. 
I know how true your affection for him was and how deeply 
you will feel his loss, and how true was his affection for 
you — how loyal and sweet the relation. Ah me ! The old 
times are passing," 

From many letters which the President wrote at the 
time the following extracts are taken: 

July 15, 1905. 
To the Rt. Hon. James Bryce, London, England: 

''John Hay's loss was to me a personal one in the sense 
which could have been true of hardly any other man, for he 
was not only a dear friend of mine but a dear friend of 
my father. The nation is richer because he has lived; and 
he fell in the harness, as I should suppose every man would 
wish to fall. ' ' 

July 11, 1905. 
To Senator Lodge: 

"John Hay's death was very sudden and removes from 
American life a man whose position was literally unique. 
The country was the better because he lived, for it was a 
fine thing to have set before our young men the example 
of success contained in the career of a man who had held 
so many and such important public positions, while there 
was not in his nature the slightest touch of the demagogue, 
and w^ho in addition to his great career in political life had 
also left a deep mark in literature. His 'Life of Lincoln' 
is a monument, and of its kind his 'Castilian Days' is per- 
fect. This is all very sad for Mrs. Hay. Personally his 
loss is very great to me because I was very fond of him. 



370 THEODORE ROOSEVELT AND HIS TIME 

and as you know always stopped at his house after church 
on Sunday to have an hour's talk with him." 

July 18, 1905. 
To Senator Lodge: 

**I particularly like what you said about John Hay, and 
every word of it was well deserved. He is one of the men 
whom we shall miss greatly all the time, and our memories 
of him will be green as long as you and I live. But I have 
not quite your feeling about his death, so far as making 
us melancholy is concerned. You have often said that the 
epitaph on Wolfe was the finest thing ever written, and I 
cordially agree with you. But Wolfe was still young and 
one could mourn his loss. John Hay, however, died within 
a very few years of the period when death comes to all of 
us as a certainty, and I should esteem any man happy who 
lived till 65 as John Hay has lived, who saw his children 
marry, his grandchildren born, who was happy in his home 
life, who wrote his name clearly in the record of our times, 
who rendered great and durable services to the Nation 
both as statesman and writer, who held high public posi- 
tions, and died in the harness in the zenith of his fame. 
When it comes our turn to go out into the blackness, I only 
hope the circumstances will be as favorable." 

July 11, 1905. 
To Ex-Senator Beveridge: 

*'Hay was a really great man, and the more credit is 
given him the more I am delighted, while the result at the 
last election showed how futile it was for my enemies to 
try and draw the distinction between what Hay did and 
what I did. Whether I originated the work, or whether he 
did and merely received my backing and approval, is of no 
consequence to the party, and what is said about it is of 
no earthly consequence to me. The same people who, not 
because they cared for Hay, but because they hated me, in- 
sisted that everything of wliich they approved in the man- 
agement of the State Department was due to him will now 
make exactly the same claim in reference to Root and will 



INAUGURATED PRESIDENT— JOHN HAY'S DEATH 371 

hope thereby to damage or irritate me, whereas in reality 
they will not be making the slightest impression upon either 
my fortunes or my temper. A year and a half ago these 
people said that with Root out of the Cabinet I would be 
wholly unable to run the country. Root has been out a 
year and a half and now when he comes back they will at 
once forget the intervening eighteen months and make the 
same assertion. They have already forgotten that Hay 
was on the other side of the water during these last peace 
negotiations; and, my dear fellow, why in the name of 
Heaven should I care? 

''I wished Root as Secretary of State partly because I 
am extremely fond of him and prize his companionship as 
well as his advice, but primarily because I think that in 
all the country he is the best man for the position and that 
no minister of foreign affairs in any other country at this 
moment in any way compares with him. Nobody can praise 
him too highly to suit me ; and right away he will begin to 
help me in connection with the Venezuelan and Santo Do- 
mingan affairs. As for which of us gets the credit for set- 
tling them, I honestly think you will find Root quite as 
indifferent as I am. What we want is to get them settled, 
and settled right/' 

July 18, 1905. 
To G. V. L. Meyer, Ambassador to Russia: 

"Hay's death was a severe personal loss, to me and to 
every one who knew him, for no more loyal, lovable and 
upright man ever existed, and as a public man he stood 
literally alone. America was the richer because he had 
lived. As for his death, I am mourning; but surely there 
is not one of us who would not be glad to die as he did, 
still in the harness, with his children and his grandchildren 
around him, and with so great a record of public service. 
I have never been able to feel that the man who died well 
on in years with a great and well earned record of victory 
behind him, and still in the flush of his triumph, was unfor- 
tunate. But it is very hard for those he leaves, and above 
all for his wife." 



372 THEODORE ROOSEVELT AND HIS TIME 

The President, very soon after Hay's death, offered the 
position of Secretary of State to Elihu Root, who accepted 
it. Writing to Senator Lodge on July 11, 1905, the Presi- 
dent said: 

'*I hesitated a little between Root and Taft, for Taft as 
you know is very close to me. But as soon as I began seri- 
ously to think it over I saw there was really no room for 
doubt whatever, because it was not a choice as far as the 
Cabinet was concerned between Root and Taft, but a choice 
of having both instead of one. I was not at all sure that 
Root would take it, although from various hints I had re- 
ceived I thought the chances at least even. To my great 
pleasure he accepted at once and was evidently glad to ac- 
cept and to be back in public life and in the Cabinet in such 
a position. He will be a tower of strength to us all. I not 
only hope but believe that he will get on well with the Sen- 
ate, and he will at once take a great burden off my mind in 
connection with various subjects, such as Santo Domingo 
and Venezuela. For a number of months now I have had 
to be my own Secretary of State, and while I am very glad 
to be it so far as the broad outlines of the work are con- 
cerned, I of course ought not to have to attend to the 
details." 

Writing on July 29, 1905, to Secretary Taft, who was then 
at Manila on a visit, the President gave this as the view 
taken by the more hysterical portion of our people of Root's 
appointment : 

'*Up to the first of July you were the one person in the 
popular eye. Then you had started for the Philippines and 
Root suddenly appeared on the stage, and the great Ameri- 
can public, to use a simile from the nursery, dropped its 
woolly horse and turned with frantic delight to the new 
cloth doll. The more lunatic portion of the press insisted 
that I had made a bargain by which Root was to have the 
next Presidency. The fact that to make such a bargain 
would show both of us to be not only scoundrels but idiots 
was treated as an unimportant detail. By the time you 



INAUGURATED PRESIDENT— JOHN HAY'S DEATH 373 

come back they will probably drop Root like dross and take 
you up as a new returned hero from the Orient and they 
will then vividly portray Root 's bitter — and entirely imagi- 
nary — chagrin at my having abandoned him for you." 



CHAPTER XXXI 

RUSSO-JAPANESE PEACE CONFERENCE 

The ''crowded" year supreme of Roosevelt's official life 
was unquestionably that of 1905. In no other does the 
record of his activity and achievement stand so high ; in no 
other did he exemplify more completely the dictum of 
Henry Adams that he was "pure act." He arranged, di- 
rected and brought to a successful conclusion the Ports- 
mouth Peace Conference which put an end to the war 
between Japan and Russia. He arranged also the Algeciras 
Convention which resulted, in 1906, in preventing war be- 
tween France and Germany over possessions in Morocco. 
He took charge of affairs in Santo Domingo and, in the 
failure of the Senate to act, brought about a peaceful solu- 
tion of the troubles between that island and its foreign 
creditors. He personally directed the vast amount of offi- 
cial business connected with the task of getting the ma- 
chinery of organization in motion for building the Panama 
Canal. These were the dominating items in the record of 
his year's activity. There were many of less magnitude 
which will be mentioned in the course of this narrative. 

The crowning achievement of the year was, of course, 
the ending of the war between Russia and Japan. The 
broad outlines of the methods which Roosevelt pursued in 
accomplishing this memorable result are matters of common 
knowledge, but the inner history of the incident has never 
been revealed. For the first time it is now accessible to his 
biographer in Roosevelt's official and private correspon- 
dence, and can, not improperly, be laid before the world. 
As it is told in that correspondence, it is virtually his own 
story of what he did, illuminated with expositions of his 
own views and motives at the time, and with his own esti- 

374 



RUSSO-JAPANESE PEACE CONFERENCE 375 

mates and graphic pen portraits of the chief personages 
with whom he was engaged in what to most men would 
have been a hopeless struggle almost from the outset. He 
himself had serious doubt at many stages as to his ability 
to succeed, but he never permitted himself to be discour- 
aged, and his resourcefulness proved more than equal to all 
emergencies. 

^ He was at the time his own Secretary of State, for Sec- 
retary Hay was absent from his post in the last stages of 
the illness which ended in his death before the peace was 
secured. Every step in the negotiations, extending over a 
period of three months, was taken by the President in per- 
son without the aid of any of his most trusted counselors, 
for Secretary Root had resigned from the Cabinet many 
months earlier and Secretary Taft was absent on a visit 
to the Philippines. 

In no other task of his life was the abnormal energy, 
mental and physical, of Theodore Eoosevelt put to a se- 
verer test, and from none did he emerge more triumph- 
antly. His activity was as tireless as his resourcefulness 
was inexhaustible. One reads the thick volumes of his cor- 
respondence with amazement bordering on incredulity. 
It is incredible that one man could do so much and do it so 
easily and so well. He was not only steadily and irre- 
sistibly forcing the two warring nations into a conference, 
but he was at the same time untiringly bringing, or en- 
deavoring to bring, other nations like England, France, and 
Germany to the support of his efforts. If Russia balked 
and showed signs of refusal, he persuaded the Kaiser to 
bring pressure upon the Czar in the interest of peace. If 
Japan showed similar signs, England was appealed to, to 
bring pressure upon her. In the end Germany alone really 
helped, and Roosevelt gave unstinted praise to the Kaiser 
ever afterwards for what he did then. 

Early in the year 1905 President Roosevelt became seri- 
ously impressed with the strain which the war was bring- 
ing upon the civilized world and that some means should 
be found for arresting it. ''From all sources of informa- 



376 THEODORE ROOSEVELT AND HIS TIME 

tion at hand," he says in his 'Autobiography,' *'I grew 
most strongly to believe that a further continuation of the 
struggle would be a very bad thing for Japan, and an even 
worse thing for Russia. Japan was already suffering ter- 
ribly from the drain upon her men, and especially upon her 
resources, and had nothing further to gain from continua- 
tion of the struggle; its continuance meant to her more 
loss than gain, even if she were victorious. Russia, in 
spite of her gigantic strength, was, in my judgment, apt to 
lose even more than she had already lost if the struggle 
continued. ' ' 

Writing to Sir George Otto Trevelyan, on March 9, 1905, 
he gave the date of his first move for peace : 

''Six weeks ago I privately and unofficially advised the 
Russian Government, and afterwards repeated the advice 
indirectly through the French Government, to make peace, 
telling them that of course if they were sure their fleet 
could now beat the Japanese, and if they were sure they 
could put and keep six hundred thousand men in Man- 
churia, I had nothing to say; but that in my own belief 
the measure of their mistaken judgment for the last year 
would be the measure of their mistaken judgment for the 
next if they continued the war, and that they could not 
count upon as favorable terms of peace as the Japanese 
were still willing to offer if they refused to come to terms 
until the Japanese armies were north of Harbin." 

On the same date, he wrote to King Edward of England : 
"It seems to me that if Russia had been wise she would 
have made peace before the Japanese took Mukden. If she 
waits until they are north of Harbin the terms will cer- 
tainly be worse for her. I had this view unofficially con- 
veyed to the Russian Government some weeks ago; and I 
think it would have been to their interest if they had then 
acted upon it." 

In a confidential letter to Secretary Hay, who was abroad 
for his health, the President wrote on March 30, 1905 : 



RUSSO-JAPANESE PEACE CONFERENCE 377 

"Cassini (Russian Ambassador) and Takahira (Japa- 
nese Minister) have been to see me about peace negotiations, 
but we do not make much progress as yet because neither 
side is willing to make the first advance. The Japanese 
say, quite rightly, that they will refuse to deal unless on 
the word of the Czar, because it is evident that no one 
minister has power to bind the government. Cassini an- 
nounces to me that officially the government is bent upon 
war, but that privately he would welcome peace. The 
Kaiser has had another fit and is now convinced that 
France is trying to engineer a congress of the nations, in 
which Germany will be left out. What a jumpy creature 
he is, anyhow! Besides sending to me he is evidently en- 
gaged in sending to all kinds of other people. I am against 
having a Congress to settle the peace terms. 

''The Chinese obviously desire the war to go on in the 
hope that both combatants will ultimately become com- 
pletely exhausted. The European powers want peace. I 
have an idea that the English would be by no means over- 
joyed if the Japs took Vladivostok. It looks as if the 
foreign powers did not want me to act as peacemaker. I 
certainly do not want to myself. I wish the Japs and Rus- 
sians could settle it between themselves, and I should be 
delighted to have any one except myself give them a jog 
to settle it between themselves. If France will do it, it will 
serve the purpose just as well." 

A letter that he wrote to the German Ambassador, on 
March 31, shows an early purpose on the part of the Pres- 
ident to cultivate the good graces of the Kaiser, even if he 
considered him a ''jumpy creature," by making him the 
confidant of his endeavors : 

"I am happy to tell you in response to your last note 
that I entirely agree with the Emperor that it is unwise for 
the peace negotiations, when the time comes to carry them 
on, to be considered in a congress of the nations. The Jap- 
anese Minister has informed me that Japan takes this view 
also. I informed the British Ambassador that this was 



378 THEODORE ROOSEVELT AND HIS TIME 

my view, and he told me that he had no doubt that the 
British Government would also take it. 

'*I saw the Russian Ambassador, and for your private in- 
formation will say that I told him that in my judgment it 
was eminently to Russia's interest to make peace, and that 
I thought, as regards the terms offered by the Japanese, 
it would be a case of the sibylline books ; that each delay, if 
the delay meant another Japanese victory, would mean an 
increase in the onerousness of the terms." 

Another confidential letter to Secretary Hay, under date 
of April 2, 1905, gives us an extremely entertaining account 
of what was in progress behind the scenes : 

"I have seen Cassini (Russian Ambassador) twice, Taka- 
hira (Japanese Minister), Durand (British Ambassador) 
and Jusserand (French Ambassador) each once, and Speck 
(von Sternburg, German Ambassador) three or four times 
during the past week. The Kaiser has become a monomaniac 
about getting into communication with me every time he 
drinks three pen'orth of conspiracy against his life and 
power ; but as has been so often the case for the last year, he 
at the moment is playing our game — or, as I should more po- 
litely put it, his interests and ours, together with those of 
humanity in general, are identical. He does not wish a con- 
gress of the powers to settle the Japanese-Russian busi- 
ness. As things are at present I cordially agree with him, 
and I find that the British and Japanese governments take 
the same view. The Kaiser is relieved and surprised to 
find that this is true of the English government. He sin- 
cerely believes that the English are planning to attack him 
and smash his fleet, and perhaps join with France in a war 
to the death against him. As a matter of fact the English 
harbor no such intentions, but are themselves in a condition 
of panic terror lest the Kaiser secretly intend to form an 
alliance against them with France or Russia, or both, to 
destroy their fleet and blot out the British Empire from 
the map ! It is as funny a case as I have ever seen of mu- 



RUSSO-JAPANESE PEACE CONFERENCE 379 

tual distrust and fear bringing two peoples to the verge 
of war. 

"Officially the Eussian government announces that it 
wishes to go on with the war. Cassini tells me, doubtless 
under instruction, that he believes they would like peace 
if they can have it on honorable terms ; but that they can not 
for a moment consider the question of an indemnity. I 
told him that to my mind the point was whether they would 
be willing to consider the question of indemnity now, before 
the Japanese had obtained any Russian territory, or would 
wait until the Japanese had Harbin and Vladivostok, and 
that it was for them to ponder whether or not, under such 
circumstances, the Japanese would make the terms more or 
less onerous. I told Cassini that I was speaking sincerely 
in the interest of Russia, not in the interest of Japan, for 
I believed that Japan, after the stunning overthrow of the 
Russian Army at Mukden, felt that danger was past and 
preferred to go on with the war unless all her terms were 
complied with. 

''There has been a very perceptible alteration in the 
temper of the Japanese government and people, not un- 
naturally. They feel that victory is theirs and that they 
are safe from outside interference, and they take a dis- 
tinctly higher tone. Takahira told me that the Japanese 
government, in addition to the points for which they made 
war, would insist upon an indemnity. I told him that I 
was in hearty accord with them as to the points on which 
they had said they felt they must insist prior to the battle 
of Mukden, but I would reserve judgment as to what I 
would say about the indemnity. It may be that they ought 
to have it and must have it, but I did not feel called upon 
to express an opinion about the matter at this time. 

''Did you ever know anything more pitiable than the 
condition of the Russian despotism in this year of grace? 
The Czar is a preposterous little creature as the absolute 
autocrat of 150,000,000 people. He has been unable to make 
war, and he is now unable to make peace." 



380 THEODORE ROOSEVELT AND HIS TIME 

On the day following the letter to Hay, above quoted, the 
President started on what he called a "week's horrid 
anguish in touring through Kentucky, Indian Territory and 
Texas; then five weeks' genuine pleasure in Oklahoma and 
Colorado on a hunt ; to be followed in its turn by three or 
four cindery, sweaty and drearily vociferous days on the 
way home." While on his hunt the President was in con- 
stant touch by telegraph with Secretary Taft who, under 
his direction, was continuing the negotiations with the Rus- 
sian Ambassador and the Japanese Minister. Not entire- 
ly satisfied with the way in which the affair was advancing, 
he telegraphed to Taft on April 27, 1905, from Colorado: 
''I shall come in from my hunt and start home May 8 in- 
stead of May 15 as I had intended. This will be put upon 
ground of general condition of public service in Washing- 
ton so as to avoid talk about Russian- Japan matter," 
adding : 

''Meanwhile ask Takahira whether it would not be ad- 
visable for you to see Cassini from me and say that purely 
confidentially, with no one else to know at all, I have on my 
own motion directed you to go to him and see whether the 
two combatants cannot come together and negotiate direct. 
Say that in my judgment it is far better that there should 
be no reservations on either side, that I cannot help feeling 
that they can make an honorable peace and that it seems 
to me it would be better as a preliminary to have an abso- 
lutely free talk between the representatives of the two 
powers without any intermediary at all. If Takahira ap- 
proves of this, act accordingly." 

This was done by Secretary Taft, who telegraphed that 
the Japanese Minister had approved and had given a state- 
ment of peace terms. On April 30, 1905, the President 
replied : 

' ' I emphatically agree with the Japanese view that there 
should be direct negotiations on all terms of peace between 
Russia and Japan. I heartily agree with the Japanese 
terms of peace, in so far as they include Japan having the 



RUSSO-JAPANESE PEACE CONFERENCE 381 

control over Korea, retaining possession of Port Arthur 
and Dalny, and operating the Harbin, Mukden, Port Arthur 
Railway, while restoring Manchuria to China with the guar- 
antee of the open door. As to the proposed indemnity and 
the cession of Russian territory I am not yet prepared 
to express myself definitely; and, indeed, do not as yet 
feel called upon to express myself definitely. Therefore, 
in approving Japan's position as to direct negotiations 
with Russia on all points concerning the peace, I do not 
wish to commit myself one way or the other on the indem- 
nity and cession of territory matters." 

The President did not find matters in a hopeful condi- 
tion when he arrived in Washington, for on May 13, 1905, 
he wrote to Sir George Otto Trevelyan: **For the moment 
I have been unable to do anything in getting Russia and 
Japan together. I like the Russian people, but I abhor the 
Russian system of government and I cannot trust the word 
of those at the head. The Japanese I am inclined to wel- 
come as a valuable factor in the civilization of the future. 
But it is not to be expected that they should be free from 
prejudice against and distrust of the white race." 

Two days later. May 15, 1905, he wrote to Senator Lodge 
in London : 

"It is evident that Japan is now anxious to have me try 
to make peace. Just as Russia suffered from cockyness, 
and has good cause to rue her refusal to take my advice and 
make peace after Port Arthur fell, so Japan made an error 
in becoming over-elated in turn after Mukden and then re- 
jecting my advice to make peace. Takahira, and I think 
the Japanese Foreign Office, agreed with my position, but 
the war party, including the army and navy, insisted upon 
an indemnity and cession of territory, and rather than ac- 
cept such terms the Russians preferred to have another 
try with Rojestvensky's fleet. I told the Japanese that if 
there was any reasonable doubt, even if not a very great 
doubt, as to the final result, it was in my judgment wise 
to build a bridge of gold for the beaten enemy. They then 



382 THEODORE ROOSEVELT AND HIS TIME 

refused to accept my view. Now they have come around 
to it, being evidently much disturbed by the presence of 
Eojestvensky's fleet, which in material is somewhat superior 
to theirs. For all their courage they are cautious, and I 
think they understand what I meant when I told them that 
though I believe the chances at least two to one in their 
favor, yet that inasmuch as this meant that there was one 
chance in three or four that they would be beaten, and 
therefore crushed to earth, it would pay them to secure the 
proofs of victory without pressing their opponents to de- 
spair. ' ' 

No progress was made during the ensuing fortnight, and 
on May 27, 1905, came the news of the great Japanese naval 
victory in the battle of the Sea of Japan. To Baron Kentaro 
Kaneko, official representative of the Japanese Govern- 
ment in the United States, who, from New York, had ex- 
pressed his joy in a jubilant message to the President, the 
latter replied: ''No wonder you are happy! Neither Tra- 
falgar nor the defeat of the Spanish Armada was as com- 
plete — as overwhelming. As Commander Takashita left 
my office this morning, the Secretary of the Navy, looking 
after him, said, 'Well, there goes a happy man. Every 
Japanese, but perhaps above all every Japanese naval man, 
must feel as if he was treading on air to-day. ' ' ' 

The first overtures for peace came from Japan. They 
reached the President four days after the news of the naval 
victory. This fact, hitherto unrevealed, is firmly estab- 
lished in Roosevelt's correspondence. Full and explicit de- 
tails of all his proceedings in the matter were set forth in 
long letters that he wrote in June, 1905, to Senator Lodge 
in London, from which I shall quote freely in compiling the 
story. In one of these (June 16) he said: "I made my 
first move in the peace negotiations on the request of Japan 
on the following telegram handed to me by Takahira; it 
had been sent to him by the Minister of Foreign Affairs of 
Japan, on the 31st of May." (As this telegram is of real 
historical value, it is reproduced here in full) : 



RUSSO-JAPANESE PEACE CONFERENCE 383 

"With reference to your telegram of the 28th of May, 
you are hereby instructed to say to the President that 
Japan's signal naval victory having completely destroyed 
the force upon which Russia confidently relied to turn the 
tide of the war, it may be reasonably expected that the 
Government of St. Petersburg will turn now its attention 
to the question of peace. The Japanese Government still 
adhere to the conviction that the peace negotiations, when 
they come, should be conducted directly and exclusively 
between the belligerents, but even in such case friendly 
assistance of a neutral will be essential in order to bring 
them together for the purpose of such negotiation and the 
Japanese Government would prefer to have that office un- 
dertaken by a neutral in whose good judgment and wise 
discretion they have entire confidence. You will express 
to the President the hope of the Japanese Government that 
[in actual circumstance of the case and having in view the 
3hanged situation resulting from the recent naval battle, he 
will see his way directly and entirely of his own motion and 
initiative to invite the two belligerents to come together for 
the purpose of direct negotiation and you will add that if 
the President is disposed to undertake the service, the Jap- 
anese Government will leave it to him to determine the 

ourse of procedure and what other Power or Powers, if 
any, should be consulted in the matter of suggested invita- 
tion. You will ask the President whether in his opinion 
the Japanese Government can, with a view to facilitate the 

ourse (?) advantageously take any other or further action 
in the matter and you will make it entirely clear to the 
President that the Japanese Government have no intention 
by the present communication (?) to approach Russia 
either directly or indirectly on the subject of peace." 

"I was amused," wrote the President, "by the way in 
which they asked me to invite the two belligerents together 
directly on my own motion and initiative. It reminded me 
of the request for contributions sent by campaign commit- 
tees to office holders wherein they are asked to make a 



384 THEODORE ROOSEVELT AND HIS TIME 

* voluntary contribution of ten per cent' of their salary. 
It showed a certain naivete on the part of the Japanese." 

After receiving this telegram the President saw Cassini, 
the Russian Ambassador. ''I told him," he wrote to Lodge, 
*'to say to the Czar that I believed the war absolutely hope- 
less for Russia; that I earnestly desired that she and Japan 
should come together and see if they could not agree upon 
terms of peace ; and that I should like to propose this if I 
could get the assent of Russia and then of Japan, which 
latter I thought I would be able to get. I could not be sure 
that Cassini would tell this to the Czar, for he is afraid of 
saying what is disagreeable; but I hardly know what to 
do else." 

Almost immediately following the naval battle, the 
Kaiser began to exert himself for peace. On June 3, 1905, , 
the German Ambassador handed this note to the President : 

**The Emperor has just informed me that in the interest 
of all concerned he thinks Russia ought to effect peace. He 
has requested me to tell you that he is ready to silently 
support any efforts which you may foel inclined to make in 
the interest of peace. For both belligerents he considers 
this way of mediation the chief est and most unselfish." 



On the same date, the American Ambassador at Berlin: 
sent this message to the President: i 

**The German Emperor has asked me to say to you thatt 
he considers the situation in Russia so serious that, when 
the truth is known at St. Petersburg in regard to the re- 
cent defeat, the life of the Czar will be in danger, and the( 
gravest disorders likely to occur. The Emperor of Ger-i ^ 
many has written to the Czar, therefore, urging him to 
take immediate steps toward peace. The Emperor said to 
me: 'I called his attention to the fact that the Americans! 
were the only nation regarded by the Japanese with thei 
highest respect, and that the President of the United Statefi! 
is the right person to appeal to with the hope that he may; 
be able to bring the Japanese to reasonable proposals. ] 
suggested to the Czar to send for Meyer and charge himt 



RUSSO-JAPANESE PEACE CONFERENCE 385 

with a message to President Roosevelt. Please inform the 
President privately, from me personally, of the steps that 
I have taken which I hope will be for the benefit of the 
world.' " 

Precisely what the Kaiser wrote to the Czar in regard to 
Roosevelt as a mediator was revealed in January, 1920, 
when a batch of his letters to the Czar was found in Petro- 
grad and published. In one of them, dated June 3, 1905, 
appears this passage: 

**I may, perhaps, turn your attention to the fact that no 
doubt the Japanese have the highest regard for America 
before all other nations. Because this mighty, rising 
power, with its tremendous fleet, is next to them. If any- 
body in the world is able to influence the Japanese and to 
induce them to be reasonable in their proposals, it is Presi- 
dent Roosevelt. Should it meet with your approval I could 
easily place myself — privately — en rapport with him, as 
we are very intimate ; also my ambassador there is a friend 
of his. Besides, you have Mr. Meyer, whom I know since 
years, who has my fullest confidence; you may send for 
him, talk with him openly; he is most discreet and trust- 
worthy, a charming causeur with agreeable manners." 

The Kaiser's proposal did not meet the President's 
views, for he ''did not desire to be asked to squeeze out of '^ 
Japan favorable terms for Russia." Furthermore, "I 
could not be sure that Cassini would really tell his home 
Government what I had been doing or Lamsdorff would 
tell the Czar what I wished. ' ' He decided to have Meyer, 
the American Ambassador at St. Petersburg, see the Czar 
in person, and accordingly sent him, on June 5, a cable 
message instructing him at once to call on His Majesty, 
saying he did so by personal direction of the President, and 
repeat to him what the President had said to Cassini. 
Meyer was also to say to His Majesty: "If Russia will 
consent to such a meeting the President will try to get 
Japan's consent, acting simply on his own initiative and 



386 THEODORE ROOSEVELT AND HIS TIME 

not saying that Russia has consented, and the President 
believes he will succeed." 

It will be noticed that in this message to the Czar the 
President was conforming strictly to Japan's wishes about 
the "initiative." 

On receipt of the President's message, Ambassador 
Meyer sought and obtained an audience with the Czar, and 
in a letter to the President under date of June 9, he de- 
scribed the interview at length. The Czar admitted that 
he had received a letter from the German Emperor urging 
him to make peace, and said: "If it will be absolutely se- 
cret as to my decision should Japan decline, or until she 
gives her consent, I will now consent to your President's 
plan that we (Russia and Japan) have a meeting, without 
intermediaries, in order to see if we can make peace." 
After asking if the President knew or could find out what 
Japan's terms were, the Czar continued: "You have come 
at the psychological moment ; as yet no foot has been placed 
on Russian soil, but I realize that at almost any moment 
they can make an attack on Saghalien. Therefore it is im- 
portant that the meeting should take place before that oc- 
curs." 

The Czar, apparently, communicated at once with the 
Kaiser, for on June 11, the German Ambassador at Wash- 
ington, handed this message to the President, under direc- 
tions from Berlin : 

"The suspicious Czar has written to the Emperor stating 
that if Japan's demands are too exorbitant or too humilia- 
ting to Russia he would have to break off negotiations at 
once. The Emperor thinks that the best thing to start 
them well would be if you could ask Japan to submit her 
demands to you for consideration before they are for- 
warded to Petersburg. In case they really should be 
exorbitant and too humiliating you could have them held 
back. He reiterates that he will do all in his power to make 
the Czar accept any demands which you consider to be 
within the bounds of moderation. So far as Japan is con- 



RUSSO-JAPANESE PEACE CONFERENCE 387 

cerned, the Emperor thinks that the negotiations better 
rest in your hands alone." 

The President next had what he called * ' a perfectly char- 
acteristic experience, showing the utterly loose way in 
which the Russian Grovernment works." On June 6, 1905, 
Cassini showed him a despatch from his government in 
which they made no answer to Roosevelt's proposition, 
said they would not ask either peace or mediation, but re- 
quested the President to exercise a moderating influence 
on the demands of Japan and find out what those demands 
were. On the following day, Meyer sent to the President a 
message which directly reversed the Cassini message by 
stating: ''The Emperor authorized me to say that he ac- 
cepts and consents to the President's proposition with the 
understanding that it is to be kept absolutely secret, and 
that the President is to act on his own initiative in en- 
deavoring to obtain the consent of the Japanese Govern- 
ment." 

No information of this message was given to Cassini by 
his government, and when it was showai to him he ques- 
tioned its accuracy, saying: "Meyer may have misinter- 
preted or forgotten what the Emperor said." The Presi- 
dent, therefore, had Cassini 's assertion cabled to Meyer, 
and Meyer obtained the authority of Lamsdorff, the Rus- 
sian Minister of Foreign Affairs, for the statement that 
he had quoted the Czar correctly. Roosevelt at the time 
received various messages from Cassini, including a pro- 
test against his seeing so much of the Japanese Minister 
and representatives of the neutral forces. To this the 
President replied through the person who brought it that 
he considered it impertinent and requested that it be not 
repeated. "Cassini also protested," says the President, 
"that I was trying to make Russia move too quickly, and 
was very indignant over my order interning the Russian 
ships at Manila, saying 'this is not the time to establish 
new principles of international law.' I had declined to 
allow the Russian ships to make any repairs that were 



388 THEODORE ROOSEVELT AND HIS TIME 

rendered necessary by the results of tlie battle, and then 
had them interned. I informed Cassini that it was pre- 
cisely the right time to establish a new principle of inter- 
national law, when the principle was a good one, and that 
the principle is now established." 

Having obtained the consent of both belligerents, Roose- 
velt, on June 8, sent by telegraph an identical note to each 
of them stating that the ''President feels that the time has 
come when in the interest of all mankind he must endeavor 
to see if it is not possible to bring to an end the terrible 
and lamentable conflict now being waged"; assuring them 
that with both the "United States has inherited ties of 
friendship and good will" ; urging them "not only for their 
own sakes, but in the interest of the whole civilized world 
to open direct negotiations for peace with one another"; 
and offering to do what he properly could, if they felt that 
his services would be of aid, in arranging the preliminaries 
as to the time and place of meeting. As casting further 
light upon Russian methods of procedure, the President 
writes : "Then Cassini must have been told what had hap- 
pened, for he called upon me and notified me that the Rus- 
sian Government thanked me and had adopted my sugges- 
tion. I am inclined to think that up to that time he had not 
received the message which he then communicated to me, 
that his government had told him nothing whatever as to 
their attitude toward peace." 

The text of the identical note was published by the Presi- 
dent, and then what he calls "a rather exasperating inci- 
dent" occurred. On June 10, 1905, Japan, through its 
Minister for Foreign Affairs, accepted the suggestion of 
the President and declared that it would appoint plenipo- 
tentiaries to meet those of Russia at such time and place as 
might be found mutually agreeable "for the purpose of 
negotiating and concluding terms of peace directly and ex- 
clusively between the two belligerent powers." Cassini, 
in his verbal statement to the President, "had accepted 
just as unreservedly," but, on June 12, there came from 



RUSSO-JAPANESE PEACE CONFERENCE 389 

Lamsdorff a cable message in which he said he had laid 
the note before his August Majesty, that His Majesty was 
''much moved by the sentiments expressed by the Presi- 
dent," and that with regard to the proposed meeting, in 
order to see if it is not possible for the two powers to agree 
to terms of peace, the ''Imperial Government had no 
objection in principle to that endeavor if the Japanese 
Government expressed a like desire." 

The effect of this message is thus described by the 
President ; 

"This note is of course much less satisfactory than 
Japan's, for it shows a certain slyness and an endeavor to 
avoid anything like a definite committal, which most nat- 
urally irritated Japan, while at the same time, as it used 
the very words of my identical note, it did not offer grounds 
for backing out of the negotiations. But Japan now started 
to play the fool. It sent a request for me to get a cate- 
gorical answer from Eussia as to whether she would ap- 
point plenipotentiaries who would have full power to make 
peace, and hinted that otherwise Japan did not care for 
the meeting. Meanwhile Russia had proposed Paris for 
the place of meeting, and Japan Chefoo. Each declined to 
accept the other's proposition. I then made a counter 
proposition of The Hague, which was transmitted to both 
Governments. It was crossed, however, by a proposition 
from Russia that the meeting should take place in Wash- 
ington. Japan answered my proposition positively declin- 
ing to go to Europe and expressing its preference for the 
United States, as being half way between Europe and Asia. 
Russia having first suggested Washington, I promptly 
closed and notified both Japan and Russia that I had thus 
accepted Washington." 

The succeeding few days were very busy ones ?or the 
President. He had to soothe the Japanese Ambassador on 
the question of a categorical answer from Russia as to the 
full powers of the Russian plenipotentiaries and convince 
the Czar that having once accepted Washington as the 



\. 



390 THEODORE ROOSEVELT AND HIS TIME 

meeting place he could not change his mind and induce the 
President to reverse himself also. On June 15, he handed 
to Cassini a memorandum in which he said that he had 
received from Japan a statement of its intention to clothe 
its plenipotentiaries with full powers to negotiate and con- 
clude a peace, and suggested that Russia do the same. This 
he showed to Takahira and explained to him that he had 
withdrawn it later from Cassini on receipt of a message 
from Eussia saying that its plenipotentiaries would have 
full powers since that was the meaning of the title. 

No sooner was this question settled than, on June 16, 
1905, came a message from Ambassador Meyer to the ef- 
fect that Lamsdorff had informed him that Russia pre- 
ferred The Hague for the place of meeting. On the same 
date this bit of *' inspired" news was sent by the Asso- 
ciated Press from St. Petersburg: 

"The question of the place of meeting of the Russian 
and Japanese representatives has been re-opened and there 
is a possibility that The Hague instead of Washington may 
be selected. After the announcement that Washington had 
been selected Russia expressed a desire to have the selec- 
tion reconsidered and exchanges to that end are now pro- 
ceeding between Foreign Minister Lamsdorff and Ambassa- 
dor Meyer and Washington. Russia's preference for The 
Hague is based on the obvious advantages that it is en- 
tirely neutralized, the capital of a small state and the site 
of the arbitration court and also by consideration of time. ' ' 

The President's handling of this situation was thorough- 
ly Rooseveltian, and resembles that which he used with the 
Kaiser in the Venezuela incident of 1902. In reply to 
Meyer's message he sent the following: 

June 16, 1905. 

''You will please immediately inform Count Lamsdorff 
that I was handed by Ambassador Cassini a cable from him 
dated June thirteenth, which ran as follows: 'As regards 
the place of the proposed meeting its choice is of only sec- 
ondary importance since the plenipotentiaries of both Rus- 



RUSSO-JAPANESE PEACE CONFERENCE 391 

sia and Japan are to negotiate directly without any partici- 
pation by third powers. If Paris, so desirable for many 
reasons, encounters opposition, then the Imperial Govern- 
ment gives the preference to Washington over all other 
cities, especially since the presence of the President, initia- 
tor of the meeting, can exercise a beneficent influence 
toward the end which we all have in view.' Accordingly, 
after having received word from Japan that she objected 
to The Hague, and before I received any notification what- 
ever about The Hague from Russia, I notified Japan that 
Washington would be the appointed place and so informed 
Ambassador Cassini. I then gave the same announcement 
to the public. It is, of course, out of the question for me 
to consider any reversal of this action and I regard the 
incident as closed, so far as the place of meeting is con- 
cerned. If Count Lamsdorff does not acquiesce in this 
view, you will please see the Czar personally and read to 
him this cable, stating to Count Lamsdorff that you are 
obliged to make the request because of the extreme gravity 
of the situation. Explain to Count Lamsdorff and if neces- 
sary to the Czar that I am convinced that on consideration 
they will of their own accord perceive that it is entirely 
out of the question for me now to reverse the action I took 
in accordance mth the request of the Russian Government, 
which action has been communicated to and acquiesced in 
by Japan, and has been published to the entire world." 

Promptly on the following day came these two interest- 
ing responses: 

Petersburg, June 17, 1905. 
President Roosevelt, 

Washington. 

Have just received the following from Lamsdorff: Je 

m'empresse d 'informer votre excellence que sa majeste 

lempereur ne voit aucun obstacle au choix de Washington 

pour la reunion et les pourparlers des plenipotentiaires 

Russes et Japonais. 

Meyer. 



392 THEODORE ROOSEVELT AND HIS TIME 

Washington, le 17 Juin, 1905, 
Monsieur le President: 

Vu certains bruits repandus par la presse, j'ai Thonneur 
de porter a Votre connaissance que, coiiformement a un 
telegramme officiel que je \aens de recevoir a I'instant meme, 
Sa JMajeste I'Empereur, mon Auguste Maitre, accepte 
definitivement Washington comma lieu de reunion des 
plenipotentiaires Busses at Japonais qui saront appales 
a negociar las preliminaires d'un traite de paix. 

Agreez, Monsieur la President, 1 'assurance da ma plus 
haute consideration. 

Cassini. 

Eoosevelt's comments upon the incident are both enter- 
taining and valuable : 

''I think it is beautiful the way in which Cassini virtually 
begins his note by speaking of the rumors given currency 
by the press, just as if his government had not explicitly 
informed me that it desired to change the place from Wash- 
ington to The Hague. What I cannot understand about 
the Russian is the way he will lie when he knows perfectly 
well that you know he is lying. 

**It is this kind of thing which makes me feel rather 
hopeless about our ultimately getting peace. I shall do my 
best, but neither the Czar nor the Russian Government nor 
the Russian people are willing to face the facts as they are. 
I am entirely sincere when I tell them that I act as I do 
because I think it in the interest of Russia, and in this crisis 
I think the interest of Russia is the interest of the entire 
world. I should be sorry to sea Russia driven completely 
off the Pacific coast and driven practically east to Lake 
Baikal, and yet something like this will surely happen if 
she refuses to make peace. Moreover, she will put it out 
of the power of any one to help her in the future if she now 
stands with Chinese folly upon her dignity and fancied 
strength. It is a case of the offer of the sibylline books. 
I told Cassini, and through Delcasse (French Foreign Af- 
fairs Minister) told the Russian home government, imme- 



RUSSO-JAPANESE PEACE CONFERENCE 393 

diately after Port Arthur, that they ought to make peace 
at once. I reiterated this advice as strongly as possible 
after Mukden. In each case my advice was refused and the 
result is so much the worse for Russia. 

"Japan is suspicious, too, and does not always act as I 
should like her to, but it behaves infinitely better than 
Russia. Of course, it will make heavy demands. No power 
could fail after such astounding victories. 

"Remember that you are to let no one know that in this 
matter of the peace negotiations I have acted at the request 
of Japan and that each step has been taken with Japan's 
foreknowledge, and not merely with her approval but with 
her expressed desire. This gives rather a comic turn to 
some of the English criticisms to the etfect that my move 
is really in the interest of Russia and not merely in the 
interest of Japan, and that Japan is behaving rather mag- 
nanimously in going into it. My move is really more in the 
interest of Russia than of Japan, but it is greatly to the 
interest of Japan also. 

"Well, I do not have much hope of getting peace, but I 
have made an honest effort, the only effort which offered 
any chance of success at all." 

While holding the Czar inflexibly to his promise as to the 
meeting place of the Conference, the President was working 
patiently and tirelessly with the Japanese authorities to 
keep them from laying too much stress on trifles. Not only 
did he reason daily with Takahira, the Japanese Minister, 
but he appealed directly to the Japanese Government. On 
June 16, 1905, he sent a long message to Mr. Griscom, the 
American Ambassador at Tokio, with directions to com- 
municate it to the Japanese Minister for Foreign Affairs. 
In this message he said: 

"At present the feeling is that Japan has been frank 
and straightforward and wants peace if it can be obtained 
on proper terms, whereas Russia has shown a tendency to 
hang back. It will be a misfortune for Japan, in the judg- 
ment of the President, if any action of Japan now gives 



394 THEODORE ROOSEVELT AND HIS TIME 

rise to the contrary feeling. Moreover, in the President's 
judgment, there is absolutely nothing to be gained by such 
action on the part of Japan. No instructions to the pleni- 
potentiaries would be of any avail if they did not intend 
to make peace. But if, as the President believes, the force 
of events will tend to secure peace if once the representa- 
tives of the two parties can come together, then it is ob- 
viously most unwise to delay the meeting for reasons that 
are trivial or of no real weight." 

He was far from being confident of success at this time. 
Writing to Lodge on June 16, 1905, he said: "The more I 
see of the Czar, the Kaiser, and the Mikado, the better I am 
content with democracy, even if we have to include the 
American newspaper as one of its assets — liability would be 
a better term. Russia is so corrupt, so treacherous and 
shifty, and so incompetent, that I am utterly unable to say 
whether or not it will make peace, or break off the negotia- 
tions at any moment. Japan is, of course, entirely selfish, 
though with a veneer of courtesy, and with infinitely more 
knowledge of what it wants and capacity to get it. I should 
not be surprised if the peace negotiations broke off at any 
moment. Russia, of course, does not believe in the genuine- 
ness of my motives and words, and I sometimes doubt 
whether Japan does." 

To Benjamin Ide Wheeler he wrote, on June 17, 1905: 
*'I do not know whether I shall get peace out of this ne- 
gotiation or not. I have awfully hard sledding in the effort 
to get the governments to come together, and am exas- 
perated almost to the breaking point by such an antic as 
this of Russia in now wishing to retract its preference for 
Washington and wanting The Hague, which it knows Japan 
will not accept. However, I shall do my best." 

The following passage from a letter to Lodge, written 
just after the negotiations had begun, is especially interest- 
ing, both psychologically and historically. Note the state- 
ment of a promised Rothschild loan to Russia : 



RUSSO-JAPANESE PEACE CONFERENCE 395 

*'I wish I could tell you all the funny details of these 
negotiations of Takahira and Cassini with us. Of course, 
if the Russians go on as they have gone ever since I have 
been President — and so far as I can find out, ever since the 
Spanish War — they are hopeless creatures with whom to 
deal. They are utterly insincere and treacherous; they 
have no conception of truth, no willingness to look facts in 
the face, no regard for others of any sort or kind, no knowl- 
edge of their own strength or weakness ; and they are help- 
lessly unable to meet emergencies. 

''About the Japanese I feel as I always did. I do not 
pretend to know the soul of the nation, or to prophesy as 
to what it will do in the future. I do not suppose I under- 
stand their motives, and I am not at all sure that they 
understand mine — although I should think they were plain 
to any people. Takahira, as instructed by his Government, 
has evidently wanted to feel his way with me. His Gov- 
ernment does not quite like to tell me what its plans are, 
but wants to develop them a little at a time. Thus, they 
asked me to find out how England feels as to the terms 
they should ask. 

"Naturally, England responded that it could not say 
until it knew what the proposed terms were; and it then 
transpired that Baron Rothschild had said he would raise 
a loan for Russia with which Russia should pay Japan the 
proposed indemnity if Russia could be persuaded to ac- 
cept peace on such terms. Evidently the Japanese have 
been uncertain whether the British Government knew of 
this offer or not, and took the roundabout way through me 
to find out. 

'*0f course, not only Cassini but Jusserand are very 
gloomy over Japan's attitude toward outside nations in 
the future. That Japan will have her head turned to some 
extent I do not in the least doubt, and I see clear symptoms 
of it in many ways. We should certainly as a nation have 
ours turned if we had performed such feats as the Japanese 
have in the past sixteen months; and the same is true of 
any European nation." 



396 THEODOEE ROOSEVELT AND HIS TIME 

On June 15, 1905, the President sent a despatcli to White- 
law Eeid, who had recently arrived in London as the Ameri- 
can Ambassador to Great Britain, asking him to sound 
Lord Lansdowne, British Secretary for Foreign Atfairs, 
as to the possibility of England's exerting pressure on 
Japan in the interest of peace. Two days later, June 17, 
Eeid replied, saying that he had sought and obtained an 
interview with Lansdowne and that the latter had said that 
nothing could be more abhorrent to the British Govern- 
ment than the thought that any action of theirs could tend 
to prolong bloodshed, but he added immediately, it would 
be quite another thing at this stage to bring any pressure 
upon Japan — especially when thoy did not even know what 
Japan's terms were going to be. 

On June 23, 1905, Eeid sent to the President a confiden- 
tial report of a conversation which he had had with King 
Edward on the preceding day at Ascot, requesting that it 
either be destroyed, or placed among confidential papers 
accessible only to the President himself. Li this report the 
King was represented as saying he thought it was best to 
let the contestants arrange their own terms of peace. When 
Eeid spoke of the possibility of the Eussians being driven 
out of Vladivostok, the King said at once : ' ' They are like- 
ly to be beaten again; it may be going on now." Then, 
with great earnestness, taking Eeid by the arm and whis- 
pering in his ear: ''In the strictest confidence, between us 
personally, not to go to another human being — if they don't 
make peace, why should not Japan take Vladivostok, and 
be in a position at the end of the war to be magnanimous 
and give it back 1 Wouldn 't that ease the final settlement ? ' ' 
When Eeid asked if he might not let the President have 
this conversation confidentially, the King hesitated a mo- 
ment and said: ''Well, perhaps, if you think so, not to be- 
come in any way official, or be seen by anybody else. I 
will leave it to you. ' ' 

All this time the President was keeping a steady pressure 
on Eussia to convince the Eussian Government of the wis- 
dom of making peace. On June 19, 1905, he wrote a long 



RUSSO-JAPANESE PEACE CONFERENCE 397 

confidential letter to Ambassador Meyer giving his reasons 
for thinking Eussia should make peace at once. In it he 
said: "Peter the Great made peace with the Turks by 
surrendering the Crimea. In 1855 Eussia made peace with 
the English, French and Turks by a surrender of territory. 
In either case, to have insisted upon going on with the war 
would have meant the conversion of a serious check into 
a possibly irretrievable disaster. The same is true now. 
In advising this I speak for Eussia 's interest because on 
the point Eussia 's interests are the interests of the world." 
In concluding, he wrote: "You know Lamsdorff and I do 
not. If you think it worth while, tell either him or the Czar 
the substance of what I have said, or show them all or parts 
of this letter. You are welcome to do it. But use your 
own discretion absolutely in this matter. 

"Eussia has not created a favorable impression here by 
the appearance of quibbling that there has been both over 
the selection of the place and over the power of the pleni- 
potentiaries whom Eussia will appoint. It would be far 
better if she would give an impression of frankness, open- 
ness and sincerity." 

A cable message from the President to Meyer on June 
23, 1905, showed that the "quibbling" was not confined to 
one side of the controversy. He asked Meyer to suggest 
to the Eussian Government that it send to him the names 
of the Eussian plenipotentiaries, promising that they would 
be kept secret till Japan had done the same, when the 
President would announce both. A further effort to bring 
the Eussian Government to the point of using plain speech 
was then made by the President. "The President has re- 
ceived from the Japanese Government the assurance that 
they will name as plenipotentiaries men of the highest rank. 
He believes that they are hesitating because they want to 
be sure that the Eussian plenipotentiaries will also be of 
ihe highest rank." He reminds the Eussian Government 
that it failed to say, when it consented to appoint pleni- 
potentiaries, that they were to negotiate and conclude a 



398 THEODORE ROOSEVELT AND HIS TIME 

treaty of peace with Japan, and this failure had ' * evidently 
made Japan feel doubtful" whether those plenipotentiaries 
would really be appointed for the purpose. "Before any 
question of an armistice is raised the President feels 
strongly that this point should be settled by the naming of 
plenipotentiaries with public instructions that they are ap- 
pointed to conclude a treaty of peace, this conclusion of 
course being subject to the ratification of the treaty by the 
respective home governments." 

Writing to Senator Knute Nelson of Minnesota, on the 
same date that he made this appeal to Russia, the Presi- 
dent revealed his uncertain state of mind about the final 
outcome of his labors: "I have not an idea whether I can 
or can not get peace between Russia and Japan, I have 
done my best. I have led the horses to water, but Heaven 
only knows whether they will drink or start kicking one 
another beside the trough." 

A day later, June 24, 1905, he sent a letter to Charle- 
magne Tower, American Ambassador at Berlin, which was 
clearly designed to encourage the Kaiser to continue his 
application of pressure to the Czar : 

**I greatly appreciate the Kaiser's action. Whether we 
can get the Japanese and Russians to make peace I do not 
know; but I hope you will personally tell the Kaiser how 
much I value what he has done, and that in my judgment 
it may be imperative to get his aid in order to make the 
Czar conclude peace. I hope that the Japanese will be 
moderate in what they ask, and I shall endeavor to make 
them moderate; but it must be kept clearly in mind that 
they are the victors ; that their triumph has been complete 
and over\vhelming, and that they are entitled to demand 
very substantial concessions as the price of peace. The 
difficulty will come with Russia, for she will find it hard to 
make up her mind to give what it is entirely right and 
proper that the Japanese should ask." 

Matters began to move a little faster now, but the Presi- 
dent did not relax his efforts to expedite them. On June 



RUSSO-JAPANESE PEACE CONFERENCE 399 

26, 1905, he sent a strong hint to the Eussian Government 
that it should send its best men to the conference to meet 
the best men from Japan : 

''The President, in accordance with the communication 
from Count Lamsdorff of the 25th, has informed the Jap- 
anese Government that Russia consents to the meeting 
taking place in the first ten days of August, but that the 
President hopes if possible the Japanese Government will 
arrange to have its envoys here on the first day of August 
as he earnestly desires there shall be no delay. Inform 
Count Lamsdorff confidentially that the President under- 
stands that the Japanese Government have under consid- 
eration as their envoys Baron Komura, the Secretary of 
Foreign Affairs, and Mr. Takahira, Japanese Minister at 
Washington. The appointment of Baron Komura repre- 
sents, of course, the very highest appointment that can be 
made by the Japanese Government, being 'equivalent, for 
instance, to my appointing Secretary Hay under similar 
circumstances. I am greatly gratified at it, for it shows 
that Japan is sending her best men with the eaniest desire 
to arrange for peace. I have confidentially informed the 
Japanese Government that in all probability one of the 
Russian plenipotentiaries will be Nelidoff." 

On June 30, 1905, Russia sent a request to the President 
to get the consent of Japan to an armistice. AVliy his ef- 
fort to secure it failed Roosevelt explained to Meyer on 
July 7, 1905 : 

'*! did my best to get the Japanese to consent to an 
armistice, but they have refused, as I feared they would. 
Lamsdorff 's trickiness has recoiled upon the Russian Gov- 
ernment. The Japanese are entirely confident that they 
can win whatever they wish by force of arms, whereas they 
are deeply distrustful of Russia's sincerity of purpose in 
these peace negotiations. Russia cannot expect peace un- 
less she makes substantial concessions, for the Japanese 
triumph is absolute and Russia's position critical in the 
extreme. I earnestly hope the Czar will see that he must 



400 THEODORE ROOSEVELT AND HIS TIME 

at all hazards and all cost make peace with Japan now and 
turn his attention to internal affairs. If he does not, I be- 
lieve that the disaster to Russia will be so great that she 
will cease to count among the great powers for a genera- 
tion to come — unless, indeed, as foreshadowed in your last 
letter, there is a revolution which makes her count as the 
French did after their revolution." 

A letter to Senator Lodge, July 11, throws further light 
on the armistice request : 

**At Russia's request I asked Japan for an armistice, 
but I did not expect that Japan would grant it, although 
I of course put the request as strongly as possible. Indeed, 
I cannot say that I really blame Japan for not granting it, 
for she is naturally afraid that magnanimity on her part 
would be misinterpreted and turned to bad account against 
her. The Japanese envoys have sailed and the Russians 
I am informed will be here by August first. I think then 
they can get an armistice." 



CHAPTER XXXII 
RUSSO-JAPANESE PEACE CONFERENCE— CONCLUDED 

On the eve of the meeting of the conference, the President 
was not sanguine of success. He wrote to Mr. J. St. L. 
Strachey, editor of the London Spectator, on July 17, 1905 : 
''The Peace Conference is about to meet, but from what 
I gather of Witte's (one of the Russian plenipotentiaries) 
attitude the chances are unfavorable for peace. The Rus- 
sians, having been entirely unable to make war, seem now 
entirely unable to make peace, and stupidly unwilling to 
face the fact that when their opponents have them at their 
mercy the opponents have the same right to exact terms 
from them that they would have if they went on and treated 
them without mercy. It is just like two wrestlers, when 
one of them has the hammerlock on the other; the latter 
need not give way if he does not choose to, but if he does 
not his arm will be broken. That is the only alternative be- 
fore him. Entirely for your information I wish to say that 
I undertook these negotiations only at the request of 
Japan." 

Ten days later found him assuring the Kaiser that he 
was working cordially with him and was grateful for his 
cooperation. To Mr. Tower, the American Ambassador at 
Berlin, he wrote on July 27, 1905 : 

''You say that the Chancellor told you 'that M. Delcasse 
had formed a plan by which peace was to be made between 
Russia and Japan through the mediation of France and 
England, and that, under it, an arrangement was contem- 
plated by which not only Russia and Japan were to obtain 
portions of China but that France and England were also 
to be indemnified by Chinese territory, as a price of their 

401 



402 THEODORE ROOSEVELT AND HIS TIME 

intervention; a course which he said would lead to the de- ]| 
struction of Chinese sovereignty and the disruption of the ' 
Chinese Empire.' Pray assure the Emperor, either direct- 
ly or through the Chancellor, that I should absolutely re- 
fuse to submit to such action by any of the Powers, and 
that I will absolutely support the Emperor's policy for the 
preservation of the integrity of China, the open door, and 
equal rights in China for the commerce of the whole world. 
''Also express to the Emperor my great obligation to 
him for his courtesy, my great pleasure at the way in which 
Germany and the United States are working together, and 
my feeling that this means well for the good of the world, 
for its peace and its progress. Will you also explain to him 
that of course in any such matter as that of this peace ne- 
gotiation between Russia and Japan, or in the Morocco 
business, I cannot do more than a certain amount, because 
I do not wish to make people think I am interfering too 
much ; but say that I am sure he will understand that when 
at any time I hesitate to take some action suggested it is 
not from lack of desire to do whatever is in my power, but 
lest I put myself in a position which would lessen whatever 
usefulness I might have in the future." 

No sooner had the President received the report about 
the attitude of Witte, one of the Eussian envoys, which he 
mentioned in his letter to Mr. Strachey, quoted above, than 
he sought to turn it to advantage by communicating it to 
the Japanese. On July 29, 1905, he wrote to Baron Kaneko, 
Japan 's official representative in New York : 

''Will you show this letter to Baron Komuraf I told 
Baron Komura that I had word from France that Witte 
had said he would not pay an indemnity. I have received 
another cable stating that he said he would not pay an in- 
demnity but would consider paying at least part of Japan's 
expenses in the war. I suggest, therefore, that gi'eat care 
be used about the word indemnity and that if possible it be 
avoided. Of course, my information may not be accurate, 
as Witte may only have been speaking for effect, but equal- 



EUSSO-JAPANESE CONFERENCE 403 

ly of course, if he does not object to reimbursing Japan 
for her expenses in the war it does not make the slightest 
difference to you whether it is called an indemnity or not." 

Writing to Whitelaw Eeid in London on July 29, 1905, 
he reverted to Lansdowne's statement cited in Reid's letter 
of June 17, 1905, already quoted, in a further effort to get 
aid from England : 

"I think that as regards what Lansdowne said to you the 
trouble comes in his own statement that the English are 
'indisposed to exert any pressure on Japan about terms 
of peace.' If by pressure anything offensive and dictatorial 
is meant this is all right. But it is all wrong if it means 
that there is no effort to get Japan to do what is best both 
for herself and for England, and that is to make peace in- 
stead of insisting upon terms which may prolong the war 
for an indefinite period." 

At the same time he was laboring with the British Am- 
bassador at Washington, Sir Mortimer Durand, for he 
wrote again to Reid on August 3 : ''Yesterday Durand was 
here to say that the British wished peace between Russia 
and Japan, but did not feel they could bring pressure on 
Japan. I told him just what I wrote you in my last letter — 
that if they really wished peace they would advise the Japs 
in their own interest to make it." 

In the latter part of July the envoys of the two nations 
arrived in the United States. Those of Russia were Serge 
J. Witte, President of the Czar's Council of Ministers and 
ex-Ministers of Finance, and Baron Rosen, who succeeded 
Cassini as Russian Ambassador at Washington; those of 
Japan were Baron Komura, and Takahira, Japanese Min- 
ister at Washington. Witte brought with him this auto- 
graph letter from the Czar: 

Peterhop, 

July 18, 1905. 
Dear Mr. Roosevelt: 

I take the opportunity of Mr. Witte 's departure for 



404 THEODORE ROOSEVELT AND HIS TIME 

Washington to express to you my feelings of sincere friend- 
ship. 

Thanks to your initiative, the Russian and Japanese dele- 
gates are going to meet in your country to discuss the pos- 
sible terms of peace between both belligerents. 

I have instructed Mr. Witte, Secretary of State, and my 
Ambassador in the United States, Baron Rosen — how far 
Russia's concessions can go towards meeting Japan's 
propositions. 

I need not tell you that I have full confidence that you 
will do all that lies in your power to bring the peace nego- 
tiations to a satisfactory conclusion. 

Believe me 
Yours truly, 

Nicolas. 

Soon after their arrival the envoys, each set going sepa- 
rately, called upon Roosevelt at his residence in Oyster Bay, 
where he was spending the summer. On August 5, 1905, he 
received the four envoys formally on board the U. S. S. 
Mayflower in the harbor of the town. In behalf of the 
Government, he had placed a war vessel at the disposal of 
each of the two sets of envoys, and they went from New 
York on board these vessels to Oyster Bay. On arrival 
they were transferred to the Mayflower on which the Presi- 
dent was waiting to receive them. He greeted them in- 
formally, introduced the envoys of the two nations to each 
other, and while chatting with them slowly moved into the 
saloon of the Mayflower, where a luncheon was spread, so 
conducting them that as they moved into the room no one 
could tell who went first. There were no chairs about the 
luncheon table and consequently all peril of giving offense 
by precedence in seating was avoided. Everything had 
been carefully arranged in advance by the President in 
order that no sign of favoritism on his part could be de- 
tected, and all passed off as planned. At the close of the 
luncheon the President said : 

''Gentlemen, I propose a toast to which there wdll be no 



RUSSO-JAPANESE CONFERENCE 405 

answer and which I ask you to drink in silence, standing. 
I drink to the welfare and prosperity of the sovereigns and 
peoples of the two great nations whose representatives 
have met one another on this ship. It is my most earnest 
hope and prayer, in the interest of not only these two great 
powers, but of all mankind that a just and lasting peace 
may speedily be concluded between them." 

The gathering then separated and the envoys, each pair 
on a separate warship, with the Mayflower in attendance 
for such use as might be desired by them, departed for 
Portsmouth, New Hampshire, where quarters had been ar- 
ranged for the sittings of the Conference on arrival there. 

The meeting of the envoys on the Mayflower was attended 
by a great fleet of private yachts and other water craft, and 
attracted attention all over the world as a memorable his- 
toric event, unlike any that had hitherto occurred in any 
land. I spent the night following the meeting with the 
President at Oyster Bay and found him weary but much 
pleased with the result. He said he had looked forward to 
the meeting with anxiety, realizing that a single slip of any 
kind on his part that could be construed as favoring one 
set of envoys more than the other would be fatal. No such 
slip had occurred and he believed that the first and very 
important step toward a successful outcome had been taken. 
He was fully aware that the attention of the whole world 
was concentrated upon him and that if he failed to secure 
peace, universal condemnation would be his portion. But 
as he said in many of his letters, so he said to me: ''I 
thought it my plain duty to make the effort. I have done 
my best to succeed and shall continue to do it to the end." 
>^ From the moment the Conference began its sessions the 
President kept a close watch upon its proceedings, was 
thoroughly informed of the situation at all times, and was 
ceaseless in his efforts to bring about a favorable result 
by exerting pressure where it would be effective. It may 
be said with truth that he was himself the Conference, for 
he was its guiding and controlling force. Its final agree- 



406 THEODOEE ROOSEVELT AND HIS TIME 

ment was the one which at the outset he had told both the 
envoys and their governments that they should make. 
Whenever the envoys hesitated and showed signs of indis- 
position or inability to agree, he sent remonstrance and 
appeal both to them and to their home governments, warn- 
ing them of the serious consequences of failure. By per- 
suading those governments to accept his views, he won 
success in the end, for it was under direct instructions from 
Tokio and St. Petersburg that the envoys came together. 
That this is an accurate statement of the case is clearly 
revealed by the President's messages and letters at the 
time. 

When late in August the envoys were virtually at a dead- 
lock, the President sent a long cable message to Ambassa- 
dor Meyer at St. Petersburg instructing him to see the 
Czar immediately and personally deliver it to him. In this 
he earnestly asked the Czar to believe that in what he was 
about to say and to advise he spoke ^'as the earnest well- 
wisher of Russia" and gave him the advice which he would 
give him were he a Russian patriot and statesman. He 
then told him that the Japanese had abandoned certain de- 
mands which he himself had felt it would be improper for 
Russia to yield to, and to his ** surprise and pleasure" had 
offered terms upon which he thought a just and honorable 
peace could be obtained ; that it seemed to him that it would 
be a ''dreadful calamity" to have the war continued when 
such a peace was obtainable, adding: "Every considera- 
tion of national self-interest, of militaiy expediency and of 
broad humanity makes it eminently wise for Russia to con- 
clude peace substantially along these lines, and it is my 
hope and prayer that your Majesty may take this view." 

On the following day, August 22, 1905, he sent a confiden- 
tial letter to Baron Kaneko at New York which he said he 
would be glad to have him cable to his home government. 
In this he said he thought he should tell Kaneko that on 
all sides he heard a good deal of complaint among friends 
of Japan as to the possibility of Japan 's continuing the war 
for a large indemnity, and strongly urged Japan not to 



RUSSO-JAPANESE CONFERENCE 407 

take that course since if taken it would cause the spilling 
of an immense amount of blood and Russia would be in no 
condition to give any money at all — certainly not enough to 
make up the extra amount spent. ''Moreover," he con- 
cluded, "I feel, of course, that every interest of civiliza- 
tion and humanity forbids the continuance of this war 
merely for an indemnity." 

One day later, August 23, 1905, he supplemented this ap- 
peal with another in which he gave specific reasons why 
Japan should not continue the war in order to get an in- 
demnity, and added : ** Ethically it seems to me that Japan 
owes a duty to the world at this crisis. The civilized world 
looks to her to make peace ; the nations believe in her ; let 
her show her leadership in matters ethical no less than in 
matters military. The appeal is made to her in the name of 
all that is lofty and noble ; and to this appeal I hope she 
will not be deaf." 

August 23, 1905, was a very busy day even for the Presi- 
dent. In addition to appeal direct to the Mikado, he sought 
to reach the Czar through Witte, one of the Russian envoys. 
A previous effort of this kind had resulted in his message 
reaching the Czar in a form which led to a misinterpreta- 
tion of the President's meaning. On this occasion he re- 
quested that his Majesty should himself receive it so that 
there might be ''no possible question of misinterpretation." 
After stating the terms of peace upon which the envoys 
were agreed, eliminating all others as unimportant, he said 
in this message : "To decline to make peace on those terms 
it seems to me is to invite terrible disaster to Russia, and 
I should hate to be responsible for the possibility of such 
disaster when the alternative is an absolutely just and 
honorable peace along the lines indicated." 

Again on August 23, 1905, he made one more attempt to 
induce England to bring pressure on Japan. He sent a 
message to Sir Mortimer Durand, who was at Lenox, Mass., 
stating the points of agreement and disagreement between 
the Russian and Japanese envoys as they had developed in 
the Conference, and saying: "In my judgment every true 



408 THEODORE ROOSEVELT AND HIS TIME 

friend of Japan should tell it as I have already told it, that 
the opinion of the civilized world will not support it in 
continuing the war merely for the purpose of extorting 
money from Russia. I wish your people could get my 
view." Writing to Henry White, Ambassador to Italy, 
on the same date, he said: 

**I am in the last throes of trying to get the Russians 
and Japanese to make peace. The Russians are the worst, 
because they stand up with Chinese or Byzantine folly and 
insist, as Witte has just written me, that Russia will not 
admit itself vanquished — making it all that I can do not 
to tell them some straightforward truths in uncomplimen- 
tary language. On the other hand, the Japanese have no 
business to continue the war merely for the sake of getting 
money and they will defeat their own ends if they do so. 
The English Government has been foolishly reluctant to 
advise Japan to be reasonable, and in this respect has not 
shown well compared to the attitude of the German and 
French Governments in being willing to advise Russia. I 
have not much hope of a favorable result, but I will do what 
I can." 

Turning his attention once more to the Czar, also on 
August 23, 1905, he sent a message to him through Ambas- 
sador Meyer outlining the terms he had suggested to the 
envoys for final agreement and saying : * ' Please send this 
supplementary cable to His Majesty at once and further 
explain that I of course cannot be sure Japan will act on 
my suggestions, but that I know she ought to, and that if 
Russia accedes to them I shall try my best to get Japan 
to accede to them also." 

The crisis arrived on August 27, 1905. On the previous 
day the Mikado sent this reply to the President's appeal, 
made through Baron Kaneko on August 22 : 

''The Imperial Government highly appreciates the sin- 
gleness of purpose and lofty intention with which the Pres- 
ident has always exerted his powerful influence in the in- 
terest of civilization and humanity. They beg to express 



RUSSO-JAPANESE CONFERENCE 409 

their cordial thanks for the sincere and useful advice which 
the President, having regard to the sentiment in America 
and other countries, has been good enough, at this juncture, 
to tender them. The Imperial Government will have no 
hesitation in acting on the advice, and they will accordingly, 
in the matter of the amount of compensation, consent to 
make still further concessions.'* 

The promised ''concessions" did not apparently reach 
the Japanese envoys on August 27, 1905, or if received were 
not satisfactory to the Eussians, for on that day the Jap- 
anese envoys abandoned all hope of peace. Baron Kaneko 
forwarded to the President from New York a telegram that 
he had received from Baron Komura, one of the envoys, 
which, wrote Kaneko, caused him to ''fear from its tone 
that the last day has come." The telegram read: 

"At the sitting this afternoon a confidential talk with the 
Russian plenipotentiaries has been held at which M. Witte 
expressed that there was absolutely no hope for him to ob- 
tain the consent of the Russian Government to concede to 
the last Japanese compromise. In reference to this he 
mentioned that even in regard to the matters concerning 
Manchuria which have already been agreed upon at nego- 
tiations, the military party in Russia considers that Russia 
has gone much beyond the limit, which fact leaves no room 
for them to seriously consider the questions of compensa- 
tion and cession of Saghalien, and their feeling is bitter 
against any further concession. In the face of these facts 
M. Witte regarded that any further attempt, on his part, 
to a successful conclusion of the conference was absolutely 
beyond his power. Whereupon, after agreeing to have a 
final meeting on next Monday afternoon, the meeting was 
adjourned. 

* ' Such being the case, I consider that the last hope for 
peace is gone. Therefore I request that you will kindly 
inform the President to that effect at once. Your tele- 
gram concerning your interview with the President and his 
advice has already been cabled to the Tokio Government." 



410 THEODORE ROOSEVELT AND HIS TIME 

On August 28, 1905, Komura sent another telegram to 
Kaneko, who forwarded it to the President with the re- 
mark: ''I fear that before this letter reaches you we may 
hear an awful result of the conference." This telegram 
read : 

''Owing to the delay of the final instruction from the 
Government, Minister Takahira, calling on M. Witte last 
evening, suggested the postponement of to-day's sitting 
until to-morrow — Tuesday. M. Witte 's reply was as fol- 
lows: 

'* 'Concerning the problems of indemnity and cession of 
Saghalien, on which we could not agree, the President has 
tendered, through the American Ambassador, an advice to 
the Czar, to which the latter has replied that under no 
circumstances could he consider any further concession 
whatever. OFor the second time, however, the President 
instructed the Ambassador to present his counsel to the 
Czar, which the former put in a letter, and requested Count 
Lamsdorff to present to the Czar. But, on receipt of the 
letter, the Czar marked on it: 'No further consideration' 
and put it aside. Furthermore, I am under the strictest in- 
struction, which absolutely forbids me to propose any new 
proposition, or enter upon discussion on a new compro- 
mise, which you may make concerning the two problems — 
indemnity and the cession of Saghalien. There is of course 
no objection as to the postponement of to-morrow's sitting. 
But I do not hesitate to say there is no way now open for 
me to further discuss on the subject, and even if you pro- 
pose a new solution of the problem, unless it comes within 
the scope of the Czar's reply to the President, I am unable 
even to transmit such proposition to the Government.' 

"I am profoundly appreciating the earnest and sincere 
effort with which the President has been trying to assist 
us for the interests of peace and humanity. But the above 
being the Czar's position, as presented by M. Witte, I 
grieve extremely to put the President into so much trouble 
to make another attempt to persuade the Czar, through the 



RUSSO-JAPANESE CONFERENCE 411 

Kaiser, which, I know, from the words of M. Witte, to be 
of no avail whatever." 

When these cries of despair reached the President he 
made a final effort to force an agreement. Direct to the 
Kaiser he sent this message, at the same time sending a 
copy of it to the Mikado: 

' * Peace can be obtained on the following terms : Russia 
to pay no indemnity whatever and to receive back north 
half of Saghalien, for which it is to pay to Japan whatever 
amount a mixed commission may determine. This is my 
proposition, to which the Japanese have assented reluc- 
tantly and only under strong pressure from me. The plan 
is for each of the contending parties to name an equal 
number of members of the commission and for the commis- 
sioners to name the odd member. The Japanese assert that 
"Witte has in principle agreed that Russia should pay some- 
thing to get back the north half of Saghalien and indeed 
he intimated to me that they might buy it back at a reason- 
able figure, something on the scale of that for which Alaska 
was sold to the United States. 

' ' These terms, which strike me as extremely moderate, I 
have not presented in this forai to the Russian Emperor. 
I feel that you have more influence with him than either 
I or any one else can have. As this situation is exceedingly 
strained and the relations between the plenipotentiaries 
critical to a degree immediate action is necessary. Can 
you not take the initiative by presenting these terms at 
once to him? Your success in the matter will make the 
entire civilized world your debtor. This proposition vir- 
tually relegates all the unsettled issues of the war to the 
arbitration of a mixed commission as outlined above, and 
I am unable to see how Russia can refuse your request if 
in your wisdom you see fit to make it." 

Success crowned this last appeal, for on August 29, 1905, 
there came to the Japanese envoys a message from Tokio, 
which Baron Kaneko forwarded to the President: 



412 THEODORE ROOSEVELT AND HIS TIME 

''The Emperor, after presiding at a Cabinet Council, de- 
cided to withdraw the demand of money pa>Taent for the 
cost of war entirely, if Russia recognize the occupation of 
Saghalien Island by Japan, because the Emperor regards 
humanity and civilization far more than his nation's wel- 
fare." 

"This is, of course," commented Kaneko, "exactly the 
line of policy you wrote to me in your two last letters, 
which were submitted to the Emperor." 

Later on the same day Baron Kaneko again wrote to the 
President : 

"The Peace is concluded at last! Our Emperor has 
decided on the line of policy you suggested in your 
letters to me, as you know these two letters were trans- 
mitted by cable to our Government. 

"Your advice to us was very powerful and comdncing, 
by which the peace of Asia was secured. Both Russia and 
Japan owe to you this happy conclusion; and your name 
shall be remembered with the peace and prosperity of 
Asia." 

An agreement was reached on August 29, 1905, on the 
terms laid do^vQ by the President, and on September 5, 
1905, a treaty of peace embodying them was signed. When 
the agreement was announced the whole world broke into 
a joyous p^ean of praise for Roosevelt. Newspapers of all 
parties and all lands joined in it. Messages of congratu- 
lation poured in upon him from crowned heads and the 
leading men of his own and other countries. The most in- 
teresting, of course, were the following: 

Neues Palais, August 29, 1905. 
President Theodore Roosevelt: 

Just read cable from America announcing agreement of 
peace conference on preliminaries of peace; am overjoyed; 
express most sincere congratulations at the great success 



RUSSO-JAPANESE CONFERENCE 413 

due to your untiring efforts. The whole of mankind must 
unite and will do so in thanking you for the great boon you 
have given it. 

William I. R. 

Peteehof, Alexandria, Au^st 31, 1905. 
President Roosevelt: 

Accept my congratulations and warmest thanks for hav- 
ing brought the peace negotiations to a successful conclu- 
sion owing to your personal energetic efforts. My country 
will gratefully recognize the great part you have played in 
the Portsmouth Peace Conference. 

Nicolas. 

ToKio, September 3, 1905. 
The President: 

I have received with gratification your message of con- 
gratulations conveyed through our plenipotentiaries, and 
thank you warmly for it. To your disinterested and unre- 
mitting efforts of peace and humanity I attach the high 
value which is their due, and assure you of my grateful ap- 
preciation of the distinguished part you have taken in the 
establishment of peace based upon principles essential to 
the permanent welfare and tranquillity of the Far East. 

MUTSUSHITO. 

(Mikado) 

Whitelaw Eeid wrote from London on September 11, 
1905, that at a luncheon where King Edward was present 
the latter had said to him that he ''was simply lost in ad- 
miration for the President; that nobody else could have 
done it ; and that it was not made any easier by the Czar, 
who was evidently afraid to have his army return." 

Roosevelt was quite cahn under it all, as he invariably 
was when action of his won strong approval. Writing to 
his brother-in-law, Douglas Robinson, on August 31, 1905, 
he said, with unjust criticism in the past clearly in mind : 

"Don't be misled by the fact that just at the moment men 



414 THEODORE ROOSEVELT AND HIS TIME 

are speaking well of me. They will speak ill soon enough. 
As Mr. Loeb remarked to me to-day, sometime soon I shall 
ha"Oe to spank some little brigand of a South American 
Republic, and then all the well-meaning idiots will turn and 
shriek that this is inconsistent vnth what I did with the 
Peace Conference, whereas it will be exactly in line ^vith it 
in reality. Of course I am very much pleased at the out- 
come. I tried as far as it was humanly possible to get the 
chances my way, and looked the ground over very carefully 
before I took action. Nevertheless I was taking big chances 
and I knew it, and I am very glad things came out as they 
did. I can honestly say, however, that my personal feel- 
ings in the matter have seemed to be of very, very small 
account compared to the great need of trying to do some- 
thing which it seemed to me the interests of the whole 
world demanded to be done." 

September 2, 1905. 
To Senator Lodge: 

*'I am very much pleased to have put the thing through. I 
am almost ashamed to say that while physically in fine trim 
the last three months have left me feeling rather tired, be- 
cause from a variety of causes I have not had at hand to 
advise with the Cabinet Ministers who were dealing with the 
subjects that were at the moment the most important, and so 
have had to run everything myself without any interme- 
diaries." 

To his cUmghter Alice {Mrs. Nicholas Longworth) , on the 

same date : 

**I have had all kinds of experiences with the envoys and 
with the governments, and to the two latter I finally had 
to write time after time as a very polite but also very in- 
sistent Dutch Uncle. I am amused to see the way in which 
the Japanese kept silent. Whenever I wrote a letter to the 
Czar the Eussians were sure to divulge it, almost always in 
twisted form, but the outside world never had so much as 
a hint of any letter I sent to the Japanese. The Russians 
became very angry with me during the course of the pro- 



RUSSO-JAPANESE CONFERENCE 415 

ceedings because they thought I was only writing to them. 
''It is enough to give any one a sense of sardonic amuse- 
ment to see the way in which the people generally, not only 
in my own country but elsewhere, gage the work purely 
by the fact that it succeeded. If I had not brought about 
peace I should have been laughed at and condemned. Now 
I am over-praised. I am credited with being extremely 
longheaded, etc. As a matter of fact I took the position 
I finally did not of my own volition but because events so 
shaped themselves that I would have felt as if I was flinch- 
ing from a plain duty if I had acted otherwise." 

A note which the President wrote to the German Ambas- 
sador at Washington, Count Speck von Sternburg, on Sep- 
tember 6, 1905, shows how cordially and promptly the 
Kaiser cooperated with Roosevelt in bringing pressure 
on the Czar: "If you see His Majesty tell him (but only 
for his own ear) that in Meyer's last audience with the 
Czar the latter commented upon the fact that whenever 
Meyer made a visit to him, simultaneously there came a 
cable from the German Emperor. I think this may amuse 
the Emperor." 

To Whitelaw Reid, in London, he wrote on September 
11, 1905: "The Kaiser stood by me like a trump. I did 
not get much direct assistance from the English Govern- 
ment, but I did get indirect assistance, for I learned that 
they forwarded to Japan my note to Durand, and I think 
that the signing of the Anglo-Japanese treaty made Japan 
feel comparatively safe as to the future." 

On September 6, 1905, the President sent a long letter to 
the Mikado, written in his own hand, which is well worth 
reproducing here in full: 

"To His Majesty, the Emperor of Japan: 

"Through Baron Komura I send you this letter, to ex- 
press, as strongly as I can, my sense of the magnanimity, 
and above all of the cool-headed, far-sighted ^visdom, you 



416 THEODORE EOOSEVELT AND HIS TIME 

have shown in making peace as you did. I am sure your 
people will soon appreciate to the full the inestimable bene- 
fit you have thereby conferred upon the empire over which 
you bear sway. During the last eighteen months your gen- 
erals and admirals, your soldiers and sailors, have won im- 
perishable renown for Nippon. Their glory — your glory, 
and your nation's glory — will last as long as history is 
written, as long as mighty deeds are remembered, as long 
as the race of man endures. You have crowned triumphant 
war by a peace in which everj' great object for which you 
fought is secured, and in so doing you have given to the 
world a signal and most striking example of how it is pos- 
sible for a victorious nation to achieve victory over other-, 
without losing command over itself. In every nation there 
are hot-heads who demand the impossible, who are discon- 
tented if they do not get something which, if they wer*- 
allowed to try to get it, they would have to pay for it at 
a cost altogether disproportionate to, and in excess of, it- 
value. Had your nation listened at this time to the advice 
of such men, they would have led it into a continuance of 
the war which, no matter how damaging to Japan's oppo- 
nent, would also have been necessarily of damage to Japan 
far beyond what could have been offset by any resulting 
benefit. The greatness of a people, like the greatness of a 
man, is often attended quite as clearly by moderation and 
wisdom in using a triumph as by the triumph itself. Many 
a great victory has been hopelessly marred, and its effects 
undone, by its arrogant and short-sighted misuse. 

"In this crucial hour your Majesty has shown that the 
people of Xijjpon are true alike to their ancient sjjirit and 
to the needs of the modem world ; for you have shown, and 
through you your people have shown, that you and they 
possess that rare combination, the combination of the high 
valor and foresight which win victories, and the lofty wis- 
dom which turns them to the best account." 

An incident which amused the President occurred on 
September 14, 1905. Baron Eosen, who had succeeded Cas- 



RUSSO-JAPANESE CONFERENCE 417 

sini as Russian Ambassador at Washington, went to Oyster 
Bay and presented to Eoosevelt a letter from the Czar in 
which the latter, after speaking of himself as the ** initiator 
of the International Peace Conference of 1899," expressed 
the belief that a favorable moment had come for system- 
atizing the labors of that Conference, and continued: 
''With this end in view and being assured in advance of the 
sympathy of President Roosevelt, who has already last 
year pronounced himself in favor of such a project. His 
Majesty desires to approach him with a proposal to the 
effect that the Government of the United States take part 
in a new International Conference, which could be called to- 
gether at The Hague as soon as favorable replies could be 
secured from all the other States to whom a similar pro- 
posal will be made." 

Roosevelt, with that quick insight into human motives 
which was one of his characteristics, in a letter to Secretary 
Root, thus explains what followed : 

"After he had read the letter Rosen began to hem and 
haw as to the steps already taken by me a year ago, and 
about the fact that The Hague Conference was the pecu- 
liar pet project of the Czar. I finally interrupted him and 
said that I thought I understood what he wished and that 
he could tell the Czar at once that I was delighted to have 
him and not me undertake the movement; that I should 
treat the movement as being made on his initiative, and 
should heartily support it. This evidently relieved Rosen 
immensely. I rather think that the Czar had felt from 
past experience with the Kaiser that there was a fair 
chance that I might endeavor to appear as the great origi- 
nator myself. As a matter of fact I am glad to be relieved 
from making the move on my own initiative. I should 
have done it if no one else had done it because I think it 
ought to be done; but I particularly do not want to appear 
as a professional peace advocate, and it gives us a freer 
hand in every way to have the Czar make the movement,*' 



418 THEODORE ROOSEVELT AND HIS TIME 

In a letter to Sir George Otto Trevelyan, written on Sep- 
tember 12, 1905, the President gave an entertaining account 
of the impressions which the envoys of the two nations 
made upon him. His report of the views which Witte ex- 
pressed about Russia are especially interesting in view of 
the later developments in that unfortunate nation: 

''I am bound to say that the Japs have impressed me 
most favorably, not only during these three months but 
during the four years I have been President. They have 
always told me the truth. They are a very secretive people, 
and I speedily learned that I must never read into any- 
thing they said one word more than was actually down 
in black and write ; but so far, whenever they have actually 
committed themselves I have been able to count absolutely 
on their doing what they said they would. Moreover, they 
know their own minds and all act together; whereas the 
Russians all pulled against one another, rarely knew their 
own minds, lied so to others that they finally got into the 
dangerous position of lying to themselves, and showed a 
most unhealthy and widespread corruption and selfishness. 

*'I suppose Witte is the best man that Russia could have 
at the head of her affairs at present, and probably too good 
a man for the grand dukes to be willing to stand him. He 
interested me. I cannot say that I liked him, for I thought 
his bragging and bluster not only foolish but shockingly 
vulgar when compared with the gentlemanly self-respecting 
self-restraint of the Japanese. Moreover, he struck me as a 
very selfish man, totally without high ideals. He calmly 
mentioned to me, for instance, that it was Russia's interest 
to keep Turkey in power in the Balkan Peninsula ; that he 
believed that Turkey would last a long time, because it 
would be a very bad thing for Russia to have the Bulga- 
rians, for instance, substituted for the Turks, for the very 
reason that they might give a wholesome, reputable gov- 
ernment and thereby build up a great Slav State to the 
South. He added cynically that such a consummation 
might be good for sentimental reasons, but that sentiment 
did not count in practical politics. Inasmuch as I person- 



RUSSO-JAPANESE CONFERENCE 419 

ally think that practical politics are a most sordid business 
unless they rest on a basis of honest and disinterested sen- 
timent (though of course I appreciate to the full that with 
this disinterested sentiment there must also go intelligent 
self-interest) I could not help feeling much contempt for 
the excellent Mr. Witte. 

^'Witte is curiously frank and very emphatic in his state- 
ment of the need of a thorough reform in Russia. He put 
it upon the perfectly simply ground that in the 20th cen- 
tury Russia could not hope to move forward to the tre- 
mendous position which he firmly believed she would ulti- 
mately reach unless she met 20th century conditions. He 
spoke with utter impatience of the reactionaries in Russia, 
and in speaking of Dostoyevsky, the author of 'Crime and 
Punishment/ he expressed the same horror of his having 
been sent to Siberia that one of us would feel. I also sym- 
pathize with him in his complaint about the hopeless na- 
ture of many of the Russian reformers, headed by Tolstoi. 
These reformers, and preeminently Tolstoi, lack sanity, and 
it is very difficult to do decent reform work, or any other 
kind of work, if for sanity we substitute a condition of mere 
morbid hysteria. Witte also expressed his views about 
religious freedom and freedom of conscience in a way that 
would command hearty support from you or me.*' 

What Witte thought of Roosevelt was revealed at the 
time the above letter was written. A cable message from 
Berlin, under date of September 8, 1905, was published giv- 
ing the following extract from a private letter that he had 
written to a friend : 

* ' From a moral point of view the President of the United 
States is a statesman of large caliber. Born in a time 
when politicians are more children of their century than of 
their history, he owes his high position, which he fills more 
worthily every day, exclusively to his personal qualities, 
as revealed in actions requiring decision, tact and clear 
vision. The world recognizes this. When one speaks with 
President Roosevelt, he charms through the elevation of 



420 THEODORE ROOSEVELT AND HIS TIME 

his thoughts and through that transparent philosophy 
which permeates his judgment. He has an ideal and strives 
for higher aims than a commonplace existence presents. In 
the stubborn struggles of our day men like Mr. Roosevelt 
have no leisure, for they are soldiers who cannot be re- 
lieved from the danger line." 



Baron Rosen, the other Russian Envoy, in commenting 
upon the above in his 'Reminiscences,' says: 

*'If it had been Witte's good fortune, as it has been mine, 
to have read 'Theodore Roosevelt's Letters to His Chil- 
dren,' he w^ould have added that profoundly as one must 
admire the great statesman, it is impossible not to love the 
man who wrote these letters." 

Of Roosevelt's ser^dces, the Baron writes: 
"But both nations owed a debt of profound gratitude to 
the great statesman who had the wise insight to realize 
that the indefinite continuation of a war which could only 
end in the exhaustion of one of them, or of both, could not 
possibly serv^e the true and permanent interests of either 
side, nor of the rest of mankind, and who had the moral 
courage to undertake the delicate and risky task of media- 
tion between them, undeterred by the apprehension of 
being considered a 'pacifist.' This debt of gratitude was 
frankly and unreser\^edly acknowledged by the rulers of 
both nations, however great may have been the disappoint- 
ment of the militaristic elements on both sides, in whose 
eyes a war would naturally be considered rather in the 
light of a prize fight, that can only be terminated with honor 
by a knockout blow dealt to the vanquished by the victor. 
In the eyes of history, however. President Roosevelt's suc- 
cess in bringing about the Portsmouth Conference and the 
subsequent termination of the war by a peace of justice 
and conciliation, will ever be regarded as the crowning 
achievement of his brilliant career as a statesman and 
Chief Magistrate of this great Nation." 



RUSSO-JAPANESE CONFERENCE 421 

A striking tribute to Roosevelt's services in the Peace 
Conference was paid by Prof. Frederic Frommhold De 
Martens, a recognized world-wide authority on interna- 
tional law, who accompanied the Russian envoys and was 
their adviser during the negotiations. It was published in 
the Outlook in January, 1920. I quote a few of its passages : 

''His conduct during the whole time that the peace ne- 
gotiations lasted has been a marvel of tact. Without ap- 
pearing to inject himself into the course of the conversa- 
tions and discussions which took place between the dele- 
gates, he contrived to keep himself exactly informed as to 
all that was going on, and more than once intervened in 
the most discreet manner by conveying a hint or a message 
to the plenipotentiaries which cleared the skies and brought 
things back to their true level. 

"I have often wondered where Roosevelt could have ac- 
quired the immense amount of information which he sud- 
denly displayed, and I have come to the conclusion that a 
great deal of it was due to his extraordinary powers of 
intuition which made him draw deductions and conclusions 
where others saw only the bare facts. And, moreover, that 
Portsmouth Conference, which will surely mark in the his^^^^ 
tory of the world the first effort made by the United States \ 
to stand as an equal at the side of the great nations ofj 
other continents, was essentially Roosevelt's work, aii3 
as such he showed us immediately that he intended, and 
that indeed he would, bring it to a good and safe conclu- 
sion. 

' ' That he contrived to do so without showing openly his 
hand, and while abstaining from everything that could have 
been interpreted as an attempt to interfere in matters 
which were not supposed to concern him, was a work which 
perhaps no one in the whole world outside of himself would 
have been able to perform. The hints which he conveyed 
to the plenipotentiaries, and which invariably threw a new 
light upon the points that they had not been able to see 
or to bring to a solution, were something quite wonderful. 
All through our conferences the personality of Roosevelt 



422 THEODORE ROOSEVELT AND HIS TIME 

made itself felt, but this was done so artistically, if such 
a word may be used, that nobody could have been offended 
at the advice which he tendered with such consummate dis- 
cretion. We Russians had come to Portsmouth without 
taking anything that he had said seriously, and yet when 
we left the United States it was with the knowledge that all 
through our stay there we had been brought in close prox- 
imity with one of the most powerful personalities now alive 
in the whole of the world. 

* ' The treaty could never have been concluded had it been 
negotiated anywhere else than at Portsmouth, and if the 
intluence of President Roosevelt had not been exercised all 
along in the cause of peace with a persistence which com- 
manded the admiration of us all. The man who had been 
represented to us as impetuous to the point of rudeness 
displayed a gentleness, a kindness, and a tactfulness mixed 
with self-control that only a truly great man can com- 
mand. ' * j 

For his services in securing peace Eoosevelt was awarded 
the Nobel Peace Prize. In acknowledgment he ^vrote, on 
January 8, 1907: 

"I have received the medal and diploma of the Xobel 
Prize, and the check for $36,734.79, being the amount of 
the prize itself. Thru you I desire to extend to the dis- 
tinguished body which has conferred upon me this great 
honor my heartiest thanks and the assurance of my deepest 
appreciation. The medal and diploma will be prized by me 
thruout my life, and by my children after my death. I have 
turned over the money to a committee, including the Chief 
Justice of the Supreme Court of the United States and the 
Secretaries of Agriculture and Commerce and Labor, in 
trust, to be used as a foundation for promoting the cause 
of industrial peace in this country. In our modem civiliza- 
tion it is as essential to secure a righteous peace based upon 
sympathy and fair dealing between the different classes of 
society as it is to secure such a peace among the nations of 
the earth; and therefore I have felt that the use I have 



RUSSO-JAPANESE CONFERENCE 423 

made of the amount of the Xobel Prize was one peculiarly 
in accordance with the spirit of the gift." 

No use whatever was made of the money by the commit- 
tee and it remained at interest till 1917. In July of that 
year the President requested Congress to give it back to 
him that he 'might distribute it among various charities in 
the United States and Europe which were affording relief 
to sufferers from the European "War. The request was 
granted and in August, the entire sum, which with accrued 
interest amounted to $45,482.83, was so distributed by him. 

He also received a gift which he valued very highly from 
a group of eminent Frenchmen. This was an original copy 
of Sully's **Memoires" of "Henri le Grand" which was 
sent to him ^vith the following letter : 

Paris, January, 1906. 

The undersigned members of the French Parliamentary 
Group of International Arbitration and Conciliation have 
decided to tender President Roosevelt a token of their high 
esteem and their sympathetic recognition of the persistent 
and decisive initiative, he has taken towards gradually 
substituting friendly and judicial for violent methods in 
case of conflict between Nations. 

They believe that the action of President Roosevelt, 
which has realized the most generous hopes to be found in 
history, should be classed as a continuance of similar illus- 
trious attempts of former times, notably the project for 
international concord known under the name of the ' ' Great 
Design of Henry IV" in the memoirs of his Prime Minister, 
the Duke de Sully. In consequence they have sought out 
a copy of the first edition of these memoirs, and they take 
pleasure in offering it to him, with the request that he will 
keep it among his family papers. 

The signatures include those of Emile Loubet, A. Carnot, 
d'Estournelles de Constant, Aristide Briand, Sully Prud- 
homme, Jean Jaures, A. Fallieres, R. Poincare, and two 



424 THEODORE ROOSEVELT AND HIS TIME 

or three hundred others. In acknowledgment the President 
wrote : 

April 22, 1906. 
To Baron d'Estournelles de Constant, 

Paris. 
Permit me once more to express my thanks to you and 
the other donors of the '^Memoirs of Sully." With such 
signatures the book becomes, not merely one of the two or 
three in my librarj' which I value most, but that one which 
I value most. I am very deeply touched, my dear sir, by 
this gift, and I really do not know how sufficiently to ex- 
press my appreciation. It is an empty phrase to say that 
France is loved and honored in America with peculiar feel- 
ing. This feeling is general among my countrymen. I 
have always shared it; but I shall feel it more than ever 
now; and I shall earnestly strive so to carry myself as not 
to forfeit the goodwill of you and the other friends whose 
signatures I cherish. I wish I could see all of the signers 
on this side of the water, but as that is impossible, I hope 
at least to see you. 



CHAPTER XXXIII 

MESSAGES TO CONGRES&-PAUL MORTON CASE— SEN- 
ATE ACTION ON SANTO DOMINGO AND ARBI- 
TRATION TREATIES 

The annual message of the President to Congress, in De- 
cember, 1904, had been looked forward to with unusual 
interest. It was to be the first deliverance of the kind since 
he became the elected President of the country. There was 
even more than the usual amount of newspaper guessing 
and prediction in advance as to what the message would 
contain. This centered chiefly about the question of fur- 
ther legislation in the direction of trusts and railways. 
Would the President ask for more stringent laws or would 
he remain content with what he had accomplished? When 
the message appeared all doubt about his attitude van- 
ished. He had not in the slightest degree modified the 
position on these or any other subjects that he had main- 
tained with such vigor and determination since his acces- 
sion to the Presidency. The Government must act directly 
in dealing with great corporations, he said, because those 
corporations can only become great by engaging in inter- 
state commerce, which is peculiarly the field of the general 
government; and it is an absurdity to expect to eliminate 
the abuses in great corporations by State action. *' Great 
corporations are necessary, and only men of great and 
sing-ular mental power can manage such corporations suc- 
cessfully, and such men must have great rewards. But 
these corporations should be managed with due regard to 
the interests of the public as a whole. Where this can be 
done under the present laws it must be done. Where these 
laws come short others should be enacted to supplement 
them." The highways of commerce must be kept open to 

425 



426 THEODORE ROOSEVELT AND HIS TIME 

all on equal terms, and to do this a complete stop must be 
put to all rebates. The most important legislative act 
needed in regard to the regulation of corporations was one 
''conferring upon the Interstate Commerce Commission the 
power to revise rates and regulations, the revised rate to 
go at once into effect and to stay in effect unless and until 
the court of review reverses it." 

On the question of the rights and needs of labor, the mes- 
sage contained a deliverance which the President had the 
opportunity to uphold a few months later during labor riot- 
ing in Chicago, as recorded in the next chapter. "Wage- 
workers have an entire right to organize and by all peace- 
ful and honorable means to endeavor to persuade their fel- 
lows to join their organizations. They have under no cir- 
cumstances the right to conmiit violence upon those, 
whether capitalists or wage-earners, who refuse to support 
their organizations, or who side with those w^ith whom they 
are at odds; for mob rule is intolerable in any form." 

The passages in the message demanding the abolition of 
rebates and giving to the Interstate Commerce Commission 
power to fix railway rates excited violent hostility among 
the interests which had steadily opposed all of the Presi- 
dent's efforts to secure governmental regulation and con- 
trol of coriDorations. There had been a law on the statute 
book for several years forbidding the granting of rebates 
but it had proved ineffective, and the President's recom- 
mendation to have it so amended as to put a stop to the 
practise was vigorously opposed by the railway interests 
and their champions in the press and in Congress. The 
recommendation that the power to fix rates be given to the 
Interstate Commerce Commission aroused a great clamor 
in the press and was denounced as an effort to deprive the 
railways of the right to manage their own business. All 
the great business interests combined against it and formed 
what seemed for a time to be an insurmountable obstacle 
to it. All the newspapers which habitually opposed the 
President in matters of the kind predicted that there would 
be no legislation and held that the issue had precipitated a 



MESSAGES TO CONGRESS— PAUL MORTON CASE 427 

permanent breach between the President and the Senate, 
in which the opposition was led by Senator Aldrich of 
Rhode Island, the Republican leader and most powerful 
member of the body. 

Early in January, 1905, the President called a conference 
of the leading members of both Houses in his office and 
sought to induce them to support his views. It became 
evident that a measure embodying his views would pass 
the House of Representatives, but would be strongly op- 
posed in the Senate. On January 30, 1905, while the dis- 
cussion of the matter was at its height, the President made 
an address at the Union League Club in Philadelphia which 
was regarded as a challenge to the opponents of his meas- 
ures because of the bold, almost defiant tone in which he 
avow^ed his position: 

** Neither this people nor any other free people will per- 
manently tolerate the use of the vast power conferred by 
vast wealth, and especially by wealth in its corporate form, 
without lodging somewhere in the Government the still 
higher power of seeing that this power, in addition to being 
used in the interest of the individual or individuals pos- 
sessing it, is also used for and not against the interests of 
the people as a w^hole. 

''In some such body as the Interstate Commerce Com- 
mission there must be lodged in effective shape the power 
to see that every shipper who uses the railroads and every 
man who owns or manages a railroad shall on the one hand 
be given justice and on the other hand be required to do 
justice. Justice — so far as it iff humanly possible to give 
and to get justice— is the foundation of our Government. 

''We do not intend that this Republic shall ever fail as 
those republics of olden times failed, in w^hich there finally 
came to be a government by classes, which resulted either 
in the poor plundering the rich or in the rich exploiting and 
in one form or another enslaving the poor ; for either event 
means the destruction of free institutions and of indi- 
vidual liberty." 



428 THEODORE ROOSEVELT AND HIS TIME 

On February 10, 1905, a bill which had been introduced 
there on January 20, embodying the President's views on 
the power to fix rates, was passed in the House by an over- 
whelming majority, 326 to 17. This was hailed by the press 
as "a great victory for Roosevelt," but the bill was hung 
up in Committee in the Senate and no report was made 
upon it during the session which ended on March 4, 1905. 
That the President had not given up the fight is sho-^i 
by this passage in a letter to me on March 23, 1905 : 

' * That we shall have a muss on the interstate commerce 
business next year I have no doubt ; but I feel that we can 
get the issue so clearly dra^^^l that the Senate will have 
to give in. On that issue I shall have a number of my own 
party against me. My chief fear is lest the big financiers, 
who, outside of their own narrowly limited profession, are 
as foolish as they are selfish, will force the moderates to 
join with the radicals in radical action, under penalty of 
not obtaining any at all. I much prefer moderate action; 
but the ultra-conservatives may make it necessary to ac- 
cept what is radical." 

In similar tone was this passage in a letter to Senator 
Lodge on May 24, 1905: "The railroads have been mak- 
ing a most active campaign against my rate-making prop- 
osition. They think they have it beaten. Personally I do 
not believe they have, and I think they are very short- 
sighted not to understand that to beat it means to increase 
the danger of the movement for the government owner- 
ship of railroads." 

The President's faith in success was shown to be well- 
founded, for in 1906 the Senate passed a bill which was 
approved by him and the Attorney General and which con- 
ferred upon the Interstate Commerce Commission the 
power to fix rates, thus giving to that body its first real 
control over the railways. 

The desired additional legislation to put an end to re- 
bating was also secured, but in obtaining it the President 
incurred some of the severest criticism of his career. A 



MESSAGES TO CONGRESS— PAUL MORTON CASE 429 

member of his Cabinet, Paul Morton, Secretary of the 
Navy, who had formerly been a railway official, volunteered 
evidence showing the guilt of his own company in the mat- 
ter which was of first value in securing the abolition of the 
practise. There was a widespread demand in the press and 
elsewhere for the prosecution by the Government of Morton 
in the courts. This the President refused to have done. 
His reasons for refusing were set forth in a letter, on June 
17, 1905, to the Attorney General, Mr. Moody, who had 
given an opinion which supported the President's position. 
In this letter the President said : 

"I entirely agree with your conclusions. In my opinion 
you would be wholly without justification in proceeding 
individually against the officers of the Atchison, Topeka & 
Santa Fe Railway for contempt when neither the Inter- 
state Commerce Commission nor the special counsel you 
have employed have developed a single fact of any kind 
tending to implicate any one of these officers. One of the 
officers, Mr. Morton, is a member of my Cabinet. This 
fact is not to be allowed to shield him, nor on the other 
hand is it to be allowed to cause him to be singled out, or 
the officers with whom he is associated to be singled out 
for attack. ' ' 

After pointing out that several other Western railways 
had also been guilty of rebating, the President continued: 

"There is of course no possible excuse for discriminat- 
ing one case from the other. Moreover, in this instance 
Mr. Morton has of his own accord written me a letter, of 
which I enclose you a copy and a copy of my reply. In it 
you will see that Mr. Morton not only states in the most 
unequivocal manner that he had no knowledge whatever of 
the unlawful practise complained of, but also shows by the 
quotation of documents issued under his direction, that all 
such unlawful practises were specifically forbidden by him, 
and that the attention of his subordinates was repeatedly 
called to the necessity of complying with the law in this 
respect. When there is not one shadow of testimony against 



430 THEODORE ROOSEVELT AND HIS TIME 

him, and when whatever evidence has been submitted shows 
expHcitly that he is not guilty, it would in my judgment 
be both absurd and wicked to proceed against him." 

Writing to Senator Lodge on May 24, 1905, the Presi- 
dent said: 

''I have of course been greatly worried about Morton. 
He is as straight as a string, but the Santa Fe management 
acted badly in a rebate case while he was vice-president of 
the road and nominally directed the department which cov- 
ered the action in question. I am convinced that he knew 
nothing of it, and therefore will not allow him to be prose- 
cuted in accordance with the general demand." 

In addition to the railway legislation there were two 
other matters of large moment which the President pressed 
upon Congress in the winter and spring of 1905, and in 
dealing with which Congress failed to meet his wishes. One 
was a treaty with Santo Domingo, and the other was a batch 
of seven arbitration treaties, unifonn in terms, with Eng- 
land, France, Germany, Switzerland, Portugal, Italy and 
Spain. For many years the Dominican Republic had been 
endeavoring to enter into treaty relations with the United 
States by which it would be placed under the protection of 
the American government, and had been steadily refused. 
In 1903 the representative of a foreign government pro- 
posed to the United States the joint fiscal control of the 
Dominican Republic by certain creditor nations which 
should take charge of the custom-houses and revenues and 
give a certain percentage to the Republic and pay the resi- 
due ratably to the claims of foreign countries. This pro- 
posal the United States Government declined. In January, 
1904, the Dominican minister of foreign affairs visited 
Washington and besought the help of the United States 
Government to enable the republic to escape financial and 
social disorders. This request was also declined. A short 
time later, a report was started that the President was plan- 
ning to annex the island to the United States. Writing to 
me on February 23, 1904, he said : 



MESSAGES TO CONGRESS— PAUL MORTON CASE 431 

*'I have been hoping and praying for three months that 
the Santo Domingans would behave so that I would not have 
to act in any way. I want to do nothing but what a police- 
man has to do in Santo Domingo. As for annexing the 
island, I have about the same desire to annex it as a gorged 
boa constrictor might have to swallow a porcupine wrong- 
end-to. Is that strong enough? I have asked some of our 
people to go there because, after having refused for three 
months to do anything, the attitude of the Santo Domingans 
has become one of half chaotic war towards us. If I pos- 
sibly can I want to do nothing to them. If it is absolutely 
necessary to do something, then I want to do as little as 
possible. Their government has been bedeviling us to 
establish some kind of a protectorate over the islands, and 
take charge of their finances. We have been answering 
them that we could not possibly go into the subject now 
at all." 

Nearly a year later the President, on Feb. 15, 1905, sent 
a special message to Congress submitting a treaty which 
he had concluded with Santo Domingo at the request of its 
government, under which the custom-houses of the republic 
were to be placed under American control, 45 per cent of 
the proceeds to be turned over to the Dominican govern- 
ment and the remainder to be used by the United States 
to pay on equitable basis such a proportion of the foreign 
debts as was possible. The President announced that no 
step had been taken by the Administration under the terms 
of the treaty, saying of it : 

"We on our part are simply performing in peaceful 
manner, not only with the cordial acquiescence, but in ac- 
cordance with the earnest request of the government con- 
cerned, part of that international duty which is necessarily 
involved in the assertion of the Monroe Doctrine. 

"I call attention to the urgent need of prompt action on 
this matter. We now have a great opportunity to secure 
peace and stability in the island, without friction or blood- 
shed, by acting in accordance with the cordial invitation of 



432 THEODORE ROOSEVELT AND HIS TIME 

the governmental authorities themselves. It will be un- 
fortunate from every standpoint if we fail to grasp this 
opportunity; for such failure will probably mean increas- 
ing revolutionary violence in Santo Domingo, and very 
possibly embarrassing foreign complications in addition. 
This protocol affords a practical test of the efficiency of the 
United States Government in maintaining the Monroe Doc- 
trine. ' ' 

The Senate paid little or no attention to the treaty, and 
on March 6, 1905, the Senate being then in executive ses- 
sion, the President sent to it another special message urg- 
ing action at as early a moment as possible and saying : 

*' Santo Domingo grievously needs the aid of a powerful 
and friendly nation. This aid we are able, and I trust that 
we are willing, to bestow. She has asked for this aid, and 
the expressions of friendship repeatedly sanctioned by the 
people and the Government of the United States warrant 
her in believing that it will not be withheld in the hour of 
her need." 

Nothing resulted from this second appeal save long de- 
bates on the treaty and the adoption of trivial amendments, 
and the Senate adjourned leaving the treaty unaffirmed. 
Writing to me, on March 23, 1905, the President gave this 
interesting statement of his views on a third term and the 
effect of his attitude upon the Senate : 

*'I did not make my announcement that I would not ac- 
cept another term, without thinking it carefully over and 
coming to a definite and final conclusion. If you will recall 
the words I used you will remember that I not merely stated 
that I would not be a candidate ; I added that I would not 
under any circumstances accept the nomination. And I 
would not. 

"Unquestionably this announcement caused me a little 
trouble in the Senate, the men coming to the conclusion that 
I need not be regarded as a factor hereafter. But I think 
the trouble between me and the Senate has been rather 



MESSAGES TO CONGRESS— PAUL MORTON CASE 433 

exaggerated, and I have endeavored to minimize, not em- 
phasize, it. I do not much admire the Senate, because it is 
such a helpless body when efficient work for good is to be 
done. Two or three determined Senators seem able to hold 
up legislation, or at least good legislation, in an astonish- 
ing way; but the worst thing the Senate did this year — 
the failure to confirm the Santo Domingo treaty — was due 
to the fact that the Democratic party as such went solidly 
against us, and this fact, coupled with the absence of cer- 
tain Republican Senators, rendered us helpless to put 
through the treaty. The result has been that I am in a very 
awkward and unpleasant situation in endeavoring to keep 
foreign powers otf Santo Domingo and also in trying to 
settle Venezuelan affairs." 

After the adjournment of Congress the President, acting 
in accordance with his established principle that while the 
Constitution did not explicitly give him power to act in 
such cases, it did not forbid him to do so, put the agreement 
into effect. 

Writing confidentially on March 30, 1905, to Secretary 
Hay, who was in Germany, the President gave this humor- 
ous account of the situation: 

''There has been a rather comic development in the 
Santo Domingo case. Morales asked us to take over the 
custom-houses pending action by the Senate. I decided 
to do so, but first of all consulted Spooner, Foraker, Lodge 
and Knox. All heartily agreed that it was necessary for 
me to take this action. Rather to my horror Taft genially 
chaffed them about going back on their principles as to the 
'usurpation of the executive.' But they evidently took the 
view that it was not a time to be over-particular about 
trifles. I also consulted Gorman, who told me that he had 
taken it for granted that I would have to take some such 
action as that proposed, and believed it necessary. I un- 
derstand, however, that this was merely his unofficial opin- 
ion, and that officially he is going to condemn our action 
as realizing his worst forebodings." 



434 THEODORE ROOSEVELT AND HIS TIME 

Having put the agreement into effect, the President did 
not hesitate to use force in upholding it, in case force should 
be needed to maintain order. When signs of internal 
trouble appeared in the island in the fall of 1905, he sent 
this order to the Secretary of the Navy, referring to the 
commander of a naval vessel near the island, under date of 
September 5, 1905 : 

''As to the Santo Domingo matter, tell Admiral Brad- 
ford to stop any revolution. I intend to keep the island in 
statu quo until the Senate has had time to act on the treaty, 
and I shall treat any revolutionary movement as an effort 
to upset the modus vivendi. That this is ethically right, 
I am dead sure, even though there may be some technical 
or red tape difficulty." 

When Congress came together in December, 1905, the 
President included in his annual message a quiet statement 
of what he had done, making neither defense nor apology. 
He merely said that the Executive Department of the Gov- 
ernment had negotiated a treaty under which "we are to 
try to help the Dominican people to straighten out their 
finances," that the ''treaty is pending before the Senate," 
and that "in the meantime a temporary arrangement has 
been made which will last until the Senate has time to take 
action on the treaty. . . . Every consideration of wise pol- 
icy, and, above all, every consideration of large generosity, 
bids us meet the request of Santo Domingo as we are now 
trying to meet it." The Senate discussed the treaty for 
two years, and during that period the President continued 
its execution ; finally, in the spring of 1907, the Senate rati- 
fied it with unimportant amendments which the President 
easily induced Santo Domingo to accept. The results of 
his action were described by the President in a speech be- 
fore the Harvard Union on February 13, 1907 : 

"I was immensely amused when at a professional peace 
meeting the other day, they incidentally alluded to me as 
having made 'war' on Santo Domingo. The war I have 
made literally consists in having loaned them a collector 



MESSAGES TO CONGRESS— PAUL MORTON CASE 435 

of customs, at their request. We now give them forty-five 
per cent, of the customs to run the Government, and the 
other fifty-five per cent, is put up to pay those of their debts 
which are found to be righteous. This arrangement has 
gone on for two years now, while the coordinate branch of 
the Government discussed whether or not I had usurped 
power in the matter, and finally concluded I had not, and 
ratified the treaty. Of the fifty-five per cent, we have been 
able to put two and a half millions toward paying their 
debts; and with the forty-five per cent, that we collected 
for them they have received more money than they ever got 
when they collected one hundred per cent, themselves ; and 
the island has prospered as never before. I feel like para- 
phrasing Patrick Henry: 'If this is ''war," make the most 
of it.'" 

The Senate's course in relation to the seven general 
arbitration treaties was in line with the President's de- 
scription of its methods in his letter of March 23 to me, 
quoted above. These treaties provided for reference to 
The Hague Tribunal, by mutual agreement, of all minor 
disputes not involving national honor. They were sub- 
mitted to the Senate on January 6, 1905, and it was at once 
made known that many Senators were in favor of amend- 
ing them in a way which the President considered to be 
fatal to their usefulness. On February 10, 1905, the Presi- 
dent wrote a letter of protest to Senator Cullom, Chairman 
of the Committee on Foreign Relations, in which he said : 

"I learn that the Senate Committee on Foreign Rela- 
tions has reported the arbitration treaties to the Senate, 
amending them by substituting for the word 'agreement' 
in the second article the word 'treaty.' 

"The effect of the amendment is to make it no longer 
possible, as between its contracting parties, to submit any 
matter whatever to arbitration without first obtaining a 
special treaty to cover the case. This will represent not 
a step forward but a step backward. If the word 'treaty' 
be substituted, the result is that every such agreement 



436 THEODOKE ROOSEVELT AND HIS TIME 

must be submitted to the Senate; and these general arbi- 
tration treaties would then cease to be such, and indeed in 
their amended form they amount to a specific pronounce- 
ment against the whole principle of a general arbitration 
treaty. 

"The Senate has, of course, the absolute right to reject' 
or to amend in any way it sees fit any treaty laid before it, 
and it is clearly the duty of the Senate to take any step 
which, in the exercise of its best judgment, it deems to be 
for the interest of the nation. If, however, in the judgment 
of the President, a given amendment nullifies a proposed 
treaty, it seems to me that it is no less clearly his duty to 
refrain from endeavoring to secure a ratification, by the 
other contracting power or powers, of the amended treaty ; 
and after much thought I have come to the conclusion that 
I ought to write and tell you that such is my judgment in 
this case." 

The clear notification in the closing passage of this letter, 
that if the amendment was adopted the President would 
abandon the treaties, was not heeded, for in executive ses- 
sion, on Februaiy 11, 1905, the treaties as amended by the 
Committee were ratified. When they reached the Presi- 
dent, Secretary Hay, on February 13, 1905, made the fol- 
lowing statement, which he had drawn up in accordance 
with the President 's instructions : 

**The President regards the matter of the general arbi- 
tration treaties as concluded by the action of the Senate on 
Saturday. He recognizes the right of the Senate to reject 
a treaty either by a direct vote in that sense, or indirectly 
by changes which are incompatible with its spirit and pur- 
pose. He considers that with the Senate amendment the 
treaties not only cease to be a step forward in the cause of 
general arbitration but are really a step backward, and 
therefore he is unable to present them in this altered form 
to the countries with which we have been in negotiation." 

In conversation with me at the time, Secretary Hay ex- 
pressed himself as disheartened and completely discour- 



MESSAGES TO CONGRESS— PAUL MORTON CASE 437 

aged by the result, saying that the treaties represented 
many months of painstaking labor and were regarded as a 
valuable advance in the cause of general arbitration. He 
added that, in his judgment, it was quite useless to make 
further effort since the ratification of any really desirable 
or useful arbitration treaty could not be hoped for in the 
present temper of the Senate. Among those supporting the 
amendment were Senators Lodge and Spooner, both of 
whom expressed great regret because they found them- 
selves unable to agree with the President. 

After Hay's death. Secretary Eoot, who succeeded him 
in the State Department, took up the treaties, accepted the 
Senate amendment, and ratifications were exchanged with 
the seven foreign governments concerned. They proved 
to be absolutely useless, and so far as they had any effect, 
it was to lower the standard which the American Govern- 
ment had previously maintained upon the question of in- 
ternational arbitration. 

Dr. John Bassett Moore, the recognized authority on in- 
ternational law, said of their effect, in an address that he 
delivered at the Lake Mohonk Conference on International 
Arbitration, on May 27, 1914: 

''The result of the Senate's action is, that so far as the 
United States is concerned, it is in practice more difficult 
to secure international arbitration than it was in the early 
days of our independence." 



CHAPTER XXXIV 

REBUKES TO RIOTOUS STRIKERS AND LYNCHERS— 

DEALINGS WITH SENATORS— LETTERS 

ON VARIOUS TOPICS 

Early in April, 1905, the President left Washington to at- 
tend a reunion of his Rough Rider regiment at San Antonio, 
Texas, on the 7th of that month, and later went on a short 
hunting trip in Colorado. On the eve of his departure he 
made a remark which had wide circulation: "Oh, things 
will be all right; I have left Taft sitting on the lid." He 
delivered addresses at various points in Texas, including 
one before the Legislature of the State, in each of which he 
expounded his views in regard to Government regulation 
and control of corporations and railways. He was greeted 
with great enthusiasm every^vhere. On his return trip he 
reached Chicago on May 10, at the moment when a general 
strike of labor unions was in progress. A committee of 
the strikers called upon him to present their cause and se- 
cure his sympathy. "What happened was described by the 
President later in two letters that he wrote after reaching 
Washington. The first was to Mr. Root, on May 13, 1905 : 
''Perhaps the thing that pleased me most was in Chicago 
when the labor men called upon me. A good many people 
had been anxious that I should dodge Chicago, which of 
course I would not have been willing to do under any cir- 
cumstances. As it turned out, the labor people called on 
me themselves and made a statement most foolish and of- 
fensive, so that they justified me completely in saying good- 
temperedly, but with unmistakable emphasis, just what my 
attitude was and would be in regard to mobs and disorder 
generally. ' ' 

438 



REBUKES TO RIOTOUS STRIKERS AND LYNCHERS 439 

The second was to Senator Lodge, who was at the time 
in London, on May 15, 1905 : 

''When I came to Chicago I found a very ugly strike, 
on account of which some of my nervous friends wished me 
to try to avoid the city. Of course I hadn't the slightest 
intention of doing so. I get very much puzzled at times on 
questions of finance and the tariff, but when it comes to 
such a perfectly simple matter as keeping order, then you 
strike my long suit. The strikers were foolish enough to 
come to me on their own initiative and make me an address 
in which they quoted that fine flower of Massachusetts 
statesmanship, the lamented Benjamin F. Butler, who had 
told rioters at one time, as it appeared, that they need 
have no fear of the United States army, as they had torches 
and arms. This gave me a good opening, and while per- 
fectly polite, I used language so simple that they could 
not misunderstand it; and repeated the same with am- 
plifications at the dinner that night. So if the rioting in 
Chicago gets beyond the control of the State and the City, 
they now know well that the Regulars will come." 

What the President said to the spokesman of the strikers, 
Mr. Shea, who had presented a letter stating their case, 
was this: 

* ' I regret that you should in the letter have spoken at all 
of the use of the Federal army, as you have there spoken. 
No request has been made to me for action by the Federal 
Government, but at the same time, Mr. Shea, as you have 
in this communication brought up the matter, I want to 
say one thing with all the emphasis in my power. In up- 
holding the law and order, in doing what he is able to do 
to suppress mob violence in any shape or way, the Mayor 
of Chicago, Mayor Dunne, has my hearty support. I am 
glad to be able to say this to you, gentlemen, before I say 
it to another body. 

''Now, let me repeat that I know nothing of the facts of 
the situation. I know nothing of the right or wrong of the 
points at issue. What I have to say is based partly upon 



440 THEODORE ROOSEVELT AND HIS TIME 

what I regard as the unfortunate phrasing of a letter pre- 
sented to the President of the United States. 

**I have not been called upon to interfere in any way, 
but you must not misunderstand my attitude. In every 
effort of Mayor Dunne to prevent violence by mobs or in- 
dividuals, to see that the laws are obeyed, and that order 
is preserved, he has the hearty support of the President of 
the United States, and, in my judgment, he should have 
that of every good citizen of the United States. 

"I am a believer in unions. I am an honorary member 
of one union. But the union must obey the law just as the 
corporation must obey the law. Just as every man, rich or 
poor, must obey the law. As yet, no action has been called 
for by me and most certainly if action is called for I shall 
try to do justice under the law to every man, so far as I 
have power. But the first essential is the preser\^ation of 
law and order, the suppression of violence by mobs or in- 
dividuals." 

At a dinner which the Iroquois Club, a Democratic or- 
ganization, gave him on the evening of the same day, the 
President repeated substantially what he had said to the 
strikers' committee, and turning directly to Mayor Dunne, 
who was seated near him, said : 

**Mr. Mayor, as President of the United States, and 
therefore as representative of the people of this country, 
I give you, as a matter of course, my hearty support in up- 
holding the law, in keeping order, in putting down violence, 
whether by a mob or by an individual. There need not be 
the slightest apprehension in the heart of the most timid 
that ever the mob spirit will triumph in this country. Those 
immediately responsible for dealing with the trouble must, 
as I know you feel, exhaust every effort in so dealing with 
it before a call is made upon any outside body. But if ever 
the need arises, back of the city stands the State, and back 
of the State stands the Nation." 

In acknowledging the President's letter Mr. Root wrote 
on May 16, 1905 : 



REBUKES TO RIOTOUS STRIKERS AND LYNCHERS 441 

*'I was particularly pleased by the way in which you 
treated the labor situation in Chicago. I doubt if most 
people realize what a very important and critical situation 
was created by the presentation of the labor address. Most 
men in your position would have taken the paper for fur- 
ther examination and have dismissed the committee with 
the promise to give it consideration ; and there would have 
been the devil to pay afterwards. Your character was, 
however, exactly adapted for the best possible treatment 
of the emergency, and I think that your instant reading of 
the paper and instant response was one of the very best 
things you have ever done." 

Secretary Hay, who was at Bad Nauheim, Germany, for 
his health, wrote under date of May 21, 1905 : 

*'I need not tell you with what pride and pleasure we 
all read your speech at Chicago. It has the true ring of 
conscience and authority combined, — the voice of a man 
' who would not flatter Neptune for his trident. ' It is a com- 
fort to see the most popular man in America telling the 
truth to our masters, the people. It requires no courage 
to attack wealth and power, but to remind the masses that 
they, too, are subject to the law, is something few public 
men dare to do." 

The President gave another illustration of his courage 
in October, 1905, when he made a tour of the South, speak- 
ing at various points in Virginia, North Carolina, Georgia, 
Arkansas and Alabama, including a visit to the home of 
his mother at Roswell, Georgia. At Little Rock, Arkansas, 
on October 25, he was introduced by the Governor of the 
State to a large concourse of citizens in the City Park. In his 
introductory remarks the Governor made a quasi defense of 
the lynching of colored men for supposed outrages upon 
white Avomen. In opening his speech the President de- 
clared that he had been fortunate enough to have spoken 
all over the Union and had never said in any State or any 
section what he would not have said in any other State or 



442 THEODORE ROOSEVELT AND HIS TIME 

in any other section. Turning a few minutes later directly 
to the Governor, he said: 

*' Governor, you spoke of a hideous crime that is often 
hideously avenged. The worst enemy of the negro race 
is the negro criminal, and, above all, the negro criminal of 
that type; for he has committed not only an unspeakably 
dreadful and infamous crime against the victim, but he has 
committed a hideous crime against the people of his own 
color ; and every reputable colored man, every colored man 
who wishes to see the uplifting of his race, owes it as his 
first duty to himself and to that race to hunt down that 
criminal with all his soul and strength. Now for the side 
of the white man. To avenge one hideous crime by another 
hideous crime is to reduce the man doing it to the bestial 
level of the wretch who committed the bestial crime. The 
horrible effects of the lynchings are not for that crime at 
all, but for other crimes. And above all other men, Gov- 
ernor, you and I and all who are exponents and representa- 
tives of the law, owe it to our people, owe it to the cause of 
civilization and humanity, to do everything in our power, 
officially and unofficially, directly and indirectly, to free the 
United States from the menace and reproach of lynch law." 

This courageous deliverance in the very heart of the 
country in which lynching was a not infrequent practise, 
commanded widespread approval. 

In the summer of 1905 several instances arose in which 
the President felt moved to very plain speech with Senators 
who sought to have him make unfit appointments in the 
civil service, or improper promotions in the army, or to 
shield some person in the service who had been found guilty 
of misconduct. The same Oregon Senator whom he had 
rebuked in 1904 and whom he afterwards forced into the 
penitentiary, wrote him an impudent letter in May, 1905. 
In replying, on the 15th of that month, the President wrote 
a long letter, saying at the close : 

"My dear Senator, you have written me very frankly. 
I shall copy your frankness in this closing paragraph. It 



REBUKES TO RIOTOUS STRIKERS AND LYNCHERS 443 

has been most unfortunate that so many of the friends 
upon whose behalf you have been active should be among 
those whose guilt is clearest and deepest. I entirely appre"^ 
ciate loyalty to one's friends, but loyalty to the cause of 
justice and honor stands above it. I think you are doing 
yourself an injury by permitting yourself to be made at 
least to seem to stand as the champion of the men who have 
been engaged in this widespread conspiracy to defraud the 
United States Government and therefore the public of your 
own State. . . . You criticize very captiously what has 
been done and said by all those whose efforts have resulted 
in the uncovering of this great wrong, and of the partial 
punishment of some of the wrongdoers. It is easy to 
ascribe such motives and to make such criticisms ; but what 
is needed now is not the picking of holes in those who are 
engaged in the great work of righteousness, but the sturdy 
upholding of their hands just so long as they are doing 
this work. 

"I am from my position the leader of the entire Eepub- 
lican party throughout the Union, in Oregon just as much 
as in New York; and in Oregon and New York alike I shall 
count it not an attack upon, but a service to, the Kepubli- 
can party if through my agents I can be instrumental in 
punishing in the severest possible manner any private citi- 
zen, and especially any public servant, who while claiming 
to be a member of that party has deeply wronged it by 
wronging the Nation which the party was created to serve. 
When the party ceases to serve the Nation it will lose its 
reason for existence ; and most emphatically I shall never, 
under any pressure or for any reason whatever, permit 
any alleged considerations of partisan expediency to pre- 
vent my punishing any wrongdoer, whether he belongs to 
my party or any other." 

To a plea from Senator Piatt of New York for clemency 
toward a man who had been dismissed from the service, 
the President sent this terse communication on May 22, 
1905 : **He was heard in full and given ample opportunity 



444 THEODORE ROOSEVELT AND HIS TIME 

to defend himself. He was thoroughly investigated, and 
not only was it necessary to dismiss him, but it may be 
necessary to indict him." 

A Vermont Senator was persistent in seeking to have 
an officer in the army promoted as a personal favor. To 
him the President wrote on June 3, 1905 : 

"In your previous letters you will remember that you 
stated that you were anxious to secure 'Vermont promo- 
tions.' In other words, you have desired that the promo- 
tions in the Army should be given primarily, not because 
the man promoted is the best man for the position, but to 
gratify a certain outside individual or to 'recognize' a 
certain State. Now I cannot possibly permit such practises 
in the Army. It is this kind of practise, carried to an ex- 
treme, which brings utter demoralization to the sei'vice, 
and in the end, rottenness. Surely it ought to be axiomatic 
that the quality and record of the individual officer and the 
needs of the service should alone be considered. . . . 

"When I uphold the hands of the General Staff by tak- 
ing their recommendations for promotion as against those 
of any outsider, no matter how influential, no matter how 
powerful, I am doing my best to prevent our little army 
from being reduced to a condition which would be only one 
degree above that to which it would be reduced if I toler- 
ated actual corruption. In so acting, it seems to me that 
I am entitled to the support of every good American who 
feels that the Army is the property of the Xation, and not 
of one party, still less of any individual in that party. I 
can no more allow it to be run in the interest of politicians 
than I could allow it to be run in the interest of contractors 
or patentees. It is to be run in the interest of the entire 
American people, and with an eye single to making it the 
best that it can possibly be made. ' ' 

To a Senator from an eastern State whose views on the 
proper use of public office were permanently antagonistic 
to those of the President, the latter wrote on July 7, 1905 : 

"Of course I should always like to do anything you ask, 



REBUKES TO RIOTOUS STRIKERS AND LYNCHERS 445 

and it is a matter of regret to me that I am unable to ap- 
point your grandson District Attorney of the District of 
Columbia as you request. If I felt that I conscientiously 
could do so with due regard to the interest of the Govern- 
ment and of the people of the District I should be really 
pleased. We have had difficulty in the office and I have 
directed the choice to be made with peculiar care to obtain 
the best man possible. With all these quasi judicial or 
legal positions I am obliged to exercise peculiar care. ' ' 

Amid all the duties that crowded upon Roosevelt in 1905 
he found time to indulge his love of reading and to conduct 
a voluminous correspondence with all sorts of people on 
all sorts of subjects. While he was busy arranging the 
Russo-Japanese Conference he was reading and absorbing 
a book which carried him back into the 13th Century, after- 
wards writing, on July 11, to the French Ambassador, M. 
Jusserand, this learned criticism of its contents : 

"I read Cahun's 'Turks and Mongols' with such thor- 
oughness and assiduity that at the end it was dangling out 
of the covers, and I have sent it to Washington to have it 
bound, with directions to deliver it to you. 

"I am very much obliged to you for loaning it to me, 
and I have been immensely interested in it. It is extraor- 
dinary how little the average European historian has 
understood the real significance of the immense Mongol 
movement of the 13th Century and its connection with the 
previous history of the Turks, Mongols, and similar 
peoples. Until I read Cahun I never understood the se- 
quence of cause and effect and never appreciated the his- 
toric importance of the existence of the vast, loosely-bound 
Turkish power of the 5th and 6th centuries and of its 
proposition to unite with the Byzantines for the overthrow 
of the Persians. Moreover, it is astounding that military 
critics have given so little space to, or rather have totally 
disregarded, the extraordinary Mongol campaigTis of the 
13th Century. 

''I doubt if the average military critic so much as knows 



446 THEODORE ROOSEVELT AND HIS TIME 

of the existence of Sabutai, who won sixty victories on 
pitched fields and went from the Yellow Sea to the Adri- 
atic, trampling Russia into the dust, overrunning Hungary 
and Poland, and defeating with inferior numbers the picked 
chivalry of Germany as he had already defeated the Man- 
chu, the Corean, and the Chinese. Moreover the victo- 
ries were not won by brute superiority of numbers. The 
ai-mies of the Mongols were not at all what we understand 
when we speak of hordes. They were marvelously trained 
bodies wherein the prowess of the individual soldier was 
only less remarkable than the perfect obedience, precision 
and effectiveness with which he did his part in carrying out 
the tactical and strategic schemes of the generals. 

"For a Frenchman, Cahun is dry; but the dryness of 
writers of your race, if they are good at all, is miles asun- 
der from the hopeless aridity of similar writers among our 
people. Cahun has a really fine phrase, for instance — a 
phrase that tells an important truth when he contrasts 
the purely personal and therefore in the end not very im- 
portant wars of Timur, with what he calls the great ' anony- 
mous' campaigns and victories of the Mongols proper 
under Genghis Khan and in the years immediately succeed- 
ing his death. 

''Naturally, this difference in dryness makes an im- 
mense difference in interest. Thus I took up De la Gorce's 
history of the Second Empire because of the allusions to 
it in Walpole 's history, which covers much the same period ; 
but Walpole 's history was only readable in the sense that 
a guide book or a cookery book is readable ; whereas I found 
De la Gorce exceedingly interesting and filled with much 
that was philosophical and much that was picturesque." 

On July 19, 1905, in a letter to Henry Beach Needham, 
he dropped into this discussion of what constitutes great- 
ness and how it is won : 

*'It has always seemed to me that in life there are two 
ways of achieving success, or, for the matter of that, of 
achieving what is commonly called greatness. One is to 



REBUKES TO RIOTOUS STRIKERS AND LYNCHERS 447 

do that which can only be done by the man of exceptional 
and extraordinary abilities. Of course this means that only 
one man can do it, and it is a very rare kind of success or 
of greatness. The other is to do that which many men 
could do, but which as a matter of fact none of them actually 
does. This is the ordinary kind of success or kind of great- 
ness. Nobody but one of the world's rare geniuses could 
have written the Gettysburg speech, or the Second Inau- 
gural, or met as Lincoln met the awful crises of the Civil 
War. But most of us can do the ordinary things, which, 
however, most of us do not do. It is of course unnecessary 
to say that I have never won a success of any kind that did 
not come within this second category. Any one that chose 
could lead the kind of life I have led, and any one who has 
led that life could if he chose — and by 'choosing,' I of 
course mean choosing to exercise the requisite industry, 
judgment and foresight, none of a very marked type — ^have 
raised my regiment or served in positions analogous to 
those of Police Commissioner, Civil Service Commissioner, 
and Assistant Secretary of the Navy.'^ 

A few days before the Portsmouth Peace Conference 
reached its agreement, in August, 1905, after sending off a 
sheaf of cable and other messages to Tokio, St. Petersburg, 
and Berlin, which forced the envoys to get together, Roose- 
velt, on August 25, took a trip in a submarine, a species of 
voyage which was regarded at the time as especially per- 
ilous. Indeed, when it was announced in advance that he 
was going, there were protests in the newspapers against 
it on the ground that as the head of the nation his life was 
not his own and he had no right to risk it. Among the 
protests was one from "Mr. Dooley" which closed with the 
memorable sentence : "If you must go, Mr. President, take 
Fairbanks with you!" He was not deterred but took the 
trip, was under water seventy minutes, and while there 
made a thorough examination of the vessel and mastered 
its method of operation. Writing to his friend. Count von 
Sternburg, he expressed views about the future of the sub- 



448 THEODORE ROOSEVELT AND HIS TIME 

marine which, addressed to a German, afford curious read- 
ing after the uses to which the submarine was put by Ger- 
mans in the European war : 

' ' I myself am both amused and interested as to what you 
say about the interest excited about my trip in the Plunger. 
I went down in it chiefly because I did not like to have the 
officers and enlisted men think I wanted them to try things 
I was reluctant to try myself. I believe a good deal can be 
done with these submarines, although there is always the 
danger of people getting carried away with the idea and 
thinking that they can be of more use than they possibly 
could be." 

The President made two efforts in 1905 to induce Joseph 
H. Choate to reenter the diplomatic service. He asked him 
to go as the American representative to the Algeciras Con- 
vention. Mr. Choate at first accepted and subsequently 
withdrew his acceptance. He next offered him the position 
of American Minister to Japan, and this also Mr. Choate 
declined. Writing about tlie latter position after the close 
of the Portsmouth Conference, the President gave this in- 
teresting statement of his personal views as to services 
which an ex-President may perform : 

"I found that the Japanese were very anxious we should 
send the very highest man possible to Tokio as Minister, 
and they say that if that is done they will shortly make 
their representative here an Ambassador. They evidently 
feel that if Choate were sent there it would be appreciated 
as an international compliment. I do not know whether 
Choate would go or not. If I were in his place I should be 
delighted to go. I have always felt that John Quincy 
Adams rendered a real service when he went to Congress 
after being President ; that is, he showed more regard for 
the work to be done than for the titular position. In the 
same way Choate could well afford to spend what would 
be a delightful couple of years in Tokio for the sake of 
the good that his going would do." 



CHAPTER XXXV 

BUILDER OF THE PANAMA CANAL 

That the United States and the world owe the existence 
of the Panama Canal entirely to President Roosevelt, is a 
fact which cannot be disputed. Every step in the progress 
of that enterprise, from the time of taking possession of 
the Isthmus without an instant's delay when the Panama 
revolution offered the opportunity, till the water-way be- 
tween the two oceans was thrown open to the shipping 
of the world, was due to his personal action in the early 
stages of the work. It was carried to completion under 
Presidents Taft and Wilson on the lines that he had estab- 
lished so jfirmly that they could not be changed. As he said 
later, with a frank boldness that astounded his critics: 
* 'Tes, I took the Isthmus, and I am in a wholly unrepentant 
frame of mind in reference thereto. The ethical conception 
upon which I acted was that I did not intend that Uncle Sam 
should be held up while he was doing a great work for 
himself and all mankind." Having made up his mind on 
the subject, he did not stop to ask if the course would 
win popular approval, or even if Congress would approve. 
If he had waited for Congress to act, the opportunity would 
have passed. 

When it came to the question of how to build the canal, 
he acted with equal promptness and courage. Here again 
he kept himself steadily ahead of Congress, as the record 
will show. In fact. Congress, building better than it knew 
or suspected, left the direction of the work virtually in his 
hands. In the law which it passed, authorizing him to build 
the canal through a commission of seven members, Con- 
gress decreed that the commission should '4n all matters 
be subject to the direction and control of the President." 

449' 



450 THEODORE ROOSEVELT AND HIS TIME 

Its failure to pass laws giving more specific definition to 
the powers which he should exercise, gave the President 
the very opportunity that he desired, and which he was 
prompt to seize when the necessity for doing so arose. 
He invariably gave Congress the opportunity to act before 
acting on his own account. Thus, when the first commis- 
sion of seven members, appointed on February 29, 1904, 
though composed of excellent, even superior material, 
proved ineffective because of failure to act as an executive 
unit, he asked Congress to reduce the number of members 
from seven to three. When Congress declined to do this, 
he secured the desired result in another way. He requested 
and obtained the resignations of the members of the com- 
mission, appointed a new commission in its stead, and 
placed the direction of its affairs in an Executive Commit- 
tee of three members, making the other four members 
merely an advisory engineering body. This arrangement, 
while producing excellent results for a time, in turn broke 
down on the question of divided responsibility, leading to a 
temporary resumption of seven-headed administration. 
The President then reached the final solution of the prob- 
lem by conferring upon a single person absolute powers of 
direction and control. The manner in which this was done 
will be described presently. 

"When Congress placed the work of construction in the 
President's hands, it left open the question of the type of 
canal to be built, whether it should be a lock canal above 
sea-level, or one at sea-level. To obtain light on this ques- 
tion the President invited eminent engineers of the United 
States and Europe to form an international board of in- 
quiry and advise him of their conclusions. Such a body, 
composed of eight Americans and five Europeans, assem- 
bled in September, 1905, and in January following made 
two reports, one signed by eight members, five Europeans 
and three Americans, in favor of a canal at sea-level, and 
one signed by five Americans in favor of a canal with locks 
at an elevation of 85 feet above sea-level. The President 
referred the reports to the Canal Commission and its Chief 




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BUILDER OP THE PANAMA CANAL 451 

Engineer in charge of the work on the Isthmus, for con- 
sideration, and the Commission and its Chief Engineer 
agreed in favoring the lock canal plan. The Secretary of 
"VVar also favored it, and the President transmitted the sev- 
eral reports and findings to Congress with a recommenda- 
tion that the lock canal plan be adopted. 

Of this decision the President said in a speech at Chicago, 
on May 10, 1905: "I came to the conclusion that the lock 
canal at the proposed level would cost only about half as 
much to build and would be built in half the time, with 
much less risk; that for large ships the transit would be 
quicker, and that, taking into account the interest saved, 
the cost of maintenance would be less." 

The merits of the two plans were discussed with much 
animation in the press of the country, and a debate, marked 
at times by animosity, occupied the Senate for several 
weeks. Under firm pressure from the President, that body 
finally adopted the lock plan by a vote of 36 to 31. The 
House, which had been known to be strongly in its favor 
from the outset, concurred with the Senate without a divi- 
sion. 

My official connection with canal work began in Septem- 
ber, 1905, when at the President's request I was appointed 
Secretary of the Commission, a position which I held for 
nine years, extending not only through President Roose- 
velt's term of office but through the entire period of canal 
construction. The first two years of my ser\^ice were spent 
in Washington and the remaining seven on the Isthmus. 
A\Tiat I write on the subject is based, therefore, on the 
intimate personal knowledge which I acquired through my 
official duties and relations. 

In order to acquaint himself thoroughly with the work 
in all its phases. President Roosevelt, accompanied by his 
wife, paid a visit to the Isthmus in November, 1906. The 
visit', which was notable as being the first instance in which 
a President of the United States had passed outside its 
territory while holding office, attracted wide attention and 
comment. He went on a war vessel of the Navy, and spent 



452 THEODORE ROOSEVELT AND HIS TIME 

three days on the Isthmus devoting nearly every daylight 
hour to the inspection of canal work from one ocean to 
the other. The work at the time was in charge of the 
second Commission, and had been under full headway from 
the moment that Congress had adopted the lock plan. In 
his inspection the President was accompanied by the Chief 
Engineer, the Chairman and Secretary of the Commis- 
sion, the Chief Sanitary Officer and other canal officials. 
Every portion of the work, including engineering plans, 
sanitary arrangements and regulations for the civil gov- 
ernment of the Canal Zone, was subjected to minute scru- 
tiny. The zeal and tireless energy of the President put 
to a severe strain the physical strength of more than one of 
his companions. 

During his visit a formal reception was extended to him 
by the President of the Panama Republic, Dr. Manuel 
Amador, the exercises being held on the platform of the 
cathedral, fronting the central plaza of the city. In re- 
sponse to an address of welcome by President Amador, the 
President assured him that the republics of the United 
States and Panama were "joint trustees for all the world" 
in doing the work of building the canal, and pledged, on 
behalf of the United States, the heartiest support and treat- 
ment ' * on a basis of a full and complete and generous equal- 
ity between the two republics." A notable passage of his 
speech, considering the revolutionary record of Panama — 
of more than fifty revolutions in fifty years — was the fol- 
lowing : 

*'The sole desire of the United States as regards the 
Republic of Panama is to see it increase in wealth, in num- 
bers, in importance, until it becomes, as I so earnestly hope 
it will become, one of the republics whose history reflects 
honor upon the entire western world. Such progress and 
prosperity, Mr. President, can come only through the pres- 
ervation of both order and liberty ; through the observance 
of those in power of all their rights, obligations, and duties 
to their fellow-citizens, and through the realization of those 



BUILDER OF THE PANAMA CANAL 453 

out of power that the insurrectionary habit, the habit of 
civil war, ultimately means destruction to the republic." 

The closing sentence of this passage was delivered with 
great force, the President striding to the front of the plat- 
form and fairly hurling it into the faces of the assembled 
crowd of Panamanians. Although it was a condemnation 
of what might be called their chief political industiy for 
half a century, the Panamanians greeted it with shouts of 
approval. That the warning was taken to heart, the subse- 
quent history of the new republic conclusively proves, for 
no revolution or insurrection has disturbed its develop- 
ment in peace and prosperity since that day. 

On the eve of his departure from the Isthmus, the entire 
canal force was assembled in a great building covering 
the largest wharf of the Canal Commission at Cristobal, 
at the Atlantic entrance to the canal, in a mass reception 
to him. In a speech which he made to the assemblage, the 
President said that to each of the canal workers had come 
an opportunity such as was vouchsafed to but few in each 
generation, adding: 

**I shall see if it is not possible to provide for some little 
memorial, some mark, some badge, which will always dis- 
tinguish the man who for a certain space of time has done 
his work well on this Isthmus, just as the button of the 
Grand Army distinguishes the man who did his work well 
in the Civil War." 

On his return to Washington the President requested 
Francis D. Millet, the accomplished artist and charming 
gentleman who lost his life in the Steamship Titwnic dis- 
aster in April, 1912, to make suggestions in regard to the 
proposed memorial, and he recommended a medal of the 
size of a silver dollar. The Isthmian Canal Commission 
was asked for suggestions as to design and inscriptions, 
and it recommended that on one side there should be a me- 
dallion portrait of President Roosevelt and on the other 
the seal of the Canal Zone. The first part of the reeom- 



454 THEODORE ROOSEVELT AND HIS TIME 

mendation was adopted by Mr. Millet, but the second was 
rejected, and instead of the seal there was adopted a bird's- 
eye view of Culebra Cut, in the completed canal, with a ship 
passing through, and the motto of the seal, "The Land 
Divided, the World United," inscribed above it. The work 
was placed in charge of Victor D. Brenner, an eminent 
sculptor, who modeled a medallion of President Roose- 
velt at personal sittings at Oyster Bay in July, 1908. 

Over one hundred pounds of copper, bronze and other 
material from abandoned French locomotives and ma- 
chineiw on the Isthmus were shipped to the United States 
Mint in Philadelphia, and from these the medals were cast. 
They were awarded to all Americans in the Canal and 
Panama Railway employ who had seiwed two years or more 
on canal work. Each additional two years of service was 
indicated by the attachment of a bar so inscribed. Distri- 
bution of the medals, inscribed with the name of the recip- 
ient and the date of his original employment, was begun 
in September, 1909, and over six thousand wore delivered. 
They were very highly prized by their o^^^lers, and the 
bestowal of them contributed materially to the patriotic 
pride in their work which was so universal in the canal 
force, and which was the chief cause of its remarkable effi- 
ciency. 

As recorded in a previous chapter, Roosevelt was the 
first President to send a message to Congress in print, 
rather than in script as had been the invariable custom. 
He established another precedent in a special message 
which he sent to Congress on December 17, 1906, setting 
forth in detail the results of his visit to the Isthmus. He 
accompanied the text in this instance with reproductions 
of photographs sho^ving the condition of the work at va- 
rious points. This was the first illustrated message ever 
transmitted to Congress and its appearance in the Senate 
caused a feeling approaching consternation in that august 
body, whose members looked upon it as that abhorrent 
thing called ''an innovation," a breach of tradition amount- 
ing almost to treason. The House, on the contrary, hailed 



BUILDER OF THE PANAMA CANAL 455 

it with joy as a public document of high interest and value 
for circulation among the people, and several editions, ag- 
gregating many thousand copies, were ordered for the use 
of members. Its interest and attractiveness were so com- 
pelling that after a short period of tremors, the Senators 
overcame their objections sufficiently to order for them- 
selves an edition of ten thousand copies. Another peculi- 
arity of the message was that simplified spelling was used 
in it for the first and only time in such a document in our 
history. 

The message had a wide circulation both in the United 
States and Europe and was of inestimable service in giving 
a clear, specific and unassailable presentation of conditions 
on the Isthmus at a time when opinion on the subject had 
been confused and misled by a great flood of newspaper 
and magazine literature grossly, and often slanderously, 
misrepresenting them. In fact, no great national enter- 
prise was ever subjected to a more persistent assault than 
was directed upon the canal work during the first few years 
of its progress. The assault was apparently so systematic 
as to suggest that powerful influences of some sort were 
instigating it. In his special message the President spoke 
of two kinds of criticism, honest and malicious, and said 
of the latter: 

** Where the slanderers are of foreign origin, I have no 
concern with them. Where they are Americans, I feel for 
them the heartiest contempt and indignation; because, in 
a spirit of wanton dishonesty and malice, they are trying 
to interfere with, and hamper the execution of, the greatest 
work of the kind ever attempted, and are seeking to bring 
to naught the efforts of their countrymen to put to the 
credit of America one of the giant feats of the ages. The 
outrageous accusations of these slanderers constitute a 
gross libel upon a body of public servants who, for trained 
intelligence, expert ability, high character and devotion 
to duty, have never been excelled anywhere. There is not 
a man among them directing the work on the Isthmus who 
has obtained his position on any other basis than merit 



456 THEODORE ROOSEVELT AND HIS TIME 

alone, and not one who has used his position in any way 
for his own personal or pecuniary advantage." 

In this message the President renewed his request for 
a smaller commission, saying that a seven-headed body was, 
of course, a clumsy executive instrument, and asking for a 
single commissioner with undivided powers and responsi- 
bilities. This request, like the former one, was not granted. 
The President then decided upon a further exercise of his 
power under the law, and consolidated the positions of 
Chief Engineer and Chairman of the Commission in a 
single person. Scarcely had this been done, when both 
the Chairman and the Chief Engineer resigned, and the 
President was fairly compelled to make a radical reorgan- 
ization of the Commission. As he said at the time, he had 
no alternative except to turn it over to the army. He had 
made two efforts to have the canal constructed by civilians, 
but in both instances the civilian who was chief engineer 
had resigned when he had become tired of the job. It was 
useless to try to build the canal with a new chief engineer 
every twelve months, since a permanent, stable force was 
unattainable under such conditions, and without a perma- 
nent force satisfactory results could not be achieved. "I 
propose now," he said, "to put the work in charge of men 
who will stay on the job till I get tired of having them 
there, or till I say they may abandon it." A new com- 
mission, composed mainly of army engineers and an en- 
gineer of the navy, was appointed and assumed duty on 
April 1, 1907. 

When I became Secretary of the Commission in 1905 
it was giving serious consideration to the question of pro- 
viding means of recreation for the Ajnericans who com- 
prised the clerical, subordinate engineering, and skilled 
mechanical elements of the working force of the canal. 
Life on the Isthmus was without relief or diversion of any 
kind. There were no reputable places of amusement, no 
clubs, libraries or reading rooms. There was a constant 
dread of sickness, for the health of the Canal Zone had not 



BUILDER OF THE PANAMA CANAL 457 

yet been fully established, and with this dread the loneli- 
ness attending existence in a land not merely foreign but 
lacking in most of the familiar comforts of modern civil- 
ization. The consequence was that after a sojourn of a few 
months, the American employees became homesick, discon- 
tented, and depressed, lost interest in their work, and re- 
turned to the United States at the earliest opportunity. 
During the first two years the annual changes in this part 
of the force amounted to 90 per cent. It was clearly im- 
possible to hope for anything approximating a permanent 
force and without a permanent force efficiency could not be 
secured. 

The Commission, working on President Roosevelt's sug- 
gestion with the National Committee of the Young Men's 
Christian Association, drew up a plan for the erection, 
furnishing and operating, at the Commission's expense, 
of recreation buildings or club-houses in the largest set- 
tlements of canal workers. It was estimated that each of 
these buildings would cost about $35,000, fully furnished, 
and that it would cost several thousand dollars a year to 
run them under Y. M. C. A. management. The legal ad- 
viser of the Commission expressed the opinion that such 
use of the Commission's appropriations was of doubtful 
legality, and that when the bills came before the Comp- 
troller of the Treasury for approval he might reject them. 

I took the matter to President Roosevelt and explained to 
him the imperative need, physical and moral, of the 
buildings to the welfare of the employees and the progress 
of the work. He took the view that they were as necessary 
as were suitable living quarters, good food, sanitation, and 
other objects of expenditure for the health and welfare of 
the force, since with a discontented and constantly chang- 
ing force the best results could not be secured. 

He asked me why the Commission did not go ahead at 
once and erect the buildings. When I informed him of the 
legal adviser's opinion, he exclaimed: ''You go back and 
tell that man to keep his mouth shut. He is not there to 
find objections; let the other fellow do that. I want to 



458 THEODORE ROOSEVELT AND HIS TIME 

build the canal ; I do not want to be told how not to do it, 
but how to do it. You tell the Commission to go ahead 
and build the club-houses. I'll take the responsibility. If 
the Comptroller of the Treasury throws out the bills, I'll 
V send a special message to Congress, asking for a special 
appropriation for the purpose. I will see to it that our 
boys down there are properly taken care of." 

The club-houses were built, the Comptroller passed the 
bills without question, and no objection to the use of the 
money was ever raised in any quarter. Before the canal 
was completed there were five of these larger buildings, 
costing about $35,000 each and about $7,000 a year each 
for their operation, together with several smaller ones. 
They were the centers of social and athletic activities and 
contributed immeasurably to the well-being and content- 
ment of the force, and, consequently, to the progress of the 
work. 

If President Roosevelt, hesitating about his authority in 
the matter, had referred it to Congress for action, it is 
safe to assume what the result would have been. As usual 
in such cases, there would have been a discussion lasting 
anywhere from six months to a year, and, at the end of it, 
lan appropriation of a few thousand dollars for a single in- 
adequate building, possibly two. In the meantime the force 
would have continued to change at the rate of 90 per cent, a 
year, the progress of the work would have been retarded, 
not merely for a few years, but for an indefinite period, 
mth possible failure as the ultimate outcome. Roosevelt's 
prompt action made it possible to have several of the 
buildings completed within a year, so that their beneficial 
influence, so vitally needed, began almost immediately. 

After the club-houses were put in operation, their man- 
agers reported a growing demand for books among the 
members, and suggested the purchase of small libraries for 
each building, there being no libraries or collections of 
books for pubHc use anywhere on the Isthmus. When this 
suggestion was taken up for consideration by the Com- 
mission, the legal adviser again raised the question of le- 



BUILDER OF THE PANAMA CANAL 459 

gality in connection with such use of the Government 
money. Again I went to President Roosevelt, stating the 
case to him, and saying that througli inquiries to publishers 
and booksellers I had ascertained that I coulcl purchase 
libraries of selected books, containing each 600 volumes, 
for $500 each. ''Why don't you buy them?" he asked. I 
stated the legal adviser's opinion, whereupon he reiterated 
with additional vigor, what he had said on the previous 
occasion about the functions of the legal adviser, and 
added ; "You spend the money ; buy the books, and tell the 
Commission I authorize the expenditure." 

Again no objection was made by any one to this expendi- 
ture. The need was a real one. Later, when I was sta- 
tioned on the Isthmus, I was informed by many members 
of the force that they had read every one of the books in 
the libraries, and the demand for more was so insistent 
that a small sum was set apart each year by the Commis- 
sion for the purchase of additional volumes. The benefi- 
cial effects of the presence of the books for use in idle hours 
can scarcely be overestimated. Again, it may be asked, 
what would have been the answer if Congress had been 
requested to appropriate this money? 

On the eve of sailing for permanent residence at Panama 
in July, 1907, President Roosevelt summoned me to Oyster 
Bay for final suggestions and instructions. He asked me, 
as soon as I became familiar with the way matters were 
going there, to write to him freely about them, telling him 
what obstacles, if any, were hampering Colonel Goethals 
and interfering with the progress of the work. He bade me 
assure the Colonel that he should back him up in every- 
thing. After Lhad been at Panama about a month I wrote 
to the President a confidential letter— one of a series, in 
fact— in which I told him that there was one very serious 
obstacle to the highest attainable degree of progress and 
that was the seven-headed Commission— that the first es- 
sential to the construction of the canal in the best manner 
and in the shortest period of time was the placing of auto-^ 
cratic power in the hands of one man— Colonel Goethals. 



460 THEODORE ROOSEVELT AND HIS TIME 

Under date of August 29, 1907, I received a reply from 
the President in which he said: 

*'I am not surprised that the Colonel finds the Commis- 
sion a cumbersome body. As you know, my own belief has 
always been that there should be one commissioner, and 
with things as they are at present I would have him the 
Chief Engineer of the Commission and let him appoint his 
assistants — or have me appoint them if necessary, though 
my preference would be to have him do so." 

Writing again on September 6, 1907, in reply to another 
letter of mine in which I had urged him to repeat the effort, 
already made in vain on former occasions, to get Congress 
to amend the law and reduce the size of the Commission, 
the President wrote : 

'' Evidently Goethals is exactly the man for the work. 
How fortunate we have been to get him ! . . . Whether we 
get the change of law or not, he shall really have all the 
powers that he would have if he were the Chief Engineer 
in sole charge of the work with the executive under him 
and the other engineers as an advisory board. Of course, 
the wise thing for him to do is, so far as possible, to act 
first and then have his acts confirmed by the Commission." 

On receipt of this letter I showed it to Colonel Goethals. 
As he finished reading it, he arose from his chair, and with 
his always erect figure if possible more erect than ever, 
he exclaimed : ' ' Now I have both feet on the ground — and 
I'll build the canal!" 

How completely the President kept his word will be 
shown as this narrative proceeds. I will make one other 
extract from his letters of that period in order to show how 
unvaryingly the President stood behind Colonel Goethals. 
His only question to me, whenever I went to him or wrote 
to him asking for some action on his part, was invariably : 
''Is this what Goethals wants?" If I answered that it 
was, nothing more was said and the action was taken. In 
a letter under date of September 11, 1907, the President 



BUILDER OF THE PANAMA CANAL 461 

wrote in regard to an official on the Isthmus who had been 
the leader in working up opposition to Colonel Goethals: 
*'He (naming him) has done good work, and I am sure 
the Colonel will give him an absolutely fair chance. If 
he does well and acts in entire harmony with the Colonel, 
he will stay; otherwise he will not. I shall back up the 
Colonel on all points. ' ' 

The official in question was given ''an absolutely fair 
chance" by Colonel Goethals, but he failed to improve it, 
and he was asked for his resignation. In announcing his 
forthcoming departure, under date of May 23, 1908, the 
President wrote me a letter which is worth quoting for 
its revelation of his attitude toward newspaper assaults: 

"Blank is going, so that you need not have any anxiety 
on that score. As for scandalous articles of the kind you 
enclose, why of course they will appear about you, and 
Colonel Goethals and me, and everybody else, and I don't 
care a snap of my fingers about them. ' ' 

When in December, 1907, Colonel Goethals arrived in 
Washington, the President at once fulfilled his promise to 
put full power into his hands. He told the Colonel to have 
an Executive Order drawn up to accomplish that purpose. 
This was done, but when it was submitted to Secretary 
Taf t, then at the head of the War Department, he said that 
he did not think it was entirely in accordance with law, but 
as it had been prepared at the President's direction he 
advised Colonel Goethals to take it to the White House and 
see what the President thought of it. Colonel Goethals, in 
his own account of the incident, published in Scrihner's 
Magazine, in May, 1913, describes what took place as fol- 
lows : 

"After reading it, the President reached for a pen, ask- 
ing if it was satisfactory to me. I replied affirmatively, but 
explained that Mr. Taft thought that it was not exactly 
in accord with the law. To this the President replied that 
he would take his chances with the law, adding that he 
wanted the canal built." 



462 THEODORE ROOSEVELT AND HIS TIME 

The Order was signed January 6, 1908, and under its pro- 
visions Colonel Goethals assumed the autocratic powers 
which he exercised without opposition till the completion 
of the work. In the narrative in Scrihner's Magazine, from 
which I have quoted above, Colonel Goethals spoke of the 
effect of the Order : 

''Now that the Canal is in operation, I doubt if this re- 
sult could have been accomplished in any other way than 
by a single responsible head. This President Roosevelt 
realized the first time I met him, and I have consequently 
felt that to this Order and to the support given to me in 
carrying it out are due the results that have been attained." 

In that view I concur absolutely, for I was present on 
the Isthmus when this and other similar acts, "backing up 
the Colonel at all points," were performed by President 
Eoosevelt and I know from personal observation that with- 
out them the canal would not have been built in anything 
like the time in which it was. 

An incident which occurred immediately following the 
election of Mr. Wilson to the Presidency illustrated the su- 
preme value of Roosevelt's support to Colonel Goethals. 
The old opposition forces in the Commission got together 
immediately wdth a new member who had been sent down 
by Secretary Bry^an, and questioned the absolute authority 
which Colonel Goethals had been and was still exercising. 
They asked him where he got it, and when he replied that 
it came from the Executive Order of January 6, 1908, they 
declared that he exceeded the powers conferred in that. 
He admitted it, but added that President Roosevelt had said 
to him that he gave him all the powers that he could in that 
Order but that if he wanted more power, to exercise it and 
he (Roosevelt) would approve his acts. When they charged 
that such action was illegal, the Colonel called their atten- 
tion to the fact that all of President Roosevelt's acts in 
reference to the canal had been approved by Congress and 
President Wilson in the new Canal Act for the operation 
of the canal, and hence had been made lawful. 



BUILDER OF THE PANAMA CANAL 463 

This was the incontestable fact in the case. If Roosevelt 
''took his chances" with the law, whenever the law seemed 
to stand in the way of progress, he won out completely in 
the end, vindicating his position that while he could not 
do what the law explicitly forbade him to do, he could do 
whatever was essential to progress even if the law did 
not explicitly empower him to do it. 

Time was to justify fully the wisdom and foresight of the 
President's decision in favor of a lock canal, for long be- 
fore the canal was completed the serious difficulties caused 
by the ''slides" in the walls of the canal through the 
mountain range, known as the "Culebra Cut," demon- 
strated conclusively the impossibility of construction at sea 
level. As Colonel Goethals, under whose able and inspiring 
leadership the work was carried to completion, said at a 
critical moment in the task : ' ' There is not money enough 
in the world to construct a canal at sea-level, and, if con- 
structed, it could not be kept open." 

That the President was willing to change the type of 
canal, if convinced that he had made a mistake, he showed 
in a letter that he wrote to Colonel Goethals on December 
13, 1908, when the advocates of a sea-level canal were mak- 
ing a concerted and vigorous assault upon the lock type by 
declaring that the Gatun Dam, which was to hold back the 
great lake which was to supply water for the locks, was 
so defective that it would never hold water. "Fake" 
stories of many kinds were widely circulated in the United 
States in support of the assertion. It was in the midst of 
this campaign of misrepresentation that the President 
wrote : 

"I intend to send Mr. Taft down to the Isthmus in Jan- 
uary, together with four or five of the best engineers in the 
country, for a last and complete overhauling of the ques- 
tion in connection with the Gatun Dam. General Davis and 
several others are convinced that the Gatun Dam will be a 
failure, and all kinds of rumors come up here about it, while 
there is an evident movement in favor of a sea-level canal. 

*'Now, my belief is, simply as a layman and judging from 



464 THEODORE ROOSEVELT AND HIS TIME 

what I have heard, that the present plan is the right plan ; 
that the Gatun Dam can be built with entire safety, and that 
the sea-level canal is not advisable. But I don't care a rap 
about consistency in the matter, and you mustn't either. 
Nobody must care anything excepting to get the canal 
built according to the best and safest plans. The issue is 
altogether too big to be complicated in any way by any 
point of pride as to past recommendations by me or by 
any one else. I want you therefore to approach the subject 
with an absolutely open mind, and to consult with Mr. 
Taft and the engineers he will bring with him, purely on 
the basis of finding out what the facts are and what is best 
to be done. Will you write me freely as to your judgment 
now and as to the reasons for your judgment I" 

In reply Colonel Goethals expressed implicit faith in the 
plan of canal and in the Gatun Dam, an opinion which time 
and experience have amply confirmed. He said to me later 
in regard to the President's letter that he had the greatest 
admiration for it — considered it a supreme revelation of 
Roosevelt's character. 

The commission which accompanied Mr. Taft on his visit 
made an exhaustive examination of the dam and of the 
canal plan and coincided entirely in the opinion of Colonel 
Goethals. 

In fact, it may be said of his securing the building of the 
canal, as of getting control of the Isthmus, that President 
Roosevelt **won off his o\vn bat." When Congress failed 
to give him the powers necessary for the effective construc- 
tion of the canal, he assumed those powers and conducted 
the work through Executive Orders. When Congress de- 
clined his request to reduce the size of the Canal Commis- 
sion and concentrate its authority in a single head, he ac- 
complished his object by issuing an Executive Order which 
placed supreme power in the hands of Colonel Goethals. 
From time to time his course was denounced in Congress 
as illegal and even unconstitutional, but he went calmly and 
steadily ahead, and when he had accomplished the build- 



BUILDER OF THE PANAMA CANAL 465 

ing of the canal, Congress passed an act for its operation 
and maintenance in which all his acts were approved. In 
this proceeding Congress followed the course of the Senate 
in giving approval to his ''taking" of the Isthmus by ratify- 
ing the treaty with the Republic of Panama. 

Theodore Roosevelt "took" the Isthmus, and he built the 
canal because he placed action and progress above technical 
construction of law and was not afraid to take chances with 
it when the end to be attained could be reached in no other 
way. His attitude toward the law and the use of the Exec- 
utive power is clearly defined by himself in this passage 
from his 'Autobiography': 

"The most important factor in getting the right spirit in 
my Administration, next to the insistence upon courage, 
honesty, and a genuine democracy of desire to serve the 
plain people, was my insistence upon the theory that the 
executive power was limited only by specific restrictions 
and prohibitions appearing in the Constitution or imposed 
by the Congress under its Constitutional powers. My view 
was that every executive officer, and above all every exec- 
utive officer in high position, was a steward of the people 
bound actively and affirmatively to do all he could for the 
people, and not to content himself with the negative merit 
of keeping his talents undamaged in a napkin. I decline to 
adopt the view that what was imperatively necessary for 
the Nation could not be done by the President unless he 
could find some specific authorization to do it. My belief 
was that it was not only his right but his duty to do any- 
thing that the needs of the Nation demanded unless such 
action was forbidden by the Constitution or by the laws. 
Under this interpretation of executive power I did and 
caused to be done many things not previously done by the 
President and the heads of the departments. I did not 
usurp power, but I did greatly broaden the use of executive 
power. In other words, I acted for the public welfare, I 
acted for the common well-being of all our people, when- 
ever and in whatever manner was necessary, unless pre- 
vented by direct constitutional or legislative prohibition. 



466 THEODORE ROOSEVELT AND HIS TIME 

I did not care a rap for the mere form and show of power ; 
I cared immensely for the use that could be made of the 
substance." 

His line of action was, therefore, in regard to the canal, 
the one which he followed uniformly in the conduct of pub- 
lic affairs — not to find reasons for not doing it, but ways in 
which to do it — to seek for results and get them. Also, not 
to pick out weak men for great tasks, but to select the best 
and strongest men he could obtain and, when selected, to 
back them to the limit so long as they showed themselves 
equal to the task. He found in Colonel Goethals a man of 
his own sort, who was not afraid to take power and who 
knew how to exercise it. The two made, a noble team, and 
they scored a *' victory of peace" that has brought honor 
to the American name throughout the world. 



CHAPTER XXXVI 

SECRET HISTORY OF THE ALGECIRAS CONFERENCE 

It is a diplomatic secret that President Roosevelt is enti- 
tled to the credit of arranging the important Algeciras 
Conference of 1906 and dictating the terms on which war 
between France and Germany, with the possible involve- 
ment of England as the ally of France, was averted. His 
service as peacemaker in this controversy, rendered in re- 
sponse to the earnest and repeated appeals of the Kaiser, 
was equaled only by that which at the same time he was 
rendering to the world in bringing to an end the war be- 
tween Russia and Japan. Secretary Root said of it to me, \ 
many years later, that he considered it of far greater im- j 
portance to the world than the Portsmouth settlement. / 
Happily a full history of what Roosevelt did is extant, nai^ 
rated by himself. It is in the form of a letter, addressed 
on April 28, 1906, to Whitelaw Reid, then American Am- 
bassador in London. This letter, which bears the impress 
of Roosevelt in every line, contains all the confidential cor- 
respondence which passed between him and the German 
and French Ambassadors, with the communications of their 
governments, including messages of the Kaiser. In the end 
the President fairly compelled the Kaiser to accept the 
terms upon which the final agreement was reached by the 
Convention. These documents have never been published, 
not even in the Blue Book, as the President says in his let- 
ter. Their full text is given here as historical material of 
the first interest and value. 

THE LETTER 

Absolutely private and confidential. 

April 28, 1906. 
My dear Reid: 

Now you are about to receive a quarto-volume from me 

467 



468 THEODORE ROOSEVELT AND HIS TIME 

and I hope it will not daunt you. But there has been so 
much that is amusing and interesting, and indeed so much 
that has been of importance, in the queer negotiations 
wherein I have been the medium between France and Ger- 
many during the past year that it is possibly worth your 
while to know of them a little in detail. 

On March 6, 1905, Stemburg came to me with a message 
from the Kaiser to ask me to join w^ith the Kaiser in in- 
forming the Sultan of Morocco that he ought to reform 
his government, and that if he would do so we would stand 
behind him for the open door and would support him in any 
opposition he might make to any particular nation (that is 
to France) which sought to obtain exclusive control of Mo- 
rocco. On the following day he submitted to me' a memo- 
randum to the same effect, stating that the Emperor re- 
garded France and Spain as "a political unity," who wished 
to divide up Morocco between themselves and debar her 
markets to the rest of the world, and that if Spain should 
occupy Tang'iers and France to the Hinterland they would 
be able to dominate the roads to the Near and Far East. 
I answered this by stating that I did not see my way clear 
to interfere in the matter, for I did not think that our in- 
terests were sufficiently great, but expressed my friendli- 
ness to Germany generally and my expectation and belief 
that her policy was one for peace. I had some further 
interviews with Speck, and on April 5th he wrote me again. 
This time he maintained that England and France were 
allies ; that he must insist upon a conference of the powers 
to settle the fate of Morocco. In this memorandum he (the 
Emperor) stated that Germany asked for no gains in Mo- 
rocco; she simply defended her interests and stood for 
equal rights to all nations there. He then added, in Speck's 
words : 

''Besides this she is bound to think of her national dig- 
nity. This makes it necessary for her to point out to 
France that her national interests cannot be disposed of 
without asking her for her consent and cooperation. Since 
35 years Germany has been obliged to keep an armed de- 



SECRET HISTORY OF ALGECIRAS CONFERENCE 469 

fensive towards France. As soon as France discovers that 
Germany meekly submits to her bullying, we feel sure that 
she will become more aggressive in other quarters and we 
do not consider a demand for a revision of the Treaty 
of Frankfort to be far off." 

The Emperor evidently felt safe in the position of defi- 
ance to France, which he had already adopted, because as 
he (Speck) said: ''According to the information which the 
Emperor has received he feels sure that England's aid 
to France in the matter will not go beyond a 'diplomatic 
support.' This, he hopes, will keep France isolated, and, 
with or without a conference, he expects that the status quo 
in Morocco can be peacefully improved and, above all, the 
rights of all foreigners safeguarded there." On April 13th 
Speck wrote me again, saying that the Italian Government 
had informed the Emperor of their sympathy with his po- 
sition, and of their conviction that France would "only con- 
tinue her aggressive policy in Morocco, aimed at all non- 
French interests, if she feels sure that England will stand 
by her and eventually show herself ready to back her up 
by force of arms." To this the Emperor added that he be- 
lieved that the attitude of England would depend upon the 
attitude of the United States, and asked us to tell England 
that we thought there should be a conference. 

On April 25th he wrote me again, saying that the Em- 
peror would be most grateful to me if I would intimate to 
England that I would like to see her and Germany in har- 
mony in their dealings with Morocco. On May 13th he 
sent me another memorandum, insisting that there must 
be a general conference and complaining of England for 
opposing this conference, and stating that the latter would 
only drop her opposition if I would give her a hint to do so. 
The Emperor also in this memorandum stated, with a dis- 
tinct note of self-righteousness, that he had refused invi- 
tations from France to come to an agreement mth her 
alone, because he was disinterestedly championing the 
cause of the world at large. He then used these words: 



470 THEODORE ROOSEVELT AND HIS TIME 

''The Emperor states that his policy is absolutely clear and 
simple. In spite of special advantages offered to him he 
stands by the treaty rights granted to all. Only if he 
should discover that he should receive no support from the 
interested treaty powers in connection with the open door 
and the conference, he would be forced to think of Ger- 
many alone. Only then — and not before — he would have to 
choose between the possibility of a war with France and the 
examining of those conditions which France may have to 
propose, so as to avoid a war." 

During the rest of this letter Speck describes the Em- 
peror's indignation with the King of England and with the 
British Government, and expresses the Emperor's belief 
that France, England and Eussia possibly with the coop- 
eration of Japan were aiming at the partition of China. 
This last supposition seemed to me mere lunacy, if it was 
put forward with sincerity. The comic feature of the 
memorandum, considering the closeness of Germany's rela- 
tions with Russia at the outset of the Russo-Japanese war, 
was that the Emperor complained that France, ignoring 
all the laws of nations, had offered the Russian fleet a safe 
retreat in the harbors of Indo-China, and had provided that 
fleet with means to prepare its attack, which action might 
result in a turn of the war in favor of Russia. The Em- 
peror added : 

'*0n the other hand the Emperor feels that England will 
drop this or any other plan, if she finds out in time that it 
would be opposed by America. The violent renewal of the 
anti-German movement in England seems to be caused by 
Germany's attempt to balk any coalition of Powers directed 
against China after the conclusion of peace. ' ' 

On May 29th the Emperor stated that both England and 
France had offered to give Gennany a sphere of interest in 
Morocco if she would accept it and let the question remain 
quiet, but that the Emperor had refused, stating that he 
was for the maintenance ''of the status quo and for the 
open door and for equal treatment of all nations whose 



SECRET HISTORY OF ALGECIRAS CONFERENCE 471 

rights were established by treaties." (It will be seen later 
on how comically the Emperor tried to go back on this prop- 
osition.) Two days later Speck sent me another memo- 
randum from the Emperor, stating that he regarded the 
Morocco question not as an isolated question, but as one 
which might develop into a starting point for a new group- 
ing of the Powers. He again, in this memorandum, threat- 
ened a war with France, using the following language : '*If 
England is successful in causing the refusal of France to 
join in a conference to settle the Morocco question, Ger- 
many will have to choose between war with France or be- 
tween an understanding with France with regard to Mo- 
rocco, which repeatedly has been sought for by France. 
Such an understanding, the Emperor believes, is to form 
the basis of a new grouping of European powers to which 
he is strongly opposed, being most anxious to maintain in 
the future his attitude, especially with regard to the Far 
East, as clearly explained to you. Everything he thinks 
depends on the attitude you may consider fit to take to- 
wards a conference of the treaty powers to settle the Mo- 
rocco question. England is the only power which opposes 
such a conference, though it seems sure she will drop her 
objections in case you should participate in the confer- 
ence." The day after I received yet another letter from 
Speck, showing that the United States had signed the con- 
vention of Madrid with reference to Morocco, in 1880. 

Meanwhile my own attitude can be best gathered by the 
following two letters, which I sent while on my bear hunt, 
one to Taft, who was then acting as Secretary of State in 
Hay's absence, and the other to Speck: 

Confidential. 

Dictated by the President in camp. East Divide Creek, 

Colorado. 

Glenwood Springs, Colo., 

April 20, 1905. 

Dear Will: 

I think you are keeping the lid on in great shape! Ap- 



472 THEODORE ROOSEVELT AND HIS TIME 

parently the Santo Domingo pot is not bubbling much at 
present, but we have troubles enough elsewhere. 

The Kaiser's pipe-dream this week takes the form of 
Morocco. Speck has written me an urgent appeal to sound 
the British Government and find out whether they intend to 
back up France in gobbling Morocco. I have told him to 
see you and lay the matter definitely before you. There 
was one part of the Kaiser's letter which he asked me to 
treat as strictly confidential, and I do not know whether 
Speck will tell you about it or not. ... I do not feel that as 
a Government we should interfere in the Morocco matter. 
We have other fish to fry and we have no real interest in 
Morocco. I do not care to take sides between France and 
Germany in the matter. 

At the same time if I can find out what Germany wants 
I shall be glad to oblige her if possible, and I am sincerely 
anxious to bring about a better state of feeling between 
England and Germany. Each nation is working itself up 
to a condition of desperate hatred of the other ; each from 
sheer fear of the other. The Kaiser is dead sure that Eng- 
land intends to attack him. The English Government and 
a large share of the English people are equally sure that 
Germany intends to attack England. Now, in my view this 
action of Germany in embroiling herself with France over 
Morocco is proof positive that she has not the slightest 
intention of attacking England. I am very clear in my be- 
lief that England utterly over-estimates, as well as mis- 
estimates, Germany's singleness of purpose, by attributing 
to the German Foreign OflBce the kind of power of con- 
tinuity of aim which it had from '64 to '71. I do not wish 
to suggest anything whatever as to England's attitude in 
Morocco, but if we can find out that attitude with propriety 
and inform the Kaiser of it, I shall be glad to do so. But 
I have to leave a large discretion in your hands in this 
matter, for if we find that it will make the English sus- 
picious — that is, will make them think we are acting as 
decoy ducks for Germany — why, we shall have to drop the 
business. Fortunately, you and I play the diplomatic game 



SECRET HISTORY OF ALGECIRAS CONFERENCE 473 

exactly alike, and I should advise your being absolutely 
frank with both Speck and the British people along the 
lines I have indicated, unless you have counter suggestions 
to make. Remember, however, that both parties are very 
suspicious. You remember the King's message to me 
through Harry White and his earnest warning to me that 
I should remember that England was our real friend and 
that Germany was only a make-believe friend. In just the 
same way the Germans are always insisting that England 
is really on the point of entering into a general coalition 
which would practically be inimical to us — an act which 
apart from moral considerations I regard the British Gov- 
ernment as altogether too flabby to venture upon. 
****** 

Ever yours, 

Theodoee Roosevelt, 
L. 
P. S. If you deem it wise to see the British Ambassador 
at all, do be careful to explain to him that we are taking 
sides neither with France nor Germany, but that we would 
like to convey Germany's request for information to Eng- 
land, and that we are acting in thus conveying it simply 
from a desire to make things as comfortable between Eng- 
land and Germany as possible. . . . 

Dictated by the President in camp. East Divide Creek, 
Colorado. 

Personal. 

Glenwood Springs, Colorado, 

April 20, 1905. 

Dear Speck: 

Your letter containing the Emperor's communication 
about Morocco is the first thing that has made me wish I 
was not off on a hunt, for I hardly know how to arrange out 
here what the Emperor requests. As I told you before, 
I dislike taking a position in any matter like this unless 
I fully intend to back it up, and our interests in Morocco 
are not sufficiently great to make me feel justified in en- 



474 THEODORE ROOSEVELT AND HIS TIME i! 

tangling our Government in the matter. You do not have 
to be told by me that I am already working in the most cor- | 
dial agreement with the Emperor about China and the 
Japanese-Russian war, while I have matters of my own in 
Santo Domingo, Venezuela and Panama to which I must 
give attention and from which I do not feel it right to be 
diverted ; but I have told Taf t substantially what you have 
said in your letter excepting the portion about the com- 
munication from the Italian Government which the Em- 
peror requested me to treat as purely confidential. Will 
you take this letter at once to Secretary Taft, show it to 
him, and tell him exactly how far you want us to go in 
sounding the British Government. Meanwhile I shall write 
him, quoting the proposal of the Emperor as to our sound- 
ing the British Government and shall suggest his finding 
out from Sir Mortimer what the British Government's 
views in the matter are. I do not think I should go any 
further than this at present. I am sorry I am not in Wash- 
ington, for I should at once see the British Ambassador 
myself and let you know just how things stood. 

Thank Admiral von Tirpitz for the very interesting 
memorandum of the Navy. 

* * # # * * 

Sincerely yours, 

Theodore Roosevelt, 
* Per W. L. Jr. 

Bakon H. Sternburg, 
German Ambassador, 

Washington, D. C. 

At the end of May I came back to Washington, and found 
Jusserand and Speck both greatly concerned lest there 
should be a war between France and Germany. Both of 
them were sincerely anxious to avert such a possibility, 
and each thought that his own Government ought to make 
concessions to avoid the war. Speck, I firmly believe, did 
not approve of the action his Government was taking, but 



SECRET HISTORY OF ALGECIRAS CONFERENCE 475 

of course was obliged loyally to back up its position. Jus- 
serand, on the other hand, sympathized absolutely with the 
general French indignation with Germany, but felt that 
it was better to yield so far as the conference was con- 
cerned, if it could be done honorably, rather than have a 
war. 

I saw Sir Mortimer on the matter, but could get very little 
out of him. He was bitter about Germany, and so far as 
he represented the British Government it would appear 
that they were anxious to see Germany humiliated by 
France's refusal to enter a conference, and that they were 
quite willing to face the possibility of war under such cir- 
cumstances. I did not think this showed much valor on 
their part, although from their point of view it was saga- 
cious, as of course in such a war, where the British and 
French fleets would be united, the German fleet could have 
done absolutely nothing; while on land, where Germany 
was so powerful, it would be France alone that would stand, 
and would have to stand, the brunt of the battle. I desired 
to do anything I legitimately could for France; because I 
like France, and I thought her in this instance to be in the 
right; but I did not intend to take any position which I 
would not be willing at all costs to maintain. 

On June 5th you telegraphed from London that Lans- 
downe had asked for an indication of my views on the 
Morocco situation, and stated that he regarded the pro- 
posal of joint action of the powers represented in Morocco 
as unfortunate, and as possibly planned to embarrass 
France. About the same time White cabled from Kome 
that the Italian Government evidently feared the confer- 
ence was inevitable unless France was able otherwise to 
pacify Germany's susceptibilities, but that the British Am- 
bassador felt sure that there would be no conference. 

I suppose I need hardly say that the English, French and 
Italian representatives all strenuously denied the state- 
ments as to the propositions which Germany said their 
nations had made to her as regards her sphere of interest 
in Morocco, etc. I did not regard the various matters in 



476 THEODORE ROOSEVELT AND HIS TIME 

which there was this contradiction as important; partly 
because I had not at any time credited the three powers 
named with ha\TLng made the several propositions they 
were alleged by the German Government to have made. 

On June 11th, the Kaiser, through Speck, sent me an- 
other memorandum, running as follows: 

•'June 11, 1905. 
''Memorandum — (Morocco) 

**Mr. Eouvier (who has shown himself distinctly friendly 
to Germany and has been opposing Mr. Delcasse) has in- 
directly informed the German Charge d 'Affaires in Paris 
that England has made a formal offer to France to enter 
into an offensive and defensive alliance with England which 
would be directed against Germany. At present the lead- 
ing statesmen of France are opposed to such an alliance, 
because the majority of the members of the French Gov- 
ernment still hope to come "to a satisfactory agreement 
with Germany. But it was emphasized, the time had ar- 
rived for Germany to make up her mind with regard to 
Morocco, otherwise France would be forced to place her- 
self in closer touch with England. 

"Indirectly Germany has been given to understand that 
the French Government is desirous of giving her a portion 
of Morocco under the name of a 'sphere of interest,' France 
apportioning the greater part of Morocco to herself. Such 
an offer Germany now can not accept, as it was through 
the council of Germany that the Sultan of Morocco placed 
himself on the ground of the conference of Madrid. Hence 
Germany is pledged by honor to stand by the Sultan. 
'Here,' says the Emperor, 'is a curious case: — we may be 
forced into war not because we have not been grabbing 
after people's land, but because we refuse to take it.' 

"My people are sure that England would now back 
France by force of arms in a war against Germany, not on 
account of Morocco, but on account of Germany's policy 
in the Far East. The combined naval forces of England 
and France w^ould undoubtedly smash the German navy 
and give England, France, Japan and Russia a more free 



SECRET HISTORY OF ALGECIRAS CONFERENCE 477 

hand in the Far East, and Russia might try to cede a por- 
tion of China to Japan as a war indemnity, instead of part- 
ing with the island of Saghalien. The previous destruction 
of the German navy undoubtedly would be welcomed by 
these powers. 

"As regards a conference to be held in Morocco, the 
British Government has asked for time to consider the 
question. The Emperor feels sure that if you could give 
a hint now in London and in Paris that, all things put to- 
gether, you would consider a conference as the most satis- 
factory means to bring the Morocco question to a peaceful 
solution, you would render the peace of the world another 
great service, without encountering any risk. In case you 
should not feel inclined to take this step the Emperor be- 
lieves that your influence could prevent England from join- 
ing a Franco-German war, started by the aggressive policy 
of France in Morocco. 

"As to the present attitude in France towards the Mo- 
rocco question a marked change is noticeable since the re- 
tirement of Mr. Delcasse. Voices are now heard which 
consider a conference not only as the most legal, but also 
as the safest way to clear a situation which has been cre- 
ated by the reckless statesmanship of Mr. Delcasse." 

It really did look as if there might be a war, and I felt in 
honor bound to try to prevent the war if I could, in the 
first place, because I should have felt such a war to be a 
real calamity to civilization; and in the next place, as I 
was already trying to bring about peace between Eussia 
and Japan, I felt that a new conflict might result in what 
would literally be a world-conflagration; and finally, for 
the sake of France. Accordingly, I took active hold of the 
matter with both Speck and Jusserand, and after a series 
of communications with the French Government, through 
Jusserand, got things temporarily straightened up. Jus- 
serand repeated to his government substantially just what 
I said. I told him that as chief of state I could not let 
America do anything quixotic, but that I had a real senti- 



478 THEODORE ROOSEVELT AND HIS TIME 

ment for France; that I would not advise her to do any- 
thing humiliating or disgraceful ; but that it was eminently- 
wise to avoid a war if it could be done by adopting a course ■ 
which would save the Emperor's self-esteem; that for such 
purpose it was wise to help him save his face. I urged 
upon the French Government, in the first place, the great , 
danger of war to them, and the fact that British assistance \ 
could avail them very, very little in the event of such a, 
war, because France would be in danger of invasion by 
land ; and in the next place, I pointed out that if there were 
a conference of the Powers France would have every rea- 
son to believe that the conference would not sanction any 
unjust attack by Germany upon French interests, and that 
if all the Powers, or practically all the Powers, in the con- 
ference took an attitude favorable to France on such a 
point it would make it well-nigh impossible for Germany 
to assail her. I explained that I would not accept the invi- 
tation of the conference unless France was -willing, and that 
if I went in I would treat both sides with absolute justice, 
and would, if necessary, take very strong grounds against 
any attitude of Germany which seemed to me unjust and 
unfair. 

At last, the French Government informed me through 
Jusserand that it would agree to the conference. At this 
time I was having numerous interviews with both Jus- 
serand and Speck. AVith Speck I was on close terms ; with 
Jusserand, who is one of the best men I have ever met, and 
whose country was in the right on this issue, I was on even 
closer terms. On the 23d of June he received from the 
French Minister of Foreign Affairs a despatch running in 
part as follows : 

[Original in French] ! 

"During his recent conversations with you. President 
Roosevelt came to the conclusion that however unjust it 
might be on the part of Germany to declare war under the 
present circumstances, it was nevertheless possible, and 
that it should be avoided by the use of conciliation, and 



SECRET HISTORY OF ALGECIRAS CONFERENCE 479 

that among the concessions which we might make a con- 
ference would without doubt be the least undesirable. 

''When communicating to the President our reply to the 
Grerman note, be good enough to tell him that his ideas and 
advice inspired it. At first we thought that it would suf- 
fice to contradict the false statements which had been pub- 
lished regarding our action in Morocco and to show that 
such action menaced no interests. We have gone farther 
and shown ourselves ready to accept, owing to necessity,' 
the idea of a conference, in spite of serious reasons we had 
to entertain objections to such a project. 

''But nothing has so far occurred to prove that even by 
a conference an agreement can be reached. Up to the 
present moment it is impossible to determine with certainty 
the immediate aim of Germany. The German Ambassador 
assures us that so far as Germany is concerned there is in 
all this affair only a question of form and of etiquette, that 
it is only to test the right of the signatory powers to the 
Convention of Madrid, that a temporary regime of very 
short duration would suffice to establish such right, and 
that then France could take up again the realization of 
her program. But in thus circumscribing the range of 
German action, Prince Radolin fails to make in the name of 
his Government any proposition save that of a conference. 
The rest, he says, is merely a deduction, which he himself 
makes from the nature of things, and he avoids making 
known the attitude which the German Government will take 
at the conference. At the same time the Emperor takes 
steps to inform us in Paris that all the forces of Germany 
are behind the Sultan of Morocco, and he uses the most 
menacing language towards us at Washington, at Rome 
and at Madrid. 

''Mr. Roosevelt can avert the danger. Tell him that the 
exceptional authority which attaches to his counsel, not 
only because of his office, but also because of his character, 
his sense of right and justice, and his clear perception of 
what are the highest interests, qualify him in supreme 



480 THEODORE ROOSEVELT AND HIS TIME 

degree to intervene in favor of the maintenance of peace. 
The insistence with which the Emperor has appealed to 
him, has left the way open for the President to take the 
initiative that we expect from his friendship." 



On the 25th of June Jusserand sent a despatch to the 
French Minister of Foreign Affairs, running in full as 
follows : 

[Original in French] 

*'I talked with President Roosevelt to-night regarding 
the reasons for urgent intervention on his part in order 
to avoid the break with which Germany would seem to de- 
sire to menace us. In order to bring him into touch with 
the situation, I used the data contained in your two tele-' 
grams. ] 

*'My appeals were most favorably received. The Presi- 
dent declared to me that he would have this evening a very 
earnest conversation with Baron Steniburg, during which 
he would insist, in the first place, upon what the Emperor 
owes to himself, and also upon his solicitude for his fame 
in history, for no one would understand, or pardon wars 
entered into for frivolous reasons. He will emphasize the 
very real successes achieved by German diplomacy, and 
also the fact of our adhering to his idea of a conference,, 
under conditions regarding the details of which it is im- 
possible not to come to an understanding. He will, on the 
other hand, allude to the risks to be run, citing the opinion 
of French experts on the condition of the French army, and I 
saying that it is not used by me simply to make an impres- 
sion, but it is really what they think of the army and that 
a German victory is by no means assured. He will men- 
tion finally the support which without doubt would not fail 
us and which would be very formidable for Germany. 'I 
would like to be sure that my words will bear fruit,' Mr. 
Roosevelt added, 'but unfortunately I am not; however, in 
any event you can be sure that I will be as energetic as 
possible in favor of an amicable understanding and that 



SECRET HISTORY OF ALGECIRAS CONFERENCE 481 

I shall neglect nothing which appears to me as being con- 
ducive to such an end. ' 

"I informed the President of the sentiments which Your 
Excellency instructed me to express to him. He did not 
desire to let *me finish, saying that what he was doing was 
only too natural to warrant any thanks. I added that the 
telegram which I had received from the President of the 
Council expressed much gratitude, but not the least sur- 
prise. 'There,' said the President, *is the real compliment 
which gratifies me.' " 

On June 18th, Speck wrote to me, saying that the Em- 
peror greatly appreciated the change which was noticed in 
the policy of France since the action I had taken as regards 
the Morocco question, adding, ''Your diplomatic activity 
with regard to France, the Emperor says, has been the 
greatest blessing to the peace of the world." I wrote to 
Speck the following three letters, all of which I showed to 
Jusserand before I sent them, as I did not wish there to be 
any suspicion of double dealing on my part ; and Jusserand 
is a man of such excellent judgment, so sound and cool- 
headed, and of so high a standard of personal and profes- 
sional honor that I could trust him completely. Indeed, 
it was only because both Jusserand and Sternburg were 
such excellent men, that I was enabled to do anything at 
all in so difficult and delicate a matter. I could only have 
acted with men I was sure of. With such a tricky creature 
as the Eussian Cassini, for instance, I could have done ab- 
solutely nothing; and little or nothing with amiable Sir 
Mortimer. 

My three letters were as follows : 

Personal. 

White House, 

Washington, June 20, 1905. 

Dear Speck: 

Pray thank His Majesty and say that if I have been of 
any use in keeping the peace I am of course more than glad. 



482 THEODORE ROOSEVELT AND HIS TIME 

I shall be in Massachusetts for the next two days, but will 
see you Friday or Saturday. 

Sincerely yours, 

Theodore Roosevelt. 
Baron H. Sternburg, 

The German Ambassador, 

Deer Park, Maryland. 



White House, 

Washington, June 23, 1905. 
My dear Mr. Ambassador: 

I hope to see you at nine Sunday evening. Meanwhile, 
pray communicate to His Majesty that in accordance with 
the suggestion I made to Ambassador Jusserand in pur- 
suance of the letter you sent me, the French Government ! 
informs me unofficially through the Ambassador that it has 
ceased its opposition to a conference of the powers on 
Morocco. It seems as a matter of course that a program 
of the conference would be needed in advance in accordance 
with the usual custom in such cases. I suggest that that be 
arranged between Germany and France. 

Let me congratulate the Emperor most warmly on his 
diplomatic success in securing the assent of the French 
Government to the holding of this conference. I had not 
believed that the Emperor would be able to secure this 
assent and to bring about this conference, from which un- 
doubtedly a peaceful solution of all the troubles will come. 
I need not say to you that I consider such peaceful solution 
as vitally necessary to the welfare of the world at this time, 
and in view of its having been secured by the Emperor's 
success in obtaining this conference, I wish again to ex- 
press my hearty congratulation. It is a diplomatic triumph 
of the first magnitude. 

Faithfully yours, 

Theodore Roosevelt. 
Baron H. Sternburg, 

The German Ambassador. 



SECRET HISTORY OF ALGECIRAS CONFERENCE 483 

White House, 

Washington, June 25, 1905. 

My dear Mr. Ambassador: 

I have received from M. Jusserand the following extract 
from a telegram sent to him by M. Rouvier : 

"You reported to me your conversation with President 
Roosevelt, who asked you to inform us that, according to 
his views, much prudence should be used in present cir- 
cumstances, and that we ought to consider the idea of a 
conference as a concession we might make. ... Be so good 
as to tell the President that his reflections and advice have 
received from us due consideration and have caused us to 
take the resolution we have just adopted. We had first 
thought that, in order to remove the erroneous impressions 
held about our action in Morocco, it would be enough to 
show that it threatens no interests whatsoever. But now 
we have gone further, and have declared that we are ready 
to accept a conference, in spite of the serious reasons we 
had to entertain objections against such a project." 

I shall ask, Mr. Ambassador, that in forwarding this in- 
formation to His Majesty you explain that it is of course 

confidential. . 

I need hardly tell you how glad I was to secure this in- 
formation from the French Ambassador. As you know, 
I was at first extremely reluctant to do anything m the 
matter which might savor of officious interference on nay 
part; and I finally determined to present the case to the 
French Government only because I wished to do anything 
I properly could do which the Emperor asked, and of course 
also because I felt the extreme importance of doing any- 
thing possible to maintain the peace of the world. As you 
know, I made up my mind to speak to France rather than 
to England, because it seemed to me that it would be use- 
less to speak to England; for I felt that if a war were to 
break out, whatever might happen to France England 
would profit immensely, while Germany would lose her 
colonies and perhaps her fleet. Such being the case I did 
not feel that anything I might say would carry any weight 



484 THEODORE ROOSEVELT AND HIS TIME 

with England, and instead I made a very earnest request 
of France that she should do as the Emperor desired and 
agree to hold the conference. The French Government 
have now done just what at His Majesty's request I urged 
should be done. 

Now in turn I most earnestly and ^\ith all respect urge 
that His Majesty show himself satisfied and accept this 
yielding to his wishes by France. I trust that the Emperor 
understands that I would not for any consideration advise 
him to do anything that would be against the interest or 
the honor either of himself or of his people, any more than 
I would counsel such an action as regards my own country; 
and I say conscientiously that I am advising just the con- 
duct that I would myself take under like circumstances; 
and I venture to give the advice at all only because, as I 
took the action I did on the Emperor's request, it seems but 
right that in reporting the effect of this action I should' 
give my own views thereon. I say with all possible em- 
phasis that I regard this yielding by France, this conces- 
sion by her which she had said she could not make and 
which she now has made, as representing a genuine triumph 
for the Emperor's diplomacy; so that if the result is now 
accepted it will be not merely honorable for Germany but 
a triumph. You know that I am not merely a sincere ad- 
mirer and well-wisher of Germany, but also of His Majesty. 
I feel that he stands as the leader among the sovereigns 
of to-day who have their faces set toward the future, and 
that it is not only of the utmost importance for his own 
people but of the utmost importance for all mankind that 
his power and leadership for good should be unimpaired. 
I feel that now, having obtained what he asks, it would be 
most unfortunate even to seem to raise questions about 
mmor details, for if under such circumstances the dreadful 
calamity of war should happen, I fear that his high and 
honorable fame might be clouded. He has won a great 
triumph; he has obtained what his opponents in England 
and France said he never would obtain, and what I myself 
did not believe he could obtain. The result is a strikincr 



SECRET HISTORY OF ALGECIRAS CONFERENCE 485 

tribute to him personally no less than to his nation, and I 
earnestly hope that he can see his way clear to accept 
it as the triumph it is. 
With high regard, 

Sincerely yours, 

Theodore Eoosevelt. 
Baron H. Sternburg, 
German Ambassador. 

There was, however, much higgling as to exactly what 
should be discussed at the conference ; and both Jusserand 
and Speck came to me to say they were still on the verge 
of seeing the negotiations broken oif. Finally I made a 
pencil memorandum as follows: "The two Governments 
consent to go to the conference with no program, and to 
discuss there all questions in regard to Morocco, save of 
course where either is in honor bound by a previous agree- 
ment with another power." I gave a copy of this memo- 
randum to Jusserand and the memorandum itself to Speck, 
and after they had transmitted it to their respective gov- 
ernments, I received the assent of both governments to the 
proposition. I explained to both that I did not care to ap- 
pear in the matter, and that no publicity whatever would 
be given by me or by any of our representatives to what 
I had done, and I thought it far better that it should take 
the shape of an agreement freely entered into by them- 
selves. You may remember that not a hint of any kind got 
out throughout the whole of last summer as to my taking 
any part in this Morocco business. 

Jusserand forwarded my memorandum in a despatch to 
his home government, on June 28th, which ran in part as 

follows : 

[Original in French] 
"I called to mind the grave reasons which we have for 
discarding all idea of a conference without previously hav- 
ing drawn up a program, or at least without an under- 
standing, indicating that which we might have reason to 
expect and guaranteeing in particular that solemn inter- 



486 THEODORE ROOSEVELT AND HIS TIME 

national undertakings, which have for a long time been 
public property, should not be brought into question. We 
could not be asked to deny our signature. 

''With a sovereign of the temperament of William II, 
who has just given, by the very documents which he has 
furnished to the President, such disquieting proofs of his 
lack of moderation and even of exactness, we are more 
particularly inclined to a course of prudence than with 
another. 

''Following these remarks the President took a piece of 
paper and endeavored to find some formula, which would 
be acceptable to the two countries and which would at the 
same time respect the pride of William II and our rights. 
The text of this formula is given below, which formula, 
however, could be slightly modified before being sent, but 
in which the general sense will certainly remain the same. 

"The President in no wise contends that this is a per- 
fect and unalterable formula, but he hopes that it perhaps 
may offer the basis of an understanding and therefore he 
had it submitted to the Kaiser by Baron Sternburg on the 
afternoon of Sunday. He is certain that the scope of such 
an understanding would be to eliminate from discussion 
the advantages of which we have assured ourselves with 
various foreign nations, for we have not obtained them 
except in consideration of making corresponding conces- 
sions to their profit, which must remain irrevocable and 
which we are in honor bound to live up to. The acceptance 
therefore of a formula of this nature would be, in short, 
the realization of the program desired by us." 

On June 28th I received the following letter from Speck : 

Deer Park, Md., 
June 28, 1905. 
Dear Mr. President: 

I have just received a telegram from Berlin which ex- 
presses highest satisfaction and gratitude with regard to 
the latest step you undertook in the interest of the Morocco 
conference. 



SECRET HISTORY OF ALGECIRAS CONFERENCE 487 

The telegram repeats a wire from the German Ambas- 
sador at Paris, who says that Rouvier is having a most 
difficult time. Delcasse's followers are trying hard to force 
him to accept Delcasse's colonial program, and England is 
making a frantic effort to prevent the acceptance of the 
invitation to the conference by the council of ministers, 
which meets to-day. The Ambassador expresses the belief 
that Rouvier 's backing will be strong enough to pull him 
through. The Emperor has requested me to tell you that 
in case during the coming conference differences of opinion 
should arise between France and Germany, he, in every 
case, will be ready to back up the decision which you should 
consider to be the most fair and the most practical. 

In doing this he wants to prove that the assistance which 
you have rendered to Germany has been rendered in the 
interest of peace alone, and without any selfish motives. 

Believe me, Mr. President, 

Yours most sincerely, 

Sternbubg. 

To THE PfiESmENT OF THE 

United States or America, 

Sagamore Hill. 



CHAPTER XXXVII 

SECRET HISTORY OF THE ALGECIRAS CONFERENCE- 
CONCLUDED 

It was a couple of days after this that I received from 
both governments the information that they had agreed on 
substantially the plan outlined in ray memorandum. 

On July 11th I received a letter from Jusserand, running 
in part as follows : 

"I leave greatly comforted by the news concerning 
Morocco. The agreement arrived at is in substance the 
one we had considered and the acceptation of which you 
did so very much to secure. Letters just received by me 
from Paris show that your beneficent influence at this grave 
juncture is deeply and gratefully felt. They confirm also 
what I guessed was the case, that is, that there was a point 
where more yielding would have been impossible; every- 
body in France felt it, and people braced up silently in 
view of possible great events." 

A fortnight afterwards the Kaiser got uneasy again, 
and for some time insisted upon the conference being held 
in Morocco, and upon Revoil not being sent by France as 
a delegate. Again I had to do some cabling to both the 
French and German Governments, but finally the Kaiser's 
objections were removed. I had urged Jusserand not to 
let his people boast or be disagreeable and try to humiliate 
the Kaiser in connection with the conference, because the 
important point was for them to get the kernel of the nut, 
and they did not have to consider the shell. On August 
9th Jusserand wrote me, expressing the thanks of his Gov- 
ernment for what I had done; the German Foreign Office 
thanked me by cable. 

After this, trouble ceased as far as I was concerned, 

488 



SECRET HISTORY OF ALGECIRAS CONFERENCE 489 

until the Conference met at Algeciras. Soon after the Con- 
ference opened I began to have a succession of visits from 
Speck and from Jusserand. Jusserand generally gave mc 
his messages verbally. Speck submitted them in writing. 
Loyal though Speck was to his Government, both Root and 
I became convinced that down in his heart the honest, brave 
little gentleman did not really believe Germany was acting 
as she should act. The attitude of France, as represented 
by the French representatives at Algeciras, seemed to be 
more reasonable; but I was entirely sure of France only 
when I could act directly through Jusserand, who rang true 
under any and all circumstances. ... 

Germany sought to impress us with the fact that all the 
other Powers but England were in her favor. We heard 
however, both from Russia and Italy that they thought 
the German position was wrong, and were anxious that we 
should do something to prevent Germany from obtam- 
ing a sphere of influence in Morocco. We became convinced 
that Austria was a mere cat's-paw for Germany and that 
Germany was aiming in effect at the partition of Morocco, 
which was the very reverse of what she was claiming to 
desire. She first endeavored to secure a port for herselt, 
and then a separate port, nominally for Holland or Switzer- 
land which we were convinced would, with the adjacent 
Hinteriand, become in eifect German. The French said 
they would not yield on these points, and, as you know it 
looked as if the Conference would come to nothing, ai^ tha^ 
there would then be the possibihty of trouble between 
FraL and Germany. Our view was that the-^-ests^^^ 
France and Spain in Morocco were far greater tb^" ^^lo^e 
of other powers. Finally we took the matter up by corre- 
spondence with Germany, as follows, Jusserand being kept 
informed of what we were doing: 

No. 333. „ ^ 

^^^^■'^wTsHTiToT'February 19, 1906. 

""r!;ident has been keeping in mind the suggestion 



490 THEODORE ROOSEVELT AND HIS TIME 

of your memorandum of January 29th that the United 
States should propose ^'to entrust the Sultan of Morocco 
with the organization of the police forces within his do- 
mains and to allow him certain funds, and to establish an 
international control with regard to the management of 
these funds, and the carrying out of the whole plan." 

Our advices from Algeciras indicate that the time has 
been reached when such a proposal should be made, if at 
all, and also that to be effective it should now be somewhat 
more specific in regard to the nature of the international 
control. 

If it is acceptable to Germany, the President will make 
the proposal suggested with the following details, which 
should, perhaps, be called modifications, but which he does 
not consider to interfere with the accomplishment of the 
end Germany had in view in securing the conference. He 
will propose : 

1. That the organization and maintenance of police 
forces in all the ports be entrusted to the Sultan, the men 
and officers to be Moors. 

2. That the money to maintain the force be furnished 
by the proposed international bank, the stock of which shall 
be allotted to all the powers in equal shares (except for 
some small preference claimed by France, which he con- 
siders immaterial). 

_ 3.^ That duties of instruction, discipline, pay and assist- 
ing m management and control be entrusted to French and 
Spanish officers and non-commissioned officers, to be ap- 
pointed by the Sultan on presentation of names by their 
Legations. 

That the senior French and Spanish instructing officers 
report annually to the government of Morocco, and to the 
government of Italy, the Mediterranean Power, which shall 
have the right of inspection and verification, and to demand 
further reports in behalf of and for the information of the 
Fowers. The expense of such inspection, etc., etc., to be 
deemed a part of the cost of police maintenance. 

4. That full assurances be given by France and Spain, 



SECRET HISTORY OF ALGECIRAS CONFERENCE 491 

and made obligatory upon all their officers who shall be 
appointed by the Sultan, for the open door, both as to trade, 
equal treatment and opportunity in competition for public 
works and concessions. 

The foregoing draft has been carefully framed with ref- 
erence to the existing situation at Algeciras, so as to give 
it a form which would make concessions from the French 
position as easy as possible, and the President thinks that 
it conserves the principle of the open door without unduly 
recognizing the claims which rest upon proximity and pre- 
ponderance of trade interests. He thinks it is fair, and 
earnestly hopes that it may receive the Emperor's ap- 
proval. 

Accept, Excellency, the renewed assurances of my high- 
est consideration. 

Elihu Boot. 
His Excellency, 

Baron Speck von Sternbubg, 
Etc., etc., etc. 

Imperial German Embassy, 

Washington, February 22, 1906. 
Dear Mr. President: 

The Emperor has requested me to express to you his 
hearty thanks for your offer to mediate in the Morocco 
question. He especially appreciates that you will only act 
as mediator in agreement with him. 

He fully agrees with your views on points 1, 2 and 4 and 
considers it a sound idea that the funds for the mainte- 
nance of the police forces should be paid out of the State 
Bank of Morocco, to be founded, and that all Powers can 
equally participate in this bank. The question of granting 
to France a slight preference he thinks might be discussed. 

According to point 3, only French and Spanish officers 
and non-commissioned officers are to be selected. This pro- 
posal covers in the main the last French proposal. 

Though the Emperor felt unable to accept this proposal 
it has been subjected to another close examination as soon 



492 THEODORE ROOSEVELT AND HIS TIME 

as your offer of mediation had been received. But this has 
not been able to convince him that a settlement on such 
lines could be considered in harmony with the principle 
accepted by the conference that all Powers are to receive 
equal treatment. 

According to the proposal the French and Spanish offi- 
cers shall not be freely chosen by the Sultan, but be named 
by their respective legations. They are to be placed in 
charge of the drill, the discipline and the pay of the police 
forces of Morocco, and they are also to participate in their 
administration and control. This would place the police 
forces entirely into their hands, and the police organization 
would be tantamount to a Franco-Spanish double mandate 
and mean a monopoly of these two countries, which would 
heavily curtail the political and the economic positions of 
the other nations. 

The Emperor is of the opinion that the Sultan should be 
permitted a free choice among the other nations. This 
would certainly not exclude such modifications which should 
be considered as practical. For instance, it might be pos- 
sible to allow the Sultan to choose the officers among those 
nations which are participating in the new State bank, 
hence have greater interests in Morocco. It could be fur- 
ther stipulated, in case France should fear that under the 
present conditions the Sultan might favor German officers, 
that at least four different nationalities should be taken 
into consideration in an equal manner. Ultimately, so as 
to acknowledge the special rights of France in Morocco, 
the Sultan might place the police control in Tangiers, and 
perhaps in some other port, entirely in the hands of French 
officers. In all the other ports officers of various nations 
would cooperate. 

As to the uniformity of the whole of the police force it 
would not seem difficult to establish a uniformity in organ- 
ization and armament by issuing regulations. 

In case it should be possible to widen your proposal for 
mediation according to the above suggestions, Germany 
would gladly negotiate on this new basis and the Emperor 



SECRET HISTORY OF ALGECIRAS CONFERENCE 493 

would be highly gratified if you should be pleased to fur- 
ther offer your mediation. 
Believe me, Mr. President, 

Yours most sincerely, 

Sternbubg. 

To THE PkESIDENT OF THE 

United States of America, 

Washington, D. C. 



No. 342. (L) 



March 7, 1906. 



Excellenci/: 

May I ask you to transmit to the German Emperor a 
message from the President which is as follows ; 

"I have given most earnest thought to Y'our Majesty's 
comments on the suggestion contained in Mr. Root's letter 
of February 19th, but I cannot bring myself to feel that I 
ought to ask France to make further concessions than the 
arrangement suggested in that letter would require. This 
being so, I would gladly drop the subject, in which our tra- 
ditional policy of abstention from the political affairs of 
Europe forbids the United States to take sides. I feel, 
however, that the events which led to the Conference at 
Algeciras forbid me to omit any effort within my power 
to promote a settlement of differences. 

"By the request of Germany I urged France to consent 
to the Conference, giving her very strong assurances of my 
belief that a decision would be reached, consonant with an 
impartial view of what is most fair and most practical. The 
nature, the strength and the justification of these assur- 
ances may be realized by referring to the terms of Baron 
Sternburg's letter to me of June 28, 1905, which said: 

" 'The Emperor has requested me to tell you that in case, 
during the coming Conference, differences of opinion 
should arise between France and Germany, he, in every 
case, will be ready to back up the decision which you should 
consider to be the most fair and the most practical. 

" 'In doing this, he wants to prove that the assistance 



494 THEODORE ROOSEVELT AND HIS TIME 

which you have rendered to Germany has been rendered in 
the interest of peace alone, and without any selfish motives.* 

''Under these circumstances, I feel bound to state to 
Your Majesty that I think the arrangement indicated in 
the above mentioned letter of February 19th is a reasonable 
one, and most earnestly to urge Your Majesty to accept it. 
I do not know whether France would accept it or not. I 
think she ought to do so. I do not think that she ought to 
be expected to go further. If that arrangement is made, 
the Conference will have resulted in an abandonment by 
France of her claim to the right of control in Morocco 
auswerable only to the two Powers with whom she had 
made treaties and without responsibility to the rest of the 
world, and she will have accepted jointly wath Spain a man- 
date from all the Powers, under responsibility to all of 
them for the maintenance of equal rights and opportunities. 
And the due observance of these obligations will be safe- 
guarded by having vested in another representative of all 
the Powers a right to have in their behalf full and com- 
plete reports of the performance of the trust, with the 
further right of verification and inspection. 

"I feel that if this arrangement be made, Germany will 
have accomplished the declared object for her intervention 
in the affairs of Morocco and for the Conference. I feel 
such arrangement would be in very fact the evidence of the 
triumph of German diplomacy in this matter. Looking at 
the subject as I do, from this standpoint of an observer 
friendly to both parties and having no possible interest in 
the result, except the interest of peace, I see grave reasons 
to apprehend that if the Conference should fail because of 
Germany's insisting upon pressing France beyond the 
measure of concession described in this proposed arrange- 
ment, the general opinion of Europe and America would 
be unfavorable, and Germany would lose that increase of 
credit and moral power that the making of this arrange- 
ment would secure to her, and might be held re^onsible, 
probably far beyond the limits of reason, for all the evils 



SECRET HISTORY OP ALGECIRAS CONFERENCE 495 

that may come in the train of a disturbed condition of af- 
fairs in Europe. 

''As a rule, parties to a past controversy, looking back, 
can see that they have ascribed undue importance to mat- 
ters of difference which were really unimportant. A dis- 
interested spectator is often able to take such a view at the 
time. I believe that I am taking such a view; that if the 
suggested arrangement can be made none of the matters 
which Germany will not have secured by that are of any 
real importance to her, and I most sincerely hope that Your 
Majesty may take this view and throw upon France the 
responsibility for rejecting, if it is to be rejected, the sug- 
gested arrangement." 

Accept, Excellency, the renewed assurances of my high- 
est consideration. 

Elihu Root 

His Excellency, 

Baron Speck von Sternburg, 
Etc., etc., etc. 

Imperial German Embassy, 

Washington, D. C, 

March 13, 1906. 
Mr. President: 

The Emperor's answer to your letter transmitted by me 
on the 7th instant is as follows : 
'*Mr. President: 

"I thank you for your repeated kind endeavors to bring 
about a solution, satisfactory to all concerned, of the Mo- 
rocco question. I highly appreciate it that notwithstand- 
ing all difficulties you have cooperated in solving the dif- 
ferences. As to the information of my ambassador, men- 
tioned by you, I can only assure you, Mr. President, that I 
am gladly willing to take your advice as a basis of an 
understanding. In this sense your proposition contained 
in Mr. R^t's letter of the 19th ultimo, has been earnestly 
considered^^at once. In principle I consented to it, provided 



496 THEODORE ROOSEVELT AND HIS TIME 

that it be given a form to meet the international side of the 
question. 

"I have also given to your recent statements in all points 
my fullest attention and entirely agree with you that a 
mandate given by the Conference to France and Spain dif- 
fers in a judicial sense essentially from any action on the 
part of France based solely on special agreements with 
England and Spain. Such a mandate would give to France 
a certain monopoly in Morocco which would prejudice the 
economical equality of the other nations, if no sufficient 
international counterpoise were created. This idea has 
been recognized in your proposal of mediation, and doubt 
could only prevail as to the question whether the regula- 
tions of control, proposed by you, would give an entirely 
sufficient guarantee from an international point. In this 
respect I think the idea has been developed in a proposal 
of mediation brought forward by Austria-Hungary. This 
proposal almost covers yours. I have therefore caused 
my representatives at Algeciras to be instructed to consent 
in principle to the proposition of Austria-Hungary, and I 
am inclined to believe that a satisfactory end of the Con- 
ference would be secured, if you, Mr. President, would like- 
wise give your consent to that proposition, which seems to 
me to be an acceptable development of your proposal." 

(Signed) William. 

The Austrian proposal has been accepted by the repre- 
sentatives of all other powers, including Sir E. Nicholson, 
the British representative, on account of its distinct inter- 
national character, as a basis for a definite understanding 
at the Conference. As this basis has now been reached it 
would seem a pity to cause further postponement by a new 
proposal. The support of Austria's mediation in Algeciras 
and Paris would in the eyes of the Emperor appear as the 
most speedy way to effect a solution of the Morocco ques- 
tion. 

I may add that on March 11th the German representa- 
tive at Algeciras was informed by all his colleagues, in- 
cluding the British and American, that after the far going 



SECRET HISTORY OF ALGECIRAS CONFERENCE 497 

concessions made by Germany during the sessions of last 
Saturday the French opposition could not be justified. In 
this sense they have spoken to Mr. Revoil. 
I have the honor to be, Mr. President, 

Yours most sincerely, 

Sternburg. 

(Received from German Ambassador March 14, 1906.) 

** Giving way beyond the Austrian proposals would 
gravely endanger the open door. The opposition lies with 
the mighty French banking interests which are aiming at 
a monopolization of the resources of Morocco." 

No. 347. 

Department of State, 

Washington March 17, 1906. 
Excellency: 

It may be useful for me to re-state in writing the answer 
of the United States, already given to you orally, to the 
questions which you have asked regarding our course upon 
the proposal made by Austria on the 8th instant in the 
Algeciras Conference. 

We do not approve that proposal. We regard it as an 
essential departure from the principle declared by Germany 
and adhered to by the United States, that all commercial 
nations are entitled to have the door of equal commercial 
opportunity in Morocco kept open, and the corollary to 
that principle that no one power ought to acquire such a 
control over the territory of Morocco as to justify the be- 
lief that she might ultimately come to regard and treat that 
territory as her own, to the exclusion of others. 

This view of international right was interposed against 
the claim of France to organize the police in Moroccan 
ports through the agency of her officers alone. France has 
yielded to this view of international right to the extent of 
offering to become, jointly with Spain, the mandatory of 
all the powers for the purpose of at once maintaining order 
and preserving equal commercial opportunities for all of 



498 THEODORE EOOSEVELT AND HIS TIME 

them. It was further proposed that an officer of a third 
power, acting in behalf of all the powers, should have the 
right of general inspection for the purpose of keeping the 
powers advised whether their agents, France and Spain, 
were observing the limits and performing the duties of their 
agency. This arrangement seemed to us to accomplish the 
desired purpose. It seemed with two mandatories jointly 
charged, no individual claim of possession or control was 
likely to grow up ; that, with the constant reminder of the 
general right involved in the inspectorship, the duties of 
the agency were not likely to be forgotten and it seemed 
that the proximity of France and Spain to Morocco, and 
their special interest in having order maintained in that 
territory, made it reasonable that they should be selected 
as the mandatories rather than any other powers. 

The Austrian proposal offers an alternative to the ar- 
rangement which I have described. It is that the eight 
Moroccan ports shall be distributed ; that in four the police 
shall be organized by the French ; in three the police shall 
be organized by the Spanish; and that in the eighth port 
the police shall be organized by the Swiss or Dutch. This 
seems to us to provide for a potential partition of the ter- 
ritory in violation of the principle upon which we have 
agreed with Germany. From our point of view all the rea- 
sons which existed against leaving to France the control 
of all the ports exists against leaving to France the control 
of some, to Spain the control of some, and to Switzerland, 
either in its own interest or in the interests of any other 
powers, the control of one. The very fact of division of 
the ports implies the existence of a special right on the part 
of the three countries in the ports assigned to them respec- 
tively. The immediate effect can only be the creation of 
three separate spheres of influence, with inferior right and 
opportunity on the part of all other powers. And the na- 
tions to whom these spheres are assigned may be expected 
in the ordinary course of events to enter into complete con- 
trol. We do not care whether the Inspector, if there shall 
be one, is Italian or Swiss. We do not care whether he 



SECRET HISTORY OP ALGECIRAS CONFERENCE 499 

reports to his own Government, or to the Corps Diplo- 
matique in Tangier, or communicates the information he 
obtains to the powers in any other way. We do consider 
that the distribution of ports to separate single powers is 
wrong in principle and destructive of the declared purpose 
of both Germany and the United States. If we had suffi- 
cient interest in Morocco to make it worth our while, we 
should seriously object, on our own account, to the adoption 
of any such arrangement. 

We have not, however, any such substantial interest in 
Morocco as to lead us to take that course. Our chief wish 
is to be of service in promoting a peaceable settlement of 
the controversy which brought the Conference together. 
Under the guidance of that wish we shall accept whatever 
arrangement the European powers, represented at Alge- 
ciras, agree upon. If the agreement is upon the Austrian 
proposal, or upon any modification of it which includes the 
principle of distribution of ports, we shall regret what we 
deem to be the failure of the true principle to which we have 
given our adherence. We still hope that there may be no 
such result. 

Accept, Excellency, the renewed assurances of my high- 
est consideration. 

Elihu Root. 

His Excellency, 

Baron Speck von Sternburg, 
Etc., etc., etc. 

Hotel Cambridge, 

New York, March 19, 1906. 

Dear Mr. President: 

I have the honor to inform you of the contents of a tele- 
gram, just received, which is the answer to my telegram, 
forwarded after the conversation I had with you on the 
situation at Algeciras : 

Sincere regret is expressed that the attitude of Germany 
should have led to certain misunderstandings. The Kaiser 



500 THEODORE ROOSEVELT AND HIS TIME 

had suggested the Conference so as to find a peaceful way 
to solve the question of Morocco. 

He appreciates the fundamental idea of your proposal: 
cooperation of French and Spanish officers to be about 
equally divided in each of the ports. 

He would readily join in any proposal at the Conference 
which would contain this mixed system and an inspector 
general, to w^hich France already has agreed in principle. 

Germany abstains from entering into details, so as to 
prevent that these should obscure the main points. The 
telegram concludes in saying that the immediate removal 
of all misunderstandings is far more important to Ger- 
many than the whole Morocco affair. 

Believe me, Mr. President, most 

Sincerely yours, 

Sternburg. 



I call your attention to the last paragraph in this tele- 
gram of March 19th. I had previously informed Speck, in 
a verbal conversation, that if the Emperor persevered in 
rejecting our proposals and a break-up ensuefl, I should 
feel obliged to publish the entire correspondence, and that 
I believed that our people would feel a grave suspicion of 
Germany's justice and good faith; but that if the Emperor 
would yield to what seemed to me our very fair proposals, 
I should not publish any of the correspondence, and would 
endeavor in every way to give Germany full credit for 
what was done ; and w^ith that in view would take an early 
opportunity to have him (Speck) bring a delegation of 
German war veterans to see me, so that I might make a 
public statement in praise of the Emperor's position and 
expressive of my appreciation thereof, and of my hope that 
the relations between France and Germany would become 
steadily more friendly. Two or three days after the Em- 
peror sent his cable saying he had yielded to our request, 
Speck called upon me to say that the Emperor very earnest- 
ly desired that I would make such public utterance. Ac- 
cordingly I arranged for him to bring the German veterans 



SECRET HISTORY OF ALGECIRAS CONFERENCE 501 

around, and I made them (April 12, 1906) the following 
speech, which I had previously gone over not only with 
Speck but with Jusserand : 

^'I \»'elcome you here, my f ellow- Americans ; for among 
the many strains that go to make up our composite race 
stock iia this country, no strain has given us better Ameri- 
cans than those who are of German birth or blood. It is 
our peduliar pride as a nation that in this republic we have 
measurj bly realized the ideal under which good citizens 
know ni) discrimination as between creed and creed, birth- 
place aiid birthplace, provided only that whatever the man's 
parentage may have been, whatever the way in which he 
worship 3 his Creator, he strives in good faith to do his duty 
by himsllf and by his fellow-men, and to show his unflinch- 
ing loya\'ty to our common country. In addition to thus 
greeting you, my fellow- Americans of German birth, I wish 
also to gieet the German citizens present, the members of 
the German army, belonging to the reserve of that army, 
and to welcome them here, especially, Mr. Ambassador, as 
they are brought here, by you, yourself an old soldier, who 
have endeared yourself to the American people by your 
hearty friendship for this country. 

"The reverence a man preserves for his native land, so 
far from standing in the way of his loving and doing his 
full duty by the land of liis adoption, should help him 
toward this love and the performance of this duty. If a 
man is a good son he is apt to make a good husband ; and 
the quality that makes a man reverence the country of his 
birth is apt to be the quality that makes him a good citizen 
in the country of his adoption. 

"The ties that unite Germany and the United States are 
many and close, and it must be a prime object of our states- 
manship to knit the two nations ever closer together. In 
no country is there a warmer admiration for Germany and 
for Germany's exalted ruler, Emperor William, than here 
in America. 

"It is not out of place in closing for me to say a word of 
congratulation both to the German people and the German 



502 THEODORE ROOSEVELT AND HIS TIME 

Emperor upon the work that has been accomplisheo in the 
Algeciras Conference which has just closed, a Conference 
held chiefly because of the initiative of Germany. It was 
not a Conference in which we Americans as a nation had 
much concern, save that it is always our concern to S3e jus- 
tice obtain everywhere, and, so far as we properly can, to 
work for the cause of international peace and good will. 
In its outcome this Conference has added to the lik'4ihood 
of the betterment of conditions in Morocco itself, has se- 
cured equitable dealing as among the foreign powc rs who 
have commercial relations with Morocco, and has dimin- 
ished the chance of friction between these powers. In par- 
ticular it may not be out of place for me to say tha*. I hope 
and believe that the Conference has resulted and will result 
in rendering continually more friendly the relations be- 
tween the mighty empire of Germany and the mighty re- 
public of France ; for it is my hope and wish, as it must be 
the hope and wish of every sincere wellw^sher of human- 
kind, that these friendly relations may not only continue 
unbroken but may ever grow in strength." 

I have since received from Jusserand and Speck, both, 
the very cordial thanks of the French and German Govern- 
ments. McCormick (American Ambassador to France) 
has just sent a note running as follows: 

''I have the honor to inform you that the Minister for 
Foreign Affairs referred immediately on my entering his 
room, at his diplomatic reception on Wednesday, to the 
cablegram which he had sent to M. Jusserand instructing 
the latter to express the high appreciation of the French 
Government of the signal aid rendered by President Roose- 
velt in arriving at a just solution of the differences between 
France and Germany with reference to Morocco — 'Ni vain- 
queur ni vaincu.' " 

There, this is a hideously long communication! I shall 
send a copy of it both to Meyer and to White, and shall 
show it to Root, but to no one else. 



SECRET HISTORY OF ALGECIRAS CONFERENCE 503 

None of the documents are to be published in the Blue 
Book ; and I need hardly say that it is to be considered as 
of the most strictly confidential character. 

(Signed) Theodore Koosevelt. 

The Convention assembled at Algeciras, Spain, on Jan- 
uary 16, 1906, and a treaty was signed on April 6th, follow- 
ing. The American delegates were Henry White, then Am- 
bassador to Italy, and Mr. S. R. Gummere, Consul-General 
at Morocco. The President had requested Joseph H. 
Choate to be a delegate and he had accepted, but he later 
recalled his acceptance. The treaty was ratified by the 
U. S. Senate on December 12, 1906, with an additional 
protocol declining to assume any responsibility for the en- 
forcement of the provisions of the act. In his message to 
Congress, on December 3, 1906, the President gave this 
statement of the treaty's effect: 

**The Algeciras Convention, which was signed by the 
United States, as well as by most of the powers of Europe, 
supersedes the previous convention of 1880, which was 
also signed both by the United States and a majority of the 
European powers. This treaty confers upon us equal com- 
mercial rights with all European countries and does not 
entail a single obligation of any kind upon us, and I 
earnestly hope it may be speedily ratified. To refuse to 
ratify it would merely mean that we forfeited our commer- 
cial rights in Morocco and would not achieve another ob- 
ject of any kind. In the event of such refusal we would 
be left for the first time in a hundred and twenty years 
without any commercial treaty with Morocco; and this at 
a time when we are everywhere seeking new markets and 
outlets for trade." 

In recognition of Ambassador Jusserand's services in the 
affair President Roosevelt wrote to him on April 25, 1906 : 

My dear Mr. Ambassador: 

During the past year our relations have been those of 
peculiar intimacy in dealing with more than one problem. 



504 THEODORE ROOSEVELT AND HIS TIME 

and particularly in connection with the Morocco conference, 
and there are certain things which I think I ought to say 
to you. 

It is the simple and literal truth to say that in my judg- 
ment we owe it to you more than to any other one man that 
the year which has closed has not seen a war between 
France and Germany, which, had it begun, would probably 
have extended to take in a considerable portion of the world. 
In last May and June the relations between the two coun- 
tries were so strained that such a war was imminent. Prob- 
ably the only way it could have been avoided was by an in- 
ternational conference, and such a conference could only 
have been held on terms compatible with France's honor 
and dignity. You were the man most instrumental in hav- 
ing just this kind of conference arranged for. I came into 
the matter at all most unwillingly, and I could not have 
come into it at all if I had not possessed entire confidence 
alike in your unfailing soundness of judgment and in your 
high integrity of personal conduct. Thanks to the fact that 
these are the two dominant notes in your personality, my 
relationship with you has been such as I think has very, 
very rarely obtained between an ambassador at any time 
and the head of the government to which that ambassador 
was accredited ; and certainly no ambassador and head of 
a government could ever stand to one another on a footing 
at once more pleasant and more advantageous to their re- 
spective countries than has been the case with you and me. 
If, in these delicate Morocco negotiations I had not been 
able to treat you with the absolute frankness and confi- 
dence that I did, no good result could possibly have been 
obtained, and this frankness and confidence were rendered 
possible only because of the certainty that you would do and 
advise what was wisest to be done and advised, and that 
you would treat all that was said and done between us two 
as a gentleman of the highest honor treats what is said 
and done in the intimate personal relations of life. If you 
had been capable of adopting one line of conduct as a pri- 
vate individual and another as a public man, I should have 



SECRET HISTORY OP ALGECIRAS CONFERENCE 505 

been wholly unable to assume any such relations with you ; 
nor, on the other hand, however high your standard of 
honor, could I have assumed them had I not felt complete 
confidence in the soundness and quickness of your judg- 
ment. The service you rendered was primarily one to 
France, but it was also a service to the world at large ; and 
in rendering it you bore yourself as the ideal public ser- 
vant should bear himself ; for such a public servant should 
with trained intelligence know how to render the most ef- 
fective service to his own country while yet never devi- 
ating by so much as a hand's breadth from the code of 
mutual good faith and scrupulous regard for the rights 
of others, which should obtain between nations no less than 
between gentlemen. I do not suppose that you will ever 
gain any personal advantage, and perhaps not even any 
personal recognition, because of what you have done in the 
past year, but I desire that you should at least know my 
appreciation of it. 






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